My new book, The Swiss Democracy Dictionary, asks a deceptively simple question: do we need better politicians, or do we need a better way of organising political power?
This 365-page guide contains 72 entries explaining, in clear and accessible language, the institutions, ideas, history and mechanisms that make Swiss democracy so different. Each entry runs across several pages, making the book equally accessible to the curious layperson, while also providing a useful reference for academics, constitutionalists, politicians and anyone interested in how democracy can work differently.
And Switzerland 🇨🇭provides a rather remarkable case study.
It is not simply that Switzerland 🇨🇭is wealthy. It repeatedly performs exceptionally well across an extraordinary range of measures.
It has one of the world's highest life expectancies. It remains the world's number one country for innovation, topping the Global Innovation Index for the 16th consecutive year in 2026. It was ranked the world's most competitive economy by IMD in 2025 and, even after falling to third in 2026, remained number one for government efficiency and infrastructure.
It is also consistently among the world's most peaceful countries, with low levels of violent crime, and ranks highly for political stability and institutional quality. Switzerland 🇨🇭was ranked 5th in the 2025 Global Peace Index and 8th in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index.
So we have a country that combines remarkable economic performance with innovation, infrastructure, stability, security, high institutional quality and an exceptionally high quality of life.
Is that simply coincidence?
Or is there something about the way Switzerland 🇨🇭organises and distributes political power that helps explain the result?
That is one of the questions this dictionary explores.
It looks beyond the familiar idea of referendums to examine the much bigger picture: subsidiarity, federalism, decentralisation, local government, civic participation, accountability, political compromise and, above all, the principle that citizens should retain meaningful political power between elections.
I have lived under the Swiss system for two decades. It is certainly not perfect. No country is. Switzerland 🇨🇭has its own problems, disagreements and political failures.
But there has to be a reason why the same country keeps appearing near the top of so many completely different international measures.
And once you start looking closely at how its political system actually works, some uncomfortable questions begin to emerge.
Why can Swiss citizens challenge laws directly?
Why can they propose constitutional change themselves?
Why is so much political power held at cantonal and communal level?
Why does Parliament not sit all year?
Why do citizens have so many opportunities to intervene between elections?
And perhaps the most uncomfortable question of all:
If citizens can be trusted to choose their politicians, why shouldn't they also be trusted to decide some of the things politicians decide for them?
This dictionary follows my two non-fiction books and four novels exploring direct democracy. It is intended as an easy guide to a system that gives citizens something many representative democracies largely reserve for politicians: the power to decide.
I make no claim that Switzerland 🇨🇭has discovered a perfect political formula, or that direct democracy alone explains its success.
But I do believe there is an inconvenient truth worth examining.
When citizens are given meaningful democratic tools, something rather interesting can happen. They do not necessarily become more extreme, more chaotic or less responsible.
They can become more engaged.
They can challenge those in power.
They can reject proposals they dislike.
They can demand change when politicians refuse to act.
And, importantly, they can also reject attractive-sounding proposals when they believe the consequences are wrong.
That is the Swiss experiment.
The Swiss have been practising it for more than a century.
Now political movements and newly formed parties around the world are increasingly looking towards Switzerland 🇨🇭and asking whether direct democracy might represent the next stage in the evolution of democratic government.
Perhaps they are discovering something Switzerland 🇨🇭has known for generations.
This book is an invitation to look closely.
Not just at Switzerland. 🇨🇭
At your own system.
Because after 72 entries and 365 pages, I suspect many readers will find themselves asking a rather uncomfortable question:
“What on earth is the system I have been living under?”
There is no perfect democracy.
But perhaps there is such a thing as a better one.
And perhaps Switzerland 🇨🇭gives us a rather compelling place to start looking.
#DirectDemocracy
The Price of Speaking Out
The German Democratic Republic claimed to be a state of the people, built on equality, justice and collective progress. Yet when two of its most respected intellectuals challenged the regime, it did not answer their arguments; it punished them. In May 1979, the novelist Stefan Heym was fined 9,000 East German marks, while the scientist and dissident Robert Havemann received a fine of 10,000 marks.
The official justification concerned foreign currency regulations, but the underlying message was unmistakable: in a state that claimed to represent its people, independent thought could come at a heavy price.
Neither man was an obscure troublemaker. Heym was an internationally recognised writer who had fled Nazi Germany and later returned, believing that socialism might offer a better future. Havemann was a distinguished scientist who had resisted the Nazis and once held an honoured position within the East German academic establishment. Both had initially believed in aspects of the socialist project, but both came to recognise the contradiction between its promises and its authoritarian reality. Their experiences reveal how the DDR used laws, institutions and financial pressure to intimidate those who questioned its authority.
Stefan Heym was born Helmut Flieg in Chemnitz in 1913. As a young man, he opposed the rise of Nazism and was forced to flee Germany in 1933. He eventually settled in the United States, where he became a writer and journalist, later serving with the American armed forces during the Second World War.
After the war, he returned to Germany and eventually settled in East Berlin in 1952, initially believing that the socialist state offered the possibility of building a fairer society. However, his relationship with the authorities deteriorated as he became increasingly critical of the restrictions imposed on writers and intellectuals. His novel Collin, published in West Germany in 1979, was particularly unwelcome to the regime.
The authorities used foreign currency regulations relating to income from overseas publications as the basis for imposing his fine. It was a convenient legal mechanism: rather than openly prosecuting a writer for criticising the government, the state could present its actions as the enforcement of financial rules.
Robert Havemann's confrontation with the state was even more striking. Born in 1910, he had been involved in resistance to the Nazis and was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943. Sentenced to death, he survived partly because the authorities considered his scientific knowledge valuable. After the war, he became a respected chemist and professor at Humboldt University in East Berlin.
Like many who had opposed Nazism, he initially supported the socialist project, but he gradually became disillusioned with the authoritarian direction taken by the DDR. His criticism eventually cost him his academic position in 1964, and he was expelled from the ruling Socialist Unity Party.
He continued to speak publicly against the regime, particularly after the expatriation of singer-songwriter Wolf Biermann in November 1976. Havemann was placed under house arrest and subjected to close surveillance. The financial penalty imposed on him in 1979 was another means of exerting pressure on a man whose influence and independence the authorities found difficult to tolerate.
A System Controlled by the Party
To understand how dissent was punished, it is important to distinguish between the different institutions of the DDR. The country had a parliament, a government, courts, police forces and numerous public organisations, but ultimate political authority rested with the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Its Politburo and Central Committee determined the political direction of the country, and the leading Party officials exercised authority over the institutions that were formally responsible for governing it.
The People's Chamber, or Volkskammer, was the DDR's parliament and formally passed legislation. The Council of Ministers, or Ministerrat, was the government responsible for administering state policy through its ministries. These were official state institutions, but neither operated as an independent check on the ruling Party. The SED controlled the political process, including the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections, and its leadership determined the direction in which government policy was to be implemented. The distinction matters: when the state punished a dissident, the action might be carried out by a government department, a court or another authority, but the political climate and direction came from the ruling Party.
The Ministry for State Security, known as the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit or MfS, and commonly called the Stasi, had a different role. It was the political secret police and intelligence service. It gathered information, recruited informants, monitored suspected opponents, conducted investigations and operated its own detention facilities. It also worked with other state bodies, including the police and employment authorities. It was not simply another name for the government or the police; it was a powerful security organisation answerable to the SED leadership and dedicated to protecting the Party's hold on power.
This distinction helps explain why repression in the DDR could take so many different forms. The Stasi might identify and monitor an individual, but a university, ministry, employer, professional organisation or court could deliver the practical consequences. Not every sanction was imposed directly by the Stasi, even though its surveillance and information-gathering often helped make those sanctions possible.
Professional and Economic Sanctions
A person who expressed the wrong opinions might find themselves dismissed from a job, denied promotion, excluded from professional organisations or prevented from pursuing a chosen career. These consequences were often administered through state ministries, public employers and institutions rather than by the Stasi itself.
For writers, journalists, academics and artists, the consequences could be particularly severe because their livelihoods depended on organisations and professional networks subject to political influence. A writer might be denied publication, an academic removed from a university position, or an artist excluded from the bodies through which professional opportunities were distributed. The purpose was not necessarily to imprison the individual, but to make it increasingly difficult for them to earn a living or maintain a public voice.
