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Public sentiment toward China in Israel has reached a historic low, yet trade between the two countries continues to expand. What does this gap reveal about Israel-China relations?
INSS researcher Roy Ben Tzur examines these conflicting trends and their implications for Israel >>> inss.org.il/publication/chin…
The intelligence failure of October 7 demands profound changes in the underlying assumptions and research methods of Israeli intelligence. But could the effort to draw lessons from this failure lead to overcorrection—and the replacement of one entrenched conception with another?
INSS researchers Raz Zimmt and Naomi Neumann examine the role of language, culture, and ideology in understanding the adversary, and the risks associated with shifting the weight assigned to these factors in intelligence analysis >>> inss.org.il/publication/over…
China’s AI-Guided Laser: Consumer Gadget or Counter-Swarm Weapon in Disguise?
INSS Senior Researcher Yehoshua Kalisky writes:
Countering swarms of attacking drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) presents a significant technological challenge. This is due to the need for early detection and identification of tiny flying objects that are difficult to detect via radar due to their small dimensions and low radar signature, resulting from nonmetallic structural materials. Beyond early detection, intercepting drones and UAVs presents another difficulty, as these aircraft have superior maneuverability and can fly through areas with complex topography. These factors add substantial difficulty in tracking their flight paths, identifying them, and determining their spatial location — and consequently, difficulty in hitting and intercepting the threat, especially when dealing with attacking swarms.
One option for intercepting drones or UAVs involves using a laser beam that reaches the target at the speed of light, heats and burns it, and, in the case of attacking swarms, rapidly switches from target to target using optical systems. The remaining challenge, of course, is early detection of the swarms, precise engagement of the UAV or drone, and transitioning to the next attacking craft. This requires determining its speed and spatial position, calculating trajectories and possible flight paths, and utilizing a fast tracking and identification system. To avoid misidentification and false alarms, it is crucial that the system be able to verify the identity of the flying object using AI and image-processing software.
These capabilities are found in a system developed by a Chinese company called Photon Matrix Lab, designed to eliminate mosquitoes by heating and burning their wings with a focused laser beam. The beam is controlled by guidance systems, sensitive LiDAR-based sensors, image-processing software to identify the flying object, and AI to analyze its physical parameters. The company claims the beam can destroy about 30 mosquitoes per second.
This data points to the possibility that operating the system against mosquitoes is actually a laboratory proof-of-concept for a multi-wavelength (i.e., multi-color) laser system and its various components against swarms of tiny flying objects. The technological achievement is particularly impressive given that these are minuscule flying objects moving randomly through space.
In our assessment, the next stage will be upgrading the laser system to higher power levels and applying it — using advanced detection technologies and AI-based software for flight-path analysis — to strike and destroy swarms of drones or UAVs.
wing Involvement in Lebanon: Bilal Erdoğan’s Visit as a Prelude to What Lies Ahead
INSS Senior Researchers Gallia Lindenstrauss and Orna Mizrahi write:
The visit by Bilal Erdoğan, son of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from November 12 to 14 reflects Turkey’s efforts to expand its involvement in Lebanon, alongside its foothold in Syria. During the visit, he met with Lebanon’s senior leadership: President Michel Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri, and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. In Tripoli, Lebanon’s Sunni stronghold, he received a warm welcome and extensive media coverage as he visited religious and Ottoman-era buildings and met with religious leaders, the local Turkmen population, and the great-granddaughter of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Throughout the visit, Bilal Erdoğan emphasized the historical ties between Turkey and Lebanon.
Bilal Erdoğan, who heads and serves on the boards of several social and educational organizations in Turkey, holds no official government position. In recent months, his media profile has risen, and he has conducted several visits outside Turkey, prompting discourse regarding the possibility that he may be his father's political successor. The senior Lebanese officials with whom Bilal Erdoğan met reflect his growing stature.
Turkey’s increased involvement can be understood in light of developments in Syria and its desire to stabilize the regime of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, with Lebanon seen as one factor in ensuring Syria’s stability. Within the framework of Syria's reconstruction and economic development, infrastructure such as the Port of Tripoli could play a central role in the transportation and energy projects Turkey seeks to advance. Furthermore, the partial vacuum created by the expected conclusion of UNIFIL's mandate at the end of 2026, and the willingness expressed by Bilal Erdoğan for Turkey to take part in a new multinational force to be established in southern Lebanon — even if the proposal does not ultimately materialize — presents an opportunity for Turkey to expand its influence.
