My press comments published by @BBCWorld's @FrankRGardner: But Mohammed al-Basha, the Yemeni-American founder of the US-based risk advisory firm Basha Report, believes the Houthis would struggle to capture the heavily fortified city of Aden.
"Any attempt to seize a densely populated city like Aden would come at a significant human cost," Basha said. "Advancing across the flat coastal plains would also expose Houthi forces to air power."
"For now, the Houthis appear to be seeking a negotiated surrender, hoping to exploit infighting and divisions among southern factions to achieve their objectives without a costly urban offensive."
It is conceivable that the Yemen war will settle into a less dramatic but deeply unsatisfactory stasis - a situation where casualty figures subside yet the country remains split between areas controlled by the Houthis - Iran's Shia allies - and the disparate and often poorly motivated forces of the Saudi-backed Yemeni army. bbc.com/news/articles/cmy97q…
#التحقق_من_الحقائق | حسابات مناهضة للحكومة والتحالف تروّج لمزاعم مضللة عن هجمات حوثية في شبوة | على غرار ما رصدناه سابقاً في #تعز، تنشط مجموعة من الحسابات على منصة إكس تستخدم أسماء عائلات ومناطق يمنية مرتبطة بمحافظة مأرب، وتنشر مزاعم ميدانية غير موثقة مصحوبة بخطاب مناهض للحكومة اليمنية والتحالف، يبدو أنه يستهدف إضعاف معنويات أفراد الجيش والمقاومة والقوات الجنوبية.
رصدنا خمسة حسابات، هي @hnd38093 و@nayif_bin_hamd و@AlsybanyQa71830 و@MahmoudAlAnsi و@Sou_Arab_News، نشرت خلال فترة زمنية متقاربة روايات مختلفة في صياغتها لكنها متشابهة في مضمونها.
تزعم المنشورات أن الحوثيين أطلقوا أكثر من ستة صواريخ على معسكرات وتجمعات عسكرية في مديريتي بيحان ومرخة السفلى بمحافظة شبوة، بينها مواقع تابعة لقوات العمالقة. وادعت بعض الحسابات مقتل خمسة من القيادات الجنوبية، بينما حمّلت حسابات أخرى القيادات العسكرية مسؤولية الزج بالجنود في معارك تخدم صراعات النفوذ والمصالح السياسية.
المقطع المصور المستخدم للترويج لهذه المزاعم متداول على الإنترنت منذ أشهر، وسبق نشره على أنه يوثق أحداثاً في سوريا وإيران. وبالتالي، فهو ليس تصويراً حديثاً من محافظة شبوة، ولا يصلح دليلاً على وقوع الهجمات أو الخسائر البشرية المزعومة.
ورغم اختلاف صياغة المنشورات، فإنها تروّج لرواية واحدة عن تعرض القوات الحكومية والقوات المدعومة من التحالف لخسائر كبيرة. ويثير تقارب توقيت النشر وتشابه الادعاءات وإعادة استخدام مقطع قديم تساؤلات بشأن احتمال وجود حملة تضليل منسقة تستهدف معنويات المقاتلين وثقتهم بقياداتهم في كل من شبوة ومأرب.
instagram.com/reel/DZY3dJdos…
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas @araghchi's aircraft departed Muscat, Oman, yesterday, November 17. Araghchi described his visit as highly productive, confirming meetings with Oman's Foreign Minister @FMofOman@badralbusaidi and Sultan Haitham bin Tariq. He said discussions covered bilateral relations, regional developments, what he described as U.S. aggression, and efforts to prevent renewed hostilities. Araghchi called for Oman to continue its diplomatic mediation role and said both sides held constructive discussions on establishing a new, independent regional security framework. He argued that regional security should be maintained by countries within the region without foreign intervention.
NEW -- Saudi Arabia is preparing for war against Yemen's Houthis to stretch well into next year, doubling down despite setbacks on the battlefield in Yemen and attacks disrupting life at home, said two Western officials briefed by Saudis on the plans.
- Saudi officials have briefed that the campaign could stretch for up to six months, aiming to see gains on the ground by the kingdom's Yemeni allies before any negotiations with the Houthis.
- Riyadh believes US offensive support for Saudi operations in Yemen, so far not forthcoming, could change the course of the war, as could broader Iran war developments.
- Saudi Arabia has cleared the calendar of all major global events it was set to host, postponing them till autmun/winter 2027 to give time.
- Public messaging around the war has also slowly shifted, with a bit more acknowledgement of impacts, including a visit by a senior official to the site of a Riyadh attack last week.
- Conflict with the Houthis took up the entire sermon at one of Riyadh's bigger mosques on Friday last week, with the imam promising fighters "victory or martyrdom" and offering prayers for Saudi soldiers at the kingdom's southern border.
The preacher said: "Oh Allah, guide their aim and steady their feet, and grant them victory over those who show them hostility."
#التحقق_من_الحقائق | حسابات مناهضة للحكومة والتحالف تروّج لمزاعم مضللة عن هجمات حوثية في شبوة | على غرار ما رصدناه سابقاً في #تعز، تنشط مجموعة من الحسابات على منصة إكس تستخدم أسماء عائلات ومناطق يمنية مرتبطة بمحافظة مأرب، وتنشر مزاعم ميدانية غير موثقة مصحوبة بخطاب مناهض للحكومة اليمنية والتحالف، يبدو أنه يستهدف إضعاف معنويات أفراد الجيش والمقاومة والقوات الجنوبية.
