The Russo-Ukrainian war started at 4.30 AM on February 27th 2014 when Russian troops took control of the Crimean Parliament building in Simferopol. The invasion of Crimea was followed by the invasion of Donbass in March 2014. The war has been going on ever since.
Ukraine’s strike on the Kerch bridge was especially designed to humiliate Putin before his meeting with Trump and Xi on Thursday, an officer involved in the operation told me for @thetimes.
“We planned this as symbolic gesture before the meeting of Trump, Putin and Xi, to show that Putin is weak.” 1
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Ukraine spent several weeks preparing strikes on the Crimean Bridge, illegally built by Russia, using Neptune and Flamingo missiles among other weapons in the final phase of the operation, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed on Nov. 17 as he released footage of the attack
🔗 link.nv.ua/c9iIBE
Trwa dyskusja nad tym, jak zniszczenie Mostu Krymskiego wpłynie na możliwości militarne czy cywilne.
Odpowiedź brzmi: poważnie i nie można lekceważyć skali wydarzenia.
Krym w ciągu 30-60 dni stanie się kryzysem humanitarnym o skali 2,5 mln obywateli.
#CrimeaBrigde
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The destruction of the Kerch Bridge’s arch and the blockage of the shipping channel by its debris affect far more than Russia’s transport links with occupied Crimea. It triggers a chain of disruptions to maritime and river transport, grain and oil exports, military logistics, and the economies of entire Russian regions. Debris from the bridge blocks the Kerch–Yenikale Canal, cutting off direct access to the Black Sea for the ports of Rostov-on-Don, Azov, Taganrog, Yeysk and Temryuk, as well as occupied Mariupol and Berdiansk. But the consequences extend further. Through the Don and the Volga–Don Canal, the Sea of Azov is connected to the Volga, the Caspian Sea and Russia’s vast network of inland waterways.
The main target of the Ukrainian strike is the military logistics network supplying occupied Crimea. The Kerch Bridge remains an important supply route for Russian forces, and Ukraine will seek to put it permanently out of service. Moscow cannot count on restoring the bridge and shipping through the Kerch Strait without interference while the war continues. The loss of road and rail links forces Russia to reroute cargo through occupied southern Ukraine, where transport routes are already supplying the front. Crimea will not be completely isolated, but Russia will lose an important fallback option for its military logistics. The fewer supply routes remain, the harder it becomes for Russia to supply its troops and hold occupied territory.
The second major blow is to Russian grain exports. According to S&P Global estimates, the route through the Kerch Strait and the Azov–Don system accounted for around 28% of Russian wheat exports in August 2026. This puts more than a quarter of exports of one of Russia’s main agricultural commodities at risk. Some grain can be rerouted through other ports, but this requires rail capacity, freight wagons, grain storage facilities and available terminals. All of this costs money and takes time. Grain will accumulate in storage, export contracts will go unfulfilled, transport costs will rise, and the prices paid to Russian agricultural producers will come under pressure.
It was Russia that blockaded Ukraine’s Black Sea ports in 2022, withdrew from the grain deal in 2023, and continued destroying Ukrainian grain silos, terminals and port infrastructure. It is now also systematically targeting production facilities themselves: in November 2026, Russian strikes shut down Astarta’s soybean processing plant and damaged Kernel’s oilseed crushing plant. The destruction of the power grid further paralyses the processing and storage of agricultural products. Russia is systematically destroying Ukraine’s agricultural supply chain, from production to exports, while trying to push Ukraine out of global food markets. If Moscow now loses the ability to ship its own grain through Kerch, along with grain stolen from occupied Ukrainian territories, this is a direct consequence of the war it launched.
The third blow is to Russian petroleum product exports. Some fuel from refining centres in the Volga region and the Kama basin reaches Black Sea export routes via the Volga, the Volga–Don Canal and the Sea of Azov. Blocking passage through Kerch severs this transport chain. Russian carriers will have to find alternative ports or shift cargo to rail. This means additional costs, delays and competition for transport capacity. All of this comes against the backdrop of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries, which have already reduced fuel production and shipment capacity. Novorossiysk’s major oil terminals do not depend directly on the Kerch Strait, but access through the Sea of Azov has been an important export route for some producers in Russia’s interior.
The fourth blow is to the freight transport system as a whole. The problem extends beyond vessels unable to pass through the canal. A ship stuck in port cannot make its next voyage. Grain that cannot be shipped out fills storage facilities. A terminal at capacity stops accepting new cargo. A producer loses a buyer, a carrier loses revenue, and an exporter loses a contract. Even after passage is restored, these losses will not automatically disappear: accumulated cargo will have to be moved, and disrupted schedules will have to be reorganised. In this way, a single blocked canal creates problems for businesses and transport companies far beyond the Sea of Azov.
The fifth blow is to Russia’s railways. Cargo previously transported by water will have to be shifted to overland routes. But the rail network does not have unlimited spare capacity. Moving additional millions of tonnes of grain, petroleum products and other goods requires freight wagons, locomotives, track capacity and port terminals. This additional cargo will compete with existing freight flows, including military shipments. Russian Railways will be able to absorb some of these volumes, but at the cost of delays, higher logistics costs and the displacement of other freight.
