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ChainLight1,605 posts
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ChainLight

@ChainLight_io

smart contract audit & token regulation and compliance | 8-time winner @defcon | winner @paradigm_ctf 23 | member @_SEAL_Org | est. 2016

◷ Joined September 2022▧ 294 Photos and videos
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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·15 Aug 2024

We did it again. We are thrilled to announce that ChainLight has won @defcon 32, the Olympics of CTF. This marks our 8th victory and the first time any team has won 3 consecutive years in the DEF CON history. 🧵For those new to ChainLight, here’s a little thread about us:

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·21 Apr 2025

3️⃣ @th3r0ar Loses $780K • Using a backdoor function in the staking contract, the deployer manipulated the token balance of a specific address by directly altering the storage. • The team attributed the responsibility to an external developer. (5/6)

R0AR@th3r0ar16 Apr 2025

Earlier today, the $1R0R staking contract had tokens removed and dumped on the open market. At this stage, we do not believe this to be an external exploit. One nefarious developer, external to R0AR core team, is seemingly behind the drain. They have been removed from the project with all accesses revoked. Some really important points: - We have a lot more liquidity than what was initially added. There is plenty in the treasury to replace this with. - Whereas with most projects this would be fatal, it isn't with R0AR, in the slightest. Our 1:1 liquidity promise at presale has transpired to be the ultimate safeguard here. We haven't spent presale funds, so there is plenty there to add back as LP. Most importantly, don't panic. There is not a team with more integrity in this space and we will make sure that we do the right thing by the community. It's a bump in the road, nothing more. Thankyou to the entire pride for your continued support. Any claims of an external hack or exploit should be ignored.

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·21 Apr 2025

2️⃣ @zksync Loses $5M • Due to the private key leakage, zkSync allowed $5M worth of $ZK, which was remained unclaimed from the airdrop program. • Stolen assets still remains on an EOA, `0xb1027ED67f89c9F588E097f70807163feC1005d3`. (4/6)

ZKsync@zksync15 Apr 2025

ZKsync security team has identified a compromised admin account that took control of ~$5M worth of ZK tokens — the remaining unclaimed tokens from the ZKsync airdrop. Necessary security measures are being taken. All user funds are safe and have never been at risk. The ZKsync protocol and ZK token contract remained secure, and no further ZK is at risk. This is an isolated incident caused by a compromised key and confined to the ZK Token airdrop contract. The investigation is ongoing, and a detailed update will be shared later today.

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·21 Apr 2025

1️⃣ @KiloEx_perp Loses $8.4M • The victim contract inherited the OZ forwarder contract but mistakenly left the execute method permissionless. • This allowed the exploiter to open a position at an artificially low price. (3/6)

Chaofan Shou@shoucccc14 Apr 2025

.@KiloEx_perp is hacked. $6M+ loss already. Likely due to price oracle access control issues.

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·21 Apr 2025

Which rug pulls, exploits, and security breaches happened this week? Read this 2-minute weekly summary to stay in the loop 🧵👇 (1/6)

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RareSkills@RareSkills_io·15 Apr 2025

When we released the ZK Book over a year ago, we took the ZK education space a huge step forward. Our book pioneered the approach of "just enough math" to learn ZK. Today we do it again with a new addition to the ZK Book. "Circom and Constraint Design Patterns" This new section focuses on how to design, create, and audit non-trivial ZK circuits. You've probably seen a lot of tutorials about how to prove you know the evaluation of a polynomial using Circom. But how do you go from there to designing a ZKVM or proving you know the primage of a traditional hash function (like MD5 or Keccak256)? The new part of our ZK Book takes you on a journey from multiplying to numbers together to: - building a ZKVM from scratch - coding constraints for the MD5 hash function - learn the recurring design patterns in constraint design The last part was interesting because some of the established "design patterns" don't even have names for them. We had to invent some terminology! As usual, we are extremely thoughtful about how we introduce the reader to new ideas to avoid overwhelming someone new. We are careful to ensure we teach the prerequisites in a sensible order and with a lot of examples. Each chapter shows how to build a circuit for an increasingly complex application. With each chapter, you both review what you learned previously and learn a new design pattern. Once you build up a collection of these design patterns, you can compose them together to build more complex applications, like the ZKVM or a non-trivial hash function. We put a huge effort into making sure that the material is both easy to understand and correct without any important omissions. We'd like to thank @ChainLight_io, @VeridiseInc, @PrivacyScaling, and @zksecurityXYZ for allocating time to review this work and provide suggestions. We are particularly grateful to @marcobesier from @zksecurityXYZ for working through several revisions to really get the chapters into a polished state. Special shoutout to @cal_nix for coauthoring the first seven chapters in this new part of the book! The topics we cover here are extremely fundamental. If you don't understand the materials here, learning the internals of more modern ZKVM or ZK L2 client will be quite challenging. Up until now, the absence of newcomer-oriented explanations for such foundational concepts has held the ZK space back. This new body of work isn't simply a "better explanation" of existing materials, but the first explanation at all -- outside of academic papers. We use Circom as the language of instruction since we consider it the most beginner-friendly. However, what you learn here generalizes to other frameworks like Plonky3, Halo2, o1js, and Gnark. The new articles now make the ZK Book over 38,000 words longer. You do not have to know how a ZK-SNARK works to read this section of the book, but there are a few prerequisites. These are listed in the "Introduction to Circom" chapter. As usual, the material is completely free with no login required.

