While Moscow looks elsewhere, post-Soviet space is quietly wiring new routes — Middle Corridor, TRACECA, Turkic formats, Central Asian dialogue.
Economic corridors last; political blocs fade.
@Aivengo96 on what actually stuck
ridl.io/around-moscow-the-mi…
Russia’s #regions are not sliding into a classic #debt crisis like 2015–16. The numbers are still manageable on paper, but the character of the problem has changed.
At the start of 2026 total regional debt stood just under 3.5 trillion rubles (roughly 19% of own revenues). Most of it remains cheap federal budget loans. What is growing, however, is commercial bank debt: bank loans tripled in 2025 to 676 billion rubles, and debt-servicing costs across regional budgets rose more than 40%.
The stress is highly uneven. Most regions face a gradual squeeze on fiscal space. A smaller group of industrial regions (notably Kemerovo, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Tomsk) are already seeing debt-servicing costs of 6–11% of their own revenues, driven by crises in coal, metallurgy and related sectors plus the need to keep priority spending going.
At the same time, the federal debt write-off program—originally framed around infrastructure—has been progressively redirected. By August 2026 at least 58% of the funds freed by write-offs were being used for war-related purposes, and only 17% for housing and utilities. Loan deferrals into the early 2030s and short-term cheap credits buy time, but they do not address structural revenue problems. They mainly keep the overall budget system able to continue prioritizing the war.
The result is a more centralized form of fiscal management in which debt relief and temporary support function as tools of control rather than genuine stabilization. Governors are left to cut capital projects, housing and, in some cases, staff, while the longer-term costs are pushed into the next decade.
Full analysis by Andras Toth-Czifra for @RiddleRussia, link in the first comment
Russia spent two decades turning itself into a "grain superpower" — the world’s top wheat exporter with roughly 21% of the global market and tens of billions in export revenue. Officials even called grain a “silent weapon.”
That model is now under real stress. Ukrainian strikes on Black Sea and Azov ports in 2026 have disrupted the routes that normally carry the bulk of Russian grain. Exports have fallen sharply, alternative corridors (Baltic, Caspian, even experimental Arctic shipments) cannot fully compensate, and domestic prices have collapsed. Many producers are selling below cost; a large share are operating at a loss. Importers in Africa and elsewhere are already diversifying.
Loginov’s analysis for @RiddleRussia shows how the war is forcing the Kremlin to prioritize military objectives over the full recovery of one of its few remaining high-value export sectors — with consequences for both Russian farmers and the global grain market.
Link in the first comment
Gustavo Pessoa examines how the war in Ukraine made Russia a more important supplier for Brazil without turning a narrow, commodity-based relationship into an alliance
ridl.io/brazil-and-russia-af…
Russia in #AFRICA is still about propaganda
Since 2022 Moscow has expanded embassies (40→49), trade (~$28B), military footprints, and the Russia House network (~22 branches). Yet as @IvanUKlyszcz shows, the real effort is informational influence — not deep economic or security partnerships.
Goals: major-power status + multipolarity, plus practical needs (sanctions evasion, recruiting Africans for the war and defense industry, sustaining Africa Corps).
Tools: media-active embassies, state media + African Initiative, Russia House as cultural cover, Orthodox expansion, paid local influencers/politicians, social media ops, and coercion.
Limits are clear. Afrobarometer ranks Russia the least popular major power in Africa. Economic footprint remains small. Anti-colonial rhetoric only goes so far against public support for civic freedoms.
Propaganda remains Moscow’s primary instrument.
Full analysis @RiddleRussia, link in first comment
Why hasn’t Russia’s economy collapsed after a war that has already cost over 70 trillion rubles ($850 bln)? Billionaires are up, official incomes rose, oil and banks are still profitable, and the defense sector is booming. Yet there are no genuine winners.