رصدنا خمسة حسابات، هي @hnd38093 و@nayif_bin_hamd و@AlsybanyQa71830 و@MahmoudAlAnsi و@Sou_Arab_News، نشرت خلال فترة زمنية متقاربة روايات مختلفة في صياغتها لكنها متشابهة في مضمونها.
تزعم المنشورات أن الحوثيين أطلقوا أكثر من ستة صواريخ على معسكرات وتجمعات عسكرية في مديريتي بيحان ومرخة السفلى بمحافظة شبوة، بينها مواقع تابعة لقوات العمالقة. وادعت بعض الحسابات مقتل خمسة من القيادات الجنوبية، بينما حمّلت حسابات أخرى القيادات العسكرية مسؤولية الزج بالجنود في معارك تخدم صراعات النفوذ والمصالح السياسية.
المقطع المصور المستخدم للترويج لهذه المزاعم متداول على الإنترنت منذ أشهر، وسبق نشره على أنه يوثق أحداثاً في سوريا وإيران. وبالتالي، فهو ليس تصويراً حديثاً من محافظة شبوة، ولا يصلح دليلاً على وقوع الهجمات أو الخسائر البشرية المزعومة.
ورغم اختلاف صياغة المنشورات، فإنها تروّج لرواية واحدة عن تعرض القوات الحكومية والقوات المدعومة من التحالف لخسائر كبيرة. ويثير تقارب توقيت النشر وتشابه الادعاءات وإعادة استخدام مقطع قديم تساؤلات بشأن احتمال وجود حملة تضليل منسقة تستهدف معنويات المقاتلين وثقتهم بقياداتهم في كل من شبوة ومأرب.
instagram.com/reel/DZY3dJdos…
#FACTCHECK | Anti-Government and Anti-Coalition Accounts Spread Misleading Houthi Strike Claims in Shabwah
Similar to what we previously observed in Taiz, a group of @X accounts using Yemeni tribal surnames and geographic references associated with Marib is circulating unverified battlefield claims accompanied by anti-government and anti-coalition messaging.
Five accounts, @hnd38093, @nayif_bin_hamd, @AlsybanyQa71830, @MahmoudAlAnsi, and @Sou_Arab_News, published different versions of the same narrative within a similar timeframe.
The posts allege that the Houthis launched more than six missiles against military camps and troop concentrations in Bayhan and Markhah al-Sufla districts of Shabwah, including Southern Giants Brigades positions. Some claim that five southern commanders were killed, while others accuse southern military leaders of sacrificing soldiers for political interests.
The video used to support these claims has been circulating online for months, previously appearing in posts claiming to show incidents in Syria and Iran. It is not new footage from Shabwah and provides no evidence of the alleged Houthi strikes or casualties.
Although the wording differs, the accounts promote the same narrative of heavy government and coalition-backed military losses. The timing, overlapping claims, and reuse of old footage raise concerns about possible coordinated disinformation intended to undermine morale among Yemeni government forces and southern fighters.
Original video: instagram.com/reel/DZY3dJdos…
#FACTCHECK | Anti-Government and Anti-Coalition Accounts Spread Misleading Houthi Strike Claims in Shabwah
Similar to what we previously observed in Taiz, a group of @X accounts using Yemeni tribal surnames and geographic references associated with Marib is circulating unverified battlefield claims accompanied by anti-government and anti-coalition messaging.
Five accounts, @hnd38093, @nayif_bin_hamd, @AlsybanyQa71830, @MahmoudAlAnsi, and @Sou_Arab_News, published different versions of the same narrative within a similar timeframe.
The posts allege that the Houthis launched more than six missiles against military camps and troop concentrations in Bayhan and Markhah al-Sufla districts of Shabwah, including Southern Giants Brigades positions. Some claim that five southern commanders were killed, while others accuse southern military leaders of sacrificing soldiers for political interests.
The video used to support these claims has been circulating online for months, previously appearing in posts claiming to show incidents in Syria and Iran. It is not new footage from Shabwah and provides no evidence of the alleged Houthi strikes or casualties.
Although the wording differs, the accounts promote the same narrative of heavy government and coalition-backed military losses. The timing, overlapping claims, and reuse of old footage raise concerns about possible coordinated disinformation intended to undermine morale among Yemeni government forces and southern fighters.
Original video: instagram.com/reel/DZY3dJdos…
Today, the Houthis reportedly blew up the home of Mazen al-Jaradi, a.k.a. Abu Assaf, a local poet turned tribal popular resistance fighter and staunch anti-Houthi opponent, in the Sabir area south of Taiz city. In a practice the Houthis have carried out for nearly two decades, they filmed themselves demolishing the house before chanting their familiar slogan, “Death to America, Death to Israel.” The footage is now going viral.
For months, Houthi leaders and loyalists have circulated videos and statements claiming that Abdul-Malik al-Houthi had prohibited the demolition of opponents’ homes, reportedly recognizing that the practice fuels armed resistance against the movement.
