In a new @CNASdc report, @StaciePettyjohn and I examine what affordable mass is worth to the United States in a war with China. We focus on two key missions—counter-invasion anti-ship strikes and coastal airbase attacks—to understand the value low-cost weapons provide and how🧵
I'm very excited to announce that my most recent @CNASdc publication, Partners in Proliferation, came out today! I'll be joining @StaciePettyjohn, @MassDara, & Nicole Grajewski tomorrow to talk more about it and unpack some key findings.
Register here: events.cnas.org/partnersinpr…
Don't Miss 👇
CNAS is hosting a live conversation on the recent developments in the Russia-Iran relationship as it evolves from short-term to long-term cooperation that poses a strategic challenge to the U.S.
Featuring:
🎙️ Nicole Grajewski
🎙️ @MassDara
🎙️ @DelaneySoliday
🎙️ @StaciePettyjohn
🚀 I just published my latest Missile Matters post on the nuclear and doctrinal dimensions of European deep strike.
The Financial Times recently reported French concerns about Germany’s procurement of conventional deep-strike capabilities and their potential to escalate a conflict with Russia.
In my view, these concerns reflect a broader problem: European deep-strike procurement is outpacing doctrine.
Some in NATO see deep strike as a useful tool for escalation management, including at the nuclear level. Others within the Alliance, particularly NATO's nuclear weapon states, view the proliferation of deep-strike capabilities with some hesitation: They fear that a lack of coordinated employment could catalyze the involvement of their nuclear arsenals, including against their national interests.
Of course, given the current threat environment and the demonstrated utility of deep-strike capabilities, slowing procurement is not realistic. The question is whether European doctrinal thinking can catch up, so that deep strike becomes a true Alliance asset rather than a liability.
For details, you can read the full post here:
missilematters.substack.com/…
Congratulations to @CNASdc for insightful new reports on affordable mass and munitions procurement. I especially commend to you @StaciePettyjohn and @PhilSheers report's parametric tools on the webpage (linked below), and @CarltonHaelig's report's (linked in the comment below) coverage of DPA Title III funding. cnas.org/publications/report…
What can't drones do in the Pacific?
"Cheap standoff weapons have three primary shortfalls. First, the sheer volume of weapons required to achieve a desired effect is, paradoxically, prohibitively expensive unless they are employed in tandem with other capabilities. Second, even extended-range attack drones cannot reach targets deep inside China. And third, these weapons will not have the capability to destroy hardened or buried targets.
New report from @StaciePettyjohn and @PhilSheers:
cnas.org/publications/report…
REMINDER: Applications are still open for the 2027 Nuclear Scholars Initiative!
The Nuclear Scholars Initiative aims to provide top graduate students and young professionals from around the country with a unique venue to interact and dialogue with senior experts on nuclear weapons issues. Those accepted into the program are hosted once per month over the course of six months at CSIS in Washington, DC where they participate in two-day workshops.
Applications are due Monday, November 2 at 11:59 PM ET. Please view all application requirements here: nuclearnetwork.csis.org/prog…
Interesting observation about military targets in China:
The Pacific area of operations is vast, and roughly half of the over 1,500 Chinese ground-based targets—including space stations, long-range radars, rocket forces, and long-range bomber bases—reside deep within China, inaccessible to range-constrained standoff weapons.
To support analysis, this project compiled a dataset of over 2,000 potential Chinese military targets that U.S. forces could be ordered to strike depending on the U.S. strategy and rules of engagement and evaluated the ability of different American platforms (e.g., aircraft, ships) armed with various weapons to destroy these targets.
In Figure 1, these deeper targets are in the green and orange bands. However, many of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces supporting the invasion would operate in the Taiwan Strait or from bases relatively close (within 370 kilometers) to China’s coastline. These 800-plus targets lie in the red band, and many would be accessible to long-range drone or cruise missile attacks.
cnas.org/publications/report…
Iran has every incentive to reconstitute its missile and drone arsenal, learn from this war, and continue its bid for regional dominance, write Stacie Pettyjohn and Philip Sheers. foreignpolicy.com/2026/10/06…
At this year's National Security Conference, the CNAS Gaming Lab ran a tabletop exercise focused on the critical role of air defense in a future round of fighting with Iran.
In their new @ForeignPolicy piece, @StaciePettyjohn and @PhilSheers break down the results of the game, and how better sensors, smarter interceptor use, and tougher base security could deliver key results for the U.S.
@PhilSheers & I write in @ForeignPolicy about @CNASdc wargames exploring the next war with a rearmed Iran. The results were troubling. Better warning & drone defenses help, but vulnerable bases raise harder questions about U.S. strategy & posture.
foreignpolicy.com/2026/10/06…
Applications for the 2027 Nuclear Scholars Initiative are now live!
The Nuclear Scholars Initiative aims to provide top graduate students and young professionals from around the country with a unique venue to interact and dialogue with senior experts on nuclear weapons issues. Those accepted into the program are hosted once per month over the course of six months at CSIS in Washington, DC where they participate in two-day workshops.
Applications are due Monday, November 2 at 11:59 PM ET. Please view all application requirements here: nuclearnetwork.csis.org/prog…
Cheap drones alone can't win a fight with China. They can't reach deep targets or crack hardened sites.
@PhilSheers and @StaciePettyjohn argue that pairing them with high-end missiles solves a problem neither one can fix alone.
This is why it is insufficient to compare low-cost and high-end weapons at price point alone. The questions to consider are not simply cost per munition, but cost and munitions per effect, and whether the munitions in question can be produced and employed at the levels needed.