In Lebanon, beyond the Sunni camp’s praise for greater Turkish involvement, there is concern that this is an attempt to encourage Sunni separatism. Rather than strengthening the Lebanese state, the visit gave expression to negative discourse surrounding sectarian division in Lebanon and the sense of marginalization felt by Tripoli's residents, who find partial relief through dialogue with actors outside the Lebanese state. Nevertheless, Bilal Erdoğan's meetings with the entire senior leadership reflect Lebanon's desire to exhaust every avenue for external assistance and maintain good relations with Turkey, despite skepticism regarding its intentions. So far, Turkish aid to Lebanon has been limited (an agreement to provide approximately $3 million in assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces was recently announced).
For Israel, the visit itself, and Bilal Erdoğan’s criticism of Israel during it — including his claim that Israel poses a threat to stability in Syria and Lebanon — confirm that Turkey’s intentions to expand its influence in Lebanon pose a further challenge to Israel, adding to the other issues currently dividing the two countries.
From missile launches from Iran to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz: data on the conflict and its impact on Israel and countries across the region, all in one place.
Explore the Institute for National Security Studies' Live Dashboard >>> inss.org.il/publication/iran…
Between Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: The Boycott of Jewish-Owned Businesses in Philadelphia
INSS Researcher Alec Mauer writes:
On November 8th, the day before Kristallnacht, several anti-Israel groups staged a protest promoting a boycott of local Jewish and Israeli-owned restaurants, intending to drive “Zionists businesses” out of Philadelphia. Notably, about half of the restaurants targeted are owned by American Jews who are not citizens of Israel.
The event was notable for two reasons: firstly, the local DSA chapter backed the event unequivocally, denouncing antisemitism while ignoring how the organizers of the event had incorporated the ethnic slur “Zios” in their initial announcement. Second, unlike the scenes endemic to so many campus protests over the last three years in which counterprotesters were usually numerical footnotes in relation to their anti-Israel counterparts, the local Jewish community effectively organized a sizable response; separated by a robust police cordon, 200 pro-Israel and pro-Jewish counterprotesters arrived to challenge the 300 masked anti-Israel and antisemitic protesters. Meanwhile, the targeted Jewish restaurants struggled to serve their clientele that day because of the long lines of patrons engaged in a counter-boycott.
The event showcased the extent to which some antizionist organizations target American Jews, blaming them for the actions of Israel, in what is defined as antisemitic under the IHRA definition. Moreover, it demonstrated that these organizations are successful in forming coalitions with other groups otherwise committed to multiculturalism, but that are willing to engage in anti-Jewish discrimination.
However, there are also reasons to be hopeful. The local Jewish community’s response was robust and effective. Moreover, despite antizionism’s growing salience within public discourse and political life, mainstream Democratic politicians did not hesitate to condemn the event. Philadelphia’s mayor, along with the state attorney general and governor of Pennsylvania, all denounced the boycott as a flagrant act of antisemitism, in what can be viewed as an ongoing commitment by most officeholders – Democrat and republican – to protect Jewish citizens.
From a Popular Tourist Destination to a Center of Protest: Is Thailand Changing Its Attitude Toward Israelis?
INSS researcher Elad Ben David and Chen Plotkin, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Asian Studies at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, write:
Thailand has long been a favorite destination for Israelis, and relations between the two countries have traditionally been positive. In recent months, however, anti-Israel discourse has intensified in the country, leading to protests against Israeli tourists and Chabad activities, particularly in Phuket and Bangkok. In an unusual move, the Thai citizenship of Rabbi Yosef Chaim Kantor, one of the leading Chabad emissaries in the country, was recently revoked for violating naturalization terms related to his dual citizenship. Against the backdrop of the growing campaign to delegitimize Israel since October 7, these developments raise the question of whether criticism of Israel is also expanding into opposition to the presence of Jewish institutions associated with it, even in a country such as Thailand.
As in the West, where Muslim minorities have taken part in protests, some members of Thailand’s Muslim community, which makes up about 5 percent of the population, have joined protests against Israelis and Chabad institutions over the war in Gaza. But unlike in the West, where protests against Israel are primarily tied to activism around the Palestinian issue, the protests in Thailand are more complex and reflect a combination of factors: criticism of the behavior of some Israeli tourists and businesspeople, the rise of nationalist sentiment following border disputes with Cambodia in 2025, and the impact of the war in Gaza on public opinion.
