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Protect Your Every Transaction. User App: chromewebstore.google.com/se… 🛡️ Dev Integration: Security Intelligence & SafeToken Protocol 🛡️

◷ Joined May 2021▧ 1,381 Photos and videos
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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Aug 18

📢GoPlus #DeepScan Comprehensive Upgrade: A New Paradigm of AI-Powered Smart Contract Security. Smart contracts hold funds — and hackers are already using AI to uncover deep-layer vulnerabilities. One-time audits can no longer keep pace with today's attack-defense dynamics. The industry must evolve toward AI-powered, continuous security: higher efficiency, lower cost, full-lifecycle protection. GoPlus DeepScan delivers three interconnected modules forming a closed-loop, continuous security service for the entire smart contract lifecycle: AI Contract Audit, Continuous Security Monitoring, and Token Security Self-Check. Features AI Auditing AI-powered deep analysis of contract source code, permission management, and business logic. Systematically detects syntax vulnerabilities and business-logic flaws, and delivers a structured audit report — including security scores, key findings, issue details, and remediation recommendations. Security Monitoring Post-audit, always-on assurance for live contracts. Tracks newly disclosed vulnerabilities, on-chain attacks, and status changes in external dependencies (oracles, cross-chain bridges) in real time. AI continuously assesses impact, triggers targeted re-reviews, and issues alerts — moving beyond the "audit as finish line" model. Token Security Checking A rapid pre-launch self-inspection tool for tokens preparing to launch or list. Identifies common high-risk characteristics in minutes, including: Honeypot detection, Malicious mint detection, Blacklist mechanism detection, Abnormal buy/sell tax detection, Owner privilege & trading restriction risks. Benchmark An open-source benchmark built from real-world attack incidents. Extracts vulnerable contract source code from attacked projects to systematically evaluate AI capabilities in vulnerability identification, attack-path understanding, contextual reasoning, and audit stability. Nearly 100 real, representative attack cases from May 2025 to date, continuously updated. Use Cases Developers — Cost-effective, high-efficiency security scanning with audit-grade quality, enabling fast, confident innovation. Project Teams — Pre-launch scanning as a complement to traditional audits; continuous auditing and monitoring during operations to stay ahead of attackers. Exchanges — Enhanced pre-listing security review efficiency and capability; continuous monitoring as routine risk control to catch new threats early and minimize post-listing incidents. Get Started GoPlus DeepScan is live — try it now: **deepscan.gopluslabs.io/** AI Auditing Benchmark: github.com/GoPlusSecurity/ai…

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 17

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: Widespread Malicious Code Injection in Optimizely Web Customer Projects On November 16, attackers injected malicious code into custom JavaScript across multiple Optimizely Web customer projects, causing affected websites to serve malicious content through previously trusted scripts. The incident affected 178 organizations, including websites operated by CNN, Zoom, BBC, GitLab, and Ledger. The malicious code attempts to swap crypto recipient addresses for attacker-controlled addresses on pages, in input fields, and in the clipboard. It can also skim payment card details entered into affected sites’ forms, steal non-HttpOnly cookies, capture page screenshots, and deliver Coruna / DarkSword exploits targeting certain iOS devices. Card details inside hosted payment iframes, such as those from Stripe and Adyen, were outside the script’s direct reach. For attacker addresses, which have received approximately $7K, and the list of affected websites, see: blog.report-uri.com/worlds-l… GoPlus has blocklisted the attacker addresses. Exercise caution on affected sites and double-check recipient addresses before sending funds. 🛡 Security Recommendations Website operators: Inspect custom code in your Optimizely projects and experiments. Review accounts, API tokens, and write permissions. Monitor third-party scripts for changes and unexpected outbound connections. Crypto users: Review recipient addresses you copied or entered on affected websites on November 16, along with any transactions you initiated. Always double-check recipient addresses before sending funds, and watch for unauthorized transactions. iOS users: Update to the latest iOS or iPadOS version available for your device. Report URI notes that the exploit kit’s own comments identify versions 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched. Monitor your wallets for unauthorized transactions.