The sixth blow is to naval logistics. Through the Volga, the Volga–Don Canal, the Don and the Sea of Azov, Russia has been able to transfer certain small warships and auxiliary vessels between the Caspian Flotilla and the Black Sea Fleet. Blocking the Kerch–Yenikale Canal deprives it of this direct route. The Caspian Flotilla, of course, retains its ability to operate in the Caspian Sea, while other inland waterways maintain connections to northern maritime basins. But the usual route from the Caspian to the Black Sea through the Sea of Azov becomes unavailable to these vessels. Russia loses another means of rapidly redeploying part of its naval forces between theatres of operations.
The seventh blow is to occupied Mariupol and Berdiansk. Russia is trying to incorporate these Ukrainian ports into its own transport system, using them for cargo shipments, military logistics and the removal of resources from occupied territories. Without access to the Black Sea, their role is sharply diminished. Russia will therefore lose the benefits it derives from the port infrastructure it seized during the war.
Moscow must recognise that Ukraine is unlikely to allow it to restore, without interference, transport infrastructure used to sustain Russian aggression. The Kerch Bridge supports Russian military logistics, giving Ukraine every reason to continue strikes aimed at putting it permanently out of service.
This is the central irony: the Kremlin built the bridge as a symbol of Crimea’s annexation, only to create a critical and highly vulnerable transport hub whose damage can paralyse routes deep inside Russian territory. The bridge Putin intended to bind Crimea to Russia forever may now cut off a substantial part of Russia itself from direct access to the Black Sea.
🚀 Ukraine deployed 11 types of missiles, drones, and other systems in the operation against the Crimean Bridge
According to the published statement, the operation lasted several weeks and consisted of seven stages. It was planned and coordinated by Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) together with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The operation involved Dovbush, Vendeta, Da Vinci, Sichen, MICH 2000, Ruta, Palyanytsia, An-197, FP-1, FP-5 Flamingo, and R-360 Neptune.
Before the final strike, Ukrainian forces systematically targeted Russian air defense systems, radars, and electronic warfare equipment.
Palyanytsia drones struck the road section of the bridge, while Neptune missiles, Ruta drones, and FP-5 Flamingo missiles hit the railway section.
The statement claims that Flamingo missiles carried out a precision-guided strike, with communication maintained until the final seconds.
😆 “Why can they do it, but we can't?” Russiаn militаry blоgger еxplains the reported success of the attаck on the Crimeаn Bridge
The аuthor оf the Russian Engineer channel claims that strikes on the bridge were carried out just 4–5 minutes apart. Accоrding to him, Ukrainian forces used hundreds of drоnes before launching precision strikes with Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles. He also suggests that FP-5 Flamingo missiles may have been involved.
By the way, the video allegedly shows the very moment just seconds before a Flamingo missile struck the Crimean Bridgе.
The blоgger believes that reliable communications, intelligence and the precision of Western weapons played a decisive role. He аlso points to Ukraine's advantage thanks to Stаrlink.
“This should help you understand why they cаn do it and we can't,” the author complains, urging Russia to speed up the development оf its own Rassvet satellite communications network.
Oh, cry me a river.
Just a reminder of how long it took Ukraine to receive weapons:
First howitzer cannons? In 3 months.
First HIMARS? In 4 months.
First Western tanks? In 1 year (American ones in 1.5 years, with just 30 of them).
First Patriot defense system? In 1 year and 2 months.
First ATACMS? In 1.5 years.
First F-16s? In 2.5 years.
Permission to strike russian territory with Western rockets? After 2 years and 8 months.
If weapons had been provided to Ukraine faster and in the right quantities, russia would already have been defeated. But the West first needed to see enough Ukrainians sacrificed: Bucha, Mariupol, Bakhmut, Avdiivka. Thousands of civilians and children. Only after this sacrifice was "accepted" did the West begin giving Ukraine weapons.
How many more Ukrainians must die before the West provides Ukraine with everything it needs to defend itself against the russian evil? How many human lives must be put on the altar before moving to the next level?
Ukraine is fighting pure evil. If this evil empire is not stopped now, it will continue its expansion. Allowing russia to keep even a small part of Ukraine will signal to other dictators that aggression works.
The only way to end this evil is to give Ukraine everything it needs now. Stop playing catch-up at the cost of Ukrainian lives.
P.S. I made this post more than two years ago, when Joe Biden still was the president of the US.
Hard to comment accurately on an isolated excerpt without having the whole story. But
1 Ukraine shouldn’t have to say thank you. We’re the ones who should be thanking the Ukrainians every day
2 Biden could have made sure Kyiv prevailed and Moscow was defeated. He didn’t want to.
WSJ: President Biden calls Ukrainian President Zelensky "stubborn" and "not grateful" in new memoir
While Biden believed that while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s acting background "turned out to be very good training" for a wartime leader, Zelensky "could be moody and stubborn in our private conversations, and not as grateful as I would have expected."
Link to article: wsj.com/arts-culture/books/t…