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·31 Mar 2025

9️⃣ A security engineer exposed as a DPRK scammer • Further investigations of @tanuki42_ revealed his activities: @aqualoan_io, which he contributed to, rugged and deleted its GitHub. • Nick Franklin initially denied the allegations but has now deleted his X and TG. (11/12)

tanuki42@tanuki42_27 Mar 2025

UPDATE: The liquidity protocol @aqualoan_io which @0xNickLFranklin was a contributor to has pulled all of it's liquidity overnight (~$800k) and deleted it's Github. github.com/techaqualoan/ hxxps[://]aqualoan[.]io/ (site still online) H/t @blackbigswan

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·31 Mar 2025

8️⃣ A Security Engineer Exposed as a DPRK Scammer • A security engineer named Nick Franklin, active in the Ethereum security community, was revealed to be a DPRK-related scammer. • He attempted to scam @k06a, the @1inch cofounder, and was subsequently exposed. (10/12)

tanuki42@tanuki42_26 Mar 2025

Meet Nick Franklin @0xNickLFranklin - Blockchain Security Engineer…. or RGB operative hacking for DPRK? Seemingly this guy has had the entire industry fooled for years.

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·31 Mar 2025

7️⃣ A Governance Attack on @Polymarket • A UMA tycoon exploited their voting power, holding about 25% of the total votes, to settle false results for profit. • Polymarket has vowed to prevent this from happening again. (9/12)

A governance attack occurred on Polymarket, where a UMA tycoon used his voting power to manipulate the oracle, allowing the market to settle false results and successfully profit. The tycoon cast 5 million tokens through three accounts, accounting for 25% of the total votes. Polymarket is committed to preventing this from happening again.

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·31 Mar 2025

6️⃣ @leveragesir Loses $354K • To bypass the checks, the exploiter bruteforced the vanity address by create2, and set the amount variable the same as the address. • After that, exploiter called its malicious contract by callback and drained the assets. (8/12)

Decurity@DecurityHQ30 Mar 2025

Synthetics Implemented Right @leveragesir has been hacked for $355k This is a clever attack. In the vulnerable contract Vault (etherscan.io/address/0xb91ae…) there is a uniswapV3SwapCallback function that uses transient storage to verify the caller. Specifically, it loads an address of a Uniswap pool from the slot 0x1 and checks that it matches msg.sender. It looks right at the first glance, however at the end of the execution uniswapV3SwapCallback stores the value of the variable amount at the same slot! Since the value of amount can be controlled externally, one has to find such an amount that will point to a controllable address. So did the hacker: they bruteforced a vanity address 0x00000000001271551295307acc16ba1e7e0d4281 (amount=95759995883742311247042417521410689) and provided precise arguments to mint exactly this number of tokens. After that they directed the flow of the execution such that this amount is stored at the slot 0x1 to replace Uniswap pool address and called uniswapV3SwapCallback from the bruteforced contract deployed with CREATE2 to drain the Vault (etherscan.io/address/0xb91ae…). Attack tx: app.blocksec.com/explorer/tx…

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·31 Mar 2025

5️⃣ @leveragesir Loses $354K • The Uniswap v3 callback function verified the caller using transient storage. • However, this storage was overwritten by the minted token amount at the end of the execution. (7/12)

Decayless@decaylessfi30 Mar 2025

IMPORTANT SIR has been hacked, do not deposit any further funds. We will post more asap.

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ChainLight@ChainLight_io·31 Mar 2025

4️⃣ @MIM_Spell Loses $13M • Abracadabra Money's cauldron contract, which leverages GMX's GM token, had a vulnerability. • Although details are scarce, @BlockSecTeam's initial analysis suggests the insolvency check logic was misimplemented. (6/12)

$13M exploit. 50% repaid in less than 36h. Zero user funds lost. Abracadabra isn’t backing down We are rebuilding stronger with @berachain , @NibiruChain, and @PurrSwap_ expansions. SPELL emissions on pools are uninterrupted, with new avenues arriving. Full remediation by mid-2025. Treasury holdings at around $19m pre repayment, liquid assets. Trust, transparency, and action. mirror.xyz/0x5744b051845B62D…