Restrictions on Education and Opportunity
Education was another means of enforcing conformity. The Ministry for People's Education and the institutions responsible for schools and universities operated within a system in which political reliability could influence access to further education.
Young people who did not demonstrate sufficient loyalty to the socialist system could find their opportunities restricted. Membership and participation in the Free German Youth organisation, the Freie Deutsche Jugend or FDJ, were often important considerations in a young person's educational and professional prospects. The FDJ was the official socialist youth organisation, not a government ministry, but it played an influential role in political education and organised youth life.
Those who refused to conform, or whose families were regarded as politically unreliable, could discover that academic ability alone was not enough to secure a university place or a desired career. The SED's influence over education was therefore felt not only through formal government policy but also through the organisations and political assessments surrounding young people's lives. In this way, the state could influence behaviour long before an individual became an adult.
Travel Restrictions and Personal Freedom
Travel restrictions provided another powerful instrument. The authorities responsible for border controls and travel permissions could refuse citizens permission to travel abroad, while those who applied to leave the country permanently might face harassment, professional consequences or criminal prosecution. The People's Police, or Volkspolizei, was the ordinary uniformed police force responsible for public order and law enforcement. It was distinct from the Stasi, although the two organisations cooperated closely. The Stasi monitored suspected opponents and could intervene in cases involving political security, while the police dealt with many of the visible enforcement activities.
Even within the DDR, the authorities could restrict an individual's movements and opportunities. The message was clear: the state was not merely concerned with what people said, but also with where they went, whom they associated with and whether they demonstrated the expected degree of loyalty. The ability to travel, maintain contact with people abroad or seek a different future could all be subject to political approval.
Financial Penalties and Legal Pretexts
Financial penalties were particularly useful because they allowed the authorities to present political punishment as the enforcement of ordinary regulations. Fines could be imposed through the legal system under laws relating to currency, public order or administrative requirements, even where the underlying concern was an individual's political activity.
The courts were formal state institutions, but they did not provide an independent judicial safeguard against political interference. The financial burden could be substantial, especially for someone whose employment or professional opportunities had already been restricted.
In the cases of Heym and Havemann, the fines were not simply a matter of money; they were intended to make an example of two men who had refused to remain silent. For those who continued to resist, the consequences could be more serious.
The DDR used criminal laws against people accused of anti-state agitation, unlawful contact with organisations abroad or attempting to leave the country illegally. Political opponents could be arrested, interrogated and imprisoned. The Stasi played a major role in investigating and detaining suspected political opponents, while prosecutors and courts dealt with the formal legal proceedings. The threat of imprisonment was always present, even when the authorities preferred to use less visible forms of pressure.
Psychological Intimidation: The Stasi Method of Zersetzung
One of the most disturbing methods employed by the Ministry for State Security was Zersetzung. The term can be translated as decomposition or disintegration, and it describes a form of psychological and social sabotage developed and used by the Stasi to undermine individuals and groups considered hostile to the regime.
Unlike ordinary police activity, which was generally visible, these operations were deliberately covert. Stasi officers might spread rumours, damage professional reputations, create suspicion between friends and colleagues, interfere with family relationships or arrange circumstances intended to make a person appear unstable or untrustworthy.
The purpose was to weaken confidence, isolate the individual and make continued opposition increasingly difficult. The Stasi could use information gathered through surveillance and its network of unofficial informants to target a person's private and professional life.
The strategy was often deliberately indirect, allowing the authorities to deny responsibility while the victim struggled to understand what was happening. It was a particularly sinister form of repression because the individual might not even know who was responsible for the damage being done.
Punishing Those Who Stood Together
The DDR also relied on organisations that were not government ministries but nevertheless played an important part in controlling professional and cultural life. The Writers' Union, for example, was a professional organisation through which writers could gain recognition and access to opportunities. It was not the Stasi, nor was it the government, but it operated within a cultural system strongly influenced by the SED. Writers who challenged official policy could face exclusion, making it harder to publish and sustain a professional career.
The punishment of Heym and Havemann formed part of a wider effort to discipline the intellectual community. When a group of writers protested against the treatment of the two men and appealed to the leadership, the response was not to engage with their concerns but to increase the pressure.
In 1979, a number of writers, including Heym, faced exclusion from the Writers' Union or its Berlin organisation. Such action could effectively remove access to the professional networks and opportunities on which writers depended. It was another reminder that the Party's influence extended well beyond formal government departments and into the organisations through which people worked, learned and expressed themselves.
What made these sanctions so effective was not simply the punishment of those who openly dissented. It was the effect they had on everyone else.
A teacher considering whether to question an official instruction, a journalist thinking about publishing an uncomfortable truth, or a student wondering whether to challenge a political assumption could all see what might happen to someone who crossed the invisible boundary.
Many people learned to exercise caution, to avoid controversial subjects and to keep private opinions to themselves. The state did not need to punish everyone. It needed only to make the consequences of dissent sufficiently visible for others to think twice.
The Price of Silence
Yet the authorities never entirely succeeded in silencing those they targeted. Stefan Heym continued to write and remained an important critical voice. Following German reunification, he was elected to the Bundestag in 1994. Robert Havemann died in 1982, before the collapse of the DDR, but his refusal to abandon his principles made him an enduring figure of opposition.
The lesson of their experiences is that authoritarian power does not depend on imprisoning everyone who disagrees. It can be just as effective when it makes people afraid of losing their jobs, education, reputation, freedom or relationships.
In the DDR, the SED directed the system, state institutions administered its decisions, and the Stasi helped identify and suppress those considered a threat. Other organisations reinforced political conformity in everyday life.
The ultimate victory the regime sought was silence. Heym and Havemann remind us that the defence of freedom begins when people refuse to surrender their right to speak.
When Cholera Changed Switzerland and Direct Democracy got its boost.
Johann Jakob Treichler, a forgotten journalist, and the epidemic that helped give ordinary people a voice
In the summer of 1867, something was happening in Zurich that would change the political future of Switzerland.
It was not a revolution in the conventional sense. There were no invading armies, no barricades in the streets and no king waiting to be overthrown. Instead, an invisible enemy was moving through the city, entering homes, destroying families and exposing something that the political establishment had spent years trying not to see.
It was cholera.
By the time the epidemic had passed, 481 people had died. But the disease had done something else. It had exposed the enormous gulf between the prosperous image of Zurich presented by its political leaders and the desperate conditions in which many ordinary people actually lived.
The wealthy could escape. The poor could not.
And as the death toll mounted, a question began to emerge that would prove more threatening to the political establishment than the disease itself.
Who was really governing Zurich, and whose interests did its government serve?
To understand what happened next, we need to go back more than twenty years, to a young journalist called Johann Jakob Treichler.
🇨🇭 The young journalist who wanted the people to govern themselves
Johann Jakob Treichler was born in 1822 in Richterswil, on the shores of Lake Zurich. His background was not one of privilege. His father was a small farmer and home weaver, and his own education was interrupted by periods of factory work.
He knew something about the lives of ordinary working people.
After training as a teacher, he became increasingly concerned about the social conditions around him. He was particularly troubled by the poverty of industrial workers, the exploitation of children in factories and the lack of educational opportunities for the working classes.
But Treichler was not content simply to complain.
He turned to journalism.
In 1845, while still studying law, he became editor of a newspaper called Der Bote von Uster. He subsequently renamed it Allgemeines Noth- und Hülfsblatt, a title that roughly translates as the General Newspaper of Need and Assistance.
The name was deliberate. He wanted his newspaper to expose the hardship experienced by working people and discuss ways of improving their circumstances.
He was one of the pioneers of socialist journalism in Switzerland.
His writing challenged the liberal establishment and questioned why a society that celebrated freedom and prosperity tolerated such widespread poverty.
He also understood that social inequality and political inequality were closely connected.
In 1851, through his newspaper Volksblatt, Treichler presented a 19-point programme challenging the limitations of representative government.
He argued that electing politicians every few years was not sufficient if ordinary citizens had no meaningful influence over the decisions those politicians subsequently made.
