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Marcus Hutchins635 posts
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Marcus Hutchins ✓

@MalwareTechBlog

Professional Shitposter

◷ Joined June 2013▧ 29 Photos and videos
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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Oct 21

Since my posts have been shared here ~30 times in the past few weeks, it seems like I'm going to be contributing to Space Karen's Ketamine Extravaganza whether I like it or not. I don't really intend to be active here, but I'll post some of the more important cybersecurity-focused stuff, since it gets screenshotted anyway. That way, people don't have to read post a week late and out of context.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·7h

Another simple explanation is that an average software update has a low to medium chance of breaking the system. Previously, orgs navigated this by performing extensive testing, then rolling out updates a few systems at a time. With the severity of some of these security issues being fixed, they can't afford to wait that long. The options are: risk breaking something by rolling out updates too fast, or get hacked and risk lots of things getting broken. Given that we just had a major vulnerability in PHP, and many organizations run PHP, it's not unexpected that we would see some major companies having software outages. PHP applications are highly version specific. Attempting to update PHP is a very well known cause of software breaking. Now, combine that with the fact that many orgs are running with less than the minimum viable number of employees. They got overexcited about AI and tripped over their own feet rushing to preemptively lay off double digit percentages of their workforce. I'm not surprised that there's a ridiculous number of major outages. I'm surprised that there aren't far more. It's amazing some of these companies have managed to hold it together as long as they have. But expect it to only get worse from here on.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·11h

I shitposted so hard about the outages that now I'm getting invites to go on major news networks and talk about the current string of outage. Unfortunately, all the invites are for morning segments on east coast time, and I'm not committed to the bit enough to wake up at 4am

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·17h

Can the FBI issue a flash warning that Marcus is really bored of hearing about Artex and would like to spend his time looking at literally anything else.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 17

Its fun watching people try to form conspiracies. "You really think all these outages are a coincidence? The government is hiding something!". Yeah, they're hiding the fact that every tech company replaced like 80% of their employees with bots that guess words, hardly anyone left knowns wtf they're doing, and admitting it's not working out would implode the economy because people invested half the US GDP into this shit.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 16

You wouldn't believe the number of networks I've seen saved by canary credentials, this stuff works and it works extremely well. The first thing most threat actors do when they successfully break into a network is look for useful credentials to pivot off of or escalate access with. Make sure they find some. fake API keys, usernames and passwords, session tokens, NTLM hashes, password.txt. Put them everywhere. Servers, employee endpoints, password managers, the web browser's password/session databases, cloud storage buckets, network shares. The credentials should look legitimate, high value, and be unique to each individual system or user. That way you can set up granular detection for what happens when an attacker attempts to log in with a canary credential. You can not only instantly lock out the system it was stolen from, but also any real credentials belonging to that system/users, which may have been exfiltrated in the process.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 16

So does the US have like a secret ATC backup system, or can adversaries just target the same single point of failure and ground all US air traffic? I keep being told the US is a super power, but all I'm seeing is bumbling middle power shit. Wym the emails and planes are down?

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 16

I meant in that specific instance. Google's security teams are full of great people who genuinely want to make a difference, any I just sometimes disagree with the decisions they make. Google as a company, though, is a neon warning sign pointing out the perils of late-stage capitalist societal decay brought on by a political system that puts shareholder interests above all else, in a country currently collapsing under the weight of excessive deregulation. My personal experience with Google so far has been: their old 'featured snippet' search engine feature kept telling people I was behind the largest most damaging cyberattack in history (which I actually stopped, not created). Then when I asked them to fix it, the head of search acted like I was being a massive inconvenience for asking them not to claim I ransomed hospitals and destroyed hundreds of thousands of systems across 150 countries. Then when they rolled out AI search, they vaporized 80% of my website traffic by having their LLM plagiarize my articles and present a slightly-reworded version to users, claiming it was "transformative" and therefore not copyright infringement. This was part of an intentional scheme to increase ad revenue by plagiarizing every website's content, keeping users on Google where they'd see Google's ads, instead of directing them to the source website (which was like the entire purpose of Google). Trust me, there's no love lost between me and Google, or between me and this techno-feudalist hellscape I find myself trapped it. Google is easily one of my top 5 least favorite companies on the planet, but their security team does good work. I will remain objective on issues that require it, and save my Google bashing for other times.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 16

Definitely not the worst way the FBI has my weekend, but blasting out a warning about Artex at 3pm on a Friday was certainly a choice. As far as I can tell, nothing new, nothing changed, activity is a month old. But it scared the customers, so now I'm spending my weekend "looking for Artex" 🥲

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 16

I'd go as far as to argue that a lot of professional software engineers couldn't build an infostealer that comes close to the ones you can rent for ~$150/month (even with the help of AI). Operating costs would likely be higher too, since in-house dev loses to economies of scale.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 15

