On Dec. 3, join us for an end-of-year expert webinar examining 2026's defining developments for South Asia and the forces likely to shape the region's policy trajectory in 2027. Ft. @avasudeva_87, @nilanthis, @Rabs_AA, and @faamer. Register: asiasociety.org/policy-insti…
"This is going to be a tougher meeting than the two previous summit meetings between the two leaders," Watch ASPI Senior VP Wendy Cutler unpack the issues complicating the U.S.-China #trade relationship ahead of Trump-Xi talks on the sidelines of #APEC. 🇨🇳🇺🇸
This issue of @AsiaPolicy’s PLA Watch highlights a PLA undergoing major leadership upheaval while expanding its operational reach and international engagement. Here are the highlights:
-The Fifth Plenum formalized the expulsion of 16 senior military officers and elevated Zhang Shengmin to the Politburo, leaving him its only serving PLA general. The issue argues that Xi continues to prioritize loyalty and discipline, even as the loss of experienced commanders raises questions about readiness ahead of the 2027 modernization milestone.
-On October 29, the PRC Defense Ministry of National Defense announced the restructuring of several military educational institutions,including the establishment and reorganization of colleges specializing in unmanned and intelligent engineering, operational support, and military discipline and legal affairs. The two principal institutions explicitly identified were the PLA Army Engineering University and the PLA National Defense University. Other military universities were also reportedly affected.
-The Liaoning’s apparent circuit around the Philippines, alongside widespread surface-ship deployments, demonstrated alternative routes into the Philippine Sea. These activities extended well beyond Taiwan, making direct comparisons with the Taiwan-centered Justice Mission 2025 exercise problematic.
-PLAN replenishment ships crossed the First Island Chain separately under destroyer escort, suggesting experimentation with a more flexible support model. Whether they directly supported Liaoning remains unconfirmed, but the pattern could have significant implications for sustained operations east of Taiwan.
-A mixed PLAN–China Coast Guard formation transited into the Western Pacific, indicating closer coordination beyond the First Island Chain. More broadly, large deployments described as “routine training” could complicate assessments of Chinese intentions and reduce warning time before a crisis.
-PLA engagements with European counterparts, Russia, ASEAN, and African officers continued despite internal turmoil. A record 378-day Gulf of Aden deployment and a hospital-ship mission to Ghana illustrated growing endurance and Beijing’s use of military missions to build diplomatic influence.
Special thanks to @angelo_mlh and @leontw99 for their contributions.
centerforchinaanalysis.asias…
Take a break from watching the big Asia Week and register for our upcoming webinar. I look forward to speaking with three brilliant experts to assess South Asia's trajectory as we prepare for the new year. Register: asiasociety.org/policy-insti…
I'm looking forward to speaking about the Smaller South Asian countries, the subject of my forthcoming book for @BloomsburyAcad. Events in Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka increasingly shape the outlook for regional cohesion. Thanks to @faamer for the invitation.
Sharing a new essay from @FengmingLuPE and me on what makes tech transfer work, vs what sounds good on paper but is unlikely to deliver…
As APEC approaches, with the G20 coming up next, there's a window to put some meat on the bones of the Board of Investment (currently just words).
Many dismiss it as unrealistic in the current political climate, but we think there's a promising way to make it work for both sides. The question is how.
And to start, what do we get wrong about tech transfer? One common misperception is that we underestimate how much heavy lifting domestic suppliers, engineers, and firms have to do.
In the piece, we discuss some of these ideas focusing on China's auto industry and what its experience with foreign automakers, e.g., Tesla, can teach us about doing tech transfers.
Our argument is that so-called tech transfer isn't a one-off transaction, or even necessarily a transfer at all... It's a process of iterative capability building. It often starts with much less glamorous legacy tech, followed by the right incentives and sustained capacity building over time.
The recipient country (in the BOI case, the U.S.) needs to think carefully about which legacy technologies to transfer that would be realistic starting points for domestic capability building, then how to iteratively build up domestic suppliers, engineers, etc., and develop the capacity to absorb, adapt, and eventually improve on those technologies.
Also, how to tie deals into Chinese incentives (which tech they are open to transfer, and for what in return?) and critically, build institutions that are independent of political climates, which change fast.
China's experience offers some surprisingly (or unsurprisingly) relevant lessons for how the U.S. might approach this today!