His ambition was nothing less than what he called pure democracy: government by the people themselves, supplementing representative institutions with direct popular participation.
He expressed the principle in words that remain remarkably relevant:
"Everything for, everything through the people."
It was a challenge to a political class that believed it knew what was best for the population.
Treichler's arguments were not universally welcomed. The authorities had already taken action against his earlier socialist journalism, and in 1846 a law against communist activities had effectively ended his first period of political activism.
But the ideas did not disappear.
🇨🇭 The men who believed they knew best
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Zurich was becoming one of Switzerland's most important centres of commerce, finance and industrial development.
The political establishment was dominated by a powerful liberal elite, whose most influential figure was Alfred Escher.
Escher was an extraordinary personality. An industrialist, banker, railway entrepreneur and politician, he was instrumental in the development of modern Switzerland. He helped establish the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and played a major role in the development of the railway network and financial institutions.
His achievements were considerable.
But political and economic power were increasingly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small circle of influential people.
Escher was particularly powerful in Zurich, where his influence extended into government, banking and business.
The establishment believed that economic development, investment and industrial progress were the priorities. It regarded representative government, administered by educated and responsible men, as the appropriate way to achieve them.
There was little enthusiasm for handing more political authority to ordinary citizens.
The argument against expanding democracy was familiar: ordinary people lacked the education, experience and judgement required to make complicated political decisions.
It was an argument that Treichler had challenged years earlier.
Indeed, one of the great ironies of his life was that he eventually became part of the very political establishment he had once criticised. In 1856, Escher helped bring him into the Zurich cantonal government, where he served until 1869.
His political journey had taken him from radical journalist to government minister.
But outside the corridors of power, dissatisfaction was growing.
🇨🇭 The summer the city began to die
In July 1867, the first cases of cholera appeared in Zurich.
The disease spread rapidly, particularly through the poorer and more overcrowded districts of the city.
At the time, understanding of infectious disease was limited. The relationship between contaminated water, inadequate sanitation and cholera was not yet properly understood or widely accepted. Public health authorities were struggling to respond.
Infected houses were quarantined. People were separated from those suspected of carrying the disease. Fear spread through neighbourhoods as families watched their relatives become ill.
The wealthy responded differently. Many simply left the city.
Those with money, country houses and the ability to travel could escape the immediate danger. Working families, living in cramped accommodation and dependent on daily wages, had no such option.
They remained surrounded by overcrowding, poor sanitation and the conditions in which disease flourished.
By the end of October, the epidemic had ended.
But 481 people had died.
The human tragedy was terrible enough. Yet the political consequences were only beginning.
For the epidemic had revealed something deeply uncomfortable about the society that Zurich's leaders claimed to have created.
The city might be prosperous. Its banks might be flourishing, its railways expanding and its industrial businesses growing. But prosperity was not being shared equally.
The cholera epidemic had exposed the lives hidden behind the impressive statistics of economic progress.
A contemporary newspaper, the Winterthurer Landbote, published a particularly revealing observation in October 1867. It questioned how workers could be expected to maintain their dignity and independence when their earnings were insufficient to meet even their basic needs.
The report asked, in essence, whether workers were expected to spend their entire lives struggling to earn only part of what they needed, relying on charity for the remainder.
It was a devastating question.
The epidemic had become a mirror in which Zurich could see itself.
When a health crisis became a democratic awakening
The cholera outbreak did not create the democratic movement. The dissatisfaction was already there.
Economic difficulties had been affecting workers and businesses. Political influence was concentrated among a relatively small group, and many citizens felt excluded from decisions affecting their lives.
But cholera brought these grievances together in a way that ordinary political arguments had not.
It demonstrated that the consequences of government decisions were not shared equally.
It also raised a fundamental question about accountability.
The authorities had been responsible for public welfare, yet the people most exposed to the consequences of poor living conditions had the least influence over the political system.
Why should those who suffered most have the least say?
The democratic movement seized upon this moment.
Newspapers, particularly the Landbote in Winterthur, became vehicles for challenging the established political order. Its editors and contributors argued that the problem was not simply that the government had made mistakes. The deeper problem was that the political system gave ordinary people too little power to correct them.
The movement began to demand constitutional change.
And it was not merely asking for different politicians.
It wanted a different relationship between the people and their government.
🇨🇭 The gathering at Uster
On 22 November 1867, thousands of people gathered in Uster for what became known as the Ustertag.
The gathering was a defining moment in Zurich's democratic movement.
People came together to demand a fundamental change in the political system. Their argument was that government should no longer be the exclusive preserve of a powerful political and economic elite.
They wanted citizens to have a direct say in the laws and decisions governing their lives.
The meeting called for a complete revision of the Zurich constitution.
The objective was ambitious: to move beyond a system in which citizens simply elected representatives and towards one in which they could actively participate in making and challenging the laws themselves.
The movement began collecting signatures.
This was particularly significant because it demonstrated that political change did not have to originate within government. Citizens could organise themselves, formulate demands and use popular pressure to force constitutional change onto the political agenda.
The establishment was deeply uncomfortable.
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which was more sympathetic to the existing liberal order, warned against allowing popular passions to determine the direction of government.
The Landbote, meanwhile, argued that the fundamental problem was that the existing system failed to recognise the people's needs.
The disagreement was about much more than one epidemic or one government.
It was about who should ultimately hold political authority.
🇨🇭 The constitution that changed everything
The campaign gathered far more support than was required to demand a constitutional revision.
A constituent assembly was elected, and after months of debate a new Zurich constitution was adopted on 18 April 1869.
It represented a remarkable transformation.
Citizens were no longer simply being offered the opportunity to elect their representatives and then leave political decisions to them.
The new system gave the people much greater direct influence over the political process, including the ability to initiate constitutional changes and exercise control over legislation through popular voting mechanisms.
It was a profound change in the relationship between the governed and those governing them.
The significance extended far beyond Zurich.
Other Swiss cantons followed its example, developing their own systems of popular participation.
In 1874, the revised Swiss Federal Constitution introduced the optional legislative referendum at national level. This gave citizens the ability to challenge laws passed by Parliament and demand a popular vote.
In 1891, the federal popular initiative was introduced, allowing citizens to propose amendments to the Federal Constitution themselves.
Together, these developments helped establish the foundations of the direct-democratic system that Switzerland is known for today.
🇨🇭 And what happened to Johann Jakob Treichler?
There is a final irony in this story.
Treichler had been one of the early voices arguing that representative government alone was insufficient. He had written about the need for people to exercise greater control over their own affairs and had challenged the assumption that political wisdom belonged exclusively to the educated and wealthy.
Yet by the time the democratic movement reached its defining moment, Treichler was no longer its radical champion.
He had become part of the government and, as a member of the constitutional council, supported only limited expansion of popular rights. He ultimately rejected the new constitution.
The young journalist who had once demanded that everything should be done through the people had become a politician reluctant to accept the full consequences of that principle.
It is a reminder that political ideas do not always remain in the hands of those who first promote them.
Treichler continued his professional career, becoming a professor of law at the University of Zurich and later at the Federal Polytechnic. He died in Zurich in 1906.
His contribution to Swiss political history is nevertheless important. He was among the early thinkers who articulated the idea that representative democracy should be supplemented by direct popular participation.
But the democratic transformation of 1867–69 belonged to a much wider movement, involving journalists, workers, artisans, farmers and citizens who had become dissatisfied with a system that offered them too little influence.
🇨🇭 The lesson that Switzerland never forgot
The cholera epidemic of 1867 did not create Swiss direct democracy. Its foundations had been developing for decades, and the movement for greater popular participation had already begun.
But the epidemic exposed the consequences of a political system that could become disconnected from the people it was supposed to serve.
It demonstrated that economic success could coexist with widespread hardship, that those with the greatest influence were not necessarily those most exposed to the consequences of political decisions, and that a government could become so preoccupied with its own vision of progress that it overlooked the needs of ordinary citizens.
Most importantly, it helped turn a philosophical argument about democracy into a practical demand for political change.
The people of Zurich were no longer content to be represented. They wanted the means to intervene, to challenge decisions and to propose alternatives.
There is something profoundly important about that distinction.
