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Preben Aavitsland48,045 posts
Preben Aavitsland avatar

Preben Aavitsland

@Prebens

Ytringer på egne vegne om det meste fra sørlending, enkeltperson, lege, epidemiolog og professor som bor i Kristiansand. Tvitring på engelsk @epidemino.

◷ Joined August 2009▧ 2,188 Photos and videos
Scanditon avatar
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Scanditon@Scanditon1·Nov 17

"Erlend Svardal Bøe og Håkon Vahl klarer å skrive et helt tilsvar om frihet, mangfold og menneskeverd uten å gi et konkret svar på det mest krevende spørsmålet jeg stilte: Hva skjer når kvinners rettigheter og krav begrunnet i kjønnsidentitet kolliderer?" nordnorskdebatt.no/hoyre-erk…

Maxou Rona 🎸🇫🇷 💙💛 #TAEM #PFM avatar
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Maxou Rona 🎸🇫🇷 💙💛 #TAEM #PFM@Madximilian·23h

🕯️💔7-year-old Bohdana Kosachenko died in her mother’s arms after a Russian shell struck the car she was sitting. 🇷🇺Russia is a terrorist state. 🤡putin is a war criminal.

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Brian Krassenstein avatar
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Brian Krassenstein@krassenstein·9h

Trump just met his best friend, Vladimir Putin. as they embrace each other with smiles. Reminder that Putin helped Iran target American soldiers. A sniper should’ve been waiting to take Putin out.

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Mario Nawfal avatar
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Mario Nawfal@MarioNawfal·13h

This Indian artist is incredible Sure, he could have done the whole thing in seconds with AI, but this takes real skill Writer: Ian

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Preben Aavitsland avatar
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Preben Aavitsland@Prebens·Nov 17

Sju alvorlige (for Putin) følger av kollapsen av Kertsj-broa.

