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IFP

@IFP

A think tank for accelerating scientific, technological, and industrial progress. Follow our team: twitter.com/i/lists/15320131…

◷ Joined April 2013▧ 29 Photos and videos
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IFP@IFP·Oct 20

Our Director of Policy Implementation @ArnabDatta321 organized a new letter in support of BAAJA:

NEWS: 19 FORMER ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERS ENDORSE THE BIPARTISAN PERMITTING REFORM BILL Today, a group of former Cabinet members and White House principals across seven Democratic and Republican administrations sent a letter calling on Congress to pass BAAJA. Here are the signatories: Janet YELLEN, Michael R. POMPEO, Steven T. MNUCHIN, Leon E. PANETTA, Timothy F. GEITHNER, Henry M. PAULSON, Jr., Robert E. RUBIN, Stephen MIRAN, Jared BERNSTEIN, Tyler GOODSPEED, Jason FURMAN, Glenn HUBBARD, Laura D’Andrea TYSON, Michael J. BOSKIN, Jeffrey ZIENTS, Jake SULLIVAN, Brian DEESE, Larry KUDLOW, Allan B. HUBBARD Key highlights from the letter: 1. “We are not building infrastructure fast enough to remain globally competitive… The median time for a new power plant to move from an interconnection request to commercial operation has more than doubled, from less than two years for projects built between 2000 and 2007 to more than four years for projects built between 2018 and 2024. 2. China has built more high-voltage transmission in the last fifteen years than the U.S. has built in all of its history... In 2024, China accounted for 31.5% of global knowledge- and technology-intensive manufacturing value added, compared with 20.7% for the United States. 3. Federally funded or permitted projects require NEPA review, but private projects often do not, creating a threat of failure precisely where the government is trying to be proactive, strategic, and engaged. 4. A project that spends years awaiting approval must continue carrying development and financing costs while remaining exposed to rising input costs. The IEA reports that prices for utility-scale transformers increased 26% in 2024, while lead times for some transformers have stretched as long as six years. 5. Mining projects also face tremendous uncertainty: a 2026 study by researchers at the Colorado School of Mines found that permitting for modern mining projects takes an average of 5.5 years, rising to 8.9 years for contested projects. The U.S. currently has the second-longest mine development timeline in the world. 6. The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is the most significant bipartisan legislative effort that Congress has undertaken in decades to tackle these challenges. 7. BAAJA addresses key constraints stifling American industry by requiring interregional transmission planning, strengthening the federal backstop for nationally significant transmission lines, and creating a faster, more predictable process for connecting new generation to the grid. 8. BAAJA also makes permits more durable by imposing tighter timelines for litigation and limiting frivolous lawsuits that can halt projects indefinitely, while preserving community input and judicial review of substantive agency decisions.” The letter was organized by @arnabdatta321 on behalf of @IFP and covered exclusively by the WSJ this morning.

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Julian Brave NoiseCat avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Julian Brave NoiseCat@jnoisecat·15h

That's a pretty substantial increase to try to bolster tribal capacity to respond to expedited reviews

Pretty big news: the funding for the Historic Preservation Fund has been increased from $200M per year to $300M per year! The fund exists to support state and Tribal review and consultation, allowing better quality review to get done faster

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Aidan Mackenzie avatar
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Aidan Mackenzie@AidanRMackenzie·12h

Senator Merkley’s sign is false BAAJA does not “lock in” projects, it requires agencies to identify specific conditions before revoking permits (illegality is covered) Few data centers even require federal permits — BAAJA’s main effect is making data centers pay more!

.@SenJeffMerkley is on the floor right now speaking against BAAJA. Comes as he is primed to lead the EPW committee next year, a main panel that negotiated the permitting bill.

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Reed Schwartz avatar
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Reed Schwartz@reedschwartzsf·16h

The new THUD appropriations draft would ban HUD from carrying out the single-stair provisions in ROAD:

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Aidan Mackenzie avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Aidan Mackenzie@AidanRMackenzie·16h

Pretty big news: the funding for the Historic Preservation Fund has been increased from $200M per year to $300M per year! The fund exists to support state and Tribal review and consultation, allowing better quality review to get done faster

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SCOOP: Senate permitting reform negotiators have finalized changes to BAAJA ahead of the final vote expected this week. I obtained the new managers' amendment text. It has compromise tribal/NHPA changes I scooped this am and tweaks to landowner compensation for transmission

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Will Poff-Webster avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Will Poff-Webster@willpoffwebster·Nov 16

Congress acted within weeks when the financial crisis and Covid happened. It is a sleeping giant

I also think everyone who believes this is just wrong about how fast Congress can move if they conclude that there's a real emergency.

