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Chamberlain's Ghost21,205 posts
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Chamberlain's Ghost

@RSA_Observer

History, geopolitics, social issues. Peels apples with scalpels. Quiet civil conversations. Mostly somewhere in the moderate middle. Aspie. Mute button user.

◷ Joined August 2011▧ 2,004 Photos and videos
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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·30 Aug 2024

Some of you may wonder about the name of this profile - Chamberlain's Ghost. Just briefly, when this war started in early 2022, I strongly expressed the view that Ukraine should seek a settlement with Russia as soon as possible. This was long before we all learned about the abortive Istanbul negotiations. For this I was pilloried by friend, family, acquaintance and stranger alike. I was labelled 'Putin's shill', 'Munich appeaser', 'Neville Chamberlain' and and many other things besides. But I was right then and I am still right now. The only solution to this war for Ukraine was and still is a negotiated peace. The only difference now from then is that now the terms will be worse, many people have died and a great deal of destruction has been done. This was, in the greater sense of matters, an avoidable war. People did not need to die and a country did not need to be wrecked. But in substance ideology preceded pragmatism.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·6h

And in the interesta of looking at all sides of an issue, FT says Russia has switched from being a major exporter of refined petroleum products to being a major importer. 🔽

“Russia is gradually changing its position in the global refined-products market, moving from being a major fuel export centre to an increasingly important import market. This is a remarkable reversal,” Sumit Ritolia, lead refining and modelling research analyst at Kpler, told @NastyaStognei. ft.com/content/6ae074cc-bc09… via @ft

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·11h

A lot of the povo out there are now yelling about how strategically significant the Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries are. Not really. A few things: ▶️ Russian state revenue oil surged in October 2026. Oil prices. Saudi the same. Exporting less but earning more. ▶️ Oil revenue is anyway not as big a part of the Russian state budget as you may think. Go look it up. ▶️ Russia builds and repairs it's own refineries. Nothing is out of service for all that long. ▶️ To fund its budget deficit, Russia has sold only 2.7% of its gold reserves. On that basis, Russia can fight a very long time still. ▶️ You probably don't even nearly understand the resolve of the Russian state and people to do what it takes on the Ukraine issue. ▶️ It would take a very long time indeed for these deep strikes to have such a serious strategic effect on Russia that Russia ceases to pursue it's war objectives. Sorry, can't help you. Colby is right. Even if you don't like it.

US intel 2021: Russia is about to invade Ukraine. Europe & Kyiv: We don’t believe you - the Russians are just bluffing. US intel 2026: Your deep strikes into Russia aren’t ending the war and may be hardening Russian resolve. Focus on the front. Europe & Kyiv: We don’t believe you - and we hate you for saying it. Same movie, different act.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·12h

Friedman reports from the Sir Bani Yas conference in Abu Dhabi. 🔽 ▶️ Mood among Arab, Iranian, Israeli, American, and European analysts and diplomats is “shock and dread,” not shock and awe. ▶️ Core fear: the US- and Israel-started war with Iran will leave Tehran more dominant over its neighbors than before. ▶️ Gulf Arabs did not push the US to launch the war; they assumed Washington had a clear plan to finish it. ▶️ Growing sense that the US and Israel started a conflict they either don’t know how to end or no longer want to pay the full price for, leaving Gulf states to absorb the costs. ▶️ Iran can claim it fought America (“Great Satan”) and Israel (“Little Satan”) to a draw and emerge emboldened. ▶️ “The trouble with being an ally of the United States is that you never know when it will turn around and stab itself in the back.” ▶️ Confusion over Trump administration Iran policy, who is actually in charge, and what happens when Democrats take Congress. nytimes.com/2026/11/17/opini…

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·12h

Suggestions emerging that A. the Kerch bridge strike was a joint Ukrainian-British operation using Storm Shadows and B. the Kremlin made a deliberate decision to let it succeed (see Helmer - Dances with Bears). No idea of veracity but interesting and, if true, potentially profound implications.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·13h

US intel 2021: Russia is about to invade Ukraine. Europe & Kyiv: We don’t believe you - the Russians are just bluffing. US intel 2026: Your deep strikes into Russia aren’t ending the war and may be hardening Russian resolve. Focus on the front. Europe & Kyiv: We don’t believe you - and we hate you for saying it. Same movie, different act.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·15h

