
Here is the permanent link to my inaugural lecture. Global Security: Is Law Our Last Hope? youtube.com/watch?v=PcrzgZ4b…
✓Professor @UniofOxford's @BlavatnikSchool, Fellow @TrinityOxford, Co-director @ELAC_Oxford: Law & Ethics of War, Global Security (in pers. capacity)

Here is the permanent link to my inaugural lecture. Global Security: Is Law Our Last Hope? youtube.com/watch?v=PcrzgZ4b…


On a technical level, this piece is misleading. The Gambia and Myanmar agree that the Court should apply existing law, not "deviate" from it. If the Court is fully convinced that Myanmar acted with both genocidal intent and military aims then genocide is proven. 1/

Not all Bridges! A bridge is a military objective IF it makes an effective contribution to mil action (like #KerchBridge, a major mil supply route) & attacking it yields a def mil advantage. Today is a good day to reiterate that #IHL demands an-objet-by-object assessment.

Our assessment that the strike violated precautionary obligations is in line with that of many analysts. I have seen fewer parallels to our assessment that the strike violated distinction, as operationalized through the rule on doubt. Here is why. Image 1: AJIL. Images 2-3: JS.

“There are several treaties in international law that suggest that the UK should not be exporting arms to Israel.” Professor @JaninaDill spoke to Channel 4 News as part of its investigation into UK arms export licences to Israel. ⬇️ ow.ly/137c5106WWT

because it is possible that the findings on intent better resemble CAH, such as extermination and persecution, or war crimes, over which the Court has no jurisdiction.

One clarification: When I say that I am not entirely confident that the ICJ will find that Israel is committing genocide, that is not because Israel’s conduct is legally redeemable, but

Here is a paper evaluating German arms transfers to Israel which form an important part of the current ICJ case against Germany brought by Nicaragua. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.… by @hanna_pfeifer & @MattHGoldmann To my knowledge, there is no similar analysis for the UK.

For the difference between failing to discharge a prevention duty and incurring state responsibility for having done so, see a longer argument here: cambridge.org/core/journals/…

whether, at that point, the UK can in theory be found responsible for violating its duty to prevent genocide. Whether the UK was in 2024 or is now violating this duty turns on the objective evidence of a serious risk of genocide then and now.

I was asked about “my own personal prediction” what the ICJ will find & that is what I qualify as “immaterial” for how we assess continued arms transfers in 2024, 2025 & now. Whether the ICJ eventually finds that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza will be relevant for ...

The ICJ has clarified that the duty "arise[s] at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed." (early 2024) & "extends over the entire period during which the event continues".

My sense is that Labor made real changes that may respond to the requirements of the Arms Trade Treaty but fall short of the duty to prevent genocide, which the previous Labour gov mischaracterized several times as hinging on an ICJ judgment. See: justsecurity.org/121169/uk-m…

The duty to prevent genocide implied a duty for the Conservative gov to “employ all means reasonable available” to the UK to prevent genocide in Gaza, including an arms embargo. We know what discharging the duty looks like i.e. from the 2007 ICJ Judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia 👇

3) The Genocide Convention. The clip focuses on the duty to prevent genocide, triggered in 2024, i.a., by three #ICJ prov. measures orders identifying a “real & imminent risk" of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Palestinians i.a. not to be subject to genocide. 3rd order 👇