Andrew Gerard avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Andrew Gerard@andrewmgerard·Nov 16

We relaunched Macroscience a year ago. 6 months ago I listed our top pieces (see below). Here are the top pieces from the second 6 months of the year: The Six Camps of Metascience: The big insight of this article is that when people talk about metascience they mean different things (specifically, 6 different things). @calebwatney and @jenngustetic's piece is useful both as an intro to metascience and in understanding the dynamism within this movement. macroscience.org/p/the-six-c… Metascience is Ignoring the National Labs: I was surprised about how much interest this piece garnered, which underlines its key point - metascience people (like me) underestimate the importance of the Labs to American science. Don’t be part of the problem - read @CabanaChemistry's piece. macroscience.org/p/metascien… America Already Build the World’s Largest Science Vetting Machine: This joint effort (@innovationwonk, @stuartbuck1, @banksianr, Amit Gupta) makes the case that philanthropy should have the opportunity to support unfunded federal science applications. It’s a simple, compelling argument. Let’s implement it already. macroscience.org/p/america-a…

We re-launched Macroscience 6 months ago. Below I share our 3 most read pieces from the last 6 months, and my guess as to why they did well: 1. Do Not Surrender to the Tech Tree (@taoburr). Tao articulated what many people had been unable to put into words. At a crucial moment in AI development, Tao laid out a theory of tech determinism that called out for us to seize windows of opportunity. macroscience.org/p/do-not-su… 2. To Get More Effective Drugs, We Need More Human Trials (@RuxandraTeslo and @JackScannell13). Like Tao, Rux and Jack tapped into interest in rapidly changing tech, but demonstrated how the need for human trials creates a huge bottleneck to pharmaceutical development (even in the context of powerful AI). macroscience.org/p/to-get-mo… 3. NSF Tech Labs FAQs (The @IFP Metascience Team). Turns out, people like it when you provide helpful info! We wrote this piece when NSF had released a Request for Information about their Tech Labs (now titled X-Labs) program. I hope it encouraged some people to submit RFI responses. Here's our FAQs piece: macroscience.org/p/nsf-tech-… And here's the NSF X-Labs program announced last week: nsf.gov/funding/initiatives/…

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Jason Baker avatar
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Jason Baker@JasonBakerJB·Nov 16

Awesome summary and discussion by Tim and I agree: It's pretty good!

The Commerce Department has released a major new export control rule targeting China’s access to advanced AI compute. It’s pretty good! Here’s what it does: (1) Restricts Chinese access to overseas AI clusters (seeks to address one of China’s largest and fastest-growing sources of AI compute) This is a new worldwide end-use control, which we’ve previously recommended (third option in image below). A license is required if providing cloud AI compute to Chinese or D:5-headquartered countries, or if acting as an intermediary training models for these actors. Technical requirements are: - Applies to any data center or group of “linked data centers” or providing more than 12 million aggregate TPP of compute (the equivalent of around 760 H100s) of AI chips meeting the current controlled thresholds. - “Linked data centers” are defined as sharing physical or virtual computing resources, jointly balancing workloads, or replicating data as a unified whole. So this is intended to capture multi-data center training runs. This applies everywhere except the US. It also covers existing data centers, which have a 90-day deadline to get a license. (2) New controls for AI chips going to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil (seeks to address smuggling of AI chips to China via third countries) The evidence for large-scale smuggling of AI chips to China via Malaysia and Singapore is strong, and there’s also evidence this is happening via Indonesia and Thailand. Brazil, on the other hand, is a bit of a head-scratcher. This is a case-by-case license review policy, rather than a presumption of denial (that's the policy for chips going directly to China/D:5 countries). BIS will evaluate each license on national security grounds. There’s an exclusion for qualifying US-headquartered recipients, subject to reporting requirements. (3) Formally repeals the AI Diffusion Rule This has been a long time coming. This eliminates the country-tier system, the Validated End User authorizations (VEU) for data centers, and export controls on advanced AI model weights. However, the replacement measures above address many of the gaps created by this, and, of course, the AI Diffusion rule wasn’t actually being enforced. (4) Tightens controls on Chinese chip designs manufactured abroad This modifies and strengthens the Biden-era “Foundry Due Diligence” rule, which applies to foundries and OSATs. This seeks to prevent Chinese chip designers from circumventing export controls through overseas foundries and packaging facilities. It’s an important complement to the measures above. — So what are the gaps? More on this to come, but from an initial read: (1) To determine remote-access eligibility, the rule requires due diligence on direct or indirect Chinese ownership or control. However, its licensing trigger is based around company headquarters and ultimate-parent headquarters, which could allow for some shenanigans around corporate structures. (2) The rule doesn’t prescribe how AI compute providers must verify customers' identities, or require them to identify and verify every user accessing their compute. The rigor of these checks could vary widely across providers. (3) The end-use restrictions don’t apply when compute is used exclusively for commercial recommender systems. So this opens a path for large-scale Chinese AI compute usage. This could be fine if verifying this kind of use is possible, but this is likely outside the current technical capabilities of many AI compute providers. (4) The end-use restrictions don’t apply to data centers in the US. So a Chinese company can still access large amounts of AI compute via US data centers. This is an interim final rule, meaning it would take effect upon publication in the Federal Register, while allowing 60 days for public comments. Read the full interim final rule here: bis.gov/media/documents/rin-…

