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Alan Funtowicz67 posts
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Alan Funtowicz

@AlanFuntowicz

phd student @EconUCL | 🇧🇷

◷ Joined March 2020▧ 2 Photos and videos
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde avatar
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Jesús Fernández-Villaverde@JesusFerna7026·Nov 9

A point I emphasize again and again is that the relation between income and fertility is changing quickly, both within and between countries. To make this point between countries, I take the total fertility rate (TFR) of up to 158 countries from the UN World Population Prospects and their GDP per capita from the Maddison Project, measured at purchasing power parity and in constant 2011 prices (that is, the data already correct for differences in price levels across countries and for inflation). I am not a big fan of the UN World Population Prospects, but this way nobody can accuse me of being selective with my sources. Then I plot TFR against GDP per capita for 1950 (the start of the sample), 1985 (the midpoint of the sample), and 2022 (the last year in Maddison’s dataset). The left panel includes all countries except the six Gulf oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman), whose wealth comes from oil rents, not from their level of economic development. In the right panel, I also remove sub-Saharan Africa, a region with very poor data on TFR and GDP per capita. Start with 1950 and 1985. Plot the two curves, and you will have trouble telling them apart. Countries with $2,000 of GDP per capita had 6.1 children per woman in 1950 and 5.9 in 1985. Countries with $5,000 had 4.3 in 1950 and 4.6 in 1985. Countries with $10,000 had 2.8 in both years. Countries got richer and had fewer children, but they moved down the same curve. In 1985, as in 1950, fertility dropped fastest between $5,000 and $10,000, and the typical country reached replacement (about 2.1 children per woman) only at around $14,000. Mexico, with $10,000 of GDP per capita, had 4.1 children per woman. Argentina, with $11,000, had 3.1. And the relationship between TFR and GDP per capita held despite many other changes. For example, child mortality collapsed at every income level, literacy and life expectancy rose, again at every income level, modern contraceptive methods spread widely, and international organizations and local governments sponsored aggressive family-planning programs across Asia and Latin America from the 1960s. Nothing seemed to matter. After 1985, the slope of the curve became much smaller (in absolute value) as the left end of the curve started falling quite fast while the right end of the curve barely changed. Interestingly, most of the fall came between 1985 and 1995, well before cell phones and social media (everyone’s favorite explanation) reached anyone outside a small elite of wealthy and highly educated persons. At $2,000 of GDP per capita, fertility went from 5.9 children per woman in 1985 to 4.0 in 2022, a drop of 1.9 children. But at $20,000 of GDP per capita, fertility was 1.7 children per woman in 1985 and the same 1.7 in 2022. Similarly, countries with 2.1 children per woman (roughly the replacement rate) were at $14,000 in 1985 but at $11,700 in 2022 Take Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s GDP per capita is $11,200, roughly the income at which the 2022 curve crosses replacement. According to the UN World Population Prospects, Sri Lanka has 2.0 children per woman in 2022, while the United States, with five times Sri Lanka’s income, has 1.7. The United States last had Sri Lanka’s income in 1923, when American women had about three children. And according to the most recent data from their national statistical agencies, Sri Lanka is in 2025 at 1.37 children per woman and the United States at 1.57. Sri Lanka has undershot American fertility by a considerable margin (yes, 1.37 is much lower than 1.57) a century before reaching American income. I also decomposed the change in average TFR across countries into two parts. The first is the change from countries getting richer while moving along a fixed curve. The second is the change from the curve itself shifting, holding each country’s income fixed. From 1950 to 1985, almost all of the fall in TFR comes from countries getting richer. Remember: the curve barely moved. From 1985 to 2022, about 40% comes from countries getting richer and about 60% from the curve shifting down. That is the big surprise. Is sub-Saharan Africa driving this result? Yes and no. In the right panel, we can see that the 1950 and 1985 curves barely change when we drop sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly, the 2022 curve becomes almost flat. Outside sub-Saharan Africa, 92 of the 108 countries with more than $2,500 of GDP per capita have a TFR below 2.5. Most of the income gradient left in 2022 is an African gradient. Why did the relation between TFR and GDP per capita hold for 35 years (in fact, for at least the early 1800s) and then fall? I do not have a proof, but my conjecture is that low fertility is driven not by income itself but by “modernity.” As I have explained in many posts, by “modernity” I mean the combination of phenomena such as large bureaucratic organizations, mass education, credentials, formal labor markets, and mass media. Until the 1980s, these features of modern life arrived together with economic development and high income. After 1990, the “modernity package” began to reach countries well ahead of income: secondary schooling for girls, television, and integration into global supply chains. Income stopped being a good proxy for “modernity,” so the curve drawn against income fell. We are only beginning to glimpse the future of “modernity” without economic development. Mexico or Sri Lanka now have the fertility of Japan or Germany, but without the incomes of rich countries, without their state capability, and without their capacity to attract immigration. Becoming rich is no longer a precondition for having few children. Instead, for most of the planet, getting old before getting rich is the new normal.