Blowing up an opponent’s home is not simply an act of destruction. It is a form of collective punishment intended to uproot an adversary from his community, prevent his return, and send a warning to others that resisting Houthi rule could cost them not only their lives but also their homes and their families’ future.
Abu Assaf has appeared in dozens of videos vowing to continue fighting the Houthis until victory or death. The reported destruction of his home sends a message far beyond his family.
It also exposes the contradiction between the Houthis’ actions and repeated claims by their leaders and loyalists that the movement has changed, abandoned its past practices, and seeks to build a state based on justice, equality, and reconciliation.
This is one of the reasons defenders of Taiz city are fighting tooth and nail to prevent a Houthi takeover. For many of them, surrender does not necessarily mean peace or reconciliation. It could mean arbitrary detention, permanent displacement, the destruction of their homes, and the uprooting of their families from communities they have lived in for generations.
The footage is another reminder of why Houthi promises of a new chapter are met with deep distrust by those who have resisted them for years. For these fighters, the war is not simply about holding territory. It is about whether they and their families will ever be able to live safely in their own homes under Houthi rule.
War in #Yemen#SITREP | 17 November 2026 | Hundreds of Coordinated Ground and Air Strikes Across Yemen |
Saudi-led coalition and internationally recognized Yemeni government forces reported conducting hundreds of coordinated ground and air strikes against Houthi positions across multiple fronts, including Marib, al-Jawf, Taiz, and Lahj. The @YemenAFMedia reported 24 manned airstrikes, 46 drone strikes, 39 rocket artillery engagements, and 551 field artillery fire missions. The operations come as government forces attempt to stabilize defensive positions following recent territorial setbacks in western Lahj and the southern Red Sea corridor, while maintaining military pressure on the Houthis across several active fronts.
Yemen's army released footage showing combat aircraft targeting Houthi troop concentrations, military equipment, and positions along the southern Marib front. Separately, the media office of the 22nd Infantry Brigade @22nd_Brigade published new combat footage from northern Marib, including images it identified as Houthi fatalities.
Maj. Gen. Haikal Hantaf, commander of Yemen's Sixth Military Region Command (MRC), reported that government forces had repelled a major Houthi offensive following more than 12 hours of fighting across two axes extending from northern Marib toward southeastern al-Jawf. According to Hantaf, Houthi forces had reinforced their positions with additional infantry and other combat units before launching the attacks.
Hantaf claimed that government forces inflicted a major defeat on the attacking Houthi formations, leaving several fighters dead on the battlefield and others wounded. He stated that wounded Houthi personnel had been evacuated to hospitals inside Marib city.
More significantly, Hantaf indicated that government forces could transition from defensive operations to counteroffensives along multiple axes. He described the latest Houthi setbacks as a potential turning point that could allow government forces to regain the initiative and pursue the objectives of Operation Dawn of Yemen #ODY, as directed by @PresidentRashad.
His remarks suggest that the Sixth MRC is considering exploiting recent defensive successes to launch coordinated counterattacks in northern Marib and southeastern al-Jawf.
Southern Giants Forces @SouthArmed@alamalikah spokesperson Aseel al-Saqaldi @aselsaqladi reported that coalition combat aircraft struck large Houthi troop concentrations and military convoys in Ras al-Arah, western Lahj, claiming substantial casualties and equipment losses. He also released footage showing a Southern Giants sniper engaging Houthi fighters allegedly attempting to infiltrate a defensive position.
Fighting continued along the southern and eastern approaches to Taiz city. The @axistaiz reported that government artillery destroyed a Houthi vehicle-mounted 23 mm antiaircraft gun at Jabal Warqah in al-Aqrud, al-Misrakh district, south of Taiz.
Government forces and local resistance fighters also reported repelling Houthi elements along the al-Shaqab front, releasing footage purportedly showing Houthi fighters retreating during the engagement.
Coalition combat aircraft reportedly conducted several strikes against Houthi positions in Dhi al-Barih and Anbiyan in al-Misrakh district, south of Taiz, followed by two additional strikes against positions in al-Hawban, east of the city.
As Saudi commentators increasingly criticize Russia’s public support for the Houthis, Russian state-backed outlets @RT_com@RTarabic are amplifying the group’s battlefield messaging. In a November 16 post about Bab al-Mandab, RT described abandoned vehicles as a “graveyard” of “American armored vehicles” left after “devastating Houthi strikes.” It also used the group’s preferred name, “Ansarallah,” when claiming it had “reclaimed key positions” overlooking the strait. In another post, RT highlighted Houthi fighters scaling “mountains in flip-flops” before launching a “point-blank assault” on Saudi-backed forces. This language portrays Houthi fighters as resourceful and effective while framing their opponents’ withdrawal as a decisive defeat.
How are the Saudis viewing recent developments in Yemen and the wider regional conflict? Part II
Securing Bab al-Mandab, global trade and energy supply chains is an international responsibility, Saudi journalist and social media commentator @halgawi argued in a video addressing recent setbacks in Yemen. He accused unnamed countries of paying the Houthis to protect their ships while expecting Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces to secure the waterway alone. “That is no longer acceptable,” he said.