For example, two prominent demonstrations were held on September 10 and October 31, outside the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok and on the island of Phuket. They were led by nationalist activist Sondhi Limthongkul, one of the leaders of the "Yellow Shirts" movement in the 2000s. Demonstrators called for the visa exemption for Israelis to be shortened and for foreign businesses and organizations to be expelled from the country. The protests have nevertheless remained limited in scale. The largest, in Bangkok, drew only about 500 people. Most criticism has focused on tourist areas where tensions have arisen between Israelis and local residents, especially Pai in the north, Phuket, and the southern islands.
It is important to note that although these trends may point to the spread of anti-Israel discourse to distant arenas, the revocation of Rabbi Kantor’s citizenship does not prove that the Thai government has chosen to adopt an anti-Israel policy. Over the past year, the Thai government has also expelled tourists and businesspeople who were citizens of countries other than Israel after they operated shell companies, clashed with locals or other tourists, or engaged in criminal activity such as arms and drug trafficking. This policy also included shortening the visa exemption to 30 days for citizens of 59 additional countries, including the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. In light of all this, it is still too early to determine whether Thailand’s policy toward Israel has undergone a substantive change.
Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs included Imam Omar Suleiman, one of the most influential Muslim leaders in the United States, on its list of leading influencers spreading antisemitism. But could this labeling actually undermine the fight against antisemitism and the delegitimization of Israel?
INSS researcher Elad Ben David explains why labeling Suleiman as antisemitic could be a strategic mistake – and what Israel could do differently >>> inss.org.il/publication/omar…
The Situation at the Front and the Strikes on Energy Infrastructure — What Might Kyiv and Moscow Agree on in Abu Dhabi?
Arkady Mil-Man, former Israeli Ambassador and Head of the Institute's Russia Program, writes:
On November 10–11, trilateral talks between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States will resume in Abu Dhabi, following the meeting that took place in Geneva on February 17–18. Since then, Ukraine has regained control of territory in the Lyman area, and Russia has intensified its strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. After four years and eight months of full-scale war, the Kremlin still hopes that continued fighting will yield concessions it has yet to secure at the negotiating table.
On the front, Moscow is struggling to achieve its objectives. Putin frames the conquest of the Donbas as inevitable, but the Russian military has yet to encircle the main cities in Donetsk Oblast that remain under Ukrainian control. Disrupting Russian supply lines with drones has helped Ukrainian forces launch counterattacks and seize the initiative in several sectors. In September and October, Russia lost more territory than it captured, although its forces continue to advance in some areas. Moscow continues to demand that Kyiv cede territories that the Russian army has failed to capture, and the likelihood that Kyiv will agree is low.
As the Russian military struggles to reach a decisive outcome on the front, the Kremlin is intensifying its attacks on the Ukrainian home front. Strikes on power grids, industrial plants, and ports are intended to weaken the economy and wear down the public's resilience. Disruptions to heating and water supplies in Kyiv ahead of winter illustrate the toll on civilians. Ukraine’s central bank forecasts a 0.4 percent contraction in 2026, compared with its previous forecast of 1.8 percent growth. Against this backdrop, Kyiv met with its partners in Brussels on November 4–5 to discuss postwar reconstruction and funding for defense needs in 2027 if the fighting continues. Budgetary pressure is also mounting in Russia: the projected federal deficit is nearly double the original target, while oil and gas revenues dropped by approximately 14 percent in January–October compared with the same period last year.
The talks, mediated by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, may clarify where agreements could be reached even before a comprehensive ceasefire. Kyiv wants to discuss prisoner exchanges, the return of Ukrainian children transferred to Russia, and commercial maritime safety in the Black Sea. Regarding security guarantees, Kyiv wants to know which of its allies will respond if Russia attacks again, by what means, and how quickly. Britain and France are preparing to conduct drills in Poland to rehearse a potential force deployment after the fighting ends, while Moscow opposes the stationing of foreign troops in Ukraine.
The Kremlin's willingness to compromise also depends on decisions made in Washington. The Trump administration reached an agreement with Moscow on the supply of Russian diesel fuel and suspended some sanctions under the Graham Act. At the same time, about $2 billion in allied funding is still missing for already approved purchases of U.S. weapons for Ukraine. Further concessions granted to Russia before it fulfills its commitments, coupled with potential delays in weapons deliveries to Kyiv, could encourage the Kremlin to stall. The Democratic victory in both houses of Congress has raised hopes in Kyiv for expanded aid, but the new Congress will only convene in January, while the Trump administration is conducting the Abu Dhabi talks.
