"The moment a similar incident affects a more mainstream manufacturer while the ecosystem has still failed to migrate sufficiently towards multi-vendor multisig, we will have a far larger catastrophe on our hands.
And yes, those manufacturers may follow more secure practices – but a single point of failure remains a single point of failure, and a freak accident can happen to any one of them.
This is a call to action for anyone who cares about Bitcoin’s long-term success."
bitcoinvn.io/shop/new-era-fo…
Many manufacturers will only ship through customs. Now you’re not only in their third party shippers database but also the government database.
Going through a highly trusted official reseller that has a long standing name might make more sense.
And pay with lightning or
Excellent initiative by team @Trezor
"We’ve seen that sharing personal information with third parties can create risks we can’t fully control. The simplest way to reduce those risks is to collect less data in the first place."
Trezor @Trezor 5h Article How to order a Trezor without sharing your personal information Trezor Anonymous Pickup lets you order a hardware wallet without giving Trezor your real name, phone number, home address, or primary email address. Your order is sent to a local pickup point in
“Whenever recovery words appear on the screen, the implant recognizes and stores them. That includes the words the device shows when it creates a wallet backup, and the words you type when you recover an existing wallet onto the device. It does the same with a passphrase if one appears on the screen. It encrypts what it captures and sends it over the mobile network to a server controlled by the attackers. If it can’t connect, it keeps the data and tries again until it succeeds.”
Here’s the follow-up we promised on our investigation into the reported implant in a Trezor Safe 5 bought from CryptoBilis. Our findings, and what we’ve changed since, are in the article below:
💯
If people are not willing to study multisig, that is fine and their choice.
But they also should not invest significant amounts of their savings in Bitcoin - unless they truly understand what they’re signing up for.
A single misstep can wipe you out - and those fatal missteps are becoming far more frequent in the current environment.
Properly configured multisig provides you with a margin of error - even if one signing device “blows up” or becomes demonstrably vulnerable, an attacker still needs additional keys to move your funds.
And if you want to survive in the long term, building in a margin for error is the most sensible thing you can do.
Especially as attackers target you with increasingly advanced, rapidly evolving tools - every minute of every day.
I honestly don’t understand why so many Bitcoiners are so biased/dead set against multisig that they’d happily invent layers of complexity (passphrases, XOR, Shamir Secret Sharing, etc.) just to avoid it. It’s as if you want to reject the notion that security takes real work.
The truth is, in the era of AI-assisted attacks, no single hardware + software stack can be fully trusted. Hence multisig MUST become the bare minimum. Multisig is the Proof-of-Work of self-custody.
"The truth is, there are no safe places in the era of AI.
What matters is designing guardrails and systems that are truly robust and have no single points of failure."
Look at the list of recent vulnerabilities discovered on major Linux distros, and tell me with a straight face that your best self-custody recommendation for average Bitcoin users is running software on general-purpose computers. You can’t.
Recently, a remote root exploit was demonstrated against Linux servers using multipath TCP. The fix landed upstream on October 5, and as of October 31, Ubuntu and Red Hat still had no patched kernel. Around the same time, six other Linux flaws were disclosed, one with a public root exploit and no merged fix at the time.
We’re as big a fan of the Bitcoin Core project as anyone. It’s one of the best reviewed and maintained software projects on the planet, and we heavily reuse its code in Nunchuk because of that quality. But recommending a Linux laptop running Core as the go-to setup for average users is both unrealistic and unsafe if adopted at scale.
Why? The “just use a Linux laptop and Bitcoin Core” approach starts with a kernel, OS and applications you didn’t write and can’t fully audit. A wallet like Core has to go online to sync the chain and show your balance, and the moment it does, any vulnerability in that stack becomes exploitable. Once an attacker is in, they can swap Bitcoin addresses in memory to steal or freeze your funds. That’s potentially tens of millions of lines of code on your average laptop, and keeping it patched is a never-ending job. Even the best reviewed and maintained projects show roughly 0.1–0.7 defects per 1,000 lines of code. Do the math on the potential number of undiscovered bugs, especially on old, unmaintained laptops.
