←
VicOne482 posts
VicOne avatar

VicOne

@VicOneAuto

VicOne, headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, is a cybersecurity leader for Physical AI, built on proven automotive cybersecurity expertise.

◷ Joined September 2022▧ 183 Photos and videos
VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Nov 13

Jamming makes a truck vanish from the map. Spoofing is quieter: the dot keeps moving while the trailer is elsewhere. With Mobile Defender Inc., we look at how fleets detect and respond. Could you prove a location was faked? vicone.com/blog/when-gps-tra… #AutomotiveCybersecurity

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Nov 5

As vehicles move from software-defined to AI-defined, AI reasoning moves closer to the center of vehicle decisions. Security must now cover how those decisions are formed and what they can influence. Is your team ready? vicone.com/blog/ai-defined-v… #AutomotiveCybersecurity #SDV

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Nov 4

As vehicles move from software-defined to AI-defined, AI reasoning moves closer to the center of vehicle decisions. Security must now cover how those decisions are formed and what they can influence. Is your team ready? vicone.com/blog/ai-defined-v… #AutomotiveCybersecurity #SDV

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Nov 4

A robot can execute an authorized command exactly as expected and still be unsafe if its inputs were manipulated. Physical AI cybersecurity turns rare hazards into testable conditions. How do you test for intent? vicone.com/blog/can-a-robot-… #PhysicalAICybersecurity

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Nov 4

VicOne observed 400 automotive cyber incidents in Q3 2026. In-vehicle systems (174) overtook enterprise IT (149) as the most affected domain. Risk is moving closer to vehicle operation. Where is your team focusing? vicone.com/blog/vicone-situa… #AutomotiveCybersecurity

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 30

IVI cybersecurity is no longer only about protecting the screen. It is about understanding the connections around it and what those connections can ultimately affect. #AutomotiveCybersecurity

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 30

Why does this matter? Modern IVI systems connect with cloud services, wireless interfaces, mobile devices and other vehicle systems. A compromise can potentially extend beyond infotainment to vehicle data, privacy and vehicle functions. #VehicleCybersecurity

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 30

VicOne’s analysis of IVI-related attacks from 2020–2026 shows how broad the attack surface has become: Cloud backend: 33.3% USB: 22.9% Bluetooth: 20.0% Wi-Fi: 17.1% These figures represent broader IVI research, not the attack path used in the BYD case. #IVISecurity

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 30

The BYD Shark 6 security research highlights a broader connected-vehicle risk: an IVI security issue can have consequences beyond the infotainment screen. The bigger question is not only where an attacker gets in, but what that access can ultimately affect. #ConnectedVehicles

Post attachment
VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 22

Until SGLang patches, enable authentication immediately. Restrict endpoint access to trusted networks. Read the full analysis and remediation guidance: vicone.com/blog/cve-2026-867… 🧵(6/6) #ThreatIntelligence #CVE #SGLang

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 22

The entry point: /update_weights_from_tensor accepts unauthenticated requests. An attacker sends base64-encoded pickle. SGLang decodes and deserializes. The gadget chain executes. Code runs as the SGLang process. 🧵(5/6) #ThreatIntelligence #CVE #SGLang

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 22

Here's how it works: pickle calls import("os"), loads the os module. Then getattr(os_module, "system") retrieves the dangerous function. SafeUnpickler never sees ("os", "system") directly—only the permitted builtins used to reach it. 🧵(4/6) #ThreatIntelligence #CVE #SGLang

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 22

The flaw: builtins.import and builtins.getattr are permitted. An attacker doesn't need eval. They only need functions that retrieve other functions. Gadget chains exploit the space between the rules. 🧵(3/6) #ThreatIntelligence #CVE #SGLang

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 22

SGLang introduced SafeUnpickler to block dangerous functions like eval, exec, compile. It uses an allowlist of safe modules + a denylist of blocked functions. The logic seemed sound. It wasn't. 🧵(2/6) #ThreatIntelligence #CVE #SGLang

VicOne avatar
VicOne@VicOneAuto·Sep 22

CVE-2026-86793: SGLang's SafeUnpickler—the patch for CVE-2025-10164—is vulnerable to bypass. A remote attacker can execute arbitrary code through an unauthenticated endpoint. VicOne researcher Reuel Magistrado details the gadget chain. 🧵(1/6) #ThreatIntelligence #CVE #SGLang