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Rush Doshi9,253 posts
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@RushDoshi

Asst Professor, Georgetown • Director, CFR China Strategy Initiative • Biden NSC '21-24 • Wrote The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order

◷ Joined December 2011▧ 296 Photos and videos
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Rush Doshi@RushDoshi·10 Nov 2024

I've watched @amanpour on TV for decades. So I was grateful for the opportunity to sit down with her for 15 minutes. Our interview aired on @CNN this weekend. We talked China policy, Trump's approach, and why this decade is the decisive decade in the competition.

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Joel Atkinson@Joel_P_Atkinson·16h

@RushDoshi on rare earths "Shortages of yttrium, used for jet engines and gas turbines, have forced some suppliers to suspend production. Chipmakers are running short of scandium. All of this strengthens the arguments of those who believe Beijing never intended to honor Busan"

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Joel Atkinson@Joel_P_Atkinson·16h

"If Washington concludes that China will weaponize rare earths no matter what the United States does, the case for American restraint may fall apart, and with it the détente that has bought Beijing the time it prizes." foreignaffairs.com/united-st…

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Rush Doshi@RushDoshi·14h

Trump and Xi will meet in Shenzhen Thursday. In today’s @ForeignAffairs, I argue that the so-called “detente” they struck a year ago is now under severe strain. Busan is cracking over rare earths, a new Democratic Congress will check Trump, and the Nvidia scandal is triggering new export controls. After a year of calm, we may be in for a period of tension. Beijing has used the detente to press its advantage. It is locking in its industrial leadership, coercing its neighbors, and keeping rare earth flows tight to keep the U.S. on a tight leash. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been accommodating. But Beijing is overreaching. If the United States believes Beijing will throttle rare earths no matter what it does, there is little reason for continued restraint. With the trade truce expiring January 10, time is running out for the two leaders to extend or preserve it. The meeting in Shenzhen, and the next one in Miami in December, are the last few opportunities to stabilize. -- A summary of the key points: 1) Chinese scholars see the current detente as temporary. Chen Dongxiao calls the detente a “tactical truce.” Wu Xinbo said it was “tactical stability” that is “neither sustainable nor solid.” And Shen Weizhong, a former Chinese foreign ministry official, says: “The more time we have, the better prepared we might be towards a final showdown on Taiwan or maybe another trade war.” 2) Chinese scholars believe China’s strength built the detente, not diplomacy. Wang Yong called the trade war “a tipping point in terms of strength.” Wu writes it “is not the result of the U.S. side having a change of heart or showing goodwill, but was won by China through arduous striving and struggle.” Wang Yong of Peking University calls the trade war’s outcome “a tipping point in terms of strength.” 3) Chinese scholars credit Trump personally for American conciliation. Chen Dongxiao points to his “distinct and unique decision-making style.” Zhao Minghao writes that Trump “admires power and prefers to engage with the leaders of powerful countries.” Others write he would "readily sacrifice" Taiwan. They want to lock in the current stability, as Xi declared, for three years and beyond. 4) Trump has indeed been accommodating so far. He kept tariffs on China well below the cap. He paused entity listings for the longest period since 2008. He let advanced AI chips flow to China and its Southeast Asian cutouts. And he held up arms sales to Taiwan and offered only muted support to Japan and the Philippines under Chinese pressure. 5) Beijing is pulling up the tech ladder and preparing for the next fight. New State Council orders threaten foreign firms that cut ties with Chinese partners. Exit bans keep key talent and their families in the country. Export controls on manufacturing equipment keep others from catching up. National security regulations on scientific publication protect domestic know-how. And rare-earth licenses force foreign buyers to hand over customer lists and production details, giving China a map of chokepoints. 6) Beijing is taking advantage of American conciliation to press its advantages in Asia, breaking past precedent. A China Coast Guard crew clubbed a Philippine sailor near Second Thomas Shoal. They blocked a resupply mission during Xi’s state visit to Washington, breaking a two-year agreement. Japan now faces the broadest coercion campaign in more than a decade, existentially threatening some of its manufacturers. And around Taiwan, the PLA fired rockets closer to the island than ever before. Washington has largely stood by. 7) Beijing is breaking the Busan agreement. Washington has complied with the terms of the Busan agreement, suspending the Affiliates Rule and lowering tariffs, but Beijing has throttled the supply of rare-earth minerals and magnets to the United States. U.S. officials say China has delivered only about two-thirds of what it promised, and trade data suggest the shortfall is larger still. Shortages of yttrium, used for jet engines and gas turbines, have forced some suppliers to suspend production. Chipmakers are running short of scandium. Beijing believes strength built detente, and more strength will preserve it - not backfire. 8) The way forward at Shenzhen. The two sides are unlikely to save the truce at Shenzhen. We should expect few breakthroughs on agriculture, aviation, or even AI despite the need. But the leaders should at least announce they are working to extend the truce ahead of the December meeting in Miami. If they fail, and tensions mount, there is a growing risk of runaway escalation. foreignaffairs.com/united-st…

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Lori Wallach@WallachLori·16h

Congress‘s ability to do this kind of quality investigation & analysis to support policymaking was mainly killed when Gingrich became House Speaker & gutted committee budgets, OTA, study groups & more. Why would a rising Dem majority trash this unique capacity on a key issue?!

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Dr Arvind Virmani@dravirmani·Nov 17

18/oxbridge This a standard Oxbridge debating trick, which one has been warning about for years (🧵☝🏽): Put up a straw man, hint that this is your opponents position, demolish the straw man. QED

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Gregory C. Allen@Gregory_C_Allen·Nov 16

I feel extremely confident that this will reveal that many think tank reports are sponsored by Nvidia without that being disclosed. It's not a crime to sponsor reports, but some institutions are likely operating in violation of their own disclosure rules. Has Nvidia received a "retain all internal and external communications" letter from the government yet?