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Alan Funtowicz@AlanFuntowicz·Oct 27

Espero que a ferramenta seja útil! Leiam a análise do @renanfunt1 com os mapas do site (Obs: o modelo de migração é simples, usem com cautela). PS: Renan é mestrando em Ciência Política na USP, está indo pro visiting em @Columbia (e é meu irmão caçula!) - sigam que ele é fera.

EXPLORE OS RESULTADOS DA ELEIÇÃO COM MAPAS INTERATIVOS: alanfuntowicz.github.io/2026… O que aconteceu no segundo turno de 2026? Em parceria com @AlanFuntowicz, exploramos algumas margens relevantes das eleições presidenciais deste ano. 1/19

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Corinthians@Corinthians·Oct 26

O Sport Club Corinthians Paulista deseja os parabéns a Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, que foi reeleito como presidente da república para o mandato dos próximos quatro anos à frente do nosso país. Viva a democracia do Brasil.

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Orçun Selçuk@orcunselcuk·Oct 25

If Lula really ends up winning the runoff, it would be historic in both Brazilian and Latin American standards. It would be first runoff reversal in Brazil since the transition to democracy. It would also defy the anti-incumbent and right-wing wave in Latin America as a region.

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Gabriel Ulyssea@GUlyssea·Oct 21

Eu também queria estar em outra eleição. Nesta, voto 13 convicto. Bolsonaro devastou 4 pilares básicos do desenvolvimento econômico de longo prazo: saúde, educação, instituições e meio ambiente. E quase destruiu a democracia. O filho, sem os mesmos freios, fará pior. Leiam:

Muitos de nós gostaríamos de estar diante de outra eleição. Com candidatos que fizessem propostas para o Brasil crescer, tornar-se menos desigual. Não é o que temos. Mas por cima de todos os problemas do atual governo, ainda é a democracia que deveria valer neste momento

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Ziho Park@Ziho_Park1·Oct 10

Many people are laughing at this paper by focusing on log(y+1), and yes log(y+1) is problematic, but the real reason why papers like this are wrong is usually just a selection issue (selection of Starbuck entry into areas that are about to have an innovation boom). Technical issues like log(y+1) are not as damning as that.

