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FearsOff Cybersecurity304 posts
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FearsOff Cybersecurity

@FearsOff

Protecting the World’s Largest Crypto Exchanges & Financial Institutions 🛡️ Stay Secure and Turn your FearsOff 🛡️

◷ Joined October 2014▧ 230 Photos and videos
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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·8h

A critical Java vulnerability was just disclosed. The bigger risk? Not knowing where Java is running in your organization. On November 17, researchers at Calif disclosed Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938), a critical security flaw affecting certain Java runtimes. Under specific conditions, attackers could exploit it to crash applications or execute malicious code, potentially without logging in. The researchers demonstrated the risk in widely used enterprise software, including identity management platforms, project management tools, and automation servers. Why should business leaders care? Because Java isn't always visible. It may be running behind your: - Business-critical applications - Authentication and identity systems - Cloud environments and containers - Internal tools and third-party software And here's the challenge: the vulnerability exists in the Java runtime itself, not a third-party library. Traditional dependency scans alone may miss affected systems. Not every Java installation is vulnerable. Exploitation requires specific runtime versions, processor capabilities, and application conditions. But that doesn't make the visibility problem any less important. Security updates were released on November 17. Here's what organizations should prioritize: 1. Identify Java runtimes across servers, containers, and applications. 2. Check affected versions, hardware, and exposure. 3. Prioritize internet-facing and authentication systems. 4. Apply the appropriate vendor security updates. A compromised identity platform or automation server can become much more than an isolated technical incident. It can create risks across the business. The real question isn't just whether you've patched Java4Shell. It's whether you know where every Java runtime is running. Does your organization have that visibility? #Java4Shell #CyberSecurity #VulnerabilityManagement #RiskManagement #FearsOff

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Nov 17

On November 16, attackers reportedly exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's Experimentation platform, injecting malicious JavaScript into customer projects and exposing 178 organizations, including Zoom, CNN, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, and HSBC. The reported impact: - 178 organizations affected, including 32 in banking and finance. - Cryptocurrency wallet address swapping and payment card skimming. - Cookie theft, screenshot capture, and iOS exploits targeting older devices. The most concerning part? The affected organizations' servers didn't need to be breached. The malicious code was delivered through a trusted third-party script, hosted on Optimizely's legitimate domain with a valid certificate. This highlights a major blind spot in web security. Marketing tags, analytics tools, A/B testing platforms, and other third-party scripts execute directly in users' browsers, often with limited security visibility. Four questions every security team should ask: 1. Do we know every third-party script running on our websites? 2. Can we detect unexpected script changes or suspicious connections? 3. What sensitive data can these scripts access? 4. Can we immediately disable a compromised script? The takeaway: Supply chain security doesn't stop at your backend. It extends to every line of JavaScript running in your customers' browsers. At FearsOff, we believe client-side security deserves the same attention as every other critical part of your attack surface. 💬 When was the last time your team audited the third-party scripts on your websites? #CyberSecurity #SupplyChainSecurity #ClientSideSecurity #ThirdPartyRisk #FearsOff

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Nov 16

A new permission is a security decision. An AI agent that recommends refunds and an agent that can issue them have very different risk profiles. The difference is not just functionality. It's what happens when the agent makes a mistake, receives manipulated instructions, or operates with more access than it needs. Consider a customer support agent. It may need to read a customer record and propose a refund. But does it need direct permission to move money? Before granting an AI agent write access, define: - Which records it can read - Which changes it can propose - Which actions it can execute - Which actions require separate approval Enforce those boundaries in the systems executing the actions, not just in the agent's instructions. Use scoped identities, validate transactions, and log what was requested, approved, and executed. Because an agent with excessive permissions is not just an automation risk. It can become an additional attack path. If an attacker gained control of one of your AI agents, what could it actually change? #AISecurity #AgenticAI #CyberSecurity #AccessControl #FearsOff

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Nov 12

An AI model can appear to behave normally while containing a hidden trigger. In research reported November 10 to 11, Microsoft researchers demonstrated that modifying a very small number of model neurons could introduce backdoor behavior without retraining an entire model. This was a controlled research result, not evidence that the technique is widespread in production systems. For organizations integrating third-party models, the finding points to a broader supply-chain challenge: model provenance, integrity checks, evaluation under adversarial conditions, and monitoring after deployment all matter. A model that passes ordinary functional tests is not necessarily free from malicious behavior. What evidence would your team require before trusting a model inside a sensitive workflow?

