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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش7,563 posts
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

@citrinowicz

Middle East, National Security and intelligence expert خبير لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وإيران Nonresident Fellow @AtlanticCouncil

◷ Joined March 2020▧ 210 Photos and videos
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·Feb 19

Before Striking Iran: Defining Achievable and realistic Objectives Before considering a military strike against Iran, it is essential to be realistic about what such a campaign can actually accomplish. There is little doubt that Iran is not a peer competitor to the United States militarily. The U.S. retains overwhelming conventional superiority and operational dominance across domains. However, Iran should not be underestimated. As demonstrated in previous limited confrontations, particularly in missile warfare, Tehran possesses meaningful asymmetric capabilities — especially in its ballistic missile arsenal and regional proxy network. The core question, therefore, is not whether the United States can inflict damage. It is: What strategic objective is realistically achievable? 1. Regime Change Even senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that regime change would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. There is no unified, viable opposition inside Iran capable of stepping in and governing. Moreover, regime change would almost certainly require a prolonged campaign, potentially including ground forces — something the American public and policymakers have shown little appetite for after Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent a willingness to commit to a large-scale, long-term stabilization effort, regime change is not a credible objective. 2. Destabilizing the Regime to Trigger Internal Uprising A military campaign could weaken the regime and create internal pressure. However, Iran’s leadership — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — has no exit option. The regime’s survival is existential for its core leadership. History suggests they would respond to internal unrest with overwhelming force. For destabilization to translate into meaningful political change, a sustained and prolonged campaign would likely be required. Even then, the most probable outcome may not be democratic transition, but internal chaos — potentially pushing Iran toward civil conflict. That scenario carries significant regional and global risks. 3. Destroying Iran’s Nuclear Program A military strike could significantly damage nuclear facilities. Precision strikes may delay progress and degrade infrastructure. But strikes cannot eliminate scientific knowledge, human capital, or political will. Nor is it certain that all highly enriched material could be located and destroyed. At best, military action may delay the program. It is unlikely to eliminate it permanently. Iran would almost certainly attempt reconstruction — potentially with greater determination and fewer constraints. 4. Eliminating Iran’s Missile Capabilities A broad campaign could substantially degrade Iran’s missile inventory and production infrastructure. However, Iran’s missile program is domestically based and central to its defense doctrine. It is viewed as a pillar of deterrence against superior conventional forces. Even after heavy losses, Tehran would likely prioritize rebuilding these capabilities. The result may be temporary degradation rather than permanent removal. 5. Forcing Iran Back to Negotiations on Better Terms There is an assumption that military pressure could coerce Tehran into accepting a more favorable agreement. Yet past confrontations suggest that the Iranian leadership may choose endurance over capitulation. The regime may calculate that time increases political pressure on Washington to de-escalate, particularly if the conflict becomes prolonged or regionally destabilizing. Rather than producing immediate concessions, military action could harden Iran’s negotiating position — or eliminate diplomatic channels entirely. 6. Targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Some might argue that removing the Supreme Leader could fundamentally alter Iran’s trajectory. However, decapitation strikes often produce unpredictable outcomes. Iran’s political system is institutionalized, not purely personalist. Removing Khamenei could trigger retaliation from Iran and its regional proxies and potentially force the United States into a much broader conflict. It is also unclear whether such a move would moderate Iranian policy. It could just as easily radicalize it. The Strategic Bottom Line There is no question about U.S. military superiority in a direct confrontation. The real issue is strategic clarity. For the first time in decades, the possibility of direct U.S.–Iran military confrontation raises the prospect of open interstate war rather than proxy conflict. That demands disciplined thinking about ends, ways, and means. No available objective appears easily attainable. All carry significant second- and third-order effects. Many outcomes could be unpredictable — and not necessarily favorable to U.S. interests. Thus, before initiating military action, policymakers must clearly define what “success” looks like — and whether the likely costs, duration, escalation risks, and regional consequences align with America’s broader strategic priorities. Military capability is not the same as strategic advantage. #IranRevolution2026 #Iran

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·50m

הקלות הבלתי נסבלת שבה מקבלים בגוש השינוי את האפשרות שראש ממשלת מעבר, שאינו נהנה מאמון הכנסת, יוביל את ישראל להסלמה ביטחונית שכולנו מבינים את משמעותה ואת השלכותיה האפשריות, וזאת בהיעדר איום ממשי או קיומי המחייב פעולה צבאית מיידית, כאילו מדובר בגזירת גורל שאין עליה עוררין, ממחישה עד כמה מצבנו הפוליטי והציבורי בעייתי. לא נעים לומר, אבל לנוכח התנהלותו של גוש השינוי וחוסר יכולתו להקים ממשלה הנשענת על רוב ברור בכנסת, קשה לפטור גם אותו מאחריות להסלמה האפשרית. מי שמאפשר למצב הפוליטי הזה להימשך, ובמקביל מקבל כמעט בהשלמה את האפשרות של הידרדרות ביטחונית, אינו יכול להתנער מחלקו באחריות לתוצאות.