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 17

#Lighter Incident Breakdown: Nonce Reuse in Custom Signing Code Enabled API Private Key Recovery 1️⃣ Affected Accounts An attacker derived the API private keys for two trading accounts on Lighter and used them to move funds out of those accounts. Approximately $15.48M was reportedly affected, with around $5M in USDC recovered and returned to the affected trader by the Lighter Security Council. Reported affected accounts: Account 1: Lighter Account ID: 714710 Associated onchain address: 0x0d1D09312665D31Ed68231b88079a245E0458F6F Amount affected: ~$10.39M Account 2: Lighter Account ID: 714723 Associated onchain address: 0x66Cf2f85115CC20bF439720927C1f93De9672068 Amount affected: ~$5.09M 2️⃣ Root Cause The affected accounts used insecure, unofficial signing code that reused cryptographic signing nonces across different transactions. This allowed the attacker to derive the API private keys from publicly available signatures. Lighter said its protocol, smart contracts, and official SDKs were unaffected. The attacker moved the funds through the following sequence: Create a public pool using the compromised account → Mint pool shares to an attacker-controlled account → Transfer the victim’s funds into the pool, increasing its net asset value (NAV) without issuing corresponding shares to the victim → Redeem the attacker’s shares and withdraw the funds. 3️⃣ Funds Withdrawn The attacker withdrew approximately 10.39M USDC from Lighter and swapped the proceeds for ETH. Onchain tracing identified part of the proceeds moving through multiple wallets to buy XMR1 on Hyperliquid. XMR1 should not be conflated with native Monero ($XMR). The available evidence does not establish that these purchases drove up Monero’s price. 4️⃣ Reported Attacker Account and Address Lighter Account ID: 769455 Associated onchain address: 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387 🛡️ Security Recommendations ▪️ Use Lighter’s official Python, Go, or TypeScript SDKs, or its Agent Kit. Avoid implementing your own signing logic. ▪️ Let the official signer handle cryptographic signing nonces. Never reuse a signing nonce or substitute timestamps, counters, weak random values, or cached values. Signing nonces are distinct from transaction nonces. ▪️ If your code may have reused signing nonces, revoke and replace all related API keys immediately. Fixing the code alone isn’t enough. ▪️ Enable IP allowlisting and per-key permissions and limits as they become available. Separate permissions for trading, transfers, pool creation, and redemptions wherever supported. ▪️ Lighter now requires wallet signatures for transfers into public pools and no longer exposes API signatures publicly.

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 16

7/7 📌 Related Addresses and Transactions Attacker’s main wallet on Kava—index manipulation and liquidations: kava1uzx5924cqsutcw365ajs8kkc3rr4vtlyzms255 Attacker’s helper wallet on Kava—127 KAVA borrowing transactions: kava1v2s266sll8ca5xrs06swmsc00nwwt7u77eufk4 Selling addresses: kava1xltn9y20smxxav0gwsv7xpr2ww0szyzzga76lv (Kava Cosmos) 0x37d732914f86cc6eb1e87419e3046a739f011042 (Kava EVM / BNB Chain) Kava Lend module account (hard): kava1a42xtwfzphuuu9mdp0es6633wu5mm8fhm789v3 LayerZero contract (Kava EVM): 0x964fef44181763f5ee8eddfa124c9ad476570e2a KAVA OFT contract (BNB Chain): 0x9bafc8d4b487cebff201721702507a3e2c67ad79 Key attack transactions: mintscan.io/kava/tx/6C00E9ED… mintscan.io/kava/tx/D5D8F728… mintscan.io/kava/tx/C59113E2… mintscan.io/kava/tx/3B32EFCF… mintscan.io/kava/tx/3F79C5AD… Example cross-chain transaction—source and destination chains: mintscan.io/kava/tx/0x062c77… (Source: Kava) bscscan.com/tx/0x76c34906326… (Destination: BNB Chain) Example selling transactions: bscscan.com/tx/0x5973dc1e5e0… bscscan.com/tx/0xa3e2e8b63ad…