Representative democracy asks citizens to choose who will exercise political power on their behalf.
Direct democracy adds another dimension: it gives citizens the means to retain a measure of that power themselves.
The story of Zurich in 1867 reminds us that democratic progress does not always emerge from political generosity or enlightened leadership. Sometimes it comes because ordinary people discover that the existing arrangements are failing them, and that waiting for those in power to put things right is not enough.
A disease had swept through the poorer streets of Zurich, but the political infection was much older. It was the growing belief that government belonged to those who held office rather than to the people whose lives were governed.
The cholera epidemic exposed the inequality. The newspapers gave it a voice. The people organised. And the constitution changed.
Perhaps the most enduring lesson is this:
A government may be elected by the people, but that does not mean the people have surrendered ownership of their democracy.
In Zurich, in 1867, ordinary citizens began to insist upon that distinction. And Switzerland's democratic history would never be quite the same again.
Direct democracy was not simply given to the Swiss people by enlightened politicians. It was demanded by citizens who wanted the power to hold their political establishment accountable.
The Man Who Refused to Speak
How one man's refusal to surrender his voice became an enduring testament to the power of truth
Imagine being taken from your home, separated from your family, locked in a prison cell and interrogated day after day by men whose entire purpose is to make you admit that you are guilty of something you have never considered a crime: telling the truth.
Imagine that the people questioning you already know what answers they want. They are not interested in discovering the truth. They want you to accept theirs.
And imagine that, eventually, you decide that the only answer you can give them is silence.
This is the story of Jürgen Fuchs, a young East German writer whose determination to speak honestly brought him into direct conflict with one of the most sophisticated systems of political surveillance and repression in post-war Europe.
It is a story about words, fear, psychological cruelty and an extraordinary act of resistance.
A young man with inconvenient thoughts
Jürgen Fuchs was born in 1950 in Reichenbach, East Germany. He grew up in a working-class family and, like many young people of his generation, was initially attracted to socialist ideas. He was intellectually curious, studied social psychology at the University of Jena and joined the ruling Socialist Unity Party.
He was not someone who had grown up believing that everything about the system was wrong. In many respects, he wanted socialism to fulfil the promises it made.
But there was a problem.
Fuchs believed that people should be allowed to question the society in which they lived. He wrote poems, essays and prose exploring the contradictions between the ideals proclaimed by the government and the experiences of ordinary people.
He questioned militarisation, political conformity and the suppression of independent thought. His writing was not simply an attack on the government. It was an attempt to understand why a society that claimed to represent its people was so frightened of allowing those people to speak freely.
The authorities began to take an interest.
In 1975, shortly before completing his psychology degree, Fuchs was expelled from the university. His academic work had received an excellent assessment, but his political views made him unacceptable. He was also expelled from the ruling party and effectively prevented from pursuing a professional career as a psychologist.
His future had been taken away because of what he thought and what he wrote.
For a young man with a wife and a growing family, this was devastating. But he did not stop writing.
Instead, he moved with his family to Grünheide, near Berlin, where they found accommodation with Robert Havemann, a prominent East German intellectual and outspoken critic of the regime.
It was an environment where independent thinkers gathered, where people discussed ideas that the authorities would rather they kept to themselves.
And the Stasi was watching.
The event that changed everything
In November 1976, the East German government made a decision that would send shockwaves through the country's artistic and intellectual community.
Wolf Biermann, a popular singer and songwriter who had become increasingly critical of the government, was stripped of his East German citizenship while visiting West Germany.
Biermann had been permitted to travel abroad to perform. The authorities evidently believed that, once outside the country, they could prevent his return and rid themselves of an increasingly troublesome critic.
But they had miscalculated.
The decision provoked protests from writers, artists and intellectuals, including people who had previously supported socialism but could no longer accept the government's treatment of independent voices.
Fuchs was among those who objected.
On 19 November 1976, just three days after Biermann's expulsion, Fuchs was travelling with Robert Havemann towards East Berlin. They intended to visit the offices of the West German magazine Der Spiegel to give an interview.
They never arrived.
The Stasi stopped the car and arrested Fuchs.
He was taken to Hohenschönhausen, the notorious State Security prison in East Berlin.
He was 25 years old.
His offence was officially described as suspicion of anti-state agitation.
In reality, the authorities wanted to establish that his writing, his associations and his support for other dissidents amounted to a threat to the state.
The young writer had become a prisoner of the organisation that had been monitoring him for years.
Inside the machinery of silence
Hohenschönhausen was not an ordinary prison.
It was an interrogation centre designed to break resistance, not simply to punish people. Its methods relied heavily on psychological pressure, uncertainty, isolation and the systematic destruction of a prisoner's sense of control.
Fuchs was questioned repeatedly.
The interrogations were long and exhausting. The same questions returned, sometimes rephrased, sometimes delivered by different officers. The interrogators wanted information about his contacts, his writing, his political opinions and his relationships with other critics of the regime.
They wanted him to provide evidence that would justify the accusations against him.
But Fuchs understood something important.
The interrogators were not merely trying to establish what he had done. They were trying to control the meaning of what he had done.
His words would become their evidence. His explanations could be rearranged, his relationships presented as conspiracies and his criticism transformed into proof of hostility towards the state.
He began to understand that participating in their questioning on their terms might simply provide them with the material they needed.
So he made a decision.
In March 1977, he stopped answering.
Not occasionally. Not as a temporary protest.
For approximately two and a half months, he maintained an extraordinary silence during interrogations.
The Stasi's own records document the change. The interrogation transcripts began to consist largely of questions directed at Fuchs, without answers.
Think about the psychological confrontation taking place.
On one side sat trained interrogators, representing an enormous state security apparatus, with files, authority, surveillance and the power to keep a man imprisoned indefinitely.
On the other sat a young writer, isolated in a prison, with no control over his circumstances and almost no means of defending himself.
Yet he had found something he could still control.
Whether he spoke.
Even his prison cell was not his own
The authorities were not prepared simply to accept his silence.
They employed another prisoner to share his cell. This man was instructed to observe Fuchs, collect information and report back to the Stasi.
It was a particularly cruel form of psychological manipulation.
A prison cell should at least be a place where a prisoner can withdraw from the interrogators. But Fuchs was denied even that small refuge.
The informer deliberately disturbed him. According to Fuchs's later account, the man would walk repeatedly around the cell, strike the table rhythmically, whistle and sing songs, and make noises during the night. If Fuchs turned off a dripping tap, the prisoner would turn it on again.
The objective was to wear him down.
There was no privacy, no reliable companionship and no certainty that anything he said would remain confidential.
The Stasi had transformed even the simplest human need for conversation into an instrument of surveillance.
But something else was happening.
Fuchs began to memorise the interrogations.
He paid attention to the questions, the language used by the officers, the procedures and the psychological techniques. He tried to reconstruct the encounters in his mind so that he could document them accurately later.
He was no longer simply enduring the interrogations.
He was recording them.
The authorities believed they were collecting information about him. They did not fully appreciate that he was collecting information about them.
Nine months in the darkness
Fuchs remained in Stasi custody for nine months.
His family was outside, his future uncertain, and the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence hung over him.
The authorities had enormous power over his life. They could continue the investigation, prolong his detention and threaten him with an uncertain future.
Eventually, Fuchs was forced to agree to leave East Germany.
On 26 August 1977, he was released from prison and immediately expelled to West Berlin.
He was free, but the price was enormous.
He had lost his home, his country and the right to live in the place where he had been born. The government had effectively decided that a man who would not conform had no place in its society.
But the Stasi had made one serious mistake.
It had allowed him to leave with his memories.
The truth comes out
In the autumn of 1977, Fuchs began publishing an account of his experiences in the West German magazine Der Spiegel.
The series was entitled Du sollst zerbrechen – translated as You Shall Be Broken.
It described the interrogations, the isolation, the psychological manipulation and the deliberate attempts to destroy his resistance.
The accounts were drawn from his recollections and the notes he had reconstructed in his mind while imprisoned.
His story reached a much wider audience.
The irony was extraordinary. The Stasi had spent nine months trying to establish that Fuchs was an enemy of the state, to discredit his writing and to silence his criticism.
Yet the prison experience itself had given him something more powerful to write about.