Meanwhile, Beijing has confirmed that discussions are underway regarding a potential trilateral meeting between Xi Jinping, Trump, and Putin on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen. The meeting has not yet been officially confirmed. If the war is discussed, Moscow will be able to advance its position in Kyiv’s absence.
In Abu Dhabi, the immediate test ahead of winter will be the feasibility of a mutual pause in strikes. According to an outline raised in pre-meeting preparations, Russia would suspend its attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, while Ukraine would suspend its attacks on Russia’s oil industry facilities, including refineries. Such an arrangement would require agreement on which facilities it covers and on a mechanism for documenting violations. The question is whether halting strikes on refineries will justify, in the Kremlin's eyes, temporarily relinquishing a leverage point that has taken on greater importance as the Russian army's advance on the frontline has slowed.
Tensions are rising in the Middle East, and all eyes are on the U.S. military posture in the region. How extensive is the American military presence, and how is it changing in response to developments?
Track the deployment of U.S. forces across the Middle East with the interactive map by the Institute for National Security Studies >>> inss.org.il/publication/us-f…
The Democratic tsunami has reached Washington - and it is expected to change the rules of the game in U.S.-Israel relations. What will become of U.S. security aid to Israel? What measures against Israel could be advanced in Congress? And can Israel influence the direction of these developments?
INSS researchers Ted Sasson and Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis analyze the implications of the Democrats’ landslide victory and the options available to Israel in the new political landscape >>> inss.org.il/publication/blue…
A stringent sanctions regime targeting settler violence and settlement expansion in the West Bank is gaining broad consensus within the Democratic Party - and if adopted, these sanctions could cause significant damage to Israel’s economy.
INSS researchers Theodore Sasson and Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis examine the risks and the steps Israel can take now to mitigate them >>> inss.org.il/publication/west…
Lebanon urgently needs economic assistance, but some of the funds could end up in Hezbollah’s hands. How can Lebanon’s recovery be supported without strengthening the terrorist organization?
INSS researchers Orna Mizrahi, former Deputy National Security Advisor, and Noam Binstok, examine the dilemma of providing economic assistance to Lebanon, the risks involved, and Israel’s interest in strengthening the Lebanese state >>> inss.org.il/publication/leba…
Riyadh: Between the Iranian Hammer and the American Anvil
INSS Senior Researcher Yoel Guzansky writes:
For months, Saudi Arabia has been absorbing missile and drone attacks from Iran and its proxies. Energy infrastructure has been damaged, Riyadh’s airport has been largely shut down, and civilians have been killed. Yet Saudi Arabia’s defense minister traveled to Tehran, was photographed smiling alongside senior Iranian officials, and called for dialogue.
Why? Riyadh fears Iranian aggression, but fears even more so the resumption of war between the United States and Israel against Iran. Saudi officials believe another round could be more destructive than the previous ones, and that Saudi Arabia could pay a heavy price for a war it did not initiate and whose course it cannot control.
More importantly, Riyadh appears to doubt that another U.S.-Israeli strike could change Iran’s policy, let alone topple the regime. From its perspective, the most dangerous scenario is a war that leaves Iran battered and vengeful, without eliminating the threat it poses. Another round.
The security costs are compounded by a steep economic price. Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 depends on stability, investment, and tourism. It is difficult to attract investors when airports and energy infrastructure are repeatedly exposed to attack.
Saudi Arabia is therefore not necessarily seeking closer ties with Iran; it is seeking to keep the threat of war at a distance. Yet herein lies the paradox: the more Iran uses force and receives dialogue in return, the more it may conclude that its aggression pays off.
The Saudi choice does not necessarily amount to capitulation, but it illustrates the limits of deterrence and the depth of Riyadh’s fear of another war. Riyadh would rather deal with a hostile yet restrained Iran, than gamble on a war that may not change Iran’s behavior, but will almost certainly exact a heavy price from the kingdom.
Two wars, a severe economic crisis, popular protests, and an ongoing crisis of legitimacy - yet the Iranian regime remains standing. Can Israel afford to base its strategy on the prospect of regime change?
Raz Zimmt, Head of the Iran and the Shiite Axis Program at INSS, examines the prospects for the regime’s collapse and the role this possibility should play in Israel’s strategic planning >>> inss.org.il/publication/iran…
Trump announced today that the United States will end its annual aid to Israel at the end of 2026. How prepared is Israel for such a change, and what could the implications be?
Back in February, INSS researchers Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis, Tomer Fadlon, and Esteban Klor examined the economic, security, and strategic implications of reducing U.S. aid to Israel.
READ THE FULL ARTICLE >>> inss.org.il/publication/us-a…