The main burden has fallen on the urban middle class (lost imports, travel, investments, higher taxes). Poorer regions saw temporary gains via recruitment payments and labor shortages (“deathonomics”), while big business absorbed only moderate hits—thanks to state compensation for oil firms and redirected spending. The defense industry is the clearest short-term beneficiary, driving much of recent GDP growth.
But even the Kremlin-adjacent elite has lost pre-war freedoms, Western assets, and long-term options. Rising taxes, selective nationalization, and business repression are creating anxiety (Sber’s German Gref called ending the war “the biggest dream of all Russians”).
Without the war, virtually every group—including the oligarchs—would be better off. The apparent resilience masks a war with almost no true beneficiaries.
Full analysis @Vladi_Moscou for @RiddleRussia: ridl.io/a-war-without-benefi…
Russia’s invasion has cost 70+ trillion rubles. The economy hasn’t collapsed. Billionaires got richer. Yet the middle class is squeezed, business is uneasy, and even the defense sector’s gains come with heavy costs.
Who is benefiting the most?
ridl.io/a-war-without-benefi…
Sanctions without incentives. The EU claims its restrictions on Russian businessmen aim to change behavior. In practice, the system offers almost no clear way out — and delisting often follow political bargaining instead.
Read @Aivengo96:
ridl.io/sanctions-without-in…
After 2022, Moscow tried to turn the SCO into a key platform against isolation and a pillar of multipolarity. It got summits, anti-sanctions language, and continued membership — but not a united front on Ukraine or real collective power.
ridl.io/the-sco-after-2022-r…
Russia’s regions are sliding into a new kind of debt trap.
War spending is crowding out everything else, commercial loans are surging at high rates, and debt write-offs are being redirected to the military. A quiet crisis is building
ridl.io/a-new-debt-crisis-fo…
Russia’s private sector is quietly atrophying. 86% of firms earning 2–20bn rubles failed to grow earnings faster than inflation (2020–25). State demand still dominates; real investment is falling. Small businesses are the canary.
@ntrickett16ridl.io/rentier-s-atrophy/
Russia’s rentier model is atrophying.
86% of mid-sized firms failed to grow faster than inflation. Small businesses keep multiplying but lack pricing power.
@ntrickett16 weekly economic roundup:
ridl.io/rentier-s-atrophy/
Kremlin insider Alexander Kharichev is soft-pedaling the corporate KPI culture that defined Kiriyenko’s team — suddenly pushing “values” and “social architecture” instead.
Rebranding or a real shift in power vertical?
Pertsev’s weekly political roundup:
ridl.io/kharichev-s-renuncia…
In this week’s @RiddleRussia Political News Week, Andrey Pertsev looks at:
1. Why Alexander Kharichev — the Kremlin’s actual ideologue (not Dugin) — attacks the “corporate” approach in Russian political management, even though he himself works inside one of the most corporate-like institutions: Sergei Kiriyenko’s Presidential Administration.
2. Why the State Duma and Federation Council are cutting 15–20% of their staff — a clear nod to rising military spending.
3. How underperforming regional governors are nominating Ukraine war veterans to the Federation Council (the Senate) as a loyalty gesture.
Link in first comment
Several post-Soviet countries have faced pressure and, at times, outright military aggression from Russia. Ukraine and Georgia are clear examples. So why haven't they joined forces to create an alternative center of power? I explore this question in my new article.
How are post-Soviet states building ties that bypass Moscow?
@Aivengo96 new piece examines the Middle Corridor, TRACECA, Turkic cooperation & Central Asia’s quiet integration push — and why infrastructure is proving more durable than political projects.
ridl.io/around-moscow-the-mi…
Russia’s regions are not facing a repeat of the 2015–16 debt crisis. They’re facing something more political.
War priorities are turning debt relief into a tool of central control, commercial borrowing is rising again at high rates, and a few industrial regions are sliding into real stress.
Full @RiddleRussia piece by Andras Toth-Czifra in the first comment