Coffee shops boost innovation. 10% more Starbucks in an area --> 3-4% more inventions. People gather over a cuppa. They share ideas, discuss how to untangle a knotty problem, help see an issue from another perspective. These conversations lead to breakthroughs and inventions. A very fun paper finds that when Starbucks rolled out to a new county, it fueled a coffee-shop culture, urging more and more people to “grab a coffee” together. The authors compare the counties where Starbucks had rolled out to those where it had not yet arrived. And they find that the number of patents in caffeinated counties is meaningfully higher. This paper underscores how essential the face-to-face encounter is. Starbucks isn’t that old. People Could have picked up the phone and chatted at any time. People Could have dropped an email. Probably they did. But those connections didn’t yield the same insights and creativity. Turns out that a Cup of Joe really does help the knowledge flow. We talk about how much in-person connection boosts creativity in In Person. It’s out in just few days, so now is a great time to pre-order. To see the full research use the link in the comments. #Innovation #InPerson #FutureOfWork #CoffeeCulture #NewBook

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Jessica Hullman@JessicaHullman·Sep 22

Two kinds of drift I see when students rely heavily on agents in research (even when overall use is reasonable): 1. Project direction drifts & more effort is needed to bring things back to initial goals. Easy to spend wks talking thru nuances of tangential aspects of the work. 1/

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Econometrica@ecmaEditors·Aug 19

Discrimination can persist as organizational trap: tackling it requires shifting beliefs across the hierarchy by trialing minority candidates. This is costly, so bias survives in firms, and standard tests fail as coworker bias depresses their performance. econometricsociety.org/publi…

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Verónica Bäcker-Peral@VBPeral·Jul 16

Excited to share our new working paper: how much did the US standard of living really rise over the twentieth century — and when? With @bhwittenbrink Using 5.1 million Sears catalog listings, we build a quality-adjusted price index for consumer goods, 1900–1990. Two headline findings: growth was much larger than official statistics imply, and its peak came before WWII, not after. (1/9)

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Arpit Gupta@arpitrage·May 5

Surprised no one in the RCT vs development macro wars has mentioned yet a critical paper for both literatures: the Bloom @bennpeifert Mahajan McKenzie Roberts QJE showing management matters for firm productivity

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Nicholas Decker@captgouda24·Mar 30

In Brazil, investments into research doubled the productivity of agriculture in that country, a 17 fold return on investment. The case for public R&D is incredibly strong -- let's look at on great example. 1/

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Anup Malani@anup_malani·Mar 7

Online higher education expanded access in Brazil—and made the country poorer. Total enrollment would fall 14% without online programs, but aggregate labor market value added declines 1.4% with them. How can more education be worse?

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Olivier Blanchard@ojblanchard1·Jan 28

In response to Jesus Fernandez Villaverde. Fun discussion. Yes, preferences are not given by God. Learning how to appreciate food, taking the time to eat, sitting together at the dinner table, is definitely building consumption/leisure capital a la Becker-Murphy. The French do it from age zero, the Americans not so much. And, (my biased but experience based view) good food is one of the daily pleasures of life. Institutions matter: That everybody takes August off makes for much easier coordination, and spending time with friends. The tax rate on labor income and not on leisure surely affects choices, although the argument that high taxes in the past is what explains current French behavior is not terribly convincing. Institutions mostly reflect preferences but can go off the rail. I indeed think that going to 35 hours without reducing the wage, was a mistake in allowing people to think there was no trade off between income and leisure. It has proven costly. Labor regulations lead too many workers to involuntary retire too early. Social norms matter. In France, dinners in Paris used to be very late. The idea is that, if you came back from the office before 8pm, you were clearly a nobody. Events matter: Covid has led to substantial and apparently hysteretic changes in going to restaurants, seeing friends. But the bottom line remains. The French are not lazy. For many reasons, some good, some bad, most are happy to work less and earn less. And it should not be seen as a sin, or as a crippling economic problem. France has problems. This is not the main one.