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Rush Doshi@RushDoshi·Nov 16

Will China retaliate against the new interim final rule on remote access? Or will they instead work around it? The NSC had this to say last week about PRC retaliation: Per @nickschifrin: “We do not negotiate American export controls. These are national security matters that we develop in the administration and interagency process....The Chinese publicly have stated that they're not involved with smuggling and they are not really involved with remote access either….Us closing these loopholes should not be something that generates countermeasures….It would be it would be completely disproportionate, given their existing restrictions [on the import of US chips], [if] we close[d] a loophole to get at an issue that the Chinese themselves say that they're not doing.” It does seem the stressors on the Busan truce are mounting. I'll have piece out about all this tomorrow.

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Bill Bishop@niubi·Nov 16

sad, excellent piece from @benthompson . This line should not be ignored. “There are whispers that Megaspeed’s ultimate customer was not, or not just, Alibaba, but also the Chinese military. These are whispers, to be clear; it was the affairs that were enough, at least publicly, to lead to Huang’s resignation.”

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Chris McGuire@ChrisRMcGuire·Nov 16

NEW: The Department of Commerce just published new AI and semiconductor export control regulations that close some major loopholes in existing export controls. The regulation includes new rules to: (1) counter Chinese smuggling of AI chips; (2) restrict Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips; and (3) block Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. These rules are a major step forward. They still contain some key gaps that need to be filled urgently in a follow-up rule, namely, they do not block Chinese companies from buying AI chips inside the United States or renting access to AI chips at US-based data centers. However, this rule will help and is the first good-faith effort to actually close loopholes in export controls in a year and a half. Hopefully more will follow. 1. Countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips. The rule expands export controls on AI chips to five new countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil. It does not block AI chip orders to these countries, but requires a US government review (unless it is a US company that meets certain requirements). This is a massively needed step. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have been the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth biggest importers of AI chips this year. The rule doesn’t cover Taiwan itself, where chip smuggling is a massive issue (exports of AI chips to China are still not illegal under Taiwanese law), and still doesn’t prevent AI chip sales to Chinese companies in the United States, which somehow remain legal. Ultimately, large orders of AI chips by untrusted companies in any country should require a license to fully combat smuggling, as Chinese companies will move to buy AI chips anywhere there isn’t a license requirement. But this is a start. 2. Restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips. The rule creates a new remote access control that restricts companies from providing Chinese companies with remote access to AI chips. It requires a US export license to provide Chinese companies with access to 12 million TPP or more (equivalent to ~200 of the most advanced Blackwell chips, or ~800 H100 chips). This applies to chips already shipped, as well as all future shipments. Some of these requirements even apply retroactively; Commerce says existing rules already barred data supplying a majority of a data center’s compute to Chinese companies, and tells companies that violated this to self-disclose. This effectively kills the business of neoclouds like Megaspeed that exist to provide remote access to large amounts of AI compute to China. The biggest gap is the remote access controls do not apply to data centers in the United States. So Chinese companies can legally train on large numbers of Blackwells at data centers in Northern Virginia. This gap should be closed immediately with a new rule that uses Commerce’s US persons authority to capture this activity. The rule also exempts recommendation algorithms, so impact will depend on enforcement. Last, new authorities included in the text of the AI Overwatch Act would strengthen Commerce's ability to enforce these controls--that bill should pass immediately. 3. Blocking Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. The rule closes loopholes in existing controls that Chinese companies are likely exploiting to illicitly make AI chips at TSMC or Samsung. Specifically, it now requires any Chinese chip designer who is seeking to make a 16/14nm or more advanced chip at TSMC/Samsung to get a U.S. export license, and restores old rules that weren’t being enforced until now that require any untrusted company anywhere in the world to get a license to make an AI chip at TSMC or Samsung. This is a significant upgrade. Overall, this is a major step forward to countering Chinese smuggling of and access to advanced AI chips. The work here is not done, as there are some critical loopholes that remain open and need to be closed in a follow-up rule (namely those related to activities inside the United States). Commerce should move extremely quickly to close these. But this is the first time in over 18 months that the administration is starting to take export controls seriously, and does represent a meaningful step forward. Last, the fact that the Commerce press release says this rule was “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council” is remarkable and unprecedented. I have never seen a BIS rule that was not written by BIS. That implies that Commerce was dragged kicking and screaming over the finish line by the White House and Treasury, and instructed to publish this rule rather than the rumored weaker one that it preferred. Remarkable.

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Rush Doshi@RushDoshi·Nov 16

In a thoughtful piece, @thomaswright08 warns that some calling for a meaningful debate on China policy (which we should have) seem to argue with strawmen rather than policy as it was, and they tend to be light on specific areas of contrast. This makes it harder to have a real debate. “Critics of strategic competition tend to compare their preferred strategy to a straw-man version of it, rather than the managed competition approach that was pursued during the Biden administration. This makes it very difficult to have a real debate that reflects the nuances and complexities involved….A common theme of these pieces is that the default U.S.-China strategy in Congress and much of Washington is all-out competition that eschews coexistence and diplomacy.” He puts forward ten questions to help heighten the policy contrast. thomasjwright.substack.com/p…

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Rush Doshi@RushDoshi·Nov 16

The Trump administration just dropped new remote access rules, no doubt spurred by the Nvidia scandal. In the first paragraph, they made Commerce publish a line effectively indicating the Administration’s lack of faith in Commerce. Remarkable. bis.gov/press-release/bis-is…

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