←
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis)44,390 posts
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) avatar✓

Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) ✓

@Laughing_Mantis

20+ yrs in Infosec. Malware Influencer. I turn Malware into Art and Music. Art @MalwareArt. 4x Pwnie Nominee. 𝕍𝕏. GameDev. Autistic.

◷ Joined February 2014▧ 3,212 Photos and videos
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) avatar
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis)@Laughing_Mantis·Nov 16

Identity verification is becoming a social engineering target. With AI making impersonation easier, attackers don't need to break IDV if they can talk you into completing it for them. Security teams need to train for this now, before it becomes routine.

Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) avatar
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis)@Laughing_Mantis·Nov 13

Jessica Payne was a close friend of mine for years when I lived in WA. We often coordinated trips to customers just so we could bitch about terrible security practices, share war stories, share blue team vs red team tactics, or admire threat actors. I'm still in shock over her passing. She was one of the most brilliant minds this community had and we all should take the time to go through the vast knowledge that she shared to make sure she stays with us. She was also a huge fan of random facts, so in her memory please find someone to share a random fact with daily, like we did for several years.

Justin Elze avatar
⟳ Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) retweeted
Justin Elze@HackingLZ·Nov 11

Most people in OffSec know clients who are still shook up from an incident 10 years ago when pentesters knocked over some servers or prod, and they’re still scoping and putting restrictions around testing because of it. Don’t be the people who start this cycle over because your agent framework is untested and does stupid things.

Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) avatar
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis)@Laughing_Mantis·Nov 6

I would *love* to sit down with everyone who came up with this report. I was the independent person responsible to do patch analysis for very large companies and facilities for many years. By that I mean I was at one point the single person responsible for pulling the $12+ million dollar switch for several Forbes 100 companies. Matter of fact that's how most of my old school followers know me, I used to dump the work in real time here on Twitter to get more customers (it worked). So what does that mean? Patch Tuesday is a great example, it used to drop 10AM PST Tuesday. I would have an approx 50 page report Friday EoB to customers covering EVERY patch, ease of exploitation, profile the discovery team or person behind it, use in the wild, IoCs, weaponization likelihood in the next 24h, 72h, 7 days, 14 days, 30 days. No AI. Just IDA, DarunGrim, BinDiff, some tools I wrote and a dream. I would be in the office, Tuesday leave Friday, yes, that's correct, no home, straight working. I performed this service from 3 different companies to various customers. Sometimes it was with a select team, most of my career it was solo. So what was the $12m switch? Well that was the cost it would be for just one of my customers to push out an emergency patch that wasn't in their already accepted patching procedures. That cost was electricity costs, server down time, service availability impact, employee costs, testing etc. I was the person that said: this patch needs to be pushed and that break glass needs to happen due to impact being greater than X million in a 72h period. I made that specific call maybe 11 times, in the 14 years that I did this service and I got that call twice. The last time I got the call wrong was one of the TCP.sys icmp vulns, ping of death style. I failed to account that another vendors vulnerability would come out to put it to shame and be far more easier to exploit with a PoC. The other time I got it wrong was exploitation happened about 96h instead of 72h. The science to get this precision is hard, I got lucky a few times. What I will say is the goal of the attackers, what is at risk, and level of sophistication that attackers will use completely vary from target to target. Also there's a ton of this exploitation data is simply not visible, a lot of this data isn't public and requires lots of embedded resources, sources, and detailed tracking. In almost all cases and scenarios during those 14 years: 0days are not kings, it's your trash exploits (auth bypass, file upload, hash leaks etc) that are 2 to 6 years old that got forgotten, unpatched, suddenly exposed to the Internet, or bridged over by a contractor that lead to massive incidents over and over.

Post attachment
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) avatar
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis)@Laughing_Mantis·Nov 6

character encoding issues is literally what worms and IIS exploits used in 2001 used. Not even double encoding, which I wouldn't be surprised if that was a second bug. Secure web development practices and web scanners from the early 2000s both would have caught this. Not sure what's more embarrassing not finding this in development or bragging that an AI caught this

Post attachment
4 of mallace avatar
⟳ Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) retweeted
4 of mallace@IceSolst·Oct 9

We’re witnessing the largest regression in software engineering maturity ever seen.

Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis) avatar
Greg Linares (Laughing Mantis)@Laughing_Mantis·Nov 4

I once got the role of being a red teamer for a very large genealogical company for several years due to the previous team accidentally hacking a 3rd party payment processor during their engagement. I asked them: what happened to the previous team? They answered: we called law enforcement, they were arrested. We figured, if they were that bad at their work, the last thing we would ever want is them to continue being terrible at their job at the expense of others.