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 16

6/7 5️⃣ Transferring the borrowed KAVA back to the main wallet, then bridging to BNB Chain via LayerZero for sale The helper wallet transferred 53,932,564.485351 KAVA to the main wallet. The main wallet subsequently sent most of those funds to the selling address, kava1xltn9y20smxxav0gwsv7xpr2ww0szyzzga76lv, corresponding to 0x37d732914f86cc6eb1e87419e3046a739f011042 on Kava EVM and BNB Chain. Through the LayerZero contract on Kava, 0x964fef44181763f5ee8eddfa124c9ad476570e2a, this address bridged out 149,045.86 KAVA and 48,209,645.86 KAVA, including fees. The corresponding amounts minted to the selling address on BNB Chain were 149,000 KAVA and 48,209,600 KAVA, totaling 48,358,600 KAVA. A third transfer bridged out approximately 849,080.97 KAVA, bringing the total across all three transfers to approximately 49.21 million KAVA.

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 16

5/7 4️⃣ Repeatedly borrowing KAVA through two wallets and using liquidation to bypass the borrowing cap The main wallet transferred BUSD to the helper wallet, kava1v2s266sll8ca5xrs06swmsc00nwwt7u77eufk4, which deposited it as collateral. The main wallet immediately withdrew the same BUSD against its inflated deposit claim. The helper wallet then borrowed KAVA, and the main wallet submitted MsgLiquidate in the following block. The first liquidation auction recorded lot = 0 BUSD and max_bid = 31392966446 ukava. The loan was closed, reopening capacity under the borrowing cap. The loop ran from 12:04:21 to 13:42:04 Beijing time (UTC+8), executing 127 MsgBorrow messages and borrowing a total of 55,205,050.601443 KAVA over approximately 98 minutes. Initial loans were smaller because little capacity remained under the cap; after about six minutes, each loan increased to approximately 445,720 KAVA. Example transaction—the first loan of 31,392.966444 KAVA: mintscan.io/kava/tx/3B32EFCF… Example transaction—the first liquidation, with an auction lot of 0 BUSD: mintscan.io/kava/tx/3F79C5AD…

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 16

4/7 3️⃣ Withdrawing the pool’s cash while retaining the inflated deposit claim After the index had inflated, the main wallet deposited another 1 base unit of BUSD, repaid its earlier BUSD loan—1,267.20663345 BUSD including interest—and executed MsgWithdraw for 7,618.44761922 BUSD. It retained the inflated BUSD deposit claim. Transaction: mintscan.io/kava/tx/C59113E2…

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 16

3/7 2️⃣ Reducing net supply to 2 base units (2×10⁻⁸ BUSD) with a tiny BUSD loan In a subsequent transaction, the same address executed the following sequence: MsgDeposit of 3,801.60356061 BUSD, MsgBorrow of 1,267.20118686 BUSD, and MsgWithdraw of 1,267.20118686 BUSD. The resulting on-chain state was: Module account cash (cash): 635,124,161,944 Outstanding borrows (borrows): 126,720,118,686 Reserves (reserves): 761,844,280,628 Net supply was therefore totalSupply = cash + borrows − reserves = 2, equivalent to 2×10⁻⁸ BUSD. Over the next approximately three minutes, supplyInterestFactor increased by roughly 243,000×. Transaction: mintscan.io/kava/tx/D5D8F728…

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 16

2/7 🔗 Attack Sequence: 1️⃣ Repaying all outstanding BUSD loans The main wallet, kava1uzx5924cqsutcw365ajs8kkc3rr4vtlyzms255, submitted 37 MsgRepay messages in a single transaction, repaying every outstanding loan in the market. This replenished the pool’s available cash and reduced outstanding borrows to zero. Transaction: mintscan.io/kava/tx/6C00E9ED…

