Hello Andhra Pradesh police,
Law enforcement authorities in Andhra Pradesh relied on fabricated evidence and lack of basic crypto tracing to obtain a court order in India to seize $1.5 million belonging to an innocent Chinese investor.
This evidence presented is fake and It would be appreciated if you can look into it..
Case reference: Cr. No. 10/2025
Indian law enforcement froze $3M from an innocent Chinese investor after mistaking a crypto bridge for a pig butchering scam. Now an Indian court has ordered Gate to hand his funds to a person they never belonged to.
My analysis of how Indian LE traced through an unlabeled service and wrongly froze @xxxkeym's Gate account:
The case stems from a pig butchering victim who allegedly lost $1.7M of BTC, USDT, DOGE & SOL in May 2025.
Andhra Pradesh CID registered it as Cr. No. 10/2025 and filed a charge sheet in March 2026.
In July 2025, xxxkeym had Gate deposit address 17mpajZ6Nq3dG3T6wUhaXxYF4Qy9HJnYx5 frozen after depositing 15 BTC from 3NcBhqK in the following transaction:
885f3afab562251b222363cf12095e864ddb94636674b01f0cdb05997e5a54a0
This is one transaction Indian LE cites in its notice. 3NcBhqK was funded by xxxkeym's own OKX & Binance withdrawals in Jan 2023 and the coins sat dormant for years until the Gate deposit.
Indian LE never froze his OKX or Binance accounts, the actual source of the 15 BTC, which tells you how flawed their justification is.
Gate froze his entire account, which held roughly $3M at the time and about $1.5M today.
The Indian court order hands all of it to the complainant.
Gate deposit address 17mpajZ also received two deposits for 15 BTC total in 2025 from bc1pkkwqyxn3rm608ryuqg9hyqna0syq4jx5pxkr7pzg8n3usx6tyqfst5u966, which is also controlled by xxxkeym.
Shortly before the deposits to Gate, bc1pkkw was funded in three transactions by bc1quzwkggdf6ly06mrrnnled0qdr57w770k45n5n7 & bc1qtu66zfqxj6pam6e0zunwnggh87f5pjr7vdr5cd.
bc1quzw & bc1qtu66z were reported as alibarbit[.]bit, the same scam named in Indian LE's press release.
That was a mistake. Both belong to the Merlin Chain bridge, which is unlabeled in most compliance tools.
xxxkeym is simply a normal Merlin user trading tokens on the L2. This wrong label is the only place the scam touches his transaction history.
Below is the blockchain data showing each Merlin withdrawal by xxxkeym matched to a BTC payout from those addresses, plus screenshots of the bridge activity.
xxxkeym bridged 50 BTC into Merlin on March 28, 2024, over a year before the alleged May 2025 theft.
His three withdrawals came out of that balance. I found zero onchain connections between xxxkeym and the theft.
Separately on July 15, 2025 xxxkeym had a 7 BTC private key compromise theft which was reported to local police and also SlowMist was engaged. His stolen funds flowed to Wasabi.
This is embarrassing incompetence by Indian LE, who seem incapable of reviewing basic blockchain data.
Indian LE, the prosecutor and the judge all signed off on this, Gate froze the account, and LE did a full press release about it recently, while the real victim here (the Gate user) hasn't had access to his funds for nearly 16 months.
My hot take is VASPs need to challenge weak jurisdictions like India, Canada, etc due to repeated negligence in criminal cases.