The commentator, who has more than one million followers on @X, acknowledged Saudi and Yemeni frustration over the withdrawal of @SouthArmed@diralwatan from Bab al-Mandab and Dhubab toward Aden and Lahj. “Everyone has the right to be upset, to ask questions and to express frustration,” he said. His response framed the withdrawal within a longer conflict and challenged expectations that Riyadh and its Yemeni partners should bear the burden of protecting international shipping.
He described Yemen as “a land of shifting sands” where endurance matters and the war cannot be judged by one battle or announcement. Al-gawi suggested that Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized Yemeni government possess information unavailable to outside observers. He also praised @alamalikah and @AbuZar3a for their sacrifices, urging followers to remain patient. “Operation Dawn of #Yemen" continues, and the promise is Sana’a,” he said.
In a separate November 15 post, he extended his criticism to Russia and China, arguing that the Houthis benefit from diplomatic protection beyond Iranian support. He alleged that both countries had weakened proposed Security Council measures against the group.
He claimed Russia opposed language describing the Houthis as a terrorist group and efforts to expand maritime inspections of suspected arms shipments. Al-gawi said China resisted additional restrictions on missile and drone components and provisions concerning chemical precursors. He also alleged that Russia, China and three African countries opposed a passage addressing Houthi ties with Somalia’s al-Shabaab.
“Do not reduce the picture to the Houthis alone,” he wrote, arguing that international interests and political bargaining also shape the war. Al-gawi suggested that some outside powers may want to preserve the Houthis as a bargaining tool rather than secure their outright victory.
His message asks Saudi audiences to view recent setbacks through that wider international context, remain patient and trust the leadership’s calculations. It also reinforces the argument that responsibility for southern Red Sea security must extend beyond Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
x.com/halgawi/status/2122106…
How are the Saudis viewing recent developments in Yemen and the wider regional conflict?
In his latest post, former @AlArabiya and @aawsat_News chief, influential Saudi commentator Abdulrahman Al-Rashed @aalrashed acknowledges that southern government forces have withdrawn from Bab al-Mandab toward Aden, a move he says “ends nearly six weeks of attempts to recapture the coastline.” He also notes that government forces are “building fortifications around the temporary capital,” suggesting that defending Aden against a potential Houthi offensive has become the immediate priority. He highlights competing claims over control of al-Mudaribah and Ras al-Arah, where southern forces maintain that they remain in control while the Houthis claim to have captured the area.
Al-Rashed then turns to al-Jawf, where he reports that government forces are making “relative progress” and have captured strategic heights east of al-Hazm with Saudi-led coalition air support. He emphasizes that these positions constituted the Houthis’ “first line of defense” and that government forces breached fortifications, trenches, and minefields built over several years.
On Saudi Arabia, Al-Rashed highlights the coalition's announcement that it intercepted seven drones over Mecca, Medina, and the Eastern Province, along with two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh. He specifically notes that Riyadh airport continues to receive flights despite the attacks. He also emphasizes that Saudi Arabia continues to export approximately four million barrels of oil per day through the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu, despite Houthi claims of attempts to strike two pumping stations.
In contrast, Al-Rashed describes Iran as facing growing difficulties exporting its oil. Citing United Against Nuclear Iran, he reports that at least 57 tankers carrying Iranian crude, petroleum products, and liquefied gas remain near Iran's coastline and are unable to sell their cargoes. He also cites Kpler estimates that approximately 43 million barrels of Iranian crude and condensates are stranded within the area affected by the American blockade.
On American military involvement, Al-Rashed highlights the reported arrival of USS Theodore Roosevelt in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, bringing the number of American aircraft carriers in the region to three. He argues that this deployment “strengthens the possibility of war,” despite President Trump's statements that American operations would remain limited to a blockade of Iranian ports and border crossings.
Citing Kpler, he says China purchased at least 80 million barrels of additional Saudi crude for September through November deliveries, while Chinese government data showed inventories increasing by approximately 15.3 million barrels in October. He also notes that Saudi Arabia has approximately 13.5 million barrels stored in Japan and South Korea, reflecting efforts to position oil supplies closer to Asian consumers and reduce dependence on Gulf shipping routes.
In contrast, Al-Rashed describes Iran as facing growing difficulties exporting its oil. Citing United Against Nuclear Iran, he reports that at least 57 tankers carrying Iranian crude, petroleum products, and liquefied gas remain near Iran's coastline and are unable to sell their cargoes. He also cites Kpler estimates that approximately 43 million barrels of Iranian crude and condensates are stranded within the area affected by the American blockade.
Bahrain Faces Renewed Iranian Threats Following Conviction of IRGC-Linked Terrorist Network
Hours after Iran openly threatened Bahrain's ruling Al Khalifa family, Bahrain's Ministry of Interior @moi_bahrain issued another public security alert, urging citizens and residents to remain calm, seek shelter in the nearest safe location, and follow official instructions. This was the second security alert in 16 hours and the fourth since November 14.
The apparent trigger for Tehran's latest threats was a November 16 ruling by Bahrain's High Criminal Court, which convicted members of an alleged IRGC-linked terrorist network accused of plotting to overthrow the Bahraini government, suspend the Constitution, and establish a political system subordinate to Iran's Supreme Leader under the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.