עדכון מישיבת ראשי הגוש: למיטב מקורותי, אביגדור ליברמן אמר בקולו, במפורש, שאם תושבע ממשלת מיעוט בתמיכת הערבים מבחוץ, הוא יצביע נגד. האחרים לא אמרו דבר כזה. עוד דבר: נדון גם המצב הבטחוני. והוא לא פשוט. יכול להיות שתהיה התחממות. מה שיקשה עוד יותר על הנסיונות להרכיב ממשלה.

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·1h

מה בדיוק המסר שמנסים להעביר כאן? איראן כבר עברה שתי מלחמות, כולל אחת שבה ארה״ב וישראל תקפו אותה ללא הפסקה במשך 39 ימים, ובכל זאת המשטר לא קרס. האם מישהו באמת חושב שתמונה של שתי נושאות מטוסים אמריקניות זו לצד זו תשנה עכשיו את החישובים של טהראן? אם כן, מדובר באי־הבנה עמוקה של העמדות האיראניות ושל האופן שבו המשטר מקבל החלטות. ואם לא — מה בעצם הטעם בפרסום התמונה, ולמי בדיוק נועד המסר?

במסר לאיראן: פיקוד המרכז האמריקני (סנטקום) מפרסם תמונות של שתי נושאות מטוסים אמריקניות זו לצד זו בים הערבי

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·2h

It’s not just about the regime perception. It’s also about how the Iranian people view the situation. Many now realize that the Iranian regime is far stronger and more resilient than they previously believed, especially when it comes to its ability to withstand a confrontation with two major world powers and still survive. That realization could also have a significant impact on their willingness to stand up to the regime and challenge its grip on power. #Iran #iranwar

Another reason why a frontal assault at the regime was always a strategically unwise move: in the (likely) event the regime survives, its perception of its own resilience will increase, making it much tougher to deter.

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·4h

No surprises here. Iran is seeking to avenge Khamenei’s death by targeting Israeli, Jewish, and American interests wherever it can. The playbook is familiar: relying primarily on intermediaries and local operatives to carry out attacks. The key question is whether Tehran will shift its approach to overseas operations, moving from proxy-based plots to more direct involvement to increase the likelihood of a successful attack. One thing is clear: Iran’s desire for revenge is not limited by geography, and this is a threat that is not going away anytime soon. #iran

North Macedonia, Greece say they uncovered Iran-linked assassination plot reut.rs/3WRuEBN

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·7h

הגמישות היחידה שהפגינה איראן עד כה הייתה נכונות לצמצם את פער הזמנים בין מימוש ההתחייבויות האמריקניות בסוגיית מצר הורמוז לבין פתיחת המשא ומתן בנושא הגרעין. מעבר לכך, אין בשלב זה אינדיקציה לנכונות איראנית לסגת מדרישות הליבה של טהראן. מבחינת המשטר, מדובר בעמדות אסטרטגיות ולא בנקודות פתיחה למיקוח. ההערכה היא כי גם החרפת האיומים מצד וושינגטון או הגברת הלחץ האמריקני לא יובילו בהכרח לשינוי מהותי בעמדותיה של איראן. בחינת - Take it or leave it

מקור דיפלומטי יודע דבר, אמר לעיתון "אלאח'באר" הלבנוני המקורב לחזבאללה, כי במסגרת "תוכנית היומיים האיראנית לסיום המלחמה" ארצות הברית תיישם, ביום הראשון, באופן מלא ומעשי, את כל התחייבויותיה, כולל סיום המלחמות בכל החזיתות, הסרת סנקציות הנפט, שחרור נכסים איראניים מוקפאים והסרת המצור הימי על נמלי איראן וביום השני, לאחר השלמת צעדים אלה, איראן תפתח מחדש את מצר הורמוז לשיט מסחרי ויתחיל המשא ומתן כדי להגיע להסכם סופי, הכולל, בין היתר, את תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית. המקור ציין, כי חילוקי הדעות בין שני הצדדים(ארצות הברית ואיראן) טמונים בעיתוי יישום ההתחייבויות: איראן מתעקשת על יישום מיידי ובו זמני של כל התנאים בשלב הראשון, בעוד שארצות הברית נוטה לדחות כמה צעדים לעתיד, תוך שהיא דורשת מטהראן לבצע ויתורים קודמים בסוגיית הגרעין שבהם מאמצי קטר לא הצליחו להביא לפריצת דרך.