Full article below. Thoughts, as always, welcome! cc @AsiaPolicyforeignpolicy.com/2026/11/12…
Pleased to contribute to this preview piece on Trump and Xi at APEC: What to Watch in Shenzhen. My @AsiaPolicy colleagues cover trade, tech, AI safety, the role of allies and partners, and Taiwan.
We expect a summit focused on keeping U.S.–China relations steady. Yet Trump and Xi face a fragile trade truce, renewed pressure over technology controls, and potentially consequential choices on Taiwan.
Have a read below!
centerforchinaanalysis.asias…
What’s at stake when Trump and Xi meet at APEC in Shenzhen?
In a new compendium, CCA experts examine the prospects for U.S.-China stability, from trade and technology to Taiwan and regional security.
Read the analysis: centerforchinaanalysis.asias…
In September, Washington and Beijing agreed to set up an AI incident channel. Seven weeks on, there are no named officials, no notification thresholds and no categories of reportable incidents. My test for the Trump–Xi meeting in Shenzhen this week is whether it produces concrete procedures or just another communiqué.
Why it matters:
• The bigger near-term risk is bad actors, not states. A third party reportedly used a Chinese open-source cyber tool with Claude and DeepSeek to breach at least nine South Korean banks. That is exactly the case a channel exists for.
• "Staying ahead" at the frontier doesn't make open-weight models safer once their safeguards can be stripped. That takes coordination with China and others.
• In cyber, attackers need one hole and defenders have to patch them all. Sharing vulnerabilities with a small set of partners leaves millions of organizations exposed.
What would make the channel real:
- Move it from Treasury's trade talks to the technical staff who meet regularly: CAISSI, China's AI Safety and Development Association, the CAC and lab evaluators.
Write terms of reference that name the contacts, a Chinese lead agency and notification deadlines.
- Set up a cyber-response link between the two sides for major vulnerabilities their models find.
- Run shared safety evaluations through a neutral host like the UK AI Security Institute.
Mistrust runs both ways, so start with the cheapest credible signal.
We can't race your way to a safer world.🚨
Please read all the details from the seven experts in the new @AsiaPolicy Center for China Analysis pre-Summit briefing. 👇
#AIPolicy#AIGovernance#USChina@wstv_lizzi@LyleJMorris@wendyscutler@QuincyInst
Happy 20 year anniversary to #Asia21! Last month, we celebrated this milestone with the annual Asia 21 Next Generation Leaders Fellowship, this year held in Ho Chi Minh City, #Vietnam (Oct. 16–18), in partnership with @RMIT University Vietnam and Vietnam 21 alumni.
Proponents of export controls on US-made chips have aggressively leveraged the Jensen Huang saga to reinforce their case, while overlooking the longer-term consequences of these restrictions. Sure, Chinese firms want access to compute no matter where it comes from. It is also true, however, that US export controls have incentivized Chinese AI firms to adapt to increasingly capable indigenous hardware, potentially eroding American competitiveness.
As I argue in my @AsiaPolicy article, Chinese start-ups have often succesfully leveraged algorithmic efficiency, domestic hardware alternatives, and greater specialization to overcome compute constraints imposed by US trade restrictions.
centerforchinaanalysis.asias…
🌏In this week's issue of Asia Policy Brief, Emma Chanlett-Avery and Shay Wester assess what Democratic control of Congress could mean for U.S. Asia policy, with a focus on tariffs, artificial intelligence, and China.
📰Read the full analysis here: asiapolicy.asiasociety.org/p…
What distinguishes water bankruptcy from a water crisis? Irreversibility. 💧
When returning to historical conditions is no longer feasible, conventional crisis management is insufficient.
Full conversation with @faamer on @AsiaPolicy 👇
youtu.be/FIXnFlB0fME#WaterBankruptcy
Read Stephen Biegun and Emma Chanlett-Avery on the obstacles to peaceful U.S.–North Korean engagement—and how the United States can overcome them:
foreignaffairs.com/north-kor…
Will Trump pursue a foreign policy win with Kim Jong-un to build his legacy? If so, he will face a very different North Korea and a regime with more leverage and more asks. ASPI's Stephen Biegun and Emma Chanlett-Avery weigh the trade-offs, risks, and upsides of re-engagement with Pyongyang in @ForeignAffairsforeignaffairs.com/north-kor…