He could now describe the methods of the organisation that had imprisoned him.
And there was an additional irony. The Stasi continued monitoring him even after his expulsion. His freedom in West Berlin did not mean that the organisation had abandoned its interest in him.
Its files continued to grow.
The man who outlived the system
Jürgen Fuchs continued writing and campaigning for freedom of expression. He remained in contact with opposition movements in East Germany and became an important voice in the effort to expose the workings of the Stasi.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the East German state began to collapse, Fuchs was among those who helped examine the legacy of the secret police.
The organisation that had once seemed almost omnipotent was finally exposed, and its records became available for historical examination.
Fuchs died in Berlin in 1999, aged just 48.
He did not live to old age, but he lived long enough to see the system that had imprisoned him disappear.
And perhaps the most remarkable aspect of his story is that we can now read the evidence in the very archives created by his persecutors.
The original Stasi documents record his arrest, his interrogations, his refusal to answer and the measures taken to undermine him. They also record the authorities' reaction to his subsequent publications.
The machinery that had been built to monitor and silence people became, in time, an extraordinary source of evidence about how that machinery operated.
What remains
There is something deeply unsettling about the story of Jürgen Fuchs.
He was not a general, a revolutionary leader or a man with an army behind him. He had no political party, no access to television and no newspaper through which he could freely communicate with his fellow citizens.
He was a writer.
His weapon was the written word, and his crime was to believe that the people who governed him should be answerable to the people they governed.
The East German authorities could remove his university place, prevent him from pursuing his chosen profession, monitor his friends, invade his privacy, imprison him and eventually force him out of his homeland.
But they could not make him believe that their version of the truth was the truth.
For a time, they even succeeded in taking away his ability to speak publicly. Yet he found a way to turn his silence into a form of resistance.
There is a lesson here that extends well beyond the history of East Germany.
A government does not have to imprison every critic to make people afraid. Sometimes it is enough to demonstrate what can happen to those who refuse to conform. Others begin to censor themselves. Journalists become cautious. Writers choose their words carefully. Citizens learn which questions are best left unasked.
That is how the freedom to speak can disappear without everyone being taken to prison.
And that is why the story of Jürgen Fuchs matters.
Because the ultimate test of freedom is not whether people are allowed to repeat what their government says.
It is whether they are free to challenge it.
The Stasi wanted Jürgen Fuchs to break. Instead, he left behind a record of how they tried.
Historical note: This account draws on the German Federal Archives and the Stasi Records Archive, which preserve original documents relating to Fuchs's arrest, interrogation, imprisonment and subsequent publications. The chronology and the two-and-a-half-month refusal to answer are documented in those records.
When Cholera Changed Switzerland and Direct Democracy got its boost.
Johann Jakob Treichler, a forgotten journalist, and the epidemic that helped give ordinary people a voice
In the summer of 1867, something was happening in Zurich that would change the political future of Switzerland.
It was not a revolution in the conventional sense. There were no invading armies, no barricades in the streets and no king waiting to be overthrown. Instead, an invisible enemy was moving through the city, entering homes, destroying families and exposing something that the political establishment had spent years trying not to see.
It was cholera.
By the time the epidemic had passed, 481 people had died. But the disease had done something else. It had exposed the enormous gulf between the prosperous image of Zurich presented by its political leaders and the desperate conditions in which many ordinary people actually lived.
The wealthy could escape. The poor could not.
And as the death toll mounted, a question began to emerge that would prove more threatening to the political establishment than the disease itself.
Who was really governing Zurich, and whose interests did its government serve?
To understand what happened next, we need to go back more than twenty years, to a young journalist called Johann Jakob Treichler.
🇨🇭 The young journalist who wanted the people to govern themselves
Johann Jakob Treichler was born in 1822 in Richterswil, on the shores of Lake Zurich. His background was not one of privilege. His father was a small farmer and home weaver, and his own education was interrupted by periods of factory work.
He knew something about the lives of ordinary working people.
After training as a teacher, he became increasingly concerned about the social conditions around him. He was particularly troubled by the poverty of industrial workers, the exploitation of children in factories and the lack of educational opportunities for the working classes.
But Treichler was not content simply to complain.
He turned to journalism.
In 1845, while still studying law, he became editor of a newspaper called Der Bote von Uster. He subsequently renamed it Allgemeines Noth- und Hülfsblatt, a title that roughly translates as the General Newspaper of Need and Assistance.
The name was deliberate. He wanted his newspaper to expose the hardship experienced by working people and discuss ways of improving their circumstances.
He was one of the pioneers of socialist journalism in Switzerland.
His writing challenged the liberal establishment and questioned why a society that celebrated freedom and prosperity tolerated such widespread poverty.
He also understood that social inequality and political inequality were closely connected.
In 1851, through his newspaper Volksblatt, Treichler presented a 19-point programme challenging the limitations of representative government.
He argued that electing politicians every few years was not sufficient if ordinary citizens had no meaningful influence over the decisions those politicians subsequently made.
His ambition was nothing less than what he called pure democracy: government by the people themselves, supplementing representative institutions with direct popular participation.
He expressed the principle in words that remain remarkably relevant:
"Everything for, everything through the people."
It was a challenge to a political class that believed it knew what was best for the population.
Treichler's arguments were not universally welcomed. The authorities had already taken action against his earlier socialist journalism, and in 1846 a law against communist activities had effectively ended his first period of political activism.
But the ideas did not disappear.
🇨🇭 The men who believed they knew best
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Zurich was becoming one of Switzerland's most important centres of commerce, finance and industrial development.
The political establishment was dominated by a powerful liberal elite, whose most influential figure was Alfred Escher.
Escher was an extraordinary personality. An industrialist, banker, railway entrepreneur and politician, he was instrumental in the development of modern Switzerland. He helped establish the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and played a major role in the development of the railway network and financial institutions.
His achievements were considerable.
But political and economic power were increasingly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small circle of influential people.
Escher was particularly powerful in Zurich, where his influence extended into government, banking and business.
The establishment believed that economic development, investment and industrial progress were the priorities. It regarded representative government, administered by educated and responsible men, as the appropriate way to achieve them.
There was little enthusiasm for handing more political authority to ordinary citizens.
The argument against expanding democracy was familiar: ordinary people lacked the education, experience and judgement required to make complicated political decisions.
It was an argument that Treichler had challenged years earlier.
Indeed, one of the great ironies of his life was that he eventually became part of the very political establishment he had once criticised. In 1856, Escher helped bring him into the Zurich cantonal government, where he served until 1869.
His political journey had taken him from radical journalist to government minister.
But outside the corridors of power, dissatisfaction was growing.
🇨🇭 The summer the city began to die
In July 1867, the first cases of cholera appeared in Zurich.
The disease spread rapidly, particularly through the poorer and more overcrowded districts of the city.
At the time, understanding of infectious disease was limited. The relationship between contaminated water, inadequate sanitation and cholera was not yet properly understood or widely accepted. Public health authorities were struggling to respond.
Infected houses were quarantined. People were separated from those suspected of carrying the disease. Fear spread through neighbourhoods as families watched their relatives become ill.
The wealthy responded differently. Many simply left the city.
Those with money, country houses and the ability to travel could escape the immediate danger. Working families, living in cramped accommodation and dependent on daily wages, had no such option.
They remained surrounded by overcrowding, poor sanitation and the conditions in which disease flourished.
By the end of October, the epidemic had ended.
But 481 people had died.
The human tragedy was terrible enough. Yet the political consequences were only beginning.
For the epidemic had revealed something deeply uncomfortable about the society that Zurich's leaders claimed to have created.
The city might be prosperous. Its banks might be flourishing, its railways expanding and its industrial businesses growing. But prosperity was not being shared equally.
The cholera epidemic had exposed the lives hidden behind the impressive statistics of economic progress.
A contemporary newspaper, the Winterthurer Landbote, published a particularly revealing observation in October 1867. It questioned how workers could be expected to maintain their dignity and independence when their earnings were insufficient to meet even their basic needs.
The report asked, in essence, whether workers were expected to spend their entire lives struggling to earn only part of what they needed, relying on charity for the remainder.
It was a devastating question.