The general consensus around Russia's demands for reorganisation of the European security architecture - as reported by the NYTimes🔽- is that that they are unrealistic and that Russia will relax the nature and extent of its demands. I am less certain than most that this is the case. I explain why. 🔽 ~~~ Russia tabled two draft documents in December 2021 – one with the United States and one with NATO – that laid out a revised European security architecture. Those texts have not been abandoned by the Russians. Rather, they have been restated, expanded, and treated by Russian officials as the necessary foundation for any durable settlement. The expectation that Moscow will water them down under the pressure of costs or Western firmness has so far proved more hopeful than empirical. The pattern or Russian demands throughtout the Ukraine war is visibly one of absolute persistence: repeat the core demands, sustain the pressure on Ukraine, and wait for conditions to develop. The 2021 drafts were not bargaining chips invented for the moment. They formalised longstanding Russian objections to the post-Cold War settlement. The proposed bilateral treaty with the United States required the US to prevent further NATO enlargement and deny accession to former Soviet states; barred US bases or military cooperation with non-NATO former Soviet states; limited deployments of forces and heavy bombers or warships in areas from which they could strike the other party; prohibited ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles outside national territory or in range of the other party; and restricted nuclear weapons deployments and related training outside national territory. The propopsed agreement with NATO member states required the parties not to strengthen their own security at the expense of others, froze additional force deployments in Europe at 27 May 1997 levels (the date of the NATO-Russia Founding Act), barred further enlargement including of Ukraine, and prohibited NATO military activity on the territory of Ukraine and other states in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Critically, both texts invoked the principle of indivisible, equal and undiminished security and referenced earlier OSCE and NATO-Russia documents. Russian officials presented them as addressing “root causes” and as requiring legally binding treatment rather than political assurances. The invasion of Ukraine followed within weeks of the Western responses that rejected the core of those texts. Russian statements then and since have linked the use of force to the failure to obtain the requested guarantees. That framing is not the whole explanation for the war – regime concerns about a successful independent Ukraine, historical claims and domestic factors also play roles – but it is not post-hoc either. The demands were tabled in advance and remain the stated strategic objective. In the November 2026 talks in Abu Dhabi the Russian side returned to the same framework. A non-paper restated the 1997 force and basing baseline, the bar on further enlargement, and the restrictions on military activity in Ukraine and adjacent regions, while adding further items such as constraints on British and French nuclear protection of other European states and conditions that would limit Ukrainian participation in the EU’s common defence policy even if membership itself were accepted. Officials including Ryabkov described the situation on the ground as shifting against Kyiv and characterised European approaches as obstructive rather than constructive. Medinsky, Lavrov and others continued to treat full Ukrainian withdrawal from the claimed oblasts, neutrality and demilitarisation as baseline requirements rather than opening bids. The talks were used to reaffirm the architecture package, not to narrow it. This is consistent with the broader record. Public Russian positions have shown continuity rather than material retreat on the central points. Tactical flexibility has appeared on secondary issues – sequencing language, limited technical measures, occasional private signals – but the architecture demands and the Ukraine-related conditions tied to them have not been publicly diluted. Claims that Russia has shown or is about to show real willingness to compromise on these points lack strong evidentialsupport. The opposite pattern is more visible: restatement, and in some respects extension, of the original package. Europe’s position sharpens the logic. European states have supplied substantial military and financial support that has enabled Ukraine to continue resisting and has imposed heavy costs on Russia. At the same time they have ruled out direct combat involvement. Industrial capacity, stockpiles, political willingness for sustained further spending increases and public tolerance remain constrained in many countries. The result is an asymmetry that grows with time: Russia can concentrate resources on a single front under wartime conditions; European governments must balance Ukraine aid against domestic priorities and the risks of escalation. A significant further deterioration in Ukraine’s military position would confront Europe with the choice of accepting an outcome that includes substantial Russian architecture demands or attempting to reverse it through direct involvement that has so far been judged too costly. By binding European credibility and security policy tightly to Ukraine’s ability to deny Russia its maximalist aims, European governments have given Moscow a mechanism for converting battlefield attrition into leverage over the wider security order. Russian combat power has not simply collapsed under those costs, contrary to repeated predictions since early 2022. Production of artillery ammunition, one-way attack drones and certain missile types has increased substantially relative to pre-war levels. The active force has grown. Operations have continued at high intensity for nearly five years. Early forecasts of rapid economic breakdown or inability to sustain mobilisation have been revised. At the same time the costs of the war to Russia are large and cumulative. In response the Russians have reconfigured to sustain a long war. Russia remains capable of gradual advances and deep strikes, even as its capacity is under strain. There is little public indication that these costs have produced a decision in Moscow to abandon or substantially dilute the core demands. Senior statements continue to convey that the war will continue until the stated objectives are achieved and that Ukraine’s position is expected to weaken further. Engagement in talks has occurred, but it has been paired with reaffirmation of maximalist conditions rather than evidence of a shift toward accepting a settlement close to the status quo ante. Internal economic pressures are real but have not translated into visible retreat from the line that continued pressure favours Russian aims. An assessment that Russia is primarily setting the scene for later European engagement with its architecture demands – while retaining the capacity and political will to continue attritional pressure – fits the diplomatic and military record more closely than expectations of near-term moderation. ~~~ Full texts of the December 2021 drafts for reference. ### Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees (Unofficial translation) The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties", guided by the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the provisions of the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation, recalling the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations both in their mutual and international relations in general, supporting the role of the United Nations Security Council that has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, recognizing the need for united efforts to effectively respond to modern security challenges and threats in a globalized and interdependent world, considering the need for strict compliance with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs, including refraining from supporting organizations, groups or individuals calling for an unconstitutional change of power, as well as from undertaking any actions aimed at