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·7h

The strategic miscalculation in Washington would be to assume that China and Russia can be relied upon to pressure Tehran into making fundamental concessions. Both powers have a vested interest in preserving Iran as a strategic partner and a counterweight to U.S. influence in the Middle East. Beijing and Moscow may support negotiations and limited concessions, but neither has an inherent interest in facilitating Iran's strategic capitulation or its realignment toward the West. Washington should not confuse diplomatic cooperation with strategic alignment. #Iran #IranWar

Trump-Putin-Xi historic meeting can provide significant opportunity to break the diplomatic deadlock with Iran. China and Russia have greater geopolitical weight than Qatar and Pakistan, which have struggled to mediate an end to the war. As major global powers with significant strategic and economic relationships with both Washington and Tehran, they have far greater diplomatic leverage. If they seriously commit to mediation, they could play a consequential role in breaking the impasse. My comments @The_NewArab newarab.com/analysis/whats-a…

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·8h

כתבתי לא אחת על העמקת האחיזה האיראנית בתאילנד ועל תפקידה של אוניברסיטת אל-מוסטפא, שעל פי החשד משמשת פלטפורמה לאיתור, לטיפוח ולגיוס גורמים פוטנציאליים לפעילות בשליחות כוח קודס. מי שעוקב אחר דפוסי הפעולה של מנגנוני המודיעין והטרור האיראניים בדרום־מזרח אסיה, אמור לזהות את סימני האזהרה. לא מדובר באירועים מנותקים, אלא בחשש לתשתית השפעה הנבנית לאורך זמן, ועשויה לשמש בסיס לפעילות מבצעית בעת הצורך. inss.org.il/he/publication/i…

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בשליחות איראן: אנשי דת תאילנדים תכננו פיגוע בשגרירות ישראל בבנגקוק אתר איראן אינטרנשיונל פרסם את שמות שישה אנשי דת שיעים שהגיעו לאיראן ללימודים - וגויסו למזימה שסוכלה. לפי הדיווח, הם ארגנו מחאות נגד ישראל בתאילנד. האחראי על גיוסם: בכיר ביחידת חיזבאללה שמקדמת פיגועים בעולם. בכיר במשמרות המהפכה לאתר האופוזיציה: ישראל חדרה לכל מוסדות השלטון bit.ly/4iOARHn קרדיט: איתמר אייכנר, ליאור בן ארי, צילום: Apichart Weerawong/AP

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·9h

How does Iranian activity manifest in the United Kingdom—and how can this threat be countered? My artice @inss inss.org.il/publication/iran…

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·9h

Could the War Against Iran Ultimately Push Tehran Toward Nuclear Weapons? Even if President Trump decides to resume military operations against Iran in the near term, the prevailing assessment in Tehran is that future American presidents, regardless of party, may be increasingly reluctant to launch another war against the Islamic Republic. Iranian officials appear to believe that the economic disruption and political fallout associated with another military confrontation would make such a decision exceptionally difficult for any future administration in Washington. This calculation is particularly significant given statements emerging from Tehran about the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. The United States could eventually find itself facing a North Korea-style dilemma: launch an unpopular military campaign with potentially dramatic consequences for the American economy, or effectively tolerate Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. That is the central paradox of the current conflict. A war intended to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons could ultimately create the strategic conditions that bring Tehran closer to that very goal. #Iran #iranwar

9 months into war in wake of midterms, Iran has drawn conclusion that no Administration - Republican or Democrat - would ever again consider mounting a multi month massive attack. The damage Trump has done to concept of US deterrence is incalculable. nytimes.com/2026/11/17/us/po…