The epidemic had become a mirror in which Zurich could see itself.
When a health crisis became a democratic awakening
The cholera outbreak did not create the democratic movement. The dissatisfaction was already there.
Economic difficulties had been affecting workers and businesses. Political influence was concentrated among a relatively small group, and many citizens felt excluded from decisions affecting their lives.
But cholera brought these grievances together in a way that ordinary political arguments had not.
It demonstrated that the consequences of government decisions were not shared equally.
It also raised a fundamental question about accountability.
The authorities had been responsible for public welfare, yet the people most exposed to the consequences of poor living conditions had the least influence over the political system.
Why should those who suffered most have the least say?
The democratic movement seized upon this moment.
Newspapers, particularly the Landbote in Winterthur, became vehicles for challenging the established political order. Its editors and contributors argued that the problem was not simply that the government had made mistakes. The deeper problem was that the political system gave ordinary people too little power to correct them.
The movement began to demand constitutional change.
And it was not merely asking for different politicians.
It wanted a different relationship between the people and their government.
🇨🇭 The gathering at Uster
On 22 November 1867, thousands of people gathered in Uster for what became known as the Ustertag.
The gathering was a defining moment in Zurich's democratic movement.
People came together to demand a fundamental change in the political system. Their argument was that government should no longer be the exclusive preserve of a powerful political and economic elite.
They wanted citizens to have a direct say in the laws and decisions governing their lives.
The meeting called for a complete revision of the Zurich constitution.
The objective was ambitious: to move beyond a system in which citizens simply elected representatives and towards one in which they could actively participate in making and challenging the laws themselves.
The movement began collecting signatures.
This was particularly significant because it demonstrated that political change did not have to originate within government. Citizens could organise themselves, formulate demands and use popular pressure to force constitutional change onto the political agenda.
The establishment was deeply uncomfortable.
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which was more sympathetic to the existing liberal order, warned against allowing popular passions to determine the direction of government.
The Landbote, meanwhile, argued that the fundamental problem was that the existing system failed to recognise the people's needs.
The disagreement was about much more than one epidemic or one government.
It was about who should ultimately hold political authority.
🇨🇭 The constitution that changed everything
The campaign gathered far more support than was required to demand a constitutional revision.
A constituent assembly was elected, and after months of debate a new Zurich constitution was adopted on 18 April 1869.
It represented a remarkable transformation.
Citizens were no longer simply being offered the opportunity to elect their representatives and then leave political decisions to them.
The new system gave the people much greater direct influence over the political process, including the ability to initiate constitutional changes and exercise control over legislation through popular voting mechanisms.
It was a profound change in the relationship between the governed and those governing them.
The significance extended far beyond Zurich.
Other Swiss cantons followed its example, developing their own systems of popular participation.
In 1874, the revised Swiss Federal Constitution introduced the optional legislative referendum at national level. This gave citizens the ability to challenge laws passed by Parliament and demand a popular vote.
In 1891, the federal popular initiative was introduced, allowing citizens to propose amendments to the Federal Constitution themselves.
Together, these developments helped establish the foundations of the direct-democratic system that Switzerland is known for today.
🇨🇭 And what happened to Johann Jakob Treichler?
There is a final irony in this story.
Treichler had been one of the early voices arguing that representative government alone was insufficient. He had written about the need for people to exercise greater control over their own affairs and had challenged the assumption that political wisdom belonged exclusively to the educated and wealthy.
Yet by the time the democratic movement reached its defining moment, Treichler was no longer its radical champion.
He had become part of the government and, as a member of the constitutional council, supported only limited expansion of popular rights. He ultimately rejected the new constitution.
The young journalist who had once demanded that everything should be done through the people had become a politician reluctant to accept the full consequences of that principle.
It is a reminder that political ideas do not always remain in the hands of those who first promote them.
Treichler continued his professional career, becoming a professor of law at the University of Zurich and later at the Federal Polytechnic. He died in Zurich in 1906.
His contribution to Swiss political history is nevertheless important. He was among the early thinkers who articulated the idea that representative democracy should be supplemented by direct popular participation.
But the democratic transformation of 1867–69 belonged to a much wider movement, involving journalists, workers, artisans, farmers and citizens who had become dissatisfied with a system that offered them too little influence.
🇨🇭 The lesson that Switzerland never forgot
The cholera epidemic of 1867 did not create Swiss direct democracy. Its foundations had been developing for decades, and the movement for greater popular participation had already begun.
But the epidemic exposed the consequences of a political system that could become disconnected from the people it was supposed to serve.
It demonstrated that economic success could coexist with widespread hardship, that those with the greatest influence were not necessarily those most exposed to the consequences of political decisions, and that a government could become so preoccupied with its own vision of progress that it overlooked the needs of ordinary citizens.
Most importantly, it helped turn a philosophical argument about democracy into a practical demand for political change.
The people of Zurich were no longer content to be represented. They wanted the means to intervene, to challenge decisions and to propose alternatives.
There is something profoundly important about that distinction.
Representative democracy asks citizens to choose who will exercise political power on their behalf.
Direct democracy adds another dimension: it gives citizens the means to retain a measure of that power themselves.
The story of Zurich in 1867 reminds us that democratic progress does not always emerge from political generosity or enlightened leadership. Sometimes it comes because ordinary people discover that the existing arrangements are failing them, and that waiting for those in power to put things right is not enough.
A disease had swept through the poorer streets of Zurich, but the political infection was much older. It was the growing belief that government belonged to those who held office rather than to the people whose lives were governed.
The cholera epidemic exposed the inequality. The newspapers gave it a voice. The people organised. And the constitution changed.
Perhaps the most enduring lesson is this:
A government may be elected by the people, but that does not mean the people have surrendered ownership of their democracy.
In Zurich, in 1867, ordinary citizens began to insist upon that distinction. And Switzerland's democratic history would never be quite the same again.
Direct democracy was not simply given to the Swiss people by enlightened politicians. It was demanded by citizens who wanted the power to hold their political establishment accountable.
”The EU Has Lost Its Way”
The EU has lost its way. It is rather like an aircraft that takes off with a clearly declared destination, its passengers having bought their tickets in the belief that they know where they are going.
Yet, just after take-off, the pilot makes a seemingly insignificant adjustment of just a few degrees.
The passengers barely notice, and nobody questions the change. But as the miles pass, those few degrees become a profound deviation, until the aircraft arrives somewhere entirely different from the destination its passengers originally signed up for.
The most troubling part is not simply that the destination has changed, but that nobody ever asked the passengers whether they wanted to go somewhere else.
L’Union européenne telle qu’elle est devenue n’a plus grand-chose à voir avec le principe de départ.
On nous avait parlé d’une communauté de nations souveraines qui coopèrent librement pour éviter la guerre et faciliter les échanges. On a fini avec une super structure où une Commission non élue au suffrage direct rédige des textes, où le droit européen prime sur les lois nationales (et parfois sur des dispositions constitutionnelles), et où chaque État se retrouve à transposer des normes qu’il n’a pas vraiment choisies.
C’est une machine à concentrer le pouvoir hors de portée des électeurs, et c’est précisément pour ça qu’elle résiste si mal à la critique.
La présidente de la Commission n’est pas élue par les citoyens. Elle est proposée par le Conseil européen (donc par les chefs d’État et de gouvernement) puis « élue » par un Parlement qui n’a lui-même qu’un pouvoir de validation très limité. Personne n’a voté pour Ursula von der Leyen sur un programme européen clair et contraignant. Elle arrive déjà en place, avec une administration de dizaines de milliers de fonctionnaires qui préparent les textes avant même que les parlements nationaux n’aient ouvert le dossier. C’est un fait institutionnel, pas une opinion.
Ensuite, la primauté du droit de l’Union n’est pas un détail technique. Depuis l’arrêt Costa c/ ENEL (1964) et les traités successifs, une directive ou un règlement européen prime sur la loi nationale, et parfois même sur des dispositions constitutionnelles des États membres. Les gouvernements signent, les cours de justice européennes tranchent, et les parlements nationaux se retrouvent à transposer des textes qu’ils n’ont ni rédigés ni vraiment négociés. Quand une norme européenne entre en conflit avec une loi votée démocratiquement dans un pays, c’est la norme européenne qui s’applique. Ce n’est plus de la coopération : c’est une hiérarchie.