The destruction of the Kerch Bridge’s arch and the blockage of the shipping channel by its debris affect far more than Russia’s transport links with occupied Crimea. It triggers a chain of disruptions to maritime and river transport, grain and oil exports, military logistics, and the economies of entire Russian regions. Debris from the bridge blocks the Kerch–Yenikale Canal, cutting off direct access to the Black Sea for the ports of Rostov-on-Don, Azov, Taganrog, Yeysk and Temryuk, as well as occupied Mariupol and Berdiansk. But the consequences extend further. Through the Don and the Volga–Don Canal, the Sea of Azov is connected to the Volga, the Caspian Sea and Russia’s vast network of inland waterways. The main target of the Ukrainian strike is the military logistics network supplying occupied Crimea. The Kerch Bridge remains an important supply route for Russian forces, and Ukraine will seek to put it permanently out of service. Moscow cannot count on restoring the bridge and shipping through the Kerch Strait without interference while the war continues. The loss of road and rail links forces Russia to reroute cargo through occupied southern Ukraine, where transport routes are already supplying the front. Crimea will not be completely isolated, but Russia will lose an important fallback option for its military logistics. The fewer supply routes remain, the harder it becomes for Russia to supply its troops and hold occupied territory. The second major blow is to Russian grain exports. According to S&P Global estimates, the route through the Kerch Strait and the Azov–Don system accounted for around 28% of Russian wheat exports in August 2026. This puts more than a quarter of exports of one of Russia’s main agricultural commodities at risk. Some grain can be rerouted through other ports, but this requires rail capacity, freight wagons, grain storage facilities and available terminals. All of this costs money and takes time. Grain will accumulate in storage, export contracts will go unfulfilled, transport costs will rise, and the prices paid to Russian agricultural producers will come under pressure. It was Russia that blockaded Ukraine’s Black Sea ports in 2022, withdrew from the grain deal in 2023, and continued destroying Ukrainian grain silos, terminals and port infrastructure. It is now also systematically targeting production facilities themselves: in November 2026, Russian strikes shut down Astarta’s soybean processing plant and damaged Kernel’s oilseed crushing plant. The destruction of the power grid further paralyses the processing and storage of agricultural products. Russia is systematically destroying Ukraine’s agricultural supply chain, from production to exports, while trying to push Ukraine out of global food markets. If Moscow now loses the ability to ship its own grain through Kerch, along with grain stolen from occupied Ukrainian territories, this is a direct consequence of the war it launched. The third blow is to Russian petroleum product exports. Some fuel from refining centres in the Volga region and the Kama basin reaches Black Sea export routes via the Volga, the Volga–Don Canal and the Sea of Azov. Blocking passage through Kerch severs this transport chain. Russian carriers will have to find alternative ports or shift cargo to rail. This means additional costs, delays and competition for transport capacity. All of this comes against the backdrop of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries, which have already reduced fuel production and shipment capacity. Novorossiysk’s major oil terminals do not depend directly on the Kerch Strait, but access through the Sea of Azov has been an important export route for some producers in Russia’s interior. The fourth blow is to the freight transport system as a whole. The problem extends beyond vessels unable to pass through the canal. A ship stuck in port cannot make its next voyage. Grain that cannot be shipped out fills storage facilities. A terminal at capacity stops accepting new cargo. A producer loses a buyer, a carrier loses revenue, and an exporter loses a contract. Even after passage is restored, these losses will not automatically disappear: accumulated cargo will have to be moved, and disrupted schedules will have to be reorganised. In this way, a single blocked canal creates problems for businesses and transport companies far beyond the Sea of Azov. The fifth blow is to Russia’s railways. Cargo previously transported by water will have to be shifted to overland routes. But the rail network does not have unlimited spare capacity. Moving additional millions of tonnes of grain, petroleum products and other goods requires freight wagons, locomotives, track capacity and port terminals. This additional cargo will compete with existing freight flows, including military shipments. Russian Railways will be able to absorb some of these volumes, but at the cost of delays, higher logistics costs and the displacement of other freight. The sixth blow is to naval logistics. Through the Volga, the Volga–Don Canal, the Don and the Sea of Azov, Russia has been able to transfer certain small warships and auxiliary vessels between the Caspian Flotilla and the Black Sea Fleet. Blocking the Kerch–Yenikale Canal deprives it of this direct route. The Caspian Flotilla, of course, retains its ability to operate in the Caspian Sea, while other inland waterways maintain connections to northern maritime basins. But the usual route from the Caspian to the Black Sea through the Sea of Azov becomes unavailable to these vessels. Russia loses another means of rapidly redeploying part of its naval forces between theatres of operations. The seventh blow is to occupied Mariupol and Berdiansk. Russia is trying to incorporate these Ukrainian ports into its own transport system, using them for cargo shipments, military logistics and the removal of resources from occupied territories. Without access to the Black Sea, their role is sharply diminished. Russia will therefore lose the benefits it derives from the port infrastructure it seized during the war. Moscow must recognise that Ukraine is unlikely to allow it to restore, without interference, transport infrastructure used to sustain Russian aggression. The Kerch Bridge supports Russian military logistics, giving Ukraine every reason to continue strikes aimed at putting it permanently out of service. This is the central irony: the Kremlin built the bridge as a symbol of Crimea’s annexation, only to create a critical and highly vulnerable transport hub whose damage can paralyse routes deep inside Russian territory. The bridge Putin intended to bind Crimea to Russia forever may now cut off a substantial part of Russia itself from direct access to the Black Sea.

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Kate from Kharkiv avatar
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Kate from Kharkiv@BohuslavskaKate·Nov 17

🇩🇪 Defense Minister Boris Pistorius responds to Elbridge Colby, who today criticized Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia: “Criticizing those kinds of strikes inside Russia, aimed at destroying its strategic military and military-use targets, is quite a stupid thing, I think. Instead of criticizing that, we should rather criticize and talk about Russian terrorist strikes every night and every day on civilian energy, water, and heating infrastructure in Ukraine. This is terrorism. We should rather talk about that than about Ukraine’s legal and legitimate strikes inside Russia against non-civilian targets.”

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Bjørn Johan Berger avatar
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Bjørn Johan Berger@bjornberger·Nov 17

Glenn Diesen har sagt opp ved USN og sier han skal gå i «eksil», men selskapet hans vil nok fremdeles tjene millioner på YouTube. På Substack går jeg kort igjennom offerfortellingen og kritikken av hans akademiske etterrettelighet: bjornjberger.substack.com/p/…

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Їne Back Їversen avatar
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Їne Back Їversen@IneBackIversen·Nov 17

Can’t help but smile seeing this video of President Zelenskyy visiting the students at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv today, because I can’t remember last time we saw the President with such joy in his eyes & lighthearted energy! And of course we all know why! 🥹🇺🇦 #CrimeaisUkraine

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