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·17h

The Escalation Is Not Random — It Is Following a Pattern As long as the U.S. naval blockade remains in place and no agreement is reached, further escalation will become increasingly difficult to avoid. There are two clear paths to de-escalation: a negotiated agreement or a U.S. decision to lift the blockade. Iran appears to be pursuing a strategy of deliberate, calibrated escalation. The objective is not necessarily to trigger an all-out war, but to steadily increase the military, economic, and political costs of maintaining the blockade. The pattern is increasingly clear: from attacks on tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz to attacks on vessels at anchor; from missile strikes to commando operations; and from attacks on U.S. bases in Bahrain to strikes extending into Kuwait, reportedly beginning with drones and progressing to missiles. There is also a significant shift in Iran's stated justification for its actions. Initially, Iranian retaliation was framed as a response to direct U.S. attacks. Now, Tehran is increasingly invoking violations of its airspace and sovereignty as grounds for further military action. It potentially expands the range of incidents Iran can use to justify retaliation, creating additional pathways to escalation even without a new direct American strike. This creates a growing dilemma for the administration. A limited response may encourage Tehran to push further, while a stronger military response risks accelerating the very escalation the United States is trying to contain. The central point is simple: these are not isolated incidents. They reflect an identifiable escalation pattern, driven by an unresolved strategic confrontation. As long as the blockade continues, Iran has an incentive to keep raising the cost of maintaining it. The greatest danger is not necessarily that either side wants a full-scale war. It is that both sides may believe they can control the escalation, until one incident proves otherwise. More to follow... #iran #IranWar‌

BREAKING: Kuwait says its air defences are countering hostile drone attacks, warning that explosions heard across the country are caused by interception operations. Authorities have urged the public to follow safety instructions. 🔴 More on Aljazeera.com

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·23h

I Call It as I See It. Since the @nytimes published its article on Iran’s dams, in which I emphasized the importance of independent energy and water supplies for Iran’s underground missile facilities to ensure their survivability during wartime, I have apparently become something of a “celebrity” in Iranian state media. Some Iranian outlets have accused Israeli intelligence of orchestrating the article, portraying my comments as part of an Israeli intelligence operation. Ironically, some of the very same outlets had quoted me just a day earlier when I explained why Iran has no intention of surrendering to American pressure. This is a good opportunity to clarify something fundamental about my approach to Iran. I call it as I see it — not as I wish it to be. I have no interest in glorifying the Islamic Republic. Quite the opposite: I would welcome the end of this regime. Nor do I have any intention of defending Israeli or American policies that, in my assessment, may ultimately strengthen the very regime they are intended to weaken. And to be clear, I do not believe that attacking Iran’s civilian infrastructure will bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic. If anything, I fear it could have precisely the opposite effect — strengthening the regime’s narrative, rallying parts of the population around the flag, and allowing Tehran to portray itself as the defender of the Iranian nation against foreign aggression. Destroying civilian infrastructure is not a strategy for regime change. Explaining Tehran’s strategic logic does not mean endorsing it. Recognizing Iran’s capabilities does not mean admiring them. And criticizing Israeli or American policy does not make someone an apologist for the Islamic Republic. Having spent much of my professional life studying Iran and working to counter the threats posed by its regime, I believe that understanding how Tehran thinks, what it fears, and what it is prepared to endure is essential to developing an effective strategy against it. The purpose of strategic analysis is not to tell policymakers or the public what they want to hear. It is to explain reality, even when that reality is uncomfortable or politically inconvenient. One can strongly oppose the Islamic Republic while recognizing its resilience, understanding its strategic calculations, and warning against policies that may produce the opposite of their intended results. That is not a contradiction. It is the essence of independent, professional analysis. Understanding your adversary is not the same as supporting your adversary. In fact, it is a prerequisite for confronting it effectively. #iran

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جمال عبدالعزيز التميمي avatar
⟳ Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweeted
جمال عبدالعزيز التميمي@Jamal_Atamimi·Nov 17

داني سيترينوفيتش : تولي دول #الخليج_العربي الأولوية القصوى للاستقرار، لا لمزيد من التصعيد. وتطمح هذه الدول، في أفضل الأحوال، إلى العودة إلى النظام الإقليمي الذي كان سائداً قبل ٢٨ فبراير. لكن لسوء حظها، من غير المرجح أن يعود هذا الواقع. خلاصة القول أن دول الخليج لا تغفل حقيقة طبيعة النظام الإيراني أو الخطر الذي يمثله على الاستقرار الإقليمي. ولا ينبغي الخلط بين الانخراط مع طهران وبين الثقة أو المصالحة أو تغيير جذري في نظرتها إلى #إيران . بل هو انعكاس لإدراك واقعي بأن البدائل، في ظل الواقع الإقليمي الراهن، قد تكون أشد خطورة. .

