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BlockReq Network1,350 posts
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BlockReq Network

@blockreq

Realtime EVM RPC for trading bots & agents · low-latency reads · live logs · mempool 实时 EVM RPC|为交易 bot 与 AI agent 提供免费的低延迟读取、实时日志和 mempool blockreq.com

◷ Joined February 2024▧ 341 Photos and videos
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BlockReq Network@blockreq·11h

公共端点上我现在不太随便拿一个很早的块高去 eth_call 了。 eth_getLogs 经常还能把挺早的 Transfer 拉回来,receipt 也能查,就容易默认这节点历史挺全。接着在同一个高度跑 eth_getBalance,再 eth_call 一下合约,结果直接 missing trie node,有的节点写 historical state unavailable。eth_getStorageAt、eth_getCode 也是同一类,都会要当时的 state。要是把它当成网络抖,脚本跟着重试,请求会白打一串,回的还是同一句。 更绕的是 eth_getBlockByNumber 有时还能把那个块头拿回来,交易列表也在,只有碰到 state 的调用会挂。日志和 receipt 留得也比较久。非 archive 节点会把老的 state 丢掉,最近一段块一般还能查,再往前就不一定了。getLogs 或块头成功,也不等于你能在同一个 blockNumber 上再做一次 call。 回放某个高度的余额,或者想在历史块上模拟交易,我会先用那个高度打一发 eth_getBalance 或 eth_call 探一下。同一类错误再打也没有,不要跟 429 限流混着退避重试,也别探失败了偷偷改成 latest 再打,那已经不是那个高度了。有的报错很含糊,就一个 -32000,不像限流那么好认 @grok。 随便点一个很老的高度去查 state,得是 archive 节点。公共 RPC 多数不是,我现在把这类失败单独算,不再当临时故障。

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·13h

就怕哪天图省事,冷存储那把也插上去签一次,隔离就没了。

管理加密钱包,如何能做到尽可能的安全? 我的认知: 1、冷存储和链上交互需要分开使用2个不同的硬件钱包,不能混用,存钱的就只能存钱,交互的就只能交互。交互的钱包肯定是硬件钱包最合理,冷存储还有一种选择:专用全新手机离线+支持冷热模式的开源软件钱包(比如Bither比太)。 很多人使用同一个钱包又存大额、又来做链上合约、又去做DeFi,遭了一个就是全军覆没,简直幼稚。 2、硬件钱包仍然需要尽可能的完全开源:Trezor、Onekey都做到了这一点。 3、存款用的硬件钱包,尽量不使用有电池的设备。 3、创建生成助记词的时候不能联网。 这一点Onekey、Ledger的设计比较合理,可以插入充电器,不用连接电脑即可生成助记词。更新钱包插件版本后再生成助记词。 4、打开Passphrase隐藏钱包功能,使用第25个助记词来管理深层钱包。 5、助记词存放在纸质(不联网不拍照),钛合金钢板(防火防水防灾)等地方。 6、世界上没有任何地方可以称得上绝对安全,今年交易所被黑、账户被冻结,软件钱包被黑、硬件钱包供应链供给,每个地方都不能说绝对安全。 所以,避免单点事故才是最重要的也是最核心的安全保障。 #Trezor #Onekey #Ledge

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 16

105_chainTransfer.js 里写了转账必须主钱包私钥签,还专门写了 NOT the API signer key。这 7 笔记在代理钥名下,我对着这两边对不上。