Enfin, la bureaucratie n’est pas un accident. C’est le mode de fonctionnement. Des milliers de pages de règlements, de normes techniques, de critères environnementaux, de règles de concurrence, de procédures de reporting s’empilent chaque année. Certaines sont légitimes dans leur intention, mais leur accumulation crée un droit parallèle que plus personne ne maîtrise vraiment. Des entreprises, des collectivités et parfois des gouvernements nationaux découvrent après coup qu’une décision locale est devenue illégale parce qu’elle contredit un texte européen adopté des années plus tôt.
Le résultat est visible : des États qui passent leur temps à se justifier, à adapter, à transposer, au lieu de décider.
On peut discuter des bienfaits du marché unique ou de la coordination sur certains sujets. Mais prétendre que ce système est « démocratique » parce que les gouvernements ont signé les traités il y a vingt ou trente ans, c’est confondre consentement initial et contrôle permanent.
Les peuples européens n’ont jamais voté directement pour la Commission, ni pour le principe de primauté, ni pour le volume de normes qui s’est accumulé depuis. Ils votent pour des gouvernements nationaux qui, une fois élus, se retrouvent souvent contraints par des règles qu’ils n’ont pas choisies.
Ce n’est pas une « union » au sens classique du terme. C’est un transfert progressif de souveraineté vers une super structure dont les principaux décideurs ne sont pas responsables devant les électeurs de la même façon que les gouvernements nationaux. Et plus on empile de compétences et de règles, plus ce décalage devient difficile à justifier.
Tant que l’Union Européene restera ce qu’elle est devenue un système où la compétence glisse vers le haut sans contrôle populaire clair, le fossé entre les citoyens et les institutions continuera de se creuser.
Revenir au principe originel n’est pas une régression. C’est la seule façon de rendre l’Europe à nouveau légitime aux yeux de ceux qui y vivent.
It’s not up to faceless bureaucrats to decide which interpretations of a conflict are fit or not fit for public consumption. Freezing journalists' assets is not the symptom of a healthy democracy and suppressing information you don't find convenient or agreeable is not a "very good reason" to destroy a citizen's life.
These sorts of actions against a citizen require a public and transparent legal procedure, not the say-so of a bureaucrat.
Citizens should be allowed to hear both sides of the story and decide for themselves. Otherwise we are forming our opinions in a carefully curated information environment, purged of uncomfortable challenges to the official story.
Taoiseach Micheál Martin has said the 114 journalists and entities sanctioned by the EU were "for very good reasons".
It comes after Irish journalist Chay Bowes was accused of being a Russian "propagandist". Bowes, who works for Russian media outlet RT was said to have "participated in information manipulation and dissemination" that legitimises Russia's war with Ukraine.
#VMNews
Travel Bans, National Security and International Pressure: Can Restricting Access Change Government Behaviour?
The United States' restrictions on 39 countries revive an approach previously used by the European Union and other governments: using access to international travel, trade and diplomatic relations as leverage to encourage stronger security, tackle criminality and terrorism, and force greater accountability from governments that fail to act.
The United States has introduced sweeping new restrictions on entry into the country, affecting nationals from 39 countries, alongside a separate restriction covering individuals travelling on Palestinian Authority-issued documents. The measures represent a significant expansion of American immigration controls and have raised questions about national security, religious discrimination, international relations and the treatment of people based on their nationality.
The restrictions, which came into effect on 1 January 2026, divide the affected countries into two categories. Nineteen countries face a full suspension of entry, covering both immigrant and non-immigrant visas, while a further twenty face partial restrictions affecting various visa categories.
Among the countries subject to the full restrictions are Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Myanmar, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Laos, Libya, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The restrictions also apply to people travelling on Palestinian Authority-issued documents.
The countries subject to partial restrictions include Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Depending on the country, these restrictions affect immigrant visas and various categories of non-immigrant visas, including tourist, business and student applications.
The Federal Government maintains that the measures are necessary to protect national security and strengthen the integrity of the American immigration system.
Its stated concerns include inadequate identity verification procedures, unreliable or incomplete information supplied by foreign governments, insufficient cooperation in sharing security information, difficulties establishing the identities of visa applicants and concerns about individuals remaining in the United States beyond the permitted duration of their visas.
Some countries have also been identified because of historically high visa-overstay rates or difficulties in establishing effective arrangements for the return of nationals who have been ordered to leave the United States. In the Government's view, where foreign authorities cannot reliably verify the identity of their citizens or provide the necessary information to American security agencies, admitting their nationals presents an unacceptable risk.
These are not entirely new concerns. Governments have long maintained the right to impose additional immigration screening requirements on countries considered to present particular security or administrative challenges. However, the scale and geographical reach of the latest restrictions have brought the policy into much wider international debate.
One particularly noticeable aspect is the number of Muslim-majority countries affected. Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are among those facing the most extensive restrictions. The inclusion of Palestinian Authority travel documents is another significant element, effectively extending the restrictions beyond a straightforward list of nationalities.
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to describe the policy formally as a ban on Muslims entering the United States. The list also includes countries with predominantly Christian populations and countries with very different religious and cultural backgrounds, including Haiti, Cuba, Venezuela and several African states. The Federal Government's stated justification is based on nationality, security screening and immigration cooperation rather than an explicitly religious test.
There is, however, another dimension to this policy that deserves consideration and is perhaps less frequently discussed. Beyond protecting its own borders, the United States may also be using access to its territory as an instrument of international pressure, encouraging governments to take greater responsibility for problems originating within their own borders.
Countries experiencing persistent problems with terrorism, organised crime, corruption, extremist organisations, trafficking and inadequate security controls cannot expect these difficulties to have no international consequences. Where governments are unwilling or unable to tackle such problems, other countries may reasonably question whether normal immigration arrangements should continue.
The restrictions could therefore create an incentive for governments to improve their security infrastructure, strengthen identity verification, cooperate more effectively with international intelligence and law enforcement agencies, tackle criminal networks and prevent extremist organisations from operating with impunity.
There is also a potentially significant domestic political consequence. When ordinary citizens discover that their opportunities to travel, study, work or conduct business internationally are being restricted because of shortcomings in their own country's institutions, they may begin to question the performance and priorities of their government. Frustration could translate into pressure for reform, greater accountability and more effective action against criminal and terrorist elements.
In this sense, the policy could be viewed as an attempt to make the consequences of inadequate national security and governance extend beyond the borders of the countries concerned. Rather than simply responding to criminality and terrorism after they reach American territory, it seeks to encourage the authorities in the countries of origin to address the underlying problems themselves.
There is historical evidence that this approach can sometimes work. In 2001, the United States imposed visa sanctions on Guyana after its government repeatedly refused or delayed issuing travel documents for 113 Guyanese nationals who had been ordered deported from America, many of whom had criminal convictions. Within two months of the restrictions being imposed, Guyana issued the necessary documents for 112 of the 113 individuals. The American restrictions were subsequently lifted. It was a relatively small measure, but a striking demonstration that restricting international access could persuade a government to change its behaviour.
There are similar examples involving The Gambia. In 2016, the United States imposed visa restrictions following difficulties in securing cooperation over the return of Gambian nationals ordered to leave America.
The European Union subsequently adopted restrictive visa measures against Gambian nationals in October 2021 because of inadequate cooperation over the identification and return of migrants without the right to remain in Europe. The Gambian Government lifted its moratorium on forced returns by charter flights in March 2022, although difficulties with cooperation continued and the EU increased visa fees in December that year. This illustrates both the potential influence of international pressure and the fact that changing government behaviour is not necessarily a straightforward or complete process.
Perhaps the most significant historical example concerns Libya. Following the Lockerbie bombing in 1988, the Libyan Government initially refused to surrender two suspects for trial. The United Nations imposed extensive sanctions in 1992, including restrictions on international aviation and arms supplies. After years of diplomatic pressure and economic isolation, Libya eventually surrendered the two suspects in April 1999 for trial before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands.