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Jesús Fernández-Villaverde@JesusFerna7026·Jan 28

Olivier Blanchard (@ojblanchard1) had a provocative post yesterday about a higher preference of French people for leisure: x.com/ojblanchard1/status/20… I have learned nearly an infinite amount of economics from Olivier since I was an undergrad, and he came to Spain to present a report on our unemployment problem, so I feel a bit intimidated about pushing back on this idea. I am perfectly happy with the idea that preferences are heterogeneous: some people like leisure more than others. And the goal of economic policy should never be to maximize output, but to maximize welfare. If most people in France enjoy sitting in the beautiful sun of Provence while productivity increases, who am I to question their wisdom? But perhaps one of the aspects of economics that I have always felt uneasy about is how little effort we have put into exploring the extent to which preferences are endogenous. Let me borrow from an old idea of Gary Becker and Kevin M. Murphy (1988) in their classic “A Theory of Rational Addiction,” a beautiful piece of work all students of economics should read. Becker and Murphy consider a model with two consumption goods: one that requires “consumption capital” to be enjoyed and one that does not. Think about fine wine: it takes some time and experience to truly enjoy a good bottle. In comparison, every kid enjoys candy on first taste, no experience required (nor much is gained from repeated tastings). How much an agent invests in “consumption capital” determines whether increases in consumption of the first good in the past will lead to higher consumption of that good in the future. Many leisure activities belong to the former group, not the latter: going to the Opera, appreciating fine food, discovering the charming streets of a world-class city, ... Based on that observation, let me extend Becker and Murphy’s framework to the work-leisure choice by introducing the notion of “leisure capital.” Imagine a situation where, in France, taxes on labor income were high (or, equivalently, wages were lower than they should have been because of misallocation). This made leisure activities preferable in the past because their relative price was low (let’s assume the income effect was small), leading to an increase in the “leisure capital” of the French today and, therefore, in how French society takes advantage of increases in productivity. Now, one could argue that this reasoning is a hyper-sophisticated form of rationality that does not resemble reality. But I have seen this phenomenon at a micro level: very rich people who made their own fortunes are often not very good at enjoying leisure, but their kids are extremely good at it, because they accumulated plenty of “leisure capital” when they were young. More seriously, other observers of society would have found the reasoning natural, because there is a long tradition of analyzing labor supply decisions as embedded in social relations. Let us start with Karl Marx. In historical materialism, consciousness follows the forces of production. When the forces of production generate a lower labor supply (for whatever reason), consciousness will follow through the multiple channels of the superstructure, starting with the creations of the culture industry that favor leisure. Having delightful bistros is an epiphenomenon of a deeper structure of relations of production. In the opposite direction, E.P. Thompson, also from a Marxist perspective (though less orthodox), emphasized that the factory system required clock-based discipline and, therefore, that within a generation or two of the Industrial Revolution, punctuality became a cardinal virtue. Just reverse E.P. Thompson’s analysis. And Émile Durkheim, with his view of how social facts shape the division of labor in society, might have agreed as well. For Durkheim, social facts are “every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right, independent of its individual manifestations.” In this perspective, the French have absorbed a particular relationship to work through decades of participation in French economic life, which is not divorced from taxes and regulations. Of course, one could reply that it might be the preferences for leisure that are behind higher taxes and regulations. For example, you can use regulations to move to a better coordination equilibrium: you do not want to take vacations if your spouse at another firm cannot take a vacation at the same time. This is what Max Weber would have called an elective affinity (Wahlverwandtschaft) of leisure and taxes. But that reply only reinforces my point that we probably want to think about preferences and economic policy as a simultaneous system, more than one driving the other. The practical implication is that policy reforms may have effects far beyond what an analysis that takes preferences as given would suggest. If decades of high taxes built up “leisure capital” in France (which fits perfectly with Olivier’s observation that the French are better at leisure), lowering taxes tomorrow will not instantly undo that accumulation. Preferences have their own inertia. But by the same token, sustained policy changes can, over time, reshape what people want, not just what they can afford. The real problem with all this reasoning, though, is that it makes welfare analysis a nightmare! I will leave that task to someone smarter than me.

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The French are not lazy. They just enjoy leisure more than most (no irony here) And this is perfectly fine: . As productivity increases, it is perfectly reasonable to take it partly as more leisure (fewer hours per week, earlier retirement age), and only partly in income.