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 16

1/7 ⚠️ Exploit Analysis: On November 14, @KAVA_CHAIN’s native lending protocol Kava Lend was exploited. The attacker reduced the net supply of its largely inactive BUSD market to just 2 base units, inflating the market’s supply interest index by approximately 243,000× in about three minutes. The attacker then used inflated BUSD deposit claims to borrow 55,205,050.60 KAVA across 127 transactions—worth approximately $3.76 million at the pre-attack price. 🔍 Root Cause: Kava Lend uses the supply interest index, supplyInterestFactor, to distribute interest paid by borrowers to depositors. It divides the interest accrued since the previous block, newInterest, by the market’s net supply, totalSupply (cash + borrows − reserves). The public code skips the division and returns a neutral factor when net supply is exactly zero, but does not guard against a positive yet extremely small denominator. When totalSupply approaches zero while remaining positive, the resulting supply interest index can become massively inflated. github.com/Kava-Labs/kava/bl… The attacker first repaid all 37 outstanding BUSD loans on behalf of their borrowers, then used a single deposit–borrow–withdraw transaction to reduce net supply to 2 base units (2×10⁻⁸ BUSD). The tiny amount of interest accrued each block was then divided by these 2 base units, causing the index to rise from approximately 2.76 to 671,186.99—roughly 243,000×—in about three minutes. As a result, the main wallet’s previously deposited BUSD was recorded as a claim worth approximately 1.25449 billion BUSD. The attacker then used a second wallet in a loop: the helper wallet deposited BUSD as collateral; the main wallet withdrew the same BUSD against its inflated deposit claim; and the helper wallet borrowed KAVA at a loan-to-value ratio of approximately 50%. In the next block, the main wallet liquidated the helper wallet. Despite there being almost no BUSD left in the pool to seize—the first liquidation auction had a lot of 0 BUSD—the loan was still closed, freeing up capacity under the KAVA borrowing cap. The configured maximum_limit for ukava was equivalent to 448,358 KAVA.

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 14

⚠️ Cursor has published a security incident report on the earlier supply chain attack. According to the investigation, the attacker used access keys issued by Cursor to Fireworks and subsequently exposed on Fireworks’ side to gain access to some of Cursor’s SaaS services and internal systems. The attacker ultimately tampered with the distribution cache for the Claude Code extension to collect information about users’ machines and install SSH backdoors. cursor.com/cn/blog/security-… The compromised versions were Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 in Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace distribution cache, affecting macOS and Windows. The exposure window ran from October 29 at 17:27 to October 30 at 04:35 (UTC+8), with up to approximately 5,000 users affected. Security recommendation: If you installed or updated to either affected version through Cursor’s marketplace during this window, read the official notice as soon as possible and run the remediation script for your platform to check for and remediate any compromise: cursor.com/cn/blog/claude-co… Fireworks’ initial announcement and subsequent update: fireworks.ai/security/bullet… fireworks.ai/security/bullet…

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 14

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: Telegram’s recently introduced HTML widgets feature poses a remote code execution risk. Security researchers have demonstrated the issue through bot messages on Android and Desktop. Although Telegram has rolled out some fixes, patch coverage remains incomplete, with potential bypasses still possible, particularly on PC. 🛡️ Security Recommendations: 1. Avoid interacting with unknown bots, and do not click “Start.” 2. Do not open unfamiliar chats or suspicious links. 3. Once a complete fix is confirmed, promptly update to the latest version of Telegram. 4. Trust only officially verified channels.

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 11

🎉 OpenFour × GoPlus launch their Ecosystem Incentive Program with up to $500,000 in prizes for next-gen launch mechanisms. GoPlus offers free token security audits for selected mechanisms, helping developers spot common contract risks earlier.