The sanctions were suspended following their handover and formally lifted in 2003 after further conditions were met, including compensation for victims' families and Libya's renunciation of terrorism. This was a much broader sanctions programme than a travel ban, and several diplomatic initiatives contributed to the outcome, but it demonstrates how sustained international pressure can help bring about significant changes in government policy.
These examples suggest that international access can be an effective bargaining instrument. Governments sometimes respond to consequences that directly affect their citizens and economies when diplomatic criticism and requests for cooperation have failed. The prospect of restoring normal international relations can provide a powerful incentive to address problems that might otherwise remain unresolved.
There is, of course, a counterargument. Ordinary citizens are frequently the principal victims of terrorism, corruption and organised crime. They may have little influence over the governments responsible for these failures. Restrictions could also generate anti-American sentiment, strengthen nationalist narratives or allow authoritarian governments to portray the measures as an attack on their entire population. There is no guarantee that external pressure will produce internal reform.
The effectiveness of this approach will therefore depend partly on whether countries are given a clear and transparent route towards having restrictions reconsidered.
If governments improve their security arrangements, cooperate with international authorities and demonstrate meaningful progress against criminal and extremist networks, there should be a mechanism through which their citizens can regain access. Without that prospect, the incentive for reform becomes considerably weaker.
The restrictions are not entirely without exceptions. Certain existing visa holders, permanent residents, diplomats and other specified categories are exempt, while individual waivers may be considered in particular circumstances, including where admission is judged to be in the American national interest. Consequently, a full suspension does not necessarily mean that every individual from an affected country is automatically prohibited from entering.
Ultimately, the central question is where governments should draw the line between protecting national security and maintaining the principle that individuals should be assessed on their own circumstances rather than simply on the passport they hold.
Like other nations, the United States has a legitimate interest in knowing who enters its territory and ensuring that its immigration system is not exploited. Equally, the use of broad nationality-based restrictions raises questions about fairness, proportionality and collective responsibility.
However, it is also legitimate to ask whether countries that fail to address serious internal security problems should continue to enjoy unrestricted access to the opportunities and privileges offered by other nations.
International cooperation involves responsibilities as well as rights, and governments cannot indefinitely expect other countries to absorb the consequences of their domestic failures.
Whether these measures will produce a demonstrable improvement in American security, encourage meaningful reforms abroad or instead create additional diplomatic and humanitarian difficulties remains to be seen. Their longer-term significance may ultimately depend not simply on how many people are prevented from entering the United States, but on whether the policy encourages governments to take greater responsibility for the security and wellbeing of their own citizens.
𝗘𝗡𝗖𝗢𝗥𝗘 𝗨𝗡 𝗕𝗨𝗚
𝗗𝗔𝗡𝗦 𝗟𝗘 𝗡𝗔𝗥𝗥𝗔𝗧𝗜𝗙 𝗔𝗡𝗧𝗜-𝗥𝗨𝗦𝗦𝗘
Le conflit entre🇩🇪 et les PM🇵🇱,🇨🇿,🇸🇰,🇭🇺,🇧🇬 révèle une bizarrerie :
▪️Puisque Macron,Barrot et les médias mainstream assurent que Poutine compte envahir toute l'Europe, les pays🇪🇺 les plus près du front🇺🇦🇷🇺 devraient être les premiers à soutenir l'effort de guerre de Zelensky. Car ils seraient les premiers à être envahis par l'armée🇷🇺 si l'Ukraine s'effondrait !
▪️Pourtant, ce sont justement ces pays qui refusent de verser un euro de plus à Zelensky !
▪️Et ce sont au contraire les pays les plus éloignés du front (🇩🇪,🇫🇷,🇬🇧,🇩🇰...) qui versent des dizaines de milliards d'euros au régime de Zelensky, prétendument pour "se protéger de la menace russe". Au risque de se ruiner eux-mêmes !!
C'est totalement illogique.
Si c'est illogique, c'est que le narratif sur la menace russe est faux.
Et ce sont les pays voisins, qui connaissent très bien la Russie, qui nous prouvent que ce narratif est faux.
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Le Figaro a révélé les rouages internes des derniers jours du mandat d’Emmanuel Macron. Le président français n’a pratiquement plus d’amis et a perdu tout son soutien initial. Tous ses mentors et alliés l’ont renié, et il se retrouve complètement isolé. Il est parfois presque catatonique. Des journalistes avec lesquels il était en contact permanent sur Telegram depuis des années ne reçoivent plus de réponse à leurs messages depuis des semaines. Les employés administratifs de bas niveau de l’Élysée et des ministères démissionnent massivement ou sont déjà à la recherche de nouveaux emplois. Ils sont remplacés par de nouveaux collaborateurs temporaires, inexpérimentés. Ses derniers fidèles s’accrochent à lui, espérant être nommés à des postes clés où ils pourront conserver leurs fonctions pendant quelques années après le départ d’Emmanuel Macron. Selon Le Figaro, Emmanuel Macron est de plus en plus frustré par son manque d’influence sur les élections de 2027.
Bien qu’il était connu que l’incapacité de Macron à trouver un héritier digne de ce nom condamnerait le macronisme en tant que mouvement, il semble que même l’idée du macronisme ne survivra pas au mois de mai 2027
From 13 December 2026, UK law mandates the addition of folic acid to non-wholemeal wheat flour 'to prevent neural tube defects like spina bifida'. The catch? Excessive folate increases cancers, & 60% of adults already have excessive folate in their bodies.
The government estimates this policy will prevent approximately 200 cases of these birth defects annually by ensuring adequate folate intake across the population, particularly among women of childbearing age.
Manufacturers must add 250 micrograms of synthetic folic acid per 100 grams of flour. This amount is considered safe and well below the established upper safety limit for adults. While the fortification is mandatory for white and brown flour, wholemeal flour, spelt, rye, and gluten-free flours remain exempt from this requirement, offering an alternative for those wishing to avoid synthetic additives.
The question is, how many cancers will it cause, and is this done to profit the chemotherapy industry?
🇨🇭 Alliance: Oath of Allegiance 🇨🇭
❓ How did a handful of small Swiss communities defy one of the most powerful supranational forces of medieval Europe—and what can their story teach us today?
🎭 Alliance: Oath of Allegiance draws back the curtain on the phenomenon of “controlled opposition”—the appearance of resistance that, rather than challenging power, ultimately helps preserve the status quo.
But this is not presented as an abstract political theory.
Instead, the idea is explored through one of the defining struggles in Swiss history: the resistance of fiercely independent communities to the expanding power and supranational ambitions of the Habsburgs.
⚔️ From scattered valleys and small territories emerged an unlikely alliance. Bound by oaths, mutual defence and a determination to preserve their freedoms, these communities gradually forged what would become the Swiss Confederation.
Their strength did not come from size.
✊ It came from unity without surrendering local sovereignty.
As the story unfolds, Alliance explores the emergence of a political tradition in which power remained close to the people, communities retained significant autonomy, and citizens could ultimately hold those governing them to account.
Set against this is the Habsburg vision of expanding central authority—a struggle between two very different ideas of how society should be governed.
One sought to bring the many under the authority of the few.
The other sought to unite the many without destroying their independence.
The parallels with the present are difficult to ignore.
TRUTH BE TOLD 👇🏼
Today, we live in an age of manufactured narratives, political messaging, censorship, institutional power and increasingly sophisticated forms of opposition. What appears to be resistance may not always be what it seems.
❓ Who really holds power?
❓ Who controls the narrative?
And when opposition is permitted, who decides the limits of that opposition?
Alliance takes the reader back to a time when ordinary people faced extraordinary power—and asks what made it possible for the small to defeat the mighty.
It is a story of oaths, courage, betrayal, sovereignty and freedom.
A story of how alliances were forged.
A story of how a nation was born.
And a story that raises a profoundly modern question:
❓ What happens when the people lose the power to hold those who govern them to account?
Packed with striking parallels between medieval history and the political world of today, Alliance: Oath of Allegiance will challenge assumptions about democracy, sovereignty and political opposition—and may change the way you look at governance forever.
Discover how the small defeated the mighty.
Discover how an oath changed history.
And draw back the veil on controlled opposition.
Available on Amazon.
For students of history, defenders of liberty, and anyone who wants to understand how freedom can be preserved—or lost.
#DirectDemocracy