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Nathan Calvin avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Nathan Calvin@_NathanCalvin·Nov 16

The new commerce department rule on remote access seems like a big deal. I haven't read it but Tim Fist has!

The Commerce Department has released a major new export control rule targeting China’s access to advanced AI compute. It’s pretty good! Here’s what it does: (1) Restricts Chinese access to overseas AI clusters (seeks to address one of China’s largest and fastest-growing sources of AI compute) This is a new worldwide end-use control, which we’ve previously recommended (third option in image below). A license is required if providing cloud AI compute to Chinese or D:5-headquartered countries, or if acting as an intermediary training models for these actors. Technical requirements are: - Applies to any data center or group of “linked data centers” or providing more than 12 million aggregate TPP of compute (the equivalent of around 760 H100s) of AI chips meeting the current controlled thresholds. - “Linked data centers” are defined as sharing physical or virtual computing resources, jointly balancing workloads, or replicating data as a unified whole. So this is intended to capture multi-data center training runs. This applies everywhere except the US. It also covers existing data centers, which have a 90-day deadline to get a license. (2) New controls for AI chips going to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil (seeks to address smuggling of AI chips to China via third countries) The evidence for large-scale smuggling of AI chips to China via Malaysia and Singapore is strong, and there’s also evidence this is happening via Indonesia and Thailand. Brazil, on the other hand, is a bit of a head-scratcher. This is a case-by-case license review policy, rather than a presumption of denial (that's the policy for chips going directly to China/D:5 countries). BIS will evaluate each license on national security grounds. There’s an exclusion for qualifying US-headquartered recipients, subject to reporting requirements. (3) Formally repeals the AI Diffusion Rule This has been a long time coming. This eliminates the country-tier system, the Validated End User authorizations (VEU) for data centers, and export controls on advanced AI model weights. However, the replacement measures above address many of the gaps created by this, and, of course, the AI Diffusion rule wasn’t actually being enforced. (4) Tightens controls on Chinese chip designs manufactured abroad This modifies and strengthens the Biden-era “Foundry Due Diligence” rule, which applies to foundries and OSATs. This seeks to prevent Chinese chip designers from circumventing export controls through overseas foundries and packaging facilities. It’s an important complement to the measures above. — So what are the gaps? More on this to come, but from an initial read: (1) To determine remote-access eligibility, the rule requires due diligence on direct or indirect Chinese ownership or control. However, its licensing trigger is based around company headquarters and ultimate-parent headquarters, which could allow for some shenanigans around corporate structures. (2) The rule doesn’t prescribe how AI compute providers must verify customers' identities, or require them to identify and verify every user accessing their compute. The rigor of these checks could vary widely across providers. (3) The end-use restrictions don’t apply when compute is used exclusively for commercial recommender systems. So this opens a path for large-scale Chinese AI compute usage. This could be fine if verifying this kind of use is possible, but this is likely outside the current technical capabilities of many AI compute providers. (4) The end-use restrictions don’t apply to data centers in the US. So a Chinese company can still access large amounts of AI compute via US data centers. This is an interim final rule, meaning it would take effect upon publication in the Federal Register, while allowing 60 days for public comments. Read the full interim final rule here: bis.gov/media/documents/rin-…