According to Bahrain's Public Prosecution, the defendants, including individuals in custody and others at large, received sentences ranging from 15 years to life imprisonment. The court also imposed fines of BHD 100,000 on some defendants and ordered the confiscation of more than BHD 8 million for charitable purposes.
Bahraini prosecutors alleged that members of the network maintained direct communications with the IRGC and Iranian intelligence, received instructions from Iranian operatives, and collected funds to finance activities aimed at destabilizing the kingdom. The investigation also identified approximately BHD 935,000 in seized funds, alongside documents, electronic devices, and recorded religious sermons allegedly used to promote political allegiance to Tehran, encourage unrest, and undermine Bahrain's constitutional order.
The prosecution further accused the network of exploiting religious institutions, charitable organizations, and educational establishments to spread the ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih, intimidate opponents, and promote loyalty to Iran over Bahrain. Authorities linked the defendants to the previously dissolved Ulema Council.
Less than 24 hours after the court ruling, an IRGC spokesperson issued an explicit warning against Bahrain's ruling family. In remarks carried by Iran's @TasnimNews1 on Tuesday, November 17, the spokesperson accused Bahrain of three offenses, cooperating in military aggression against Iran, relying on American security guarantees, and violating the sanctity of the Shiite religious establishment.
Notably, the Iranian official avoided referring to Bahrain by its official name, instead repeatedly using the politically derogatory designation "Al Khalifa regime." He warned that continuing these policies would place the ruling family's survival under the region's emerging security order in doubt, concluding with the phrase, "A word to the wise is sufficient."
The reference to the Shiite religious establishment appears particularly relevant to the previous day's convictions, given the Bahraini authorities' allegations that the network exploited religious institutions and promoted allegiance to Iran's Supreme Leader. The timing suggests that the court ruling may have contributed to Tehran's latest threat, although a direct causal connection has not been established.
The political threats come amid repeated Iranian aerial attacks against Bahrain. On November 17, the Bahrain Defence Force @BDF_Bahrain announced that its air defense systems had intercepted and destroyed several Iranian aerial threats before they reached their intended targets. Two days earlier, on November 15, Bahrain's military had accused Iran of continuing a systematic campaign of aggression against the kingdom.
The latest developments also follow reported Iranian drone strikes against a U.S. @CENTCOM radar installation in Bahrain, part of a series of attacks targeting American military facilities in the kingdom. The United States reportedly retaliated against Iranian positions along a major shipping corridor.
Separately, Bahrain's Coast Guard announced a live-ammunition exercise around Fasht Al Jarim on November 17, between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m., warning maritime traffic to avoid the designated area. Despite the repeated security alerts and reported interceptions, Bahrain International Airport appears to remain operational at the time of writing.
#Iraq#Update: “We are on the verge of a crisis, a major crisis,” Kataib Hezbollah official Abu Talib al-Saidi warned during a press conference inside Jurf al-Sakhar, a.k.a. Jurf al-Nasr, on Tuesday, November 17. The group used the event to challenge the government’s oil-smuggling allegations and signal that it would avoid fighting Iraqi security forces. Al-Saidi accused unnamed political actors of seeking bloodshed and described the current prime minister’s approach as a political “adventure.”
Al-Saidi invoked the “shared blood” of Kataib Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, Federal Police, Counter Terrorism Service and Iraqi Army during the battles against ISIS twelve years ago. He recalled fighters’ remains becoming indistinguishable after suicide bombings and said efforts to push these forces into fighting one another would be thwarted by “the wisdom of reasonable people.”
Addressing the government committee’s visit, al-Saidi said its members had been welcomed and offered lunch. “We held no ill will toward them. We did not know that they intended, unfortunately, to falsify the facts,” he said. He rejected government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi’s account of a provocation during the visit. “We did not restrict the committee,” he said, adding that journalists could inspect every location the investigators had visited.
Standing near a rudimentary processing facility, al-Saidi disputed its alleged connection to oil smuggling. He claimed it was approximately five kilometers from the three pipelines allegedly punctured to extract fuel and had been abandoned for months. He described it as an emergency facility used to process purchased heavy fuel oil, known locally as “black oil,” into what he called “gas” for generators and vehicles.
“Certainly, this is a political issue. It is not a technical issue,” al-Saidi said. He argued that successive governments had failed to provide enough fuel for the group’s extensive operational sector, requiring it to buy supplies with its own funds.
Al-Saidi also portrayed Kataib Hezbollah as a fighting organization that had stayed outside government appointments, claiming it held no ministerial, deputy ministerial or municipal leadership posts. He recounted its opposition to Saddam Hussein, foreign occupation forces, al-Qaeda and ISIS. Al-Saidi closed by urging the assembled journalists to report what they saw and help calm public tensions.
#Iraq#SITREP | Iraq’s government is moving to assert control over Jurf al-Sakhar, also known as Jurf al-Nasr, in Babil Governorate, following an investigation into alleged oil smuggling. The dispute is becoming a test of Baghdad’s authority over Kataib Hezbollah, which controls the area. Government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi said Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi ordered the armed forces to enter and set a deadline for the group to withdraw. A senior Iraqi official said that the deadline expires Friday.