changing the political or social system of one of the Contracting Parties, bearing in mind the need to create additional effective and quick-to-launch cooperation mechanisms or improve the existing ones to settle emerging issues and disputes through a constructive dialogue on the basis of mutual respect for and recognition of each other’s security interests and concerns, as well as to elaborate adequate responses to security challenges and threats, seeking to avoid any military confrontation and armed conflict between the Parties and realizing that direct military clash between them could result in the use of nuclear weapons that would have far-reaching consequences, reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and recognizing the need to make every effort to prevent the risk of outbreak of such war among States that possess nuclear weapons, reaffirming their commitments under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War of 30 September 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas of 25 May 1972, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 15 September 1987, as well as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities of 12 June 1989, have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Parties shall cooperate on the basis of principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security and to these ends: shall not undertake actions nor participate in or support activities that affect the security of the other Party; shall not implement security measures adopted by each Party individually or in the framework of an international organization, military alliance or coalition that could undermine core security interests of the other Party. Article 2 The Parties shall seek to ensure that all international organizations, military alliances and coalitions in which at least one of the Parties is taking part adhere to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 3 The Parties shall not use the territories of other States with a view to preparing or carrying out an armed attack against the other Party or other actions affecting core security interests of the other Party. Article 4 The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them. Article 5 The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties. The Parties shall refrain from flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments or deploying surface warships of any type, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas outside national airspace and national territorial waters respectively, from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other Party. The Parties shall maintain dialogue and cooperate to improve mechanisms to prevent dangerous military activities on and over the high seas, including agreeing on the maximum approach distance between warships and aircraft. Article 6 The Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party. Article 7 The Parties shall refrain from deploying nuclear weapons outside their national territories and return such weapons already deployed outside their national territories at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty to their national territories. The Parties shall eliminate all existing infrastructure for deployment of nuclear weapons outside their national territories. The Parties shall not train military and civilian personnel from non-nuclear countries to use nuclear weapons. The Parties shall not conduct exercises or training for general-purpose forces, that include scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons. Article 8 The Treaty shall enter into force from the date of receipt of the last written notification on the completion by the Parties of their domestic procedures necessary for its entry into force. Done in two originals, each in English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America For the Russian Federation ### Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Unofficial translation) The Russian Federation and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), hereinafter referred to as the Parties, reaffirming their aspiration to improve relations and deepen mutual understanding, acknowledging that an effective response to contemporary challenges and threats to security in our interdependent world requires joint efforts of all the Parties, determined to prevent dangerous military activity and therefore reduce the possibility of incidents between their armed forces, noting that the security interests of each Party require better multilateral cooperation, more political and military stability, predictability, and transparency, reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the Rome Declaration "Russia-NATO Relations: a New Quality" signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Russian Federation and NATO member States in 2002, have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Parties shall guide in their relations by the principles of cooperation, equal and indivisible security. They shall not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties. The Parties shall settle all international disputes in their mutual relations by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties shall not create conditions or situations that pose or could be perceived as a threat to the national security of other Parties. The Parties shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations in accordance with their obligations under international law, including those set out in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea outside territorial waters and in the airspace above, as well as in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of dangerous military activities. Article 2 In order to address issues and settle problems, the Parties shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral or multilateral consultations, including the NATO-Russia Council. The Parties shall regularly and voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers, and main provisions of their military doctrines. All existing mechanisms and tools for confidence-building measures shall be used in order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities. Telephone hotlines shall be established to maintain emergency contacts between the Parties. Article 3 The Parties reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries. The Parties shall maintain dialogue and interaction on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas (primarily in the Baltics and the Black Sea region). Article 4 The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties. Article 5 The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties. Article 6 All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States. Article 7 The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia. In order to exclude incidents the Russian Federation and the Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct military exercises or other military activities above the brigade level in a zone of agreed width and configuration on each side of the border line of the Russian Federation and the states in a military alliance with it, as well as Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Article 8 This Agreement shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, nor the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations. Article 9 This Agreement shall enter into force from the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification, expressing consent to be bound by it, with the Depositary by more than a half of the signatory States. With respect to a State that deposited its instrument of ratification at a later date, this Agreement shall enter into force from the date of its deposit. Each Party to this Agreement may withdraw from it by giving appropriate notice to the Depositary. This Agreement shall terminate for such Party [30] days after receipt of such notice by the Depositary. This Agreement has been drawn up in Russian, English and French, all texts being equally authentic, and shall be deposited in the archive of the Depositary, which is the Government of ... Done in [the city of ...] this [XX] day of [XX] two thousand and [XX]. ~~~ x.com/RSA_Observer/status/21…

