
What's next? We've covered the immediate implications earlier today, so the question now is: what's next? Firstly, the destruction of the Kerch Bridge will save many Ukrainian lives, both on the front and in the occupied territories. Well done. The E-58 highway / land bridge becomes increasingly important. As Russia's sole remaining land connection to Crimea, it presents a substantial logistical dependency. Ukraine's mid-range strike capability continues to develop, and Russian movements, supply infrastructure and transport networks across the occupied territories will remain under considerable pressure. This is particularly relevant given the continuing uncertainty surrounding US restrictions on Starlink and Starshield. The refinery campaign will continue. Ukraine appears to have established a fairly effective rhythm of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure recently, with repeated attacks causing disruption across the refining and distribution network. There is little reason to expect this campaign to slow, and it does appear that capability is only increasing as we head into 2027 Russian military aviation remains another area of demonstrated Ukrainian success. Repeated attacks on airfields over recent months have resulted in losses of operational aircraft and damage to supporting infrastructure. Whoever is currently coordinating these new operations appears to have a considerably better understanding of the target set than some of their predecessors. One area worth watching more closely is Russia's military transport aviation. The Il-76 fleet, in particular, provides an important capability for moving specialist personnel and time sensitive military cargo. Recent reporting of strikes against an Il-76 at Staraya Russa, alongside earlier attacks around Rostov, highlights the vulnerability of this infrastructure. The loss or disruption of transport capacity can have consequences well beyond the aircraft themselves, particularly when replacement capacity is limited. And that brings us to another subject related to aircraft. Putin's financial and political ecosystem. A number of prominent Russian businessmen have benefited enormously from the wartime redistribution of state assets and commercial opportunities. The acquisition of Moscow's Domodedovo Airport by a consortium of oligarchs, following its transfer through a state auction, is an especially interesting example of how valuable infrastructure and ownership interests have shifted during the war. There is an important OSINT angle here. Russian aviation infrastructure is not simply a collection of military airfields. It is also an extensive network of commercial assets, ownership structures, state-linked companies and oligarchs interests. Understanding who owns what, who benefits, and how these organisations are connected provides another way of measuring the economic consequences of the war. Aircraft movements, changes in international airline operations, insurance restrictions, airport ownership and the withdrawal of foreign operators are all worth monitoring. International aviation is particularly sensitive to security risks, and confidence can be lost considerably faster than it can be restored. Zelenskyy hinted at the possibility of strikes against commercial aviation infrastructure during the summer of 2026, but the idea seemingly went nowhere. Perhaps the same cautious voices that delayed the Kerch Bridge operation for so long had something to do with that. If so, it's worth asking whether their advice is serving Ukraine's interests or their own, particularly given the continuing Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.





