Another indication of the increasingly complex relationship between the Gulf states and Iran in the aftermath of the war. If even the UAE, arguably one of the most hawkish Gulf states toward Iran during the war, is now pursuing this kind of engagement with Tehran, it is reasonable to assume that similar dynamics are unfolding across other Gulf capitals. The Gulf states overriding priority is stability, not further escalation. Ideally, they would like to return to the regional order that existed before February 28. Unfortunately for them, that reality is unlikely to return. Above all, Gulf leaders increasingly recognize the need to take greater ownership of their own security and strategic future. They want to ensure that decisions affecting their security are made in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and other Gulf capitals, not dictated by Washington or Jerusalem. This reflects a deeper strategic dilemma: The Gulf states find themselves caught between an Iran they do not trust and security partners whose decisions they cannot control. While they continue to rely heavily on the United States for their security, they are increasingly determined to avoid being dragged into another regional confrontation. The bottom line is thay the Gulf states have no illusions about the nature of the Iranian regime or the threat it poses to regional stability. Engagement with Tehran should not be mistaken for trust, reconciliation, or a fundamental shift in their perception of Iran. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic recognition that, in the current regional reality, the alternatives may be even more dangerous. For the Gulf states, engaging Iran is not necessarily a choice they want to make. It is increasingly a choice they believe they cannot afford not to make. #Iran #IranWar‌ #gulf

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·Nov 17

איראן הפכה בשנים האחרונות לאחד האיומים המשמעותיים על ביטחון הפנים של בריטניה. לצד ניסיונות לפגוע במתנגדי משטר, בעיתונאים וביעדים יהודיים וישראליים, טהראן פועלת להרחבת השפעתה באמצעות רשת של גופי תקשורת, מוסדות דת, ארגונים ופעילים מקומיים. חלק מהפעילות מתקיים בגלוי ובמסגרת החוק, בעוד שבמקרים אחרים נחשפו קשרים לגורמי מודיעין, לארגונים המזוהים עם איראן ואף להפעלת עבריינים לצורך ביצוע פעולות אלימות. שורת תחקירים ואירועים שנחשפו לאחרונה ממחישה את עומק האתגר הניצב בפני הרשויות הבריטיות: כיצד להתמודד עם תשתיות השפעה איראניות הפועלות בתוך הממלכה, לזהות את המעבר מפעילות אזרחית לגיטימית לפעילות עוינת ולמנוע מטהראן לנצל את פתיחותה של החברה הבריטית לקידום מטרותיה. המאמר ממליץ לבריטניה להעמיק את המעקב והפיקוח על רשתות ההשפעה האיראניות, לחזק את שיתוף הפעולה המודיעיני והבינלאומי, לשפר את האכיפה נגד פעילות סמויה וגורמי פשיעה הפועלים בשליחות טהראן ולהבטיח שהמאבק באיום האיראני לא יפגע בחופש הביטוי, הדת והפעילות האזרחית הלגיטימית מאמר שלי @INSS_Hebrew inss.org.il/he/publication/i…

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش avatar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz·Nov 17

A Slippery Slope Toward Escalation It bears repeating: the current situation in the Persian Gulf is neither stable nor sustainable. Iran has shown no indication that it intends to back down or accept the status quo. And even if Washington has no desire to escalate, the dynamics on the ground could ultimately lead to a broader confrontation. The absence of an intention to escalate does not mean the absence of a risk of escalation. #Iran #iranwar

The IRGC has announced that, in response to “continued violations of Iranian airspace by American drones,” it had targeted a U.S. radar installation at Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain. The IRGC statement also says that the operation was conducted as part of its efforts to counter“ hostile U.S. activities in the region.” This is significant because the IRGC appears to be trying to establish a new equation in which not only attacks against Iranian military assets and infrastructure, including those on its southern islands, but even violations of Iranian airspace would trigger retaliatory strikes against U.S. assets. Having apparently established a certain level of “unstable deterrence” against large-scale attacks, Tehran now seems to be seeking to expand the scope and stabilize that deterrence and bring the situation further under its control.

Raz Zimmt avatar
⟳ Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweeted
Raz Zimmt@RZimmt·Nov 17

שיחה חשובה של @citrinowicz וירון שניידר מתוכנית איראן והציר השיעי ב- @INSS_Hebrew עם @manuelbaz על שיתוף הפעולה הגובר בין החות'ים למיליציות השיעיות הפרו-איראניות בעיראק והמשמעויות הנגזרות מכך גם על ישראל. youtu.be/66fB5PhVlcU?si=BfV2…