The other thing that kind of bugs me (pun intended), is the "31% of intrusions are the result of software exploitation" statistic. It hides two different problems: Zero-day exploitation - the bad guys find a vulnerability before the good guys, then use it to hack into systems (a problem finding and reporting vulnerabilities reduces). N-Day exploitation - someone reports a vulnerability, a fix gets published, but then the threat actors rush to use the information from the fix to build an exploit before downstream users get a chance to install the fix (a problem finding and reporting vulnerabilities exacerbates). Since organizations typically take a long time to install security fixes, N-day exploits are extremely powerful, and also make up the majority of all software exploitation. There's also 100x more people who can create N-days from known vulnerabilities than can find and exploit Zero-days. The more vulnerabilities found, the more vulnerabilities N-day attackers have to choose from, and the more software fixes that downstream users have to juggle. Orgs struggle to even install the monthly Windows update within a month of it going live. Now mix in "every single product you use has critical vulnerability fixes every patch cycle so you have to install all 4,000 patches every month". And yeah.... It's pretty bleak. That's not to say vulnerability research shouldn't be done, isn't important, or isn't a net long term benefit (I feel like I have to say this because half the people on this fucking website have zero capacity for nuance and try to read every post in the most disingenuous way possible). But since the majority of exploitation is N-day exploitation, and vulnerability research increases N-day exploitation, using exploitation rate as a justification for pouring more resources into find vulnerabilities (but not helping fix or patch them), is just circular reasoning. Plenty of good arguments for why vulnerability research is important, but "we're showing the attackers more vulnerabilities that they can use, which is leading to them using more vulnerabilities" is not one of them. Equal effort needs to go into all part of the vulnerability management pipeline for this to work. But currently the effort drops by a factor of 10 from finding bugs to fixing bugs, then another factor of 10 from fixing bugs to ensuring the fixes get installed. Just reducing the disclosure window and telling everyone "don't worry, I'm sure you'll figure it out" is extremely likely to make the problem worse, not better.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 15

FFMPEG had one of the most valid crash outs in infosec history IMO. There's a huge elephant in the room when it comes to the fact that cybersecurity is extremely unbalanced. You have like 1,000 people pointing at problems for every 1 person fixing them. Vulnerability research is extremely important, but it's become somewhat of a marketing stunt. First with fuzzers, and now with LLMs. It's a lot of "look what my new toy can do" rather than earnest attempts at actually fixing security problem. What Google did to open source developers was especially egregious. They're a $3.6 trillion dollar company, who spent billions upon billions of dollars building a bot that points at problems really really fast, then they just dumped them all on a bunch of unpaid open source project maintainers to fix. Then because of Google's 90 day disclosure policy, the maintainers have 90 days to fix the issues. After 90 days, Google goes public with the issues, making their project look bad if the vulnerability is yet to be fixed, and also potentially harming users if it gets exploited. The 90 day policy was intended to give developers a reasonable amount of time to fix issues, while also applying some pressure with the threat of disclosure. Otherwise, you do get a bunch of goober ass vendors that will just ignore all security issues reported to them, then act completely surprised when their software gets hacked. But when you're a small team, non-profit, or a solo developer, and you have a trillion dollar company's AI just blasting you with infinite problems to fix (each coming with a 90 countdown & a threat), that becomes extremely untenable. They're essentially inadvertently blackmailing developers into becoming unpaid interns. Then on top of that, Google profits unimaginable amounts of money from the use of open source code. They use FFMPEG's code extensively across several highly-profitable products, meanwhile FFMPEG's developers work for free. There's no reason Google couldn't have donated money, engineers, AI tokens, or something towards fixing the problems. They can more than afford it. I don't think Google has any malicious intent at all, it's just that the whole incentive structure behind vulnerability research is completely whack. All the glory goes to people who find issues, not those who fix them, so there's not a whole lot of interest in helping with fixes. Some vulnerability researchers will submit fixes with their reports, but most don't. Honestly, in 2026 cybersecurity basically just feels like the equivalent of 50,000 people following the housecleaner around yelling "you missed a spot". Abysmally little effort has gone into anything outside of pointing out vulnerabilities.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 15

Just a head's up, it looks like LearnWorlds may have been hacked, and their mail server is currently being used to phish YouTube accounts (LearnWorlds is a major white-label online course platform, so you may not realize you're a user of their platform). This morning I received an email from LearnWorld's official mail server, claiming something I posted on my YouTube channel violated the company's copyright, and that I need to respond immediately. The email felt off. It cited no specific copyright violations, didn't reference my channel by name or link to any videos, was sent on a Saturday morning, and YouTube has a built-in copyright system to handle exactly this. On the second pass I realized the link it asks recipients to visit to handle the "copyright claim" is a YouTube redirect link. It uses the official YouTube url, but has an embedded redirect which takes you to a third-party website. The site is designed to look like an official YouTube webpage that enables users to review copyright claims against their channel. It contains both the YouTube and Google branding, as well as a very similar theme to the official YouTube one. The site asks users to look up their channel name to check for copyright claims, presents them with a fake copyright violation, then asks them to "verify" their channel. The channel verification button takes the user to an official Google OAuth sign in page, which if they log into, will give the hackers control over the Google account they sign in with, enabling them to steal both the Google account and associated YouTube channel.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 15

I get what Google is trying to do, but I don't agree with it at all. Sure, there are some vendors who just sit on bugs forever and don't make any effort to patch them. But there's way more overworked & underpaid teams, non-profits, and solo projects who are patching bugs as fast as they physically can. The number of CVEs found in 2026 is double that of 2025, so double the workload for anyone doing security fixes. Then on top of that, reducing the disclosure time from 90 to 60 days gives them 2/3 of the time to do double the work. At some point the dam is going to break. You have vulnerability researchers and AI companies burying software maintainers under an endless torrent of bug reports, while doing little to nothing to help with actually fixing the bugs. Eventually, the software maintainers are just going to burn out and give up.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 14

It's fascinating how AI has just completely erased people's memory of pre-ChatGPT era automations. Not only were most hacking techniques already automated before "AI", many of those automations were actually faster and more effective.

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Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 14

One of the startups I'm a founding investor of actually wanted to pivot into OT/ICS security and I was just like Nonononononono. They were like "but it's a massive untapped market" And I'm like "yeah, in the same way that erupting volcanos are untapped heated swimming pools".