Connect your agent to the Anticapture MCP and find governance data on the market's leading protocols, including @Uniswap, @Compound_xyz, @ENS_DAO and others listed on @anticapture.
Information on delegates, voting power, the share of tokens held by specific addresses and much more is available through the Anticapture MCP.
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Among a DAO's top 10 delegates, who actually votes?
Every protocol has a different reality.
At @ENS_DAO , 7 of the top 10 delegates voted on more than 50% of proposals since receiving their delegations. The people with the most voting power take part in the organization's decisions.
@Uniswap is close behind ENS, with 5 addresses above 50% participation and 1 address between 25% and 50%.
At @0xfluid and @Compound_xyz, only 5 of the top 10 delegates vote on proposals. Both also stand out for concentrating power in 2 delegates who don't vote on every proposal. At Compound, these addresses belong to Humpy and the Compound Foundation.
Finally, Shutter has only 2 delegates in its top 10 with more than 50% participation, and together they hold just 10% of the DAO's voting power.
Data from the @anticapture MCP.
UNI supply on CEXs grew from 77.4M $UNI to 97M $UNI between August and October, peaking in early October.
However, on October 29, CEX supply dropped from 94M $UNI to 87M $UNI. The reason was the attack on Binance, which drained 7M $UNI from the centralized exchange.
The hacker sold this balance on DEXs, which is why DEX supply spiked suddenly on October 29 and then returned to normal.
Since the hacker sold all 7M $UNI below the price on CEXs, arbitrage bots and market makers such as Wintermute bought them. Some of it was then sent to CEXs, likely to profit from the price difference.
Chart and data from the Anticapture MCP.
A proposal submitted by Humpy aims to end the multisig that can cancel proposals on @Compound_xyz .
This is the peak of the dispute between Humpy and Compound, where Humpy wants to use their $COMP tokens to block and pass proposals in the DAO, and the Compound is blocking every attack attempt Humpy promotes.
Ugur, their API3 representative on the Compound forum, was banned. Humpy has now posted a proposal personally on the forum and in on-chain governance.
If the proposal passes, thanks to Humpy’s $COMP, the multisig will likely cancel Humpy’s proposal again, further straining Compound’s governance.
Analyzing the flow of tokens deposited on CEXs, we noticed that some governance tokens tracked on Anticapture are behaving differently.
Holders of $OBOL, $FLUID and $UNI are sending their tokens to exchanges, increasing the share of supply held on exchanges.
This could mean their holders are simply selling. Or perhaps it reflects concern about self-custody after the vulnerabilities in the last weeks.
Other tokens, however, show the opposite behavior.
$GTC and $COMP saw a drop in balances on exchange addresses, meaning more holders are withdrawing tokens than sending them to exchanges.
It's a peculiar pattern, which may mainly reflect governance token holders who want to use them for voting or other strictly on-chain actions.
With the return of the Governor at @gitcoin and the political conflicts at @Compound_xyz , the data fits the current context.
All data was sourced using the @anticapture MCP.
Over the last 90 days, 76% of proposals submitted to @nounsdao failed to reach quorum - and therefore didn't pass. Only 4 proposals reached quorum in the past 3 months, and all of them passed.
Of those 4 approved proposals, 3 needed the vote of 5gram.eth, the largest individual holder in Nouns DAO, with 177 votes. Without his vote, and those of other holders with more than 40 NFTs (votes), reaching quorum becomes mathematically much harder, creating a dependence on them.
Since April 24, 2026, when the Noun/NFT reserve price was set at 2.8 ETH, the number of new buyers has plummeted. As a result, power is becoming concentrated among those who already hold the tokens, like 5gram.eth.
Data from @anticapture MCP
Although @Uniswap's Delegated Cap keeps rising, reaching $1.67B on September 22, the number of delegated tokens has dropped nearly 30% since May 2026.
This means Uniswap is more secure, since the cost of capturing it keeps getting higher, thanks to $UNI's price appreciation since August.
However, the number of delegated tokens continues to fall, which means fewer $UNI holders are delegating their tokens.
This sharp drop of nearly 30%, ~58M $UNI, may have been caused by old addresses holding $UNI moving or selling their tokens.
With market optimism over the past few weeks, governance token prices have risen, increasing the cost to attack DAOs.
On @Uniswap, for example, $UNI doubled in price: it went from $3.29 on August 18 to $7.37 on September 5. Even with the drop in the DAO's Delegated Supply, the cost to overtake it jumped from $534M to $1.2B.
So, in a bull market, @Uniswap and other DAOs end up becoming more expensive to attack. On the other hand, their treasuries, which are based on governance tokens, also become more valuable.
At Anticapture, we analyze capture and on-chain governance problems, but what happens when there are disagreements over off-chain governance?
Today, @greenfield_cap announced that it has filed a request for Swiss regulators to investigate the governance of the Safe Foundation (not the DAO) and determine whether there are issues that need to be corrected.
Greenfield Capital claims there is a disagreement between investors and the way the Foundation has been run, harming the project and, by extension, those who invested in it.
It's interesting to see VCs using traditional mechanisms to resolve governance problems at a Foundation where the token has no power, but regulators still might.
1/
Today @greenfield_cap published an open letter on the @safe Community Forum explaining why we have filed a supervisory complaint with the Swiss Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (ESA) concerning the Safe Ecosystem Foundation. Here is why, and what we are asking for.
Another day, another attempt to capture an abandoned governance.
Rarible is part of a series of attacks carried out on abandoned DAOs that either (1) hold a treasury or (2) control ways to extract money in some form.
Option 2 has been becoming increasingly popular. A DAO may not have money, but it can mint new tokens or drain funds from users who granted infinite approvals 5 years ago.
We're preparing a deeper analysis of this risk currently circling the market.