The NYTimes has obtained a copy of a position paper that Russia presented at Abu Dhabi setting out its broader requirements around the European security architecture, which it has now placed at the centre of the negotiations with (about) Ukraine. The main points are as follows: ▶️ NATO must pull troops and bases back to positions held in 1997 (before its eastward expansion). This would sharply reduce or eliminate the alliance’s military presence on its eastern flank, including in Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). ▶️ No further NATO expansion and a ban on “any military activity” by NATO in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. ▶️ Cessation of “the supply of any type of Western weapons and military equipment and products to Ukraine.” ▶️ Ukraine could join the EU only if it does not participate in the bloc’s common defense policy. ▶️ Assurances that Britain and France would not use their nuclear weapons to protect other European countries (beyond ending NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements). The paper frames these as necessary to address the “root causes” of the war (Russia’s grievances with NATO expansion and Ukraine). In the talks, Russian officials pointed to Cold War-era spheres of influence (e.g., the Warsaw Pact period) as a model that reduced conflict risk through mutual understandings and divided zones. nytimes.com/2026/11/13/us/po…

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·17h

🔽

If you think the midterm outcome means that "America is back" you aren't looking at the data. Trump wasn't punished because he changed foreign policy too much, but because he didn't change it enough. He started new wars, kept defense spending high, & ignored domestic needs. Parties and leaders that put military confrontation (direct or by proxy) above improving American lives will keep losing elections.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·19h

▶️ Iran’s leaders have hardened their negotiating position with the US since the midterms, viewing the sweeping Republican losses as a rebuke of Trump’s handling of the war (per US, European, and Iranian officials). ▶️ Tehran sees its Strait of Hormuz disruptions (imposing economic pain on US voters) as having paid off, strengthening its bargaining power and reducing willingness to make concessions. ▶️ Iranian analyst Peiman Salehi: “Iran thinks Trump is under pressure from his constituents and his party to end the war… They have been emboldened and feeling very confident right now.” ▶️ JD Vance and other Republicans blamed the war for the GOP wipeout; Trump subsequently removed Vance from the negotiating team. ▶️ Officials are divided on how serious Iran is about ending the 8+ month war. Intelligence indicates Tehran remains open to a deal if it gains access to billions in frozen assets. ▶️ Iran has developed plans to escalate (more attacks or increased strikes on non-fee-paying tankers in Hormuz) to force the US back to the table—potentially raising fuel and other prices. ▶️ Rep. Jim Himes (expected House Intelligence Committee chair): Iranian leaders “feel more strategically empowered against the Trump administration than they have in a long time.” nytimes.com/2026/11/17/us/po…

