
research by @Scott_Helme / @reporturi for more on #SoftwareSupplyChain attacks, follow @0xLupin

Official X account for the Bug Bounty Village @DEFCON. Founded by @infinitelogins and @arl_rose.

research by @Scott_Helme / @reporturi for more on #SoftwareSupplyChain attacks, follow @0xLupin

One software provider’s bug turned 178 major sites into malware dispensers. If your eng/security team can’t say what your Optimizely, Segment, or tag-manager scripts are allowed to do on your site… you’re in the 85%.
BREAKING: A cyberattack hit 178 major organizations, including Zoom, CNN, BBC, Fox News, HSBC, Ledger, Equifax, Salesforce, IKEA and Air France-KLM, by loading malware on the Optimizely Web platform, exposing visitors to scripts built to steal payment data and exploit iOS devices, per security firm Report URI. Banking and finance was the hardest-hit sector, with 32 organizations affected, including the UK's HSBC across multiple markets such as the US, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, Australia and the UAE.

The recording is finally out! 🎉 Here’s my talk from @defcon 34, presented at the @BugBountyDEFCON ! 🤖 AI Nightmare: Hacking at 0-Hour Once again, a huge thank you to the Bug Bounty Village team for the opportunity! 🎥 Watch the talk here: youtube.com/watch?v=0pJet2AA… #DEFCON #BugBounty

Inti De Ceukelaire (@securinti) made $50K in a few weekends with no Burp, no scanners, no dupes. His targets? AI support agents. 🤖 He turned an “out of scope” chatbot bug into paid reports, then had Claude pick up the phone for a zero-click account takeover. New video out now 👇 youtube.com/watch?v=v09tF8TT…

I found a critical unauthenticated account takeover that let me log in as any customer on the platform. No password, no account of my own. It earned a $5,000 bounty. Quick context: the platform runs unattended devices, and those devices sign in with no human present. So instead of a password, each account has an "auto login key." A device presents the key and gets a session. The key is the credential. That design is fine right up until a key leaks. The chain came down to 3 things: - Keys are the credential: by design, holding an account's auto login key gets you a session for that account, no password. - Wildcard injection: the lookup endpoints ran input through a SQL `LIKE` query, so a single `%` let me pull any account's key out of the database. - No rate limiting: I could iterate the whole customer table and lift every key. Here's how I chained them: 1. Leak accounts with a wildcard The lookup took a `key` and found it in the database with a `LIKE` query. So I sent: `GET /autologin/lookup?key=%` Instead of one record, it returned matching accounts: user IDs, tenant IDs, emails. A single `%` dumped account rows. 2. Pull a victim's real key A second endpoint resolved a key to an account. Same flaw. I sent a wildcard plus an ID I'd just leaked: `POST /autologin/resolve?key=%` `{"user_id": {victim-id}, "tenant_id": {tenant-id}}` It handed back that victim's actual auto login key. 3. Trade the leaked key for a session The device endpoint does exactly what it's built to do: present a valid auto login key for an account, get a session token for that account. The catch is the key was the victim's, leaked in the steps above, and should never have been in my hands. `POST /autologin/devices` `{"user_id": {victim-id}, "key": "{victim-key}", ...}` It registered my device under the victim's account and returned a fresh session token for them. 4. Full takeover `GET /me` with that token returned the victim's full profile. PII, billing identifiers, all of it. No authentication, no account of my own, and no notification to the victim that a new device had appeared. The wildcard enumerated the entire customer table, there was no rate limiting, so this worked against every account on the platform at scale. #BugBounty tip: Any endpoint that takes a secret and looks it up is a candidate for wildcard injection. If `%` returns more than it should, it's a `LIKE` query and you can enumerate the table.

5 rival platforms on the future. At #DEFCON34, industry leaders got candid about AI’s impact on bug bounty and how companies and hackers can stay ahead. Watch now 👇 youtu.be/66ORKwwJoHo

10K X followers whaaaaaaat? Only one way to celebrate... With an EPIC GIVEAWAY! Follow us, re-tweet, like this post, and tag a hacker friend in the comments to be in with a chance of winning ONE of the following: 1 x @hackthebox_eu Annual VIP+ Subscription (1 of) 3 x @CaidoIO 1 year licences (1 of) 4 x @PentesterLab 6 months licenses Giveaway ends on November 12th @ 9pm UTC - winners announced after! GOOD LUCK! #BugBountyVillage #Giveaway #HackTheBox #Caido #PentesterLab

A $10K paywall. A hacker who hired an employee just to get past it. A 20x+ return. 🤯 @humor4fun and @codingo_ share the wildest stories from 10 years of bug bounty, and what they reveal about where it’s headed. New video out now 👇 youtube.com/watch?v=6jf1OTYh… #BugBounty #DEFCON

This is the first blog post I’ve written since joining @Xbow. This post covers a particularly interesting RCE found by XBOW in an EAC application, including the reasoning and validation process that led to the finding. Please check it out and let me know your thoughts!
Read the full details here: xbow.com/labs/research/how-x…


I stumbled across a simple IDOR yesterday after ordering something online. Here's how I found it: After placing my order, I noticed the receipt URL contained two parameters: `/order/receipt?orderId=12345&codeId={uuid}` Opening this URL returned the full order details, including the shipping address and payment method. Removing the `codeId` parameter returned an "invalid code" error. Since the `codeId` was a UUID, it wasn't something I could simply increment. But I wondered what would happen if I kept my valid UUID and changed the order ID. My order: `/order/receipt?orderId=12345&codeId={my-uuid}` Another order: `/order/receipt?orderId=12346&codeId={my-uuid}` No luck. The request was rejected. Then I had another thought. What if the backend wasn't validating the UUID properly? What if it accepted the order ID itself as the `codeId`? So I tried: `/order/receipt?orderId=12345&codeId=12345` It worked. My full order details were returned, even though I hadn't supplied the UUID. Now for the interesting part. I incremented both parameters: `/order/receipt?orderId=12346&codeId=12346` And there it was. Another customer's order details, shipping address, and payment method information. Because order IDs were sequential, this exposed thousands of customer records. #BugBounty Tip: Don't assume an endpoint is secure just because it uses UUIDs. When multiple parameters are involved, test how they're validated together, not just individually. A UUID is not an authorization check.

inb4 a good ol’ fashioned XSS hackerone.com/anthropic
anthropic made claude code 3x faster using gzip. a compression tool from 1992.

🚨 First public disclosure: @ClovisMint walked into his first live hacking event and walked out with a $90K Meta account takeover. AI agents are old web bugs in a new skin. Full breakdown with @NahamSec 👇 youtu.be/WkCe5VTf1MA

One 6-hour run. One hackbot. 4 confirmed criticals. 17 confirmed highs. @jhaddix breaks down how Arcanum built Armada - their in-house hackbot running on Claude Code - and every failure it took to get there. Full talk is up. youtu.be/cRKToFkZMvk

Web apps protect their cookies from XSS with `HttpOnly`. But ESI markup runs server-side, so an attacker can read those cookies anyway. The lesson? Obscure tech = completely new attack surface. Read those docs. Full talk: youtu.be/Df42-CfJF8k

At DEF CON 33, @PayPal hall of fame hacker @nytr0gen_ recalls stealing cookies from a web app behind an Akamai CDN. The app ran attacker-controlled input inside JSON responses. But the input type? Edge Side Includes, a markup language from 2004. #throwBackThursday