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L0Psec3,276 posts
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L0Psec

@L0Psec

reverse engineer | arm64 :) | macOS/iOS @Volexity | YouTube: youtube.com/@l0psec

◷ Joined October 2017▧ 769 Photos and videos
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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

80effa5f7306b1cd477f73ae53f188291d3193eac00364dffc1ccc7972139803 96f17e614b17337b0254762b4d2fdb86a6ca73a67d2905d4d3feb9cf60c29c91 50fa68c5768283accdbb967de7df5fb5caf9a6113b6eca0693a5117de17e7eec - py 5aa5104963cf74cb93156604a1c353c1f8902d2f1fd6746b344abf59e9fe647f - backdoor

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

There's some more interesting things about these files, but wanted to get a summary out. Associated IOC hashes below.

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

What about the Word app in charge of creating a dialog and grabbing the user's password and writing to a file cpass.txt. Simple main.scpt file within the Resources directory to prompt the user for their password: 96f17e614b17337b0254762b4d2fdb86a6ca73a67d2905d4d3feb9cf60c29c91

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

We can see the remote command list here in a decoded state with a lot of capabilities: screenshots, file archive/upload, addition python exec modules, shell commands, removing persistence,

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

deobfuscating this code, we see this is a multi-platform backdoor with code for Windows, Linux and macOS. funcs: _8so8b() password checker (from word app), _a6iyq() remote task getter, _ruev0() shell command exec, _g051s() additional payload exec, _pnpsa() command mapping.

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

It also contains more base64 strings...... at line 50: with obfuscated python code. This results in the backdoor called catch\.py

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

decoded python script "drop_set.py" sets up persistence and references files: catch\.py and GoogleUpdateService with label com.google.updater.cservice

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

Here's the embedded python installer which is essential to get the python code covered next installed.

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

Now things start to get interesting. We have a reference to an embedded zipped Word app, nice logging of actions, com.apple.python dir, uzips etc. , etc. Bunch more base64 encoded strings in this as well.

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

Ok another one of these double extension scpt files, BUT there's some fun to be had. Malicious code begins at line 9001. Feel like these just keep getting longer. Base64 encoded strings which is then executed. So let's look at that code.

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L0Psec@L0Psec·21m

In time for #OBTS, @malwrhunterteam shared this double extension (compiled applescript) file 80effa5f7306b1cd477f73ae53f188291d3193eac00364dffc1ccc7972139803 (1 VT hit) - Embedded "Word app" bundle, python installer, script, multi-platform python backdoor. Let's dive in. 🧵

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L0Psec@L0Psec·Nov 17

Awesome macOS capabilities in this release from the team. More cool features to come for macOS :)

.@Volexity Volcano v26.11.12 makes macOS 27 memory analysis a reality and expands what your AI agents can do with Volcano! This release adds support for macOS 27 (Golden Gate) memory and unified logs, as well as recursive file system enumeration. It also includes new MCP tools to cover collection template management, deployments, scheduled endpoint collections, IOC creation, API scanning, file extraction, and reading memory addresses. Contact us to schedule a demo: volexity.com/contact/demo-re…

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L0Psec@L0Psec·Nov 16

More granular control is a good step.

What Mac users will soon see when trying to give an app Full Disk Access This will no doubt be very effective

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L0Psec@L0Psec·Nov 12

Great analysis by @moonlock_lab here. Interesting use of plist to exec Chrome with headless and debug args to read files through it.

8/ Platform tricks: on Windows it fetches /download-abe-payload to recover Chrome's app-bound encryption key. On macOS a LaunchAgent starts headless Chrome with remote debugging, and the malware reads files, incl. login.keychain-db, through it.

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