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·19h

You'll see I changed my profile pic. This is now actually me - a younger version of the person writing this. The picture is from my military ID card and has been stylised into a watercolour. But yes, it's me. Yes, I know you probably don't care, but still, FWIW.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·19h

I agree with Jen on this 🔽 more strongly than I can easily express. The real foundations of military power are always economic, industrial and technological capacity. The paradox is that the more you spend on the military itself, the less remains for building and renewing those underlying strengths. Before both the First and Second World Wars the United States maintained comparatively modest defence budgets, yet possessed the industrial base that allowed it to mobilise at speed once war came. The same tension is visible in the current European rearmament drive. The impulse is understandable, but the effort is largely disconnected from the social and economic conditions that would actually sustain it. Without first restoring the fundamentals of productive capacity and technological edge, higher defence spending risks becoming an expensive form of self-deception.

There are consequences to spending much of the discretionary U.S. federal budget on the military. And this is one of them. The framing here tries to make China's actions look nefarious, but all governments make choices about how to spend scarce resources. The opportunity costs of the U.S. obsession w/ military spending will become more apparent over time.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·Nov 17

I am reading this ⬇️ and am trying to figure out what is really happening. This seems to suggest Kerch bridge rail traffic is normal and that the road bridge can carry traffic in any one direction at a time. If this is so, it would seem to suggest that (some of) the pictures doing the rounds of the claimed damage do not show the (full) reality of matters. I have seen one other post as well with claimed satellite images showing little damage. At this stage I am not sure who is telling the truth - but we will probably know in the next few days.

𝗩𝗘𝗛𝗜𝗖𝗟𝗘 𝗧𝗥𝗔𝗙𝗙𝗜𝗖 𝗢𝗡 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗖𝗥𝗜𝗠𝗘𝗔𝗡 𝗕𝗥𝗜𝗗𝗚𝗘 𝗥𝗘𝗦𝗨𝗠𝗘𝗦 𝗨𝗡𝗗𝗘𝗥 𝗥𝗘𝗩𝗘𝗥𝗦𝗜𝗕𝗟𝗘 𝗧𝗥𝗔𝗙𝗙𝗜𝗖 𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗗𝗜𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡𝗦 Vehicle traffic on the Crimean Bridge has resumed in reversible mode. There are no restrictions on train services. Together with Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Marat Shakirzyanovich Khusnullin and representatives of the relevant agencies, I visited the site. During the meeting, we discussed issues related to addressing the consequences of the enemy attack. We know exactly what needs to be done and how. All the necessary resources are available. We will restore everything; there is absolutely no doubt about that. One of our main priorities now is to restore logistics. We are working to resolve this issue. I will keep the residents of Crimea and visitors to the peninsula informed about developments. I urge everyone to trust only official sources. t.me/yurasumy/30080

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·Nov 17

Kyiv's bridges⬇️were certainly built to withstand a major assault. I see that Ukraine has now eventually knocked out the Crimean road bridge. No doubt they will attack the rail bridge soon again. It's certainly going to cause difficulties but is quite unlikely to have any material strategic effect.

Aftermath of the overnight Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile strikes on the Northern Bridge across the Dnieper River in Kyiv. Approximately 3 impacts occurred.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·Nov 17

🔽

This idea that the European security architecture is somehow sacred & cannot even be discussed is ahistorical. Europe's security has changed repeatedly since the end of the Cold War -the European Union was formalized -NATO added new members -the U.S. added & moved military forces -NATO intervened in Civil Wars in the Balkans -Russia fought several of its neighbors. It is one thing to take issue with Moscow's specific demands but to rule out any discussion at all suggests that a set of security arrangements set up in 1990 can manage relations in a Europe that looks radically different. Talking about how to update old rules is normal & necessary. And of course Russia should be part of that conversation. It is bizarre to say the the U.S. (Not in Europe) should have a say in Europe's security oder but Russia (in Europe) should not.

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Chamberlain's Ghost@RSA_Observer·Nov 17

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ICYMI, China is deliberately keeping large volumes of Nvidia AI chips out of the country and has ordered firms like Alibaba and ByteDance to cancel orders. Roughly 600,000 Nvidia chips are now stuck in Hong Kong. China is forcing its own semiconductor industry to catch up. And we already how this will very likely ultimately end - with masses of high quality Chinese chips available on the global market at prices others can't match. Go see solar panels and EVs.