On Tuesday, al-Aboudi said the government had prepared a plan to remove any party involved in exploiting the area’s oil resources. He said Interior Ministry surveillance cameras corroborated intelligence on smuggling and that further findings would be announced soon. A judicial committee, accompanied by a government committee, also visited Jurf al-Nasr to inspect suspected sites and establish the circumstances of the case.
The government has already announced measures against officials accused of failing to prevent the alleged smuggling. Following an emergency security meeting Saturday, al-Zaidi ordered suspects referred to the judiciary and removed nine security and administrative officials. They included Babil’s police chief, senior security and intelligence officials, the commander of the Sixth Energy Police Brigade, and the director of the Oil Pipelines Company. Subsequent military and security meetings focused on executing arrest warrants, strengthening checkpoints, and protecting oil infrastructure. Federal Police commander Mohammed Qasim al-Fahd also inspected the 16th Federal Police Brigade in Jurf al-Nasr.
Iranian media coverage is adding a political dimension to the dispute. Tasnim carried comments from State of Law Coalition media director Hisham al-Rikabi calling for dialogue, rejecting oil smuggling, and warning against an armed confrontation. His statement that “both sides are our brothers” reflects concern that the government’s planned entry could lead to fighting.
Tasnim also carried a competing account from Supreme Islamic Council political bureau member Furat al-Sharaa, who claimed that a government committee left the area without confirming oil smuggling. He questioned aspects of the investigation and linked the dispute to efforts to bring weapons under state control. His account conflicts with the government’s assertion that surveillance footage supported the intelligence findings.
The immediate issue is whether Kataib Hezbollah complies with the withdrawal deadline and allows government forces to enter. Baghdad is presenting the operation as an effort to protect public resources and enforce the law. Statements carried by Iranian media increasingly frame it as a sensitive dispute requiring negotiation to prevent bloodshed.
#Iraq#SITREP | Iraq’s government is moving to assert control over Jurf al-Sakhar, also known as Jurf al-Nasr, in Babil Governorate, following an investigation into alleged oil smuggling. The dispute is becoming a test of Baghdad’s authority over Kataib Hezbollah, which controls the area. Government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi said Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi ordered the armed forces to enter and set a deadline for the group to withdraw. A senior Iraqi official said that the deadline expires Friday.
On Tuesday, al-Aboudi said the government had prepared a plan to remove any party involved in exploiting the area’s oil resources. He said Interior Ministry surveillance cameras corroborated intelligence on smuggling and that further findings would be announced soon. A judicial committee, accompanied by a government committee, also visited Jurf al-Nasr to inspect suspected sites and establish the circumstances of the case.
The government has already announced measures against officials accused of failing to prevent the alleged smuggling. Following an emergency security meeting Saturday, al-Zaidi ordered suspects referred to the judiciary and removed nine security and administrative officials. They included Babil’s police chief, senior security and intelligence officials, the commander of the Sixth Energy Police Brigade, and the director of the Oil Pipelines Company. Subsequent military and security meetings focused on executing arrest warrants, strengthening checkpoints, and protecting oil infrastructure. Federal Police commander Mohammed Qasim al-Fahd also inspected the 16th Federal Police Brigade in Jurf al-Nasr.
Iranian media coverage is adding a political dimension to the dispute. Tasnim carried comments from State of Law Coalition media director Hisham al-Rikabi calling for dialogue, rejecting oil smuggling, and warning against an armed confrontation. His statement that “both sides are our brothers” reflects concern that the government’s planned entry could lead to fighting.
Tasnim also carried a competing account from Supreme Islamic Council political bureau member Furat al-Sharaa, who claimed that a government committee left the area without confirming oil smuggling. He questioned aspects of the investigation and linked the dispute to efforts to bring weapons under state control. His account conflicts with the government’s assertion that surveillance footage supported the intelligence findings.
The immediate issue is whether Kataib Hezbollah complies with the withdrawal deadline and allows government forces to enter. Baghdad is presenting the operation as an effort to protect public resources and enforce the law. Statements carried by Iranian media increasingly frame it as a sensitive dispute requiring negotiation to prevent bloodshed.
#Iraq#SITREP | A leaked 19-page Iraqi intelligence report prepared by the Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency documents suspected oil theft, illegal refining, underground storage facilities, and petroleum smuggling networks operating in Jurf al-Sakhar, also known as Jurf al-Nasr, in Iraq’s Babil Governorate.
The area is widely associated with the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia. The intelligence findings suggest that petroleum infrastructure has been illegally accessed and that organized tanker movements have supported the suspected operation over several years. Satellite imagery and geospatial analysis indicate that some facilities remained active into 2026. However, the available evidence does not independently establish the identities of those directing the operations or the total financial proceeds.
The investigation identifies at least six locations associated with suspected petroleum theft, storage, refining, and transportation activities. One suspected pipeline breach was identified near Bahbahani junction at MGRS coordinate 38SMB2883828797, with indications of activity during 2025 and 2026. Another possible breach was identified at 38SMB2914528645. At 38SMB2957629508, analysts documented excavations, oil staining, and tanker movements dating back to 2021.
A separate location at 38SMB2415132129 was assessed as a possible underground petroleum storage and small-scale refining facility. Newly constructed petroleum-related infrastructure and tanker activity were also identified at 38SMB2407931433. The report’s use of satellite imagery and multiple observation periods suggests a sustained operation rather than isolated incidents of fuel diversion.