拒 @fuhuahuai 称,其在 @Aster_DEX 的账户约 456 万美元资产在未经本人签名的情况下被转出。我们基于 Aster 官方文档、官方代码和链上公开记录,对事件做了独立核查。 一、发生了什么 2026 年 11 月 12 日 16:22,一个新账户在 Aster 注册。113 秒后,它收到第一笔 700,000 USDT。16:24 至 17:08 的 44 分钟内,共 7 笔、4,564,675.50 USDT 转入该账户,随后分 10 笔提到 BNB Chain,链上实收 4,564,674.38 USDT。 二、链上怎么记的(图 1) Aster 链浏览器显示,这 7 笔转出全部记在地址 0x647E 名下,付款人和收款人是同一个地址。0x647E 是当事人账户的网页代理钥地址,同时也是那个新注册账户的地址。当事人账户名下没有对应的转出记录。 三、Aster 自己的规则怎么写的(图 2、图 3) Aster 接口文档把“转给其他地址”(Transfer to Address)列为 WITHDRAW 级操作,签名一栏写的是 user 账户钱包私钥。 Aster 官方示例代码在同一接口上写得更直接:必须用主钱包私钥签名,“NOT the API signer key”。该示例提交于 2026 年 10 月 27 日,早于事件发生。 四、隐私模式(图 4) Aster 说明文档写明:账户隐私开启期间,不允许向其他用户做内部转账。 Aster 的公开查询接口显示,当事人账户的隐私状态为 enabled。链浏览器上,该账户最后一条公开记录是 9 月 16 日开启隐私,此后没有关闭记录。 五、资金去向 提出的资金经跨链换成 ETH。其中 1,000 ETH 分 10 笔进入 Tornado Cash;另有 768.1 ETH 和 993,999.67 USDT 进入 NEAR Intents 兑换。目前没有停留在可冻结地址上的资金。 六、请 @Aster_DEX 正面回答 你们的文档和示例代码都写明,转给其他地址必须由账户主钱包签名,“NOT the API signer key”。这 7 笔在链上记于代理钥地址名下。它们是凭哪项权限放行的? 你们的文档写明,隐私模式开启时不允许向其他用户转账。该账户隐私自 9 月 16 日起一直开启。这 7 笔为什么能执行? 被签名的内容里没有付款账户。你们的系统是依据什么,从该用户账户里扣走这 456 万的? 一个注册 113 秒的账户收到 70 万 USDT 并立即提走,2 小时 38 分内提走 456 万。风控有没有触发过一次?如果没有,为什么? 事件之后,相关逻辑是否做过调整?如果做过,改了什么、什么时候改的、为什么没有公告? 这五个问题的答案都在 Aster 自己的系统日志里,希望Aster能有所担当,用户的 456 万美元已经被黑客盗走,Aster 欠用户和市场一个解释。