Note that build reproducibility doesn’t solve this. It proves one piece of software matches its source, which is valuable, but that piece runs alongside software many times its size. With general-purpose computing, you can lock down static build quality, but it’s impossible to completely lock down and isolate the runtime environment.
And even constant vigilance might not save you from zero-day exploits (the attackers might just possess a better AI model than your defense). The attack surface of a typical general-purpose computer is just too large.
In the era of AI-assisted attacks, there’s this tempting idea of supposedly safe places: “my system is better than yours because it hasn’t been hacked yet.” That’s simply an illusion. Something typically hasn’t been hacked yet because it isn’t widely adopted enough for attackers to seriously go after it. Ledger and Binance have been targeted repeatedly because they’re the biggest names in their categories, and that’s where historically a lot of user funds concentrate. The moment something like the “Core + laptop” approach becomes popular, expect people to get targeted and lose money, just like with every other custody tool. It’s a simple cost-benefit calculation for attackers.
The truth is, there are no safe places in the era of AI. What matters is designing guardrails and systems that are truly robust and have no single points of failure.
That’s why the first order of business in security is to aggressively cut down the attack surface. That means removing hardware components, favoring single-purpose over general-purpose, and bringing the amount of code in your wallet system from millions down to the few thousand lines that are absolutely required. And since no single hardware+software stack can be perfectly locked down, you combine several independent ones in a multisig. Then you have a chance.
A tampered Trezor device has been found in Malaysia, linked to the #CryptoBilis case.
At this time, we are not aware of any reports of tampered devices in Vietnam 🇻🇳 and/or within our own supply chain.
Single points of failure are not acceptable in your custody setup if any significant amount of funds is involved.
The current trend of cyber exploits is unlikely to slow down any time soon - if anything, it's likely going to accelerate further.
After the past several months of folks claiming self custody is dead / too risky, a single exchange hack results in more losses than all the self custody failures this year combined.
A tampered Trezor device has been found in Malaysia, linked to the #CryptoBilis case.
At this time, we are not aware of any reports of tampered devices in Vietnam 🇻🇳 and/or within our own supply chain.
CryptoBilis update
We've been made aware, through responsible disclosure, of a single hardware implant in a Trezor Safe 5 device bought from the reseller CryptoBilis in August 2026.
No CryptoBilis buyer has reported a loss of funds to us.
IMPORTANT: If you bought a Trezor from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards, we know this is unsettling. Here’s what to do:
Already using it?
Move your funds to a newly created wallet with a new seed as soon as possible. Do not reuse the old seed in any wallet, hardware or software. If you don’t have another secure hardware wallet available, we recommend temporarily migrating your funds to a software wallet or an exchange you are familiar with.
Not set up yet? Don’t set it up, and never enter your existing wallet backup on it.
We haven’t received the device to confirm this report, but based on the customer’s description, we’re treating it as credible and sharing it now so customers who purchased a Trezor via CryptoBilis can secure their funds as a precaution. Our security team will examine the device as soon as it arrives.
On October 9, 2026, we removed CryptoBilis as a reseller following reports of tampered Ledger devices sold through it. Since then, we have been inspecting Trezor devices that customers bought from CryptoBilis and have found no signs of tampering on any of the four devices we’ve received so far.
NEVER share your wallet backup (recovery phrase) with anyone. Trezor Support will never ask for it.
If you are affected by this incident, please keep your CryptoBilis device and contact Support to receive a new Trezor hardware wallet: trezor.io/support#open-chat
We're investigating and will post updates here as soon as we know more. Thank you to the customer who reported this through our responsible disclosure program, and to @SEAL_911 for working alongside our teams on the response. Reports and engagement like this help us protect everyone else.
For more information, visit our blog: trezor.io/blog/news/implant-…