The intelligence assessment also documents tanker movements at suspected smuggling sites. At one location, analysts identified 21 tankers in imagery from 2022. Some vehicles were assessed to have capacities of approximately 36,000 liters. The report suggests that nighttime loading and transportation could conceal additional activity not captured in daytime satellite imagery. Although these observations support the possibility of organized petroleum transportation, the available reporting does not establish how many tankers were carrying illegally obtained fuel or the total volume transported.
The report identifies three possible transportation corridors connecting Jurf al-Sakhar with Baghdad and surrounding areas. These routes reportedly pass through Musayyib, Amiriyat al-Fallujah, Habbaniyah, Fallujah, and Abu Ghraib. The geographic distribution of the suspected facilities and transportation corridors suggests that the operation could involve multiple collection, storage, and distribution points.
Jurf al-Sakhar occupies a sensitive position south of Baghdad and has remained under the influence of Kataib Hezbollah and associated armed formations for years. The area’s restricted access and limited civilian oversight complicate independent verification of activities inside the district. The reported presence of suspected illegal petroleum infrastructure raises questions about whether armed groups operating in the area have benefited financially from unauthorized access to Iraq’s energy resources. Nevertheless, the published intelligence findings do not conclusively demonstrate that Kataib Hezbollah’s leadership organized, financed, or directly profited from the alleged smuggling network.
How are the Saudis viewing recent developments in Yemen and the wider regional conflict?
In his latest post, former @AlArabiya and @aawsat_News chief, influential Saudi commentator Abdulrahman Al-Rashed @aalrashed acknowledges that southern government forces have withdrawn from Bab al-Mandab toward Aden, a move he says “ends nearly six weeks of attempts to recapture the coastline.” He also notes that government forces are “building fortifications around the temporary capital,” suggesting that defending Aden against a potential Houthi offensive has become the immediate priority. He highlights competing claims over control of al-Mudaribah and Ras al-Arah, where southern forces maintain that they remain in control while the Houthis claim to have captured the area.
Al-Rashed then turns to al-Jawf, where he reports that government forces are making “relative progress” and have captured strategic heights east of al-Hazm with Saudi-led coalition air support. He emphasizes that these positions constituted the Houthis’ “first line of defense” and that government forces breached fortifications, trenches, and minefields built over several years.
On Saudi Arabia, Al-Rashed highlights the coalition's announcement that it intercepted seven drones over Mecca, Medina, and the Eastern Province, along with two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh. He specifically notes that Riyadh airport continues to receive flights despite the attacks. He also emphasizes that Saudi Arabia continues to export approximately four million barrels of oil per day through the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu, despite Houthi claims of attempts to strike two pumping stations.
In contrast, Al-Rashed describes Iran as facing growing difficulties exporting its oil. Citing United Against Nuclear Iran, he reports that at least 57 tankers carrying Iranian crude, petroleum products, and liquefied gas remain near Iran's coastline and are unable to sell their cargoes. He also cites Kpler estimates that approximately 43 million barrels of Iranian crude and condensates are stranded within the area affected by the American blockade.
On American military involvement, Al-Rashed highlights the reported arrival of USS Theodore Roosevelt in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, bringing the number of American aircraft carriers in the region to three. He argues that this deployment “strengthens the possibility of war,” despite President Trump's statements that American operations would remain limited to a blockade of Iranian ports and border crossings.
Citing Kpler, he says China purchased at least 80 million barrels of additional Saudi crude for September through November deliveries, while Chinese government data showed inventories increasing by approximately 15.3 million barrels in October. He also notes that Saudi Arabia has approximately 13.5 million barrels stored in Japan and South Korea, reflecting efforts to position oil supplies closer to Asian consumers and reduce dependence on Gulf shipping routes.
In contrast, Al-Rashed describes Iran as facing growing difficulties exporting its oil. Citing United Against Nuclear Iran, he reports that at least 57 tankers carrying Iranian crude, petroleum products, and liquefied gas remain near Iran's coastline and are unable to sell their cargoes. He also cites Kpler estimates that approximately 43 million barrels of Iranian crude and condensates are stranded within the area affected by the American blockade.
اشارككم مستجدات الجبهات والنفط :
• الانسحاب 🇾🇪 من باب المندب، القوات الجنوبية وهي من مجموعة القوات الحكومية من باب المندب. أعلنت إعادة نشرها باتجاه عدن، على بعد نحو 150 كيلومتراً. تنهي بذلك محاولات استمرت نحو ستة أسابيع لاستعادة الساحل.
• المضاربة ورأس العارة: القوات الجنوبية تقول إنها تسيطر والحوثي يدعي انه استولى عليها.
• تحصين مدينة عدن لوقف الحوثيين من التقدم من محافظة لحج، يقولون انهم تمركزوا في معسكر الخراز بالمضاربة وخور عميرة على بعد حوالي 100 كم من عدن. القوات الحكومية تبني تحصينات حول العاصمة المؤقتة
• الحوثي قال هناك عمليات قصف يمنية على صنعاء
• تحقق القوات اليمنية 🇾🇪 تقدماً نسبياً في الجوف شمالاً، ما يجعلها إحدى الجبهات التي تضغط على الحوثيين حالياً.
