
The big problem with the actual Neocons was that they never delivered on immigration, cutting welfare, or winning wars quickly. Their legacy became a sort of Pavlovian trigger that, when activated, can be used to make Americans reflexively oppose actually doing a thing at all if previous attempts at doing that thing were done badly. This is more effective wrt some issues than it is with others. For example, you won't always get called a Neocon for agreeing with what the Neocons SAID about being tough on the border. You'll never get called one for supporting their defense and expansion of the welfare state. You will, however, never escape the false accusations of guilt by association for agreeing with Neocons about any aspect of foreign policy -- especially if it even remotely resembles proactive defense of America's interests via the maintenance and use of its military. Actual Neocons were right about the need for America to confront its enemies abroad but their execution was, to put it charitably, flawed. Americans aren't historically or ideologically opposed to war but they do want to see America actually WIN its wars -- and win them quickly. If the public thinks a war can't be won, they won't want America to fight it in the first place. Most of America's recent wars dragged on for so long that some people view even the suggestion that America SHOULD win its wars as being intrinsically Neocon. In other words, they actively root for America's enemies. It is not a good thing for a majority of Americans to accept the idea that wars can't be won because it means America has lost faith in the competence and superiority of America's military, which signals weakness to hostile foreign enemies who will wage wars against us whether we want war or not. Anti-war activism and Neoconservatism thus default to being two sides of the same coin. The Neocons overextend and poorly utilize the military, presenting a facsimile of a solution that merely wastes resources without meaningfully obstructing or deterring America's enemies abroad. Intuitively sensing that something is amiss, the public grows to resent the very idea of solving the problem, which they now doubt even exists. The less real the problem seems, the more vulnerable they are to foreign influence operations aimed at capturing their sympathy and loyalty. Both sides allow America's enemies to pursue their military and geopolitical agendas unmolested.




















