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Squiblydoo2,187 posts
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Squiblydoo

@SquiblydooBlog

Creator of Debloat and CertGraveyard.org Support: ko-fi.com/squiblydoo Join the Debloat/CertGraveyard discord: discord.gg/dvGXKaY5qr

◷ Joined November 2020▧ 694 Photos and videos
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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 17

"GoogleCert.scpt" used to run a stealer and install fake crypto-apps to steal seed phrases and such. h/t @malwrhunterteam DPRK uses this same empty padding technique, dunno who this is, but it seemed clever. rogueauthority.org/macos-scr…

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 17

Old kernel driver signed "Beijing Datang Shenzhou Technology Co., Ltd." used for kernel resident backdoor. dda67a294e6a086022e1ba51f2ff9a63addf16dc865d9205741caa9a35df0d33 C2: 23.95.31[.]14 rogueauthority.org/windows-k…

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 17

Fake Zscaler client signed "MARQUEE AUDIO VISUAL LIMITED" The file can backdoor, proxy, or exfil. fe9829f1c102a79b4ca33c8c8bda8ef2236dc94c6d1de88249c89e82681adc8c Was FUD, found by @malwrhunterteam rogueauthority.org/signed-fa…

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 13

Analysis of the APT backdoor. Includes pivots to other copies and C2: rogueauthority.org/bectrl-po… Nice use of PID spoofing and other classic techniques. Policy lure targeting SE Asia Same campaign over several months.

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A suspected MustangPanda APT backdoor disguised as PDF software. Sample shared for further malware analysis. dll:virustotal.com/gui/file/4748… anyrun分析:app.any.run/tasks/b4c1b80f-b… #MustangPanda #APT #Backdoor #MalwareAnalysis

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 12

Imagine getting ransomwared because a CA gave a code-signing cert to an Estonian firewood company.

Yes, a small Estonian company that on paper is "focused on the wholesale of solid fuels (primarily firewood)", that in past years looked very dormant (zero revenue in 2024-2025), surely was in a very big need of a code signing cert in 2026 October... so it's still not totally obvious that SSL Corp is just one of the "legit certificate authority companies" that are actually gangs giving certs to basically anyone as long as they are getting the money for the given certs... 🤷‍♂️

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

The OpenSUpdater campaign leverages the same certificate bloating technique, same cx1, cx2 and cx3 exports and 32-bit constant. That at least helps us link back to a "financially motivated actor" but doesn't tell us much more. 9/9

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

Like RecipeLister, I don't know what the goal is. The campaigns been running for several months, and I still have no answers, but someone is investing money and time into it. Further poking suggests it is related to blog.gdatasoftware.com/2026/… which @struppigel 8/9

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

The campaign seems most similar to the classic "Recipe Lister", the original TamperedChef, analyzed by @luke92881 , @InvokeReversing 's community, Dingusxmcgee, others x.com/InvokeReversing/status… Based on the certificate usage, it aligns: again with US, UK, and UA certificates. 7/9

We had an awesome collaboration on the Invoke RE Discord server that looked at an interesting "RecipeLister" Adware campaign, check out the blog from Dingusxmcgee here: blog.dingusxmcgee.com/blog/2…

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

The following are code-signing certs associated with the campaign: Virtual Holding Resources, LLC Net Sourcing Experts LLC Launch Window, LLC Alternate Financial, LLC Pausatech LLC ROAD MEDIA PASS LIMITED Binary Wave Innovations LLC Serve-o-lution LLC 6/9

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

The parsing failure is being used by other actors: Reported by GData in a unrelated (?) campaign: blog.gdatasoftware.com/2026/… The impact of the parsing failure is unclear to me, but it's made me much slower at reporting these. 5/9

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

The failure happens because SigCheck (and other certificate parsing tools) find a mismatch between the PE's Security Directory OptionalHeader's size and the size specified in the certificate table. The mismatch violates the size expectation. Windows doesn't see the problem. 4/9

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

The code-signing certificates are abusing a bug in certificate parsers too. If you look on VirusTotal, it states that the file's not signed but has certificate data. This is intentional by the actor. This happens due to a failure in Microsoft's SigCheck. 3/9

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

The installers drop a fairly straight forward app, and then a separate loader that checks a few factors before dropping a payload. I haven't managed to see what payload is gated, but we've seen a ton of domains and code-signing certificates for this campaign. 2/9

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Squiblydoo@SquiblydooBlog·Nov 11

There's an on-going wave of TamperedChef that @luke92881 has been chasing. TamperedChef = apps that work as advertised while keeping a back door for later. Functionality: rogueauthority.org/signed-co… For C2 and signers: rogueauthority.org/cookup-cl… 1/9