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Leah Libresco Sargeant avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Leah Libresco Sargeant@LeahLibresco·Nov 16

Let’s goooooo

The Commerce Department has released a major new export control rule targeting China’s access to advanced AI compute. It’s pretty good! Here’s what it does: (1) Restricts Chinese access to overseas AI clusters (seeks to address one of China’s largest and fastest-growing sources of AI compute) This is a new worldwide end-use control, which we’ve previously recommended (third option in image below). A license is required if providing cloud AI compute to Chinese or D:5-headquartered countries, or if acting as an intermediary training models for these actors. Technical requirements are: - Applies to any data center or group of “linked data centers” or providing more than 12 million aggregate TPP of compute (the equivalent of around 760 H100s) of AI chips meeting the current controlled thresholds. - “Linked data centers” are defined as sharing physical or virtual computing resources, jointly balancing workloads, or replicating data as a unified whole. So this is intended to capture multi-data center training runs. This applies everywhere except the US. It also covers existing data centers, which have a 90-day deadline to get a license. (2) New controls for AI chips going to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil (seeks to address smuggling of AI chips to China via third countries) The evidence for large-scale smuggling of AI chips to China via Malaysia and Singapore is strong, and there’s also evidence this is happening via Indonesia and Thailand. Brazil, on the other hand, is a bit of a head-scratcher. This is a case-by-case license review policy, rather than a presumption of denial (that's the policy for chips going directly to China/D:5 countries). BIS will evaluate each license on national security grounds. There’s an exclusion for qualifying US-headquartered recipients, subject to reporting requirements. (3) Formally repeals the AI Diffusion Rule This has been a long time coming. This eliminates the country-tier system, the Validated End User authorizations (VEU) for data centers, and export controls on advanced AI model weights. However, the replacement measures above address many of the gaps created by this, and, of course, the AI Diffusion rule wasn’t actually being enforced. (4) Tightens controls on Chinese chip designs manufactured abroad This modifies and strengthens the Biden-era “Foundry Due Diligence” rule, which applies to foundries and OSATs. This seeks to prevent Chinese chip designers from circumventing export controls through overseas foundries and packaging facilities. It’s an important complement to the measures above. — So what are the gaps? More on this to come, but from an initial read: (1) To determine remote-access eligibility, the rule requires due diligence on direct or indirect Chinese ownership or control. However, its licensing trigger is based around company headquarters and ultimate-parent headquarters, which could allow for some shenanigans around corporate structures. (2) The rule doesn’t prescribe how AI compute providers must verify customers' identities, or require them to identify and verify every user accessing their compute. The rigor of these checks could vary widely across providers. (3) The end-use restrictions don’t apply when compute is used exclusively for commercial recommender systems. So this opens a path for large-scale Chinese AI compute usage. This could be fine if verifying this kind of use is possible, but this is likely outside the current technical capabilities of many AI compute providers. (4) The end-use restrictions don’t apply to data centers in the US. So a Chinese company can still access large amounts of AI compute via US data centers. This is an interim final rule, meaning it would take effect upon publication in the Federal Register, while allowing 60 days for public comments. Read the full interim final rule here: bis.gov/media/documents/rin-…

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Ben Schifman avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Ben Schifman@BenSchifman·Nov 16

It is odd to claim that stuff the Trump admin is doing today "requires BAAJA" (a bill that has not been passed). BAAJA would not remove courts' ability to block unlawful actions by the Trump administration. If we look at the recent golf course injunction specifically, you can see that BAAJA actually would not have changed the result. 1. BAAJA would change the judicial remedies that a court can issue under a few laws, one of which (National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA) is implicated in the lawsuit. 2. But the *majority of the claims* the injunction rested on were not NEPA claims but rather Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims, specifically: (a) closing the golf course without notice-and-comment rulemaking violated NPS regulations; and (b) the agency's explanation of its decision (that the longstanding seawall issues and lack of an operator that the government itself had terminated) was irrational. 3. BAAJA limits injunctive relief under NEPA and NHPA (and to some extent CWA 404) but *expressly preserves* injunctive relief and all other remedies for all other laws, including the APA. 4. BAAJA therefore would not have prevented the court from issuing this injunction.

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TRUMP RAMPAGE ACROSS DC AND AMERICA REQUIRES BAAJA! Judge blocks Trump administration from closing East Potomac Park for golf project wapo.st/4iIRLHo (gift link) This is also why advocates for immigrants oppose current "permitting reform."