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Nov 11

Smart-contract audits are essential. But a secure contract doesn't mean a secure operation. Some of the most damaging crypto attacks exploit weaknesses far beyond the code: - Compromised private keys and privileged endpoints - Hijacked signing workflows and approval processes - Social engineering targeting trusted operators - Third-party access and infrastructure trust chains - Abuse of legitimate permissions and privileged identities Attackers don't always need to break the code. They just need to compromise whoever controls it. Across exchanges and DeFi platforms, the attack often begins with something seemingly ordinary: an employee's laptop, a trusted vendor, or an authorized transaction. By the time assets move on-chain, the critical security failure may have happened much earlier. At FearsOff, we approach security as a complete attack-path problem. Through red teaming and adversary simulation, we test how real attackers move from initial access to identity compromise, privilege escalation, signing infrastructure, and ultimately asset control. Because the most dangerous vulnerabilities aren't always isolated findings. They're the connections between weaknesses that traditional audits and scanners miss. If your security strategy ends at smart-contract audits and periodic vulnerability scans, you're only testing part of your attack surface. Where is your biggest exposure today: smart contracts, private keys, or the people and processes controlling them? #FearsOff #Web3Security #RedTeaming #CryptoSecurity #OffensiveSecurity #ContinuousAdversarialSimulations

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Nov 10

An attacker compromised credentials for the AWS account used by Qubole's platform. That account had something far more valuable than direct access: trusted IAM roles granted by multiple customers. Between October 14 and October 26, the attacker used those existing trust relationships to access customer AWS environments and steal stored secrets and data. No exploit against the customers' applications was needed. The permissions were already there. This is why third-party access deserves the same scrutiny as your own infrastructure. A vendor doesn't need to be malicious to become your attacker's entry point. It only needs to be compromised while holding permissions inside your environment. At FearsOff, we look beyond the traditional perimeter. Cross-account IAM roles, service accounts, third-party integrations, and long-lived trust relationships are all part of the attack surface. Because when a vendor has access to your environment, compromising that vendor can become a path into yours. When was the last time you audited the permissions your third-party vendors still hold? #CloudSecurity #ThirdPartyRisk #IAM #OffensiveSecurity #FearsOff

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Marwan Hachem@mar1hachem·Nov 6

Most major crypto exchange breaches don't start with broken cryptography. They start with compromised trust. A developer endpoint gets compromised. An attacker moves into a service container. Privileges are escalated. A legitimate signing workflow is hijacked. Minutes later, hot wallets across multiple chains are drained. No cryptography broken. No private keys necessarily stolen. Just trusted systems doing exactly what attackers want. We've seen variations of this attack pattern repeatedly. And the lesson is clear: protecting keys isn't enough if attackers can abuse the infrastructure authorized to use them. Here are 5 uncomfortable questions every exchange and custody provider should be asking: 1. Endpoint to signer: Can a compromised developer or DevOps workstation become a path to your signing infrastructure? 2. Full attack-chain testing: Are you testing endpoint compromise → privilege escalation → signing abuse → multi-chain execution, or just scanning individual components? 3. Detection and response: Could you detect and contain a coordinated multi-chain drain in under 30 minutes? 4. Signing authorization: Can your security controls distinguish legitimate signing activity from attacker-controlled requests using legitimate workflows? 5. Real-world validation: When did an independent red team last attempt this exact attack chain against your environment? The uncomfortable truth? Attackers don't exploit vulnerabilities in isolation. They chain them until they reach the money. At @FearsOff , that's exactly how we approach offensive security. Our team has earned top positions on major crypto exchange Halls of Fame and Top Hackers leaderboards by focusing on exploitable attack paths, not just isolated findings. Because a pentest that finds vulnerabilities is useful. A red team that shows how your exchange could actually be drained is a different level of security validation. If you're responsible for exchange security, custody infrastructure, or wallet operations, here's the question: Would your current defenses stop the entire attack chain, or just one step of it? Let's put that to the test.

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Oct 30

The Binance security breach of October 29, 2026, is shaping up to be one of the most significant incidents in crypto history. And new evidence suggests the attack was far more sophisticated than initially believed. The latest reported figures: - $6.3 billion in estimated affected assets. - ~$3 billion reportedly frozen. - Multiple hot wallets impacted across several blockchains. What happened? Initial reports pointed to a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop. However, subsequent findings suggest a coordinated, multi-stage attack involving compromised infrastructure and abuse of trusted transaction-signing workflows. Researchers also identified malicious use of EIP-7702 account delegation, potentially enabling attacker-controlled smart contracts to execute transactions through legitimate wallet authorization mechanisms. The attackers didn't necessarily break the cryptography. They exploited the systems trusted to use it. Could this have been detected earlier? At FearsOff, our elite offensive security teams focus on identifying precisely these types of attack paths before adversaries exploit them. Through advanced penetration testing, red teaming and adversary simulation, we investigate: → How compromised endpoints can lead to critical infrastructure. → How attackers chain vulnerabilities across containers, privileges and services. → How legitimate signing workflows can be manipulated to authorize malicious transactions. → Whether security controls can detect and contain coordinated attacks. A single vulnerability is dangerous. A chain of vulnerabilities can be catastrophic. While the investigation continues and the full root cause remains unconfirmed, this incident reinforces one critical lesson: Don't just test individual vulnerabilities. Test the entire attack chain. At FearsOff, we think like attackers, so organizations can strengthen their defenses before attackers find the way in. #FearsOff #Binance #CyberSecurity #RedTeam #OffensiveSecurity #PenetrationTesting #BlockchainSecurity

