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Hugo Bromley178 posts
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Hugo Bromley

@HugoBromley

Historian who wanders. Economic Statecraft @CamGeopolitics, @RobinsonCamb. Visiting Fellow @HooverInst PhD @CamHistory

◷ Joined May 2022▧ 3 Photos and videos
Simon French avatar
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Simon French@Frencheconomics·13h

The UK's fresh productivity data (released yesterday by the ONS) does present a rather awkward data backdrop to the UK-EU summit. It now reveals that since the Brexit vote in 2016 the UK's productivity performance has accelerated away from comparable EU economies - having largely tracked them (2016-2025) in the previous iteration of this data. It must call into question the validity of the (widely cited) NBER estimate that Brexit triggered a 3%-4% reduction in UK productivity. We have consistently believed the -ve Brexit impact to be closer to half this level.

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International Security avatar
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International Security@IntSecHarvard·Nov 6

6) “The Malacca Myth: Why the United States Should Be Wary of a Distant Blockade Against China,” by @HugoBromley and @eyckfreymann doi.org/10.1162/ISEC.a.428 This article is open access.

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Hugo Bromley@HugoBromley·Nov 5

If Democrats are looking for a clear agenda that puts Republicans in the most difficult position possible, they should just listen to Brad…

I am a little worried that America's great companies only seem to be able to make money in the United States. Look how little they earn in the big Asian and big European countries ... 1/many

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Javier Blas@JavierBlas·Nov 2

The Chinese view on the Strait of Hormuz keeps hardening (against Iran). This is the joint communique between China and Oman, issued today: “….The two sides believed that the Strait of Hormuz should return to normal and safely open to navigation…”

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Macro Zoro@ShortCircuit_KJ·Oct 23

Adam Tooze makes a useful point about bond markets that often gets inverted. When Germany barely issued new debt (debt brake + surpluses), Bunds became scarce. Bond traders and portfolio managers still need high-quality paper to buy, sell, and hold. So French OATs stepped in as the closest substitute. Demand for French bonds rose, prices went up, yields fell — and France temporarily joined the “high-quality” club alongside Germany. Scarcity of the safest asset doesn’t mean managers love thin markets. It means capital gets pushed into the next-best alternative until that scarcity eases. Once German issuance picked up and perceptions shifted, France’s spreads widened again.

. @adam_tooze one year ago

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Michael Pettis@michaelxpettis·Oct 11

NYT: "Maros Sefcovic, the trade commissioner of the 27-nation bloc, said that the understanding could lead to China’s halving the number of hybrid gasoline-electric cars that it sends to the European Union in the next four years." This may seem like a victory, but the problem is a systemic one, and not sectoral. Because this agreement does not in any way address either China's demand imbalance or the overall role of the EU in absorbing that imbalance, it won't have much effect on overall EU manufacturing. All that will happen is a shift in the locus of net manufacturing imports from China, so that EU producers of hybrids will be better off, but at the expense of other EU manufacturers. For historical reasons, trade discussions are usually held on a product-by-product basis, but while that may make sense in a world of broadly balanced trade, it makes no sense in a world of deep, persistent imbalances. China runs huge surpluses not because it produces too many hybrids but rather because of its deep consumption imbalance and the very low household income share of GDP. As long as that happens, the only recourse for the EU, if it does not want to accept deindustrialization, is either to reduce its own household share of GDP (which would be politically disruptive as well as bad for the global economy) or to intervene in its external accounts in such a way that it reverses the competitive impact of China's low household share of GDP. nytimes.com/2026/10/09/busin…

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BBC Radio 4 Today@BBCr4today·Oct 8

Britain needs to stop 'throwing shade' at itself, the London Stock Exchange's CEO says. Julia Hoggett tells Today business presenter @WillBain31 the nation's negativity has driven companies to delist from the UK. Hear the Big Boss Interview on Sounds 🔊 bbc.co.uk/sounds/brand/p016t…

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Simon French@Frencheconomics·Oct 8

Credit @WillBain31 for this interview. What Julia speaks to about self-confidence is no doubt correct. The interview also acknowledges that the UK is an outlier at having tax reliefs that are agnostic to the country in which the underlying company pays tax. Franked dividends in Australia are a good long-held example. Trump Accounts in the US the most contemporary example. Moving beyond mandation would endogenise the fiduciary duty issue that dogged the passage of the Pension Schemes Bill, Mansion House Accord. Ending rationing of capital would be addressed by a lot of what Julia talks about.

Britain needs to stop 'throwing shade' at itself, the London Stock Exchange's CEO says. Julia Hoggett tells Today business presenter @WillBain31 the nation's negativity has driven companies to delist from the UK. Hear the Big Boss Interview on Sounds 🔊 bbc.co.uk/sounds/brand/p016t…

1:49
Michael Pettis avatar
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Michael Pettis@michaelxpettis·Oct 6

1/2 This is why, when examining the impact on US manufacturing of external shocks, it is important to separate the manufacturing share of output from the manufacturing share of employment. When the manufacturing share of employment declines because of a rise in manufacturing productivity, this is a good thing, and is precisely the reason why countries should want to specialize in manufacturing. Even China, whose share of global manufacturing has surged in recent years, has seen a decline in the manufacturing share of employment. This is exactly the definition of productivity growth. But when the manufacturing share of employment declines because of a decline in the manufacturing share of GDP, this is a very different thing. It means the country is reducing its ability to take advantage of rising productivity in manufacturing. This is clearly not a good thing. I am always a little shocked when American economists dismiss the importance of manufacturing to the US economy by pointing to the long-term decline in the manufacturing share of employment in the US. This is not evidence that manufacturing doesn't matter. On the contrary, it is evidence that countries that specialize in manufacturing benefit from more rapid productivity growth.

A few comments on the China shock debate, from a more "macro" point of view that sets aside the vicious debate about "identification" -- There was clearly a downturn in manufacturing output around the time of China's WTO entry (it doesn't recover til 06/07) 1/

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