Tim Fist avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Tim Fist@fiiiiiist·Nov 16

The Commerce Department has released a major new export control rule targeting China’s access to advanced AI compute. It’s pretty good! Here’s what it does: (1) Restricts Chinese access to overseas AI clusters (seeks to address one of China’s largest and fastest-growing sources of AI compute) This is a new worldwide end-use control, which we’ve previously recommended (third option in image below). A license is required if providing cloud AI compute to Chinese or D:5-headquartered countries, or if acting as an intermediary training models for these actors. Technical requirements are: - Applies to any data center or group of “linked data centers” or providing more than 12 million aggregate TPP of compute (the equivalent of around 760 H100s) of AI chips meeting the current controlled thresholds. - “Linked data centers” are defined as sharing physical or virtual computing resources, jointly balancing workloads, or replicating data as a unified whole. So this is intended to capture multi-data center training runs. This applies everywhere except the US. It also covers existing data centers, which have a 90-day deadline to get a license. (2) New controls for AI chips going to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil (seeks to address smuggling of AI chips to China via third countries) The evidence for large-scale smuggling of AI chips to China via Malaysia and Singapore is strong, and there’s also evidence this is happening via Indonesia and Thailand. Brazil, on the other hand, is a bit of a head-scratcher. This is a case-by-case license review policy, rather than a presumption of denial (that's the policy for chips going directly to China/D:5 countries). BIS will evaluate each license on national security grounds. There’s an exclusion for qualifying US-headquartered recipients, subject to reporting requirements. (3) Formally repeals the AI Diffusion Rule This has been a long time coming. This eliminates the country-tier system, the Validated End User authorizations (VEU) for data centers, and export controls on advanced AI model weights. However, the replacement measures above address many of the gaps created by this, and, of course, the AI Diffusion rule wasn’t actually being enforced. (4) Tightens controls on Chinese chip designs manufactured abroad This modifies and strengthens the Biden-era “Foundry Due Diligence” rule, which applies to foundries and OSATs. This seeks to prevent Chinese chip designers from circumventing export controls through overseas foundries and packaging facilities. It’s an important complement to the measures above. — So what are the gaps? More on this to come, but from an initial read: (1) To determine remote-access eligibility, the rule requires due diligence on direct or indirect Chinese ownership or control. However, its licensing trigger is based around company headquarters and ultimate-parent headquarters, which could allow for some shenanigans around corporate structures. (2) The rule doesn’t prescribe how AI compute providers must verify customers' identities, or require them to identify and verify every user accessing their compute. The rigor of these checks could vary widely across providers. (3) The end-use restrictions don’t apply when compute is used exclusively for commercial recommender systems. So this opens a path for large-scale Chinese AI compute usage. This could be fine if verifying this kind of use is possible, but this is likely outside the current technical capabilities of many AI compute providers. (4) The end-use restrictions don’t apply to data centers in the US. So a Chinese company can still access large amounts of AI compute via US data centers. This is an interim final rule, meaning it would take effect upon publication in the Federal Register, while allowing 60 days for public comments. Read the full interim final rule here: bis.gov/media/documents/rin-…

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Connor O’Brien avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Connor O’Brien@cojobrien·Nov 15

We have seen nothing yet. If $100k fees to stay after graduation via OPT and $103,265 to do the typical move onto an H-1B stick, we’ll see much larger declines. Not to mention coming restrictions on getting green cards, changing jobs, getting a petition actually adjudicated…

US colleges struggle as international students turn away politi.co/4BWdF1c

Aidan Mackenzie avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Aidan Mackenzie@AidanRMackenzie·Nov 15

Don’t let the anti-BAAJA nonsense distract you: Congress is on the cusp of passing transformative legislation to overhaul American grid policy and build big things fast! BAAJA would be the biggest bipartisan energy bill in decades. Let’s get it done!

"Democrats everywhere ran on putting affordability first. The bill is an early test of whether they meant it." nytimes.com/2026/11/15/opini…

Will Poff-Webster avatar
⟳ IFP retweeted
Will Poff-Webster@willpoffwebster·Nov 15

BAAJA would make our legal system more similar to Europe's, where you can stop a project for substantive environmental reasons, but you cannot stop it on a technicality

Flagging this for BAAJA. Reducing injunctive relief for NEPA procedural errors and only allowing vacatur when illegal actions are taken or substantive environmental harm will occur would put the US in sync with German administrative law. Germany has a good environmental record.