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 11

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: At approximately 18:45 UTC on November 10, 2026, Across suffered a DNS hijacking attack. The attacker gained control of Across’s domain through a social engineering attack targeting Namecheap and replaced the official Across website with a phishing site. ⚠️ Total user losses are estimated at $350,000, with funds stolen from user wallets on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Ink, and Plasma. The malicious phishing page lured users into signing one or more of the following types of authorizations or transactions: 1. EIP-2612 permit: The attacker submits users’ off-chain signatures on their behalf, then calls transferFrom to transfer their tokens. 2. Permit2 authorization: A malicious spender transfers users’ assets through the canonical Permit2 contract. 3. Direct approve calls or other transaction-based authorizations. 4. In some cases, users may also be tricked into transferring funds directly. Malicious spender addresses used by the attacker—check and revoke any associated approvals immediately: 0x46a2a474d4c22bf1ae4f8fa55da7a58673472be2 0xdbd7fbe5b7cd56f99c059dc24052009d2626125c 0x5ff35703c22533398d5c7ce7acd32a04ac8462da 0x2ff67cddd9ff45e0b47957d9d7c19b0732f9c514 0x373c415ef034bb620e8d720afd2ace26bca13529 0xdcd65e3a8f3b73c7e2f40dbab1fb95dbef871d6c 0x3ef438c34ce51a697a24247fe033c4562c94f0fd 0x0c894c253c62eda066197011efd73b632dc96263 Addresses identified by Across as recipients of stolen funds: 0x2846e69d3298e99eddf2fd8116e952844da11fde 0x0c7c656126aa62625fdd8051eb69dc14aee8d37b 0x3ef438c34ce51a697a24247fe033c4562c94f0fd 0xa0e6c7d79b74d1a6d366dd11309b6faafda05ac5 🚑 Recovery Update: At 01:16:45 UTC on November 11, 2026, Across announced that it had regained control of its domain and restored its systems. It also committed to compensating affected users. A full post-mortem report will follow. 🛡️ Security Recommendations: 1. Stay alert if a website behaves unexpectedly or differs from your previous experience. DNS hijacking can redirect you to a malicious clone of the legitimate site. 2. If you signed a suspicious transaction or noticed an unexpected transfer, investigate the cause immediately and move your remaining assets to a newly created, secure wallet as soon as possible. 3. Use tools such as the GoPlus security extension to check and revoke suspicious approvals as soon as possible.

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 11

⚠️ Keep your phone and computer updated to the latest OS version. More importantly: don’t install sketchy software or click unfamiliar links!

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GoPlus Security 🚦@GoPlusSecurity·Nov 10

8/8 Attacker address (transaction initiator / relayer): 0x9A88Dd45AE846A979705c9cFdfD0f229e592D703 Attacker’s recipient address: 0x119D250b82C1cf5345dF5912EFb4B1a4107a1Aa6 Exploited contract (Ankr Bridge on Ethereum): 0xc437DF90B37C1dB6657339E31BfE54627f0e7181 Notary / signer address (recovered via ecrecover for all five withdrawals): 0x4069d8a3de3a72eca86ca5e0a4b94619085e7362 Consolidation wallet: 0x4Ea3da46a7B15b50A519D6f8e79eE02Cd6bFe2D2 Related operational wallets that were swept: 0xf33715d923e78d5df18275d2763426dec5c64add 0x102aaeb12120c7158a102806544757cd5787ea85 0x8e708d5827ea364ae18a3ce563a33b809fd249f4 0x9846c1f06d2f0e7c4678aeea56eb826efe41bb9a Attack transactions (forged withdrawals): etherscan.io/tx/0x7310af5d53… etherscan.io/tx/0x90c563360c… etherscan.io/tx/0xde2d5b455c… etherscan.io/tx/0x91ba1a9c81… etherscan.io/tx/0x46e20d4c8c… #Optimism source transaction reused across all five receipts: optimistic.etherscan.io/tx/0… Legitimate #Ethereum transaction corresponding to the source transaction: etherscan.io/tx/0xe66cb86e5c… Related wallet-sweeping transaction (example): etherscan.io/tx/0xec3bec8779…