Merlin source transactions from xxxkeym
10.1368 BTC - March 25, 2025
0x975081c2a62355019561c3ec0d01c72bf0dadf7121d46764bbb13ac0013a9a06
4.9071 BTC - May 6, 2025
0xa30f7b770e2e8e2e2d0fc0d390aa800e7f880e8e129d1b705dbc4167fc878769
9.9796 BTC - June 17, 2025
0x147429d324520c9ebee8015b0214dbd7bdce97ee37ad25e11819f4b04aecc049
Bitcoin destination transactions to xxxkeym
10.1367 BTC - March 28, 2025
55ab5373c2daa69b1728e6551b59f9dc661d1d78786face798d5251ccbe4685a
4.907 BTC - May 9, 2025
b2222fe38856e65420f15051a4cc419a92868803dec69a218f007948972ea367
9.9795 BTC - June 19, 2025
094f01388638523fb29aac0a0d4f70adf6949fede0847a45cef2c3f930692c73
Merlin Chain bridge
bc1quzwkggdf6ly06mrrnnled0qdr57w770k45n5n7
bc1qtu66zfqxj6pam6e0zunwnggh87f5pjr7vdr5cd
Gate deposit address - xxxkeym
17mpajZ6Nq3dG3T6wUhaXxYF4Qy9HJnYx5
Other addresses - xxxkeym
3NcBhqKnyo8dfzqfG1p5rbaKJFV8yLnx3u
bc1pkkwqyxn3rm608ryuqg9hyqna0syq4jx5pxkr7pzg8n3usx6tyqfst5u966
0x59fd8E3aEca4FAbb53ef6078D2319Dc174fb66a6
July 15, 2025 BTC theft addresses
bc1qjmf2e4fc2r97rq762055ag3g9uhypavta0payq
bc1q80gq7ctfsm6p9h9jh2k45da87jy6s7a87pj3h0
March 28, 2024 50 M-BTC destination transaction to xxxkeym
0xf1ee67ba1d3f97fb2d4776fa8ffc90f0b7ba7d116de3bf510a2c6aeae7d80def
#PeckShieldAlert Specter has reported that a Gnosis Safe may have been compromised, resulting in $6.45M being drained, including $4.3M in $USDC and $1.7M in $syrupUSDC. The hacker has spent ~$813K to buy $XMR on Hyperliquid.
It has become an everyday narrative: "The Ethereum Foundation is selling." Much like engagement farmers repeatedly claiming that Binance is selling BTC to generate engagement.
While I respect the original poster, I believe there have been too many instances of inappropriate or low-confidence wallet attribution.
One such example is wallet 0x5CBC6299faB3320E7758ac97fd4CA45E5B72209, which was identified as an Ethereum Foundation wallet allegedly selling ETH. I decided to look into its transaction history, and I would argue that the attribution is weak.
The connection
In August 2025, the wallet received 17.7K ETH ($79M) and 10M DAI from 0xF39d30Fa570db7940e5b3A3e42694665A1449E4.
0xF39 had received ETH from an address that was funded by a verified Ethereum Foundation address.
On December 9 and 13, 2015, four and a half months after Ethereum's genesis block, the verified EF address transferred 10,378 ETH twice, totalling 20,756 ETH ($4.8M at the time), to an entity address.
That entity address held the ETH from 2015 until May 31, 2017, when it transferred the funds to 0xF39.
What happened to the funds?
Just two hours later, 0xF39 used 20,522 ETH ($4.78M) to participate in the Brave Browser Basic Attention Token (BAT) ICO.
This was the largest individual purchase in the entire BAT crowdsale.
The wallet received 131.3M BAT and held the tokens for about a year before gradually selling them.
It eventually sold 109M of the 131M BAT directly, receiving 84.3K ETH and $7.6M in stablecoins.
These are the proceeds I could directly verify. This excludes BAT transferred to other addresses, which may also have been sold.
DeFi activity
From 2017 onward, 0xF39 continued participating in DeFi activities, including:
-Compound lending.
-Maker vault collateral positions.
-Liquidity provision.
-Staking and farming, including UNI and CRV.
The wallet has 3,425 transactions and 16,216 token-transfer records.
After eight years of DeFi activity, it transferred $89M in ETH and DAI to the claimed EF address 0x5CB in August 2025.
So, is the Ethereum Foundation the entity performing these DeFi activities and participating in ICOs?
There are several possible explanations.
The original ETH allocation could have been a payment or allocation to an entity, such as an engineer or team member. It could also have been an investor's private or OTC purchase.
Another on-chain connection shows a wallet directly linked to the entity receiving ETH withdrawals from Bitfinex between 2016 and 2020 which may likely be the entity buying ETH, can EF be buying ETH?
The entity participated in an ICO, generated substantial returns, and engaged in years of DeFi activity, ... are EF the one performing those activities?
