
This is a summary of the main points in my new book, out today. mercatus.org/publications/ho…

I discovered a new framework for understanding the housing bubble, the financial crisis, and costly housing markets. See my substack link for ongoing analysis.

This is a summary of the main points in my new book, out today. mercatus.org/publications/ho…

Links: Executive summary and white paper: freopp.org/whitepapers/a-fun… Working paper: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.… Substack series: kevinerdmann.substack.com/p/…

btw, what I wrote in this thread about investors is more true about large investors. They bought at even lower prices. Small investors replaced missing families & large investors formed a 2nd floor under small investors. Anti-investor = anti-renter. Let's stop the nonsense. 25/25

After we collectively made that decision, so that prices in those neighborhoods are still clearing at the investor demand line that lies well below where the homeowner demand line should be, now we're going to say that those families can't be owners or renters?! 24/25

The investors are buying the homes in the $200,000 neighborhoods because those homes are still great deals on a rent vs. own metric, and we decided collectively in 2008 that it was going to be much harder for the residents of those homes to borrow money to buy them. 23/25

They never tell their realtor to check on homes in the $200,000 neighborhood to see if the rent yields are better there. But that's the 1st question all investors - big and small - ask. There is no competition here. They are buying different things! 22/25

This tendency has been so strong, it statistically has created LOWER prices where families are buyers. When a family finds a $500,000 home that they can qualify to buy in a neighborhood they like, there is one thing they never do. 21/25

Investors have been either buying properties in collapsing markets, where their arrival slowed the collapse. Or they have systematically sold homes to families where families were buyers & bought homes where families weren't buyers & prices were rising but still discounted. 20/25

Now that we are a decade into the return of homeowners, there are something like 10 million potential renter households that would have formed if investors would have had enough market power to keep prices from falling more and to help keep construction robust after 2008. 19/25

Again, it is hard to believe that we have to have this discussion in a public context where legislation is being passed based on investors having too much market power. If they had much more market power, the loss of homeowners wouldn't have been so destabilizing. 18/25

And prices had to collapse MASSIVELY in order to attract enough investor capital to stabilize the market. If investors had had much, much more market power, they would have been able to stabilize the market much better. 17/25

These are MASSIVE coefficients, and yet the existing literature on the effect of investors universally fails to fully account for this. Investor demand was static. The market came to investors because millions of households lost mortgage access. 16/25

Why did prices collapse? The red line here is the cumulative decline in home prices associated with pre-2003 use of FHA mortgages. The orange line is the decline associated with the disappearance of small mortgages within a ZIP code. 15/25

Investors weren't pricing out households. The investor demand curve was sitting well below the homeowner demand curve, catching the collapsing market. Then, when the collapsing markets caught back up to the other markets, the investors reduced their positions significantly. 14/25

The same pattern holds across metro areas. Where investor share increased the most from 2004 to 2012, prices collapsed the most. 13/25

Those years from 2007 to 2014 are when investor ownership increased. It increased the most where the most former homeowners were locked out and prices were collapsing the most. Then, where homeowners started marginally returning and prices increased, investors were sellers. 12/25