
I love the flight from Boston to ASSAs. It’s like a fashion show for what kind of clothing to wear to Econ seminars….

Assistant Professor of Economics at @BentleyU, Waltham MA • Formerly @Wharton, @FTC Bureau of Economics, and @PennLDI

I love the flight from Boston to ASSAs. It’s like a fashion show for what kind of clothing to wear to Econ seminars….

I don't know what JD's ideas will do in practice. We've looked at this in specific example markets. But the best I have is use a foggy crystal ball. One thing I know for sure is that the role of economics is massively important. /end


All of the area in the trapezoid is welfare lost because of adverse selection. Sometimes this is a full unravelling of the market and other times it is partial. Other times it doesn't happen. What drives the magnitude of the selection problem?

Where the Average Cost (dotted) is above the demand (grey), the insurer can't break even. So the final, healthiest consumers don't enroll. That's the distance (in percent terms) between the two Q's on the lower right, Q-equilibrium & Q-max.

The Demand (grey) is universally above the Marginal Cost (black), meaning for everyone individually, it's profitable for the insurer to sell and desirable for the buyer to buy. But because the sickest select in first, the insurer prices at the average cost of who's in the market

Where's the market failure? It's only profitable for the insurer to sell insurance when Demand (grey) , or willingness-to-pay, is above average cost (dotted). Otherwise they'd lose money on the marginal enrollee. But here we have a insurance market failure!

Falling marginal cost pulls average cost down. Just like a new student with a lower grade in the class than the average will pull the average down. Thus, MC (black line) is always below AC (dotted).

If the first person costs 100, their average cost is 100 (=100/1). The second person to buy insurance is a bit less sick and costs 99. Avg. cost is 99.5 (=[100+99]/2) but marginal cost is 99 (MC<AC).

This is illustrated by a downward sloping average and marginal cost curve (which start out together).

In insurance markets, we're concerned that sicker people are more likely to demand insurance and be expensive to cover. Not a moral failing, just rational expectations about health care usage. Thus, the sickest people will be the first to buy. Or those with high risk aversion.

Let's now define "Selection Markets". A selection market is a market where sellers care not just about how much they sell but also about whom they are selling to. nytimes.com/2016/09/25/upsho… @sangerkatz

Next I've highlighted the Demand Curve. This is relationship between how many people get insurance and the price. Obviously (perhaps), Demand slopes down. At higher prices, fewer people buy insurance.

Second, the horizontal axis represents the share of the market that ends up buying insurance. On the right is Q-max, where 100% of the market buys insurance. The share who buys can range from 0% to 100% of the potential market.

First: the Y-axis represents the price of an insurance contract. Higher on the vertical axis represents a higher price charged to make someone whole after a health event.

Stepping carefully into this conversation between @crampell and @Avik because it seems like economists' voices need to be heard right now. It might be good to examine the Einav-Finkelstein-Cullen model to understand the dynamics of adverse selection in insurance markets🧵
(6/x) This is the basic actuarial insight that @JDVance was trying to express that @crampell claims will "unravel the U.S. health-care system." In fact, directly subsidizing those costs through reinsurance, as the GOP replacement contemplated, would strengthen U.S. health care.