There is also an Ethereum Foundation article published in January 2016 in which the Foundation disclosed $650,000 in private ETH sales to individuals and businesses which also mean it may have been sold to the entity
blog.ethereum.org/en/2016/01…
I think the attribution is incorrect.
A historical transaction link does not establish common ownership or control. Strong attribution requires more than transaction tracing, and ideally should be supported by independent off-chain evidence.
Continuously labelling every wallet with a historical connection to EF or similar cluster as a team-controlled wallet risks spreading FUD.
Stay Smart.
"Because you get rinsed by the same KOL grifters who have done it for years, and you never learn."
Just a few weeks ago, CT was praising Kmichi. Some even went as far as calling a known bundler a "mentor."
A few weeks later, a token was deployed, and he indirectly promoted it.
That same token is now down 96%. Same pattern, as usual.
He moves on.
Everyone moves on.
Come back a few months later, and CT will still be calling him a legend.
I stopped spending time on memecoins because it's usually the same pattern over and over, yet people still never learn.
I'd rather spend my time investigating real theft cases than chasing grifters and bundlers.
My previous post on Kmichi:
x.com/SpecterAnalyst/status/…
Stay Smart
Le groupe Crédit Mutuel Arkéa confirme l'incident dans un communiqué et assure qu'il est terminé.
Le montant du préjudice n'est pas dévoilé.
lemonde.fr/pixels/article/20…
Relay's compliance and team are so bad that DPRK manage to bridged $38M (still bridging) in just 7 hours through the @RelayProtocol Bridge, and they couldn't stop it despite claiming to have an active KYT system.
DPRK couldn't laundered that amount within such a short timeframe through THORChain, but Relay opened the door.
so bad for you guys....
Address: TNhpfKq83wufEKGjBhQFnT7jnxYmyBzH6F
Stay Relay.
Guess the only provider specifically mentioned by the FBI to block funds stolen from Binance by the DPRK?
Yes, you're right, @THORChain. They were explicitly mentioned.
I hope @jpthor and @CBarraford will do the right thing this time.
Stay Smart.
The scale of the danger North Korea poses to crypto has become impossible to ignore.
This is the story of the investigators exposing North Korean operatives working inside the industry.
You think you know who your developer is.
But do you?
🎬 Introducing THE DEVELOPER.
Update: Stolen funds from the $6.3B Binance exploit and $388M Bitget exploit were commingled at the same address 45 minutes ago, after arriving via THORChain.
This indicates the same actor is likely behind both incidents.
The Bitget exploit was attributed to DPRK-linked TraiderTraitor, which had overlap with other previous exploits such as Kelp DAO.
Commingling address:
0x15104a9ce0f08a8f0075a0869ae80e795fe0feb7
Bitget exploit context: x.com/zachxbt/status/2104528…
BREAKING: Arbitrum Security Council has executed a transaction to freeze ~$30.5M from the Binance Exploit.
Thanks to all other signers involved.
Exploiter address
0x3E2bf1ac6bf0934BBba6456C341c2EcbCED632d5
Trsanction hash: 0xb69c81774f507d46ce776aeaed8b4d31df96dd66ce6fd05073481011835355d6
So far, $2.8B has been frozen. Shout-out to the teams for their swift action.
Next: First Digital should help freeze the remaining $3.45M in FDUSD.
Stay smart.
It’s quite nuanced so I am not sure how much benefit a site would end up having.
Majority of CT is not capable of thinking critically about the following:
-what’s the threshold for number of scams promoted before it’s malicious?
-what’s the threshold for undisclosed paid shills before it’s malicious vs accidental?
-when is it fair to call a project a scam vs failure?
(people call projects a scam because the token price never went up or the token was never launched)
-when can you forgive people for past mistakes?
-what burden of proof is considered as evidence?
(people get falsely accused of being paid shills without evidence and it gets a lot of engagement on X bc they’re controversial)
There’s a difference between doing 1-2 paid promotions with the same legit brand for months or years vs multiple per week with a questionable brand.
Ethos made an attempt at reputation however it was abused by low quality farmers.
Majority of CT would see a name on the site and immediately bring out the pitchforks….
The conclusion reached would be the exact same thing everyone knows.
Do not trust random people online.