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 16

同一钱包前几天往币安还充了大约 20 个,那边到现在都没冻。这个对比我看完愣了一下。

2025-07-16:当事人@xxxkeym 从冷钱包 3NcBhq…Lnx3u 向 Gate 充值 15 BTC(哈希 885f3afa…) 2025-07-20:Gate 发来账户审查邮件,只点名这一笔,要求说明资金来源 2025-10-28:印度安德拉邦 CID 来信,称被骗的 BTC 追到了该账户,点名的仍是同一笔哈希 2026-03-06:案件提交印度法院 2026-10-30:贡土尔特别法院裁定,4 个 Gate 账户的全部资产换成 USDT,转给报案人 2026-11-12:当事人收到 Gate 通知,才知道裁定已经下来 而当事人这笔 15 BTC 充值由三个部分组成。主体 14.99999322 BTC 于 2023-01-09 进入该钱包,此后两年半一动未动,直到 2025-07-16 才充入 Gate。印度 CID 的来信自己也写明,这个钱包一直持有来自 OKX 的资金。 另一个是 3,373 聪的找零,上溯同样是 2023-01-09 从币安热钱包提出的一笔 85 BTC。 唯一一笔 2023 年之后进入的外部资金只有 600 聪,来自仿冒地址 3NcoFs…Pnx3u,首三位和尾四位与当事人地址相同。这个仿冒地址来自 2024 年 11 月一笔 1,401 个输出的批量投毒交易,属于典型的地址投毒粉尘,充值时被钱包一并花了出去。 同一钱包在 7 月 11 日和 15 日还先后向币安充值约 20 BTC。当事人称,他的币安和 OKX 账户至今没有被冻结。 案件 2025 年立案,而这笔充值的主体资金 2023 年初就已到位。除非受害人早在 2023 年以前就已被骗,或者警方掌握站内划转、场外交易等尚未公开的证据,否则这笔钱很难定性为赃款。 Gate 是这起事件里唯一同时掌握资产、用户资料和执法文书的一方。当事人追问了 16 个月,得到的只有一句不便透露。在法律允许的范围内,我们认为 @Gate 至少应当说清五件事: 1、冻结的触发点:2025 年 7 月 20 日的冻结,发生在当事人收到印度警方来信之前。它是 Gate 自己的风控报警,还是当时已经收到执法请求?如果是风控报警,命中的是哪一笔输入。 2、执法文书本身:向当事人本人提供冻结令、调证函和法院裁定的完整副本,并告知 Gate 向印度警方提供了哪些用户资料。 3、冻结范围:被点名的只有 15 BTC 一笔充值,为什么冻结的是整个账户。 4、划扣口径:按哪一天的价格换成 USDT、划扣多少、剩余资产如何处理。 5、执行时间表:何时执行划转,是否给当事人留出上诉和申请暂缓执行的时间。 配合合法的执法和司法要求,是交易所的义务,这本身不是过错。当事人帖中提到的内外勾结,目前没有证据支持。 但 Gate 是资产的托管方,而不只是传达指令的中间人。我们认为它至少有三项审慎义务 1、执行划扣前,核对执法方的追踪依据与链上记录是否对得上。链上记录 Gate 自己就能查。 2、用户提交的反证,应当正式转交执法方和法院,而不是把用户推给印度方面自己去沟通。 3、在不违反保密要求的前提下,及时告知用户冻结依据、资料移交和裁定内容。这次当事人是在裁定作出 13 天后,才从 Gate 的邮件里得知的。 如果最终证明这 15 BTC 是被错认的赃款,而 Gate 在未核对、未告知的情况下就执行了划扣,那么用户的损失,很难只算在印度警方头上。 交易所配合执法是底线,让用户看得见自己为什么被冻、被划扣,也是底线。

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 15

repricing state access looks clean on a slide. @grok i'm more stuck on the contracts that already shipped and can't be upgraded if a path starts running out of gas.

one thing i think deserves more attention in ethereum’s next upgrade is the risk of changing the rules underneath applications that are already live. @ethereum’s upcoming @GLAMSTERDAM_ETH upgrade is meant to improve how the network handles state growth and execution costs. two proposals, EIP-8037 and EIP-8038, are particularly important because they change how gas is charged for state creation and state access. the reasoning makes sense. as ethereum grows, storing and accessing data becomes increasingly expensive for the nodes maintaining the network. gas pricing needs to reflect those real costs if ethereum wants to increase capacity without making the network harder to operate. but there’s another side to this. @chain_security identified that some existing smart contracts rely on gas-related assumptions that these changes could invalidate. the Ethereum Foundation subsequently reported four submissions identifying deployed contracts that could break under the proposed changes. this is where things get interesting for DeFi. → a smart contract doesn’t need to be rewritten to become incompatible with a network upgrade. → protocols can have failure-handling logic, gas limits and execution assumptions that were perfectly reasonable under the old rules but behave differently under new ones. → for immutable contracts, fixing the problem may not even be straightforward. some developers could be forced to consider migration, while others may need changes to the protocol specifications themselves. there’s also a bigger economic implication here. ethereum is trying to make state growth more sustainable so it can support greater capacity over time. but that capacity is only valuable if the applications, liquidity and infrastructure built on top of it can continue operating safely. this is why protocol upgrades should be evaluated beyond transaction throughput and cheaper execution. developer confidence, backward compatibility and the cost of maintaining deployed applications matter just as much. the Hoodi testnet rollout has been put on hold while the findings are reviewed. the November 16 developer meeting is expected to examine the audit reports, with further discussion scheduled for November 19. my take: i actually think delaying an upgrade over compatibility concerns is a positive signal, not necessarily a setback. ethereum’s value isn’t just in being able to process more transactions. it’s also in the reliability of the financial applications people have already built around it. scaling the network while preserving that trust is the harder problem. and honestly, that’s the part worth watching. do you think protocol upgrades should prioritize backward compatibility even when it means sacrificing some progress on scalability?

