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Christian Pieter Hoffmann6,393 posts
Christian Pieter Hoffmann avatar

Christian Pieter Hoffmann

@cphoffmann

Prof @UniLeipzig @ifkmw & Institute for PolSci @crifc_de @cdp_org (Private account & personal opinions, of course.)

◷ Joined November 2009▧ 270 Photos and videos
Jacob Mchangama avatar
⟳ Christian Pieter Hoffmann retweeted
Jacob Mchangama@JMchangama·Nov 11

The default position in democratic Europe is now to blame every bad thing on the Internet and insist that government regulation of speech is the answer. This will not end well.

Polish PM Donald Tusk: It is time for the internet, the virtual space, to be treated with the utmost seriousness. What happens in the virtual world influences people's minds and actions just as strongly, and sometimes even more strongly, than what happens in the real world. What is prohibited and illegal in real life must also be prohibited and eliminated from the virtual world.

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Jan Zilinsky avatar
⟳ Christian Pieter Hoffmann retweeted
Jan Zilinsky@janzilinsky·Nov 4

He says many 2024 Trump/Vance voters switched or abandoned the GOP because of cost of living/inflation, citing polling (what people said mattered to them). I might have a better measure - let's tally up the actual economic hardships people experienced (losing a job, borrowing money to pay the bills & more) and see how they voted. Trump voters who reported four or more economic hardships were nearly three times as likely to back a Democrat for Senate as those who reported none. As @BrendanNyhan has been saying there's no reason to take stated reasons for voting a certain way at face value nytimes.com/2014/11/05/upsho…; and @rp_griffin, @johnmsides have documented that asking detailed questions about people's personal finances is the way to go: voterstudygroup.org/publicat…

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One of the things the data analysts on our side obsessed over was "composition"—whether the electorate looked close enough to 2024 for Republicans to win. And despite polls that showed a Democrat blowout, the data kept on telling us the same story: in some states turnout was merely OK, in other states it was downright amazing, and in no state was it catastrophic. There was a genuine sense of optimism on our team: our people were showing up. So, I asked the smartest data guy I know, does that mean we're going to shock the world? "No," he told me. "We might do better than the polls suggest. But the data is telling us that a lot of Trump/Vance 2024 voters are pissed and planning to vote for the other guys. Our voters are turning out, but they may not vote for us." Well, that looks prophetic now. Our voters did show up. In Florida, for example, the electorate was 9 points more Republican than Democrat, just a couple points worse than 2024. Undoubtedly there were places we could have done better on turnout. But the main problem is not turnout. The main problem is that many people who voted for Trump/Vance in 2024 voted for Democrats in 2026. There will be a lot of infighting and arguing over what happened and why that is. One of the pollsters I really respect told me that our economic messaging wasn’t sharp enough down the stretch. I’m sure that’s true. But the real reason we lost is obvious to almost everyone. Another pollster—one of the smartest people I know in politics, told me yesterday we’d lose the generic ballot by 13 points. I felt negative going into Tuesday, but even I was shocked by this. In his polling, he saw that a lot of Trump 2024 voters were angry and planning to vote for Democrats. He asked those voters who had abandoned us what would cause them to come back on our team. The top four answers, accounting for nearly all of the responses were: 1) End the war 2) Focus