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Oct 28

Security is a team sport. Big respect to the @blockscout team for taking security seriously and championing responsible disclosure. Always happy to help make Web3 safer, one bug at a time. 🫡

Many thanks to @fearsoff for responsibly disclosing a security issue in Blockscout 🐐 The report helped us improve our security, and they’ve been added to our Security GOATS page For open projects, researchers like this are more important than ever 🙏 docs.blockscout.com/resource…

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⟳ FearsOff Cybersecurity retweeted
Marwan Hachem@mar1hachem·Oct 27

The breach didn't start inside a hardware wallet. On October 26, Keystone disclosed that an attacker who accessed its website had also obtained its WebAuth key, used to verify whether devices are genuine. According to Keystone, the attacker exploited a vulnerability in a third-party data monitoring tool to escalate privileges. The consequences go beyond a typical website breach: ▪ 18,835 wallets in inventory will be destroyed because the compromised authentication key cannot be rewritten on existing devices. ▪ 25,964 buyer records retained personal information, including names, contact details, shipping addresses and order histories. ▪ 12,873 unpaid checkout records were also exposed. The stolen key could allow counterfeit devices to pass Keystone's authenticity checks. Keystone says recovery phrases, private keys and payment information were not compromised. The stolen authentication key is not used to sign transactions. The investigation also revealed a separate failure: customer information remained stored beyond Keystone's stated 180-day retention period because automated deletion tasks had failed without being detected. Two security lessons stand out. 1️⃣ A credential that cannot be rotated can turn a single compromise into a hardware inventory problem. 2️⃣ A data-retention policy is only as reliable as the controls verifying that deletion actually happens. At @FearsOff, we see this as a reminder that security boundaries extend beyond the product itself. Third-party access, credential exposure and data lifecycle management all contribute to the attack surface. For security and product leaders: If a critical key you couldn't rotate were compromised tonight, how many of your products would you have to replace?

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⟳ FearsOff Cybersecurity retweeted
Kirill Firsov@k_firsov·Oct 20

php2shell Tomorrow is a helluva day.

3:05
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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Oct 15

Japan’s ruling party says the country is in “a state of emergency in cyber space.” Two stories from the past week show why, and they are more connected than they look. On October 9, Japan’s National Cybersecurity Office issued a nationwide advisory after a wave of breaches at major consumer brands: • Monogatari (Yakiniku King): 10.79 million app member records • Daiichikosho: up to 8.72 million customers • BOOK OFF: up to 6.43 million member records Japan has passed 500 reported incidents this year, already above 2025’s full-year total. The advisory focuses on three areas: web-system vulnerabilities, supply chains, and data management. Daiwa Securities’ exposure came through a contractor’s server. On October 14, Microsoft and Health-ISAC, with Japan’s JC3 among the partners, disrupted YAM Store, CoGUI and Iron Man under a Florida federal court order. Since January, these services enabled more than 1 billion malicious messages targeting over 75,000 organizations. CoGUI was used heavily against victims in Japan. Here’s the link: names, emails and phone numbers stolen in breaches are exactly what phishing kits run on. That’s why the breached Japanese companies are warning customers about fraudulent emails and calls. YAM Store’s supply chain matters too. It hijacked Microsoft 365 and Azure for Education tenants and revived dormant nonprofit websites to fraudulently obtain cloud accounts, then resold them to phishing operators. Two lessons: The member apps and vendor systems holding your customer data are the target. Test them the way attackers will, including the ones your contractors run. Every tenant, domain and account you’ve forgotten is inventory in someone else’s store. One question for your team this week: do you know every system holding customer data, and every cloud tenant and identity your organization still owns? #Japan #Cybersecurity #PhishingAsAService #CloudSecurity #ThreatIntelligence #FearsOff