فقد سيطرت القوات الحكومية بدعم جوي من التحالف على مرتفعات استراتيجية شرق مدينة الحزم، عاصمة المحافظة التي لا تزال تحت سيطرة الحوثيين،
سلسلة جبال حويشيان ومليفيفة وقرن الصيعري ومواقع أخرى تحت سيطرة قوات الحكومة.
كانت تشكل خط الدفاع الأول عن الحزم، وقد اخترقت القوات الحكومية تحصينات وخنادق وحقول ألغام بناها الحوثيون على مدى سنوات.
• البحرين 🇧🇭– يركز الإيرانيون هجومهم على البحرين واطلقوا ست مسيّرات امس وفق إعلان الحرس الثوري. وأعلنت المنامة اعتراض الهجمات وتدميرها، دون إصابات أو أضرار.
وقد يكون لاستهداف البحرين بشكل مكثف علاقة بإدانة ارهابيين مرتبطين بايران في البحرين:
احكام المحكمة الكبرى الجنائية في البحرين في قضية جماعة إرهابية مرتبطة بالحرس الثوري الإيراني.
•أُدين جميع المتهمين (المحبوسين والهاربين).
•العقوبات: السجن المؤبد أو 15 عاماً.
•(بعضهم غيابيا، عيسى قاسم).
• التهم الرئيسية: تغيير نظام الحكم بالقوة، التخابر مع إيران والحرس الثوري، جمع أموال غير مرخص لتمويل النشاط، التحريض على أعمال إرهابية وشغب، ونشر أفكار “ولاية الفقيه” والولاء لإيران عبر المساجد والمؤسسات.
• السعودية 🇸🇦 : أعلن التحالف الأحد اعتراض 7 مسيّرات فوق مكة والمدينة والمنطقة الشرقية وصاروخين باليستيين باتجاه الرياض. مطار الرياض لا يزال يستقبل الطيران.
• تعزيزات الحرب 🇺🇸 : وصلت حاملة الطائرات الأمريكية الثالثة ثيودور روزفلت الأحد إلى نطاق القيادة المركزية، وفق مسؤول أمريكي، بما يعزز فرضية الحرب رغم تأكيدات ترمب انه سيكتفي بالحصار على موانيء ومعابر إيران.
البترول 🚨
• برنت: بلغ 95.89 $ للبرميل, الاثنين.
• هرمز: أعلن الحرس الثوري إصابة ثالث ناقلة نفط بألغام،
• ينبع: التقارير تشير استمرار ضخ السعودية نحو 4 ملايين برميل يومياً عبر خط شرق–غرب، إلى البحر الأحمر وفق تقدير رويترز، رغم محاولات ميلشيا الحوثي استهدافه التي تقول انها حاولت استهداف محطتي ضخ.
التخزين:
تطور في سوق النفط: الصين بدأت تعيد بناء مخزونها بعد استنزافه خلال الحرب،
تتجه السعودية إلى زيادة تخزين نفطهما خارج الخليج، قرب الأسواق الآسيوية.
أما مخزون إيران العائم فقد تقلص بشدة.
1. المشترون الكبار:
الصين 🇨🇳
بدء زيادة المخزون الصيني في أكتوبر
نحو نصف مليون برميل يومياً،
مشتريات صينية إضافية من الخام السعودي
80 مليون برميل برميل على الأقل، لشحنات سبتمبر–نوفمبر، وفق Kpler
• البيانات الصينية الحكومية الجديدة: ارتفاع مخزون الخام بنحو 15.3 مليون برميل خلال أكتوبر، بعد تناقص كميات كبيرة من المخزونات، لتعويض ما استهلكته خلال الحرب.
2. المصدرون:
السعودية 🇸🇦
تخزين نحو 13.5 مليون برميل في اليابان وكوريا،
الهند 🇮🇳
بحث تخزين جزء من احتياطياتها الاستراتيجية في الفجيرة الإماراتية
3. التخزين في عرض البحر:
• إيران 🇮🇷 : رصدت منظمة UANI ما لا يقل عن 57 ناقلة محملة بالنفط الإيراني ومشتقاته قرب الساحل الإيراني لا تستطيع بيعه. ويشمل الرقم الخام والمنتجات والغاز المسال،
حجم المخزون العالق: قدرت Kpler وجود نحو 43 مليون برميل من الخام والمكثفات عالقة داخل منطقة الحصار، الذي تفرضه القوات الاميركية على ايران.
• عمان 🇴🇲 مشروع تخزين بحري: تدرس شركة OQ شراء ناقلتين عملاقتين واستخدامهما للتخزين العائم قبالة ميناء الدقم، إلى جانب رفع التخزين البري من 5 ملايين إلى 10 ملايين برميل. المشروع لم يُنفذ بعد،
روسيا 🇷🇺 : إجمالي الصادرات النفطية 6.82 ملايين برميل يوميا
وصل الخصم على مبيعات نفطها خام أورال إلى 33 دولارا للبرميل وذلك لتجاوز العقوبات .
روسيا تستطيع الاستمرار في بيع النفط للصين والهند بعملات غير الدولار، لكن تغيير العملة لا يلغي العقوبات الأمريكية على البائع أو البنك أو الناقلة.