
more hack tx etherscan.io/tx/0x2074d4f995…, attacker etherscan.io/address/0x9c862…

Securing Web2 & Web3, auditing and penetration testing.

more hack tx etherscan.io/tx/0x2074d4f995…, attacker etherscan.io/address/0x9c862…

Meanwhile, it lost 4.3 ETH and ~6,000 USDT tokens (worth ~$14,600 total). The root cause is the unprotected function 0x6cd50a67 in the contract etherscan.io/address/0x359cf…, which allowed arbitrary transfers and mints.

It seems @taraxa_project was hacked. The attacker minted 100 * 1e30 $TARA tokens (etherscan.io/address/0x2f42b…) in transaction etherscan.io/tx/0xa1301596c7…. Attacker address: etherscan.io/address/0x7bd73….

The other contracts created by the same deployer were attacked, too. TX etherscan.io/tx/0x1b28fdbf0a… victim: etherscan.io/address/0xae4c2…

Root cause is ............. re-entry. The most famous and popular one still. The sell() function does not clear the user's balance.

An old contract named RIGHT (etherscan.io/address/0x02411…) was hacked and lost about 6.7 ETH (~$14K). Tx: etherscan.io/tx/0x7b3878969c… Attacker: etherscan.io/address/0x66d38…

The unknown function selector 0x83c7b8e4 allows transferFrom of any user who previously approved the $ETF token (bscscan.com/address/0xec7bac…) and swap with $USDT. In that transaction, 22 victims' $ETF tokens were attacked.

Another access control attack on the contract bscscan.com/address/0x1b6938…. Address bscscan.com/address/0x56b903… gained about $75k. Attacker: bscscan.com/address/0x4bf7c6…. Tx: bscscan.com/tx/0x1d8ebeb5a54…

There are two issues in the victim contract (bscscan.com/address/0x46e185…). The unknown function selector 0x6f73978a allows calling transferFrom on any account, forcing a swap of $OLY tokens (bscscan.com/address/0x544028…) and enabling the sandwich attack.

Attacker bscscan.com/address/0xf10395… gained more than $60K in tx bscscan.com/tx/0x827e23d6dc6…. The victim contract bscscan.com/address/0x46e185… lacks access control and blindly trusts user input, allowing it to transfer any user's $USDT who has given allowance. Please revoke the allowance ASAP!

2/ The attacker created 60 contracts and kept calling rescue() to force the victim contract to swap out more Heaven Gate ($HATE Token) while putting 5 WETH into the swap. This affects the K value, allowing the attacker to profit using a sandwich attack.

An old NFT contract, DoomCat (@doom_cats), was attacked and lost about 2 ETH (~$5k). Attacker: etherscan.io/address/0xb84be… Tx: etherscan.io/tx/0x58d57759c5…

The double add caused the profit to increase no matter what.

The root cause is a logic bug and seems pretty obvious.

An old WADJET contract on BSC was hacked, losing about 111 BNB (worth $98k) in tx bscscan.com/tx/0x6ee0086b59b…. Attacker bscscan.com/address/0xdbdcc7… moved the assets to bscscan.com/address/0x8b6b00…, which seems funded by Rail BSC: Deployer (bscscan.com/address/0x76eb57…) @RAILGUN_Project.

An attacker (bscscan.com/address/0xa33af0…) attacked the new $HTC token using nearly 500 contracts and 37M gas. TX: bscscan.com/tx/0x9e1ea64cba6…. The token contract's awarding logic has an issue, leading to a $45K loss.