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Oct 13

On October 11-12, hundreds of supermarkets across France were reportedly affected by a cyberattack targeting connected refrigeration systems. Major retailers, including Carrefour, Intermarché, E. Leclerc, Monoprix, and Coopérative U, confirmed affected stores. The consequences were serious: Refrigeration temperatures were remotely manipulated, leading to significant food losses. Fires linked to the attack were confirmed by the Paris prosecutor. Intermarché estimated nationwide losses in the tens of millions of euros. According to Danfoss, many affected controllers were legacy systems no longer receiving security updates. How did it happen? According to media reports, attackers exploited remotely accessible refrigeration controllers to trigger extended defrost cycles, potentially raising temperatures to 50°C. The exact attack vector remains under investigation. This incident highlights a critical OT security risk: Systems designed to control physical environments can become attack surfaces when exposed to the internet. And unlike traditional IT incidents, the consequences can include physical damage, operational disruption, and substantial financial losses. At FearsOff, we believe OT security starts with understanding your exposure, identifying vulnerable systems, and securing remote access before attackers exploit it. The question for every organization operating connected infrastructure is simple: If your refrigeration, HVAC, or industrial controllers were exposed to the internet today, would you know? #OTSecurity #ICSSecurity #CyberPhysicalSecurity #CriticalInfrastructure #RetailSecurity #OffensiveSecurity #FearsOff

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Oct 12

318 GitHub repositories compromised in 16 minutes. On October 8, attackers used compromised maintainer credentials to inject malicious GitHub Actions workflows disguised as security audits. StepSecurity documented two compromised accounts: One used to modify 27 repositories. Another used to modify 318 repositories in just 16 minutes, including an Uber-owned repository where the malicious workflow executed. How the attack worked: 1. Compromised access: Attackers used legitimate maintainer credentials, potentially obtained through a leaked GitHub personal access token. 2. Workflow injection: Malicious files such as security-audit.yml were committed directly to default branches. No pull request. No code review. 3. Secret exfiltration: The workflows searched repository files and git history for 13 credential patterns, including AWS, OpenAI, Anthropic, and GitLab keys, then sent collected matches to an attacker-controlled IP over HTTP. The scale was even larger. By October 9, Socket reported that more than 500 accounts had committed malicious workflows to tens of thousands of repositories. GitGuardian separately identified 772 affected public repositories in an earlier campaign wave. By October 5, only 16% had been cleaned in public history. The real security failure? Attackers didn't need to exploit application code. They abused trusted developer access to turn CI/CD automation into a credential-stealing mechanism. And deleting secrets from the latest commit doesn't remove them from git history. What security teams should prioritize: Require reviews for workflow changes. Enforce least-privilege CI/CD permissions. Restrict unnecessary outbound network access. Revoke compromised tokens and rotate exposed credentials. Scan git history, not just current files. If a maintainer's GitHub token were stolen tonight, what would stop an attacker from pushing and executing a malicious workflow? Your CI/CD pipeline is part of your attack surface. Test it like one. #GitHubActions #SupplyChainSecurity #DevSecOps #OffensiveSecurity #FearsOff

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FearsOff Cybersecurity@FearsOff·Oct 2

An AI-powered attacker reached root during the breach of DIVD. That is important. But the bigger lesson is what happened after the initial compromise. On September 21, the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure was breached through Zammad, an open-source helpdesk and ticketing platform. During the investigation, DIVD identified two previously undisclosed vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-102489 - a remotely exploitable vulnerability affecting Zammad 6.3.0 to 6.5.4 that can lead to code execution and session leakage. CVE-2026-102490 - a local privilege-escalation vulnerability that allowed the Zammad user to escalate to root. DIVD says the attacker used AI agents that selected their next actions dynamically during the intrusion. And they moved fast. According to DIVD, the agentic nature of the attack allowed parts of the intrusion to happen in seconds. The attacker was not flawless either. DIVD reported that the agent interfered with its own activity by performing password spraying and left unusually detailed comments explaining its actions, making parts of the intrusion easier to reconstruct. That is what makes this incident interesting. An AI-driven attacker does not need to be perfect. It needs to move quickly enough to exploit the opportunities your environment gives it. DIVD says network segmentation helped stop the attackers from moving deeper into its infrastructure. That shifts the defensive question. It is not only: "Can this system be compromised?" It is also: "What happens if it is?" If your helpdesk, ticketing platform, or another internet-facing internal service were compromised today, what could the attacker reach next? What credentials could it access? What internal systems trust it? How far could it move before something stops it? Prevention matters. So does blast radius. Assume the helpdesk is compromised. Then check what it can touch. Stay secure. Turn your FearsOff. #CyberSecurity #AISecurity #ZeroDay #AgenticAI #IncidentResponse #NetworkSecurity #FearsOff

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