Keep an eye on @anticapture 👀
Another abandoned governance is under attack - this time it's Rarible's.
@rarible was a well-known NFT marketplace between 2020 and 2022. It moved millions of dollars during the NFT frenzy. The protocol and its treasury are governed by $veRARI holders - locked $RARI - using veNomics to set voting power in the DAO, just like Curve does.
On September 20, a wallet bought 3.5 ETH worth of $RARI and locked it in Rarible's contracts, receiving 132,576 veRARI in voting power.
Moments later, the same wallet submitted a proposal from a supposed activist investor called Falcon. According to the proposal text, they would "unlock veRARI's value for its holders."
In practice, if approved, the proposal transfers ownership of all contracts to "Falcon." The voting period ends on September 25 at 08:53 UTC.
Rarible DAO has a Security Council, so it is able to block the attack, if it manages to get the multisig signers who control the Council to act in time.
The strangest part of this attack is that Rarible has only $368 in its treasury, yet the attackers spent $9,311 to capture its governance.
Like other attacks, they don't want money - they want control over what Rarible can do, such as:
- The ability to mint unlimited $RARI tokens on the market and sell them on the secondary market (while shorting it on an exchange)
- Stealing users' funds via $WETH, $USDC, and other token approvals (including NFTs) granted to Rarible's marketplace
- Draining all the tokens locked in the veRARI contract
These are just simple possibilities that let attackers extract profit without needing a treasury to steal from.
Over time, these attacks are getting more sophisticated, and the pool of potential victims keeps growing - even projects with no money worth stealing.
We recommend that anyone holding an address with approvals granted to Rarible revoke them, to avoid any trouble in case governance is indeed captured.
After receiving a 3M $ENS delegation and voting on 2 proposals with that voting power, nick.eth withdrew the delegation and now has only 151K $ENS delegated to his address.
The tokens are still held in wallets he controls, but they are not currently being used to vote in ENS DAO governance.
New major governance change detected:
nick.eth received a 3M ENS delegation. To put in perspective, the quorum is 1M ENS and average turnout ~1.4M ENS.
Attack attempts continue to happen in DAOs with abandoned multi-million dollar treasuries.
The capture of decentralized organizations and protocols is a reality - and it will continue to happen if projects don't prioritize the security of their treasuries and contracts.
That's why we built @anticapture
@AmpleforthOrg was the target of a governance attack attempt this past weekend.
An address submitted a proposal requesting a supposed DAO payment of $2.5M to a grantee, the project's entire USDC treasury. The project exists and is discussed on the forum, so it could slip by at first glance.
However, in the last few hours, the proposal that would have executed the attack was canceled.
The address that submitted the proposal was receiving a delegation from another wallet. That wallet held 87K $FORTH, with 70K $FORTH being the minimum required to submit a proposal. Today, the owner of those $FORTH decided to sell their entire position in the governance token.
@AmpleforthOrg governance has a mechanism that allows anyone to cancel a proposal when the submitter holds less than 75K $FORTH. Seventy blocks after the $FORTH sale, an address canceled the proposal that would have stolen the $2.5M in USDC.
In parallel, a proposal to move treasury administration to the Ampleforth team's multisig entered voting. It was submitted one day after the attacker's proposal and will begin being voted on tomorrow.
If approved, Ampleforth would move administration of its treasury (via Timelock) to a 2-of-5 multisig, thereby preventing any $FORTH holder from moving the funds currently held in treasury.
That would prevent further attacks, but it would also end the utility of $FORTH - using the DAO's money.
With @anticapture we can assess ENS DAO's revenue and identify the main activities that generated income for the protocol.
The main revenue sources are (1) new registrations, (2) renewals, and (3) premium sales.
Revenue from new registrations has currently been declining, but revenue from premium sales has increased over the past 3 months - in August alone, it reached $113K.
Premium sales are ENS domains that have already expired and passed the 90-day grace period. After that period, the domain goes into a 21-day descending auction. Its price starts at $100M and drops to 0 by day 21.
The DAO charges a premium in this auction for whoever wants to claim the domain.
The difference between the premium paid in the auction and the cost of registering the ENS name is an additional revenue source for the DAO - today, just as important as renewals or new registrations.
With market optimism over the past few weeks, governance token prices have risen, increasing the cost to attack DAOs.
On @Uniswap, for example, $UNI doubled in price: it went from $3.29 on August 18 to $7.37 on September 5. Even with the drop in the DAO's Delegated Supply, the cost to overtake it jumped from $534M to $1.2B.
So, in a bull market, @Uniswap and other DAOs end up becoming more expensive to attack. On the other hand, their treasuries, which are based on governance tokens, also become more valuable.
$COMP, from @Compound_xyz , saw a spike in on-chain transfers on September 2, six days ago.
At first, the movement seemed strange, but there is a justification.
The proposal to move funds from the old Franchiser contracts, which delegate $COMP from the treasury to delegates, to a new contract (FranchiserPool) was approved. As a result, delegation was rebalanced, including a delegation of 33K $COMP to blockful.
It's interesting to be able to find, on a platform like @anticapture , on-chain events that stand out - and, on the same platform, locate the answer to their cause.
On July 27, Uniswap approved a proposal enabling the fee switch across multiple networks, including Robinhood Chain. The fee switch uses fees charged to LPs to buy and burn $UNI.
Since the proposal passed, Uniswap has burned $6.4M worth of $UNI driven by volume on Robinhood Chain alone.
That already makes it the third-largest network for $UNI burns, accounting for 70% of all fees accumulated toward the burn, and it's closing in on Base. All of that in just a month and a half.
The DAO's timing on this proposal let Uniswap tie the fee switch activation directly to Robinhood Chain's traction, turning the network's early success into a burn number $UNI holders can see.