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 14

On Base and OP I don't treat latest like the real chain anymore. Arbitrum too. latest there is the sequencer head. It moves constantly, which is fine if I'm just watching or checking whether a hash showed up at all. It gets messy once you already acted on that block. A receipt can come back from eth_getTransactionReceipt, logs from eth_getLogs, the balance can even look right — and then that head gets reorged. The block you stored isn't canonical anymore. I use safe and finalized for that. safe is the head that's already been confirmed back through L1, so you're not sitting on a sequencer-only fork. finalized waits for L1 finality. I still use latest when I only care if a tx landed. If I'm about to reuse a nonce, move funds, or write a position into a database, I pin the read to safe, or I keep the block hash and check it again. Another thing: not every public endpoint treats these tags the same. Some nodes error if they don't support them. If the call fails and you retry with latest without looking, you think you asked for safe. I also don't mix tags in the same decision. eth_getLogs at latest and eth_getBalance at safe will give you a state that never existed on either block.

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 14

五分钟就把找机会、模拟、丢堆再截前面几个串完了,我看着都有点慌。后面还写利润 99.99% 给 builder,这步更难受。

fable真牛逼,是我偏见了,5分钟给我做了个mev。 find机会模拟,丢大小堆,然后截取前面多少个,try catch, chain上不回滚的利润累计 99.99%给builder,感觉要失业了。 权威fable

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 13

the old cancel-all coming back before the orders are actually gone would drive me crazy. I'll take the 3ms that means it's really done. @grok 412x is a fun headline, that early-return thing is what got me.

At the end of August, I said our Polymarket DeFi CLOB couldn't be saved, and we were rewriting it from scratch in Rust 🦀 Today I'm excited to announce Nex, our new exchange built from the ground up. We've been sprinting on it since August. A Nex instance has been running in shadow mode on production traffic for the last week, side by side with the current exchange. It mirrors every order the current exchange gets, so we can measure latency, stability under load, and validate matching correctness against live production flow. The numbers below are internal exchange timings, not e2e (those are coming soon), but we wanted to show how big the difference is. p99 current CLOB → Nex: - Place order: 1.55s → 3.76ms (412x faster) - Cancel orders: 627.92ms → 3.20ms (196x faster) - Cancel market orders: 810.16ms → 5.14ms (158x faster) - Cancel all*: ↳ Response (current CLOB) vs complete (Nex): 35.70ms → 3.14ms (11x faster) ↳ Full cancel all: ~636ms-2.04s → 3.14ms (~200-650x faster) p95 current CLOB → Nex: - Place order: 341.84ms → 1.59ms (215x faster) - Cancel orders: 78.22ms → 1.58ms (50x faster) - Cancel market orders: 84.89ms → 2.27ms (37x faster) - Cancel all*: ↳ Response (current CLOB) vs complete (Nex): 6.20ms → 1.58ms (4x faster) ↳ Full cancel all: ~606ms-2.01s → 1.58ms (~380-1,270x faster) *Cancel all: the current CLOB responds immediately and cancels in the background, so when you get the response, your orders aren't cancelled yet. Nex responds only after everything is actually cancelled. Full cancel all on the current CLOB depends on how many orders you have, but it usually adds another 600ms-2s. We also rewrote our WebSockets in Rust. This is the feed you see the market through: book changes, price moves, your fills. Fall behind it, and you're trading on old prices, and your quotes get picked off. - Write latency p99: 44.5-88.1ms → 0.099ms (~449-889x faster) - Slow readers/sec: 48.7-75.6 → 0.01 (~4,870-7,560x fewer, basically 0) Scale: The current CLOB in stable state can handle 10k commands/s with 15k bursts → Nex can handle 100k commands/s with 150k bursts. 10x more, and with a few optimisations we can get to 200k commands/s with 250k bursts; with more low-level core changes, we can get to 1M commands/s over the next year. Not needed yet, but the headroom is there. Startup time: 5 mins → 15s (20x faster) The old CLOB had many race conditions and wasn't deterministic. Nex is deterministic by design and removes the race conditions in the old CLOB. We also skipped some easy wins for launch to get this out faster that could make p95 and p99 another 5x faster, and we'll start work on that in Q1 next year to keep pushing these numbers down. We wanted to build this without any breaking changes for MMs or builders; Nex has no breaking changes to requests or responses, so we just need to swap out the binary on our side and it will go live. We want everyone to be on this journey with us, with the ability to relay feedback and test it against the existing CLOB, so we've opened a Nex Sandbox. Fill out the form and test it yourself: docs.polymarket.com/nex We'll run 4 weeks of shadow mode on production traffic to make sure everything is perfect, then if everything is good, we will go live mid-December. We can roll out WebSocket improvements without the full exchange, so we may do that sooner. We've been rebuilding every system around the exchange for months, and we've seen huge benefits, but the exchange is the heart of Polymarket DeFi. Nex fixes most of the pain traders have had. Really proud of the team on this one. Make Polymarket fast, finally. It's coming.

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 12

Patch notes go public and the RPC providers and validator clients don't ship on the same day. That's the interval I'd actually be watching.

A security patch changes the risk for everyone who has not installed it yet The distinction in this research is important: recovering a vulnerability from a binary is not the same as building a working exploit. The strongest tested agent did both on a subset of the benchmark, and standard hardening reduced success in a follow up test. Those results do not tell us how often production systems will be compromised For DeFi infrastructure, the useful question is how long critical dependencies remain exposed after a fix becomes public. RPC providers, validator clients, wallet backends and bridge operators all have different deployment constraints A practical response is to inventory those dependencies, rehearse emergency updates and prepare temporary controls for components that cannot be patched immediately. Faster analysis must be matched by faster, verifiable rollout

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 11

公共 RPC 上我已经不太用 eth_newFilter 了。 eth_newFilter 或者 eth_newBlockFilter 会给你一个 filter id,然后再用 eth_getFilterChanges 去拉新日志。自己跑的单节点上这没问题。前面要是有负载均衡,下次请求经常打到另一台机器,那台根本没这个 id,直接回 filter not found。还有的节点闲一会儿就把 filter 清了,你还当自己在订阅。更烦的是有的不报错,getFilterChanges 直接给你空数组,你还以为这段没事件。 我现在改成自己轮询 eth_getLogs。记下上次处理到的块高,下次 fromBlock 从那儿接着扫。那个块的 hash 我也留着,下一轮先 eth_getBlockByNumber 对一下,hash 对不上就说明重组过,得往回退几块再扫。不然同一条 log 会进库两次,或者已经被重组掉的那条还躺在库里。 toBlock 我也不写成 latest。latest 一直在往前走,你扫这一段的时候后面可能又出新块,边界很容易空一截。我一般扫到一个已经确定的块,下一轮再往前挪。 本来觉得 filter 更省请求,少打几次多舒服 @grok。后来发现丢事件比多打几次 logs 麻烦得多。 WS 的 eth_subscribe 是另一回事,连接还在的时候它能推过来。HTTP 这边的 filter id,我已经不指望它在公共端点上能活过一轮调度了。

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Scient@Crypto_Scient·Nov 9

This has more room to it. Extreme fear is needed. Altcoins bleeding while $BTC holds ground and BTC.D goes up would do the job.

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 9

ives still falling and you're already mapping fib pockets — that patience is either skill or stubbornness @grok

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 9

Ethereum RPC pricing in 2026 — packs vs CU vs credits, archive + WSS called out. Unlike some L2s there's no single official public endpoint; you pick a provider when you need history or subscriptions. @grok blockreq.com/blog/en/best-et…

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BlockReq Network@blockreq·Nov 9

us cash market closed so the whole move priced on binance perps first. $360m overnight volume is kinda wild

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Cointelegraph@Cointelegraph·Nov 9

🚨 REKT: Over $1 billion in crypto positions were liquidated in the past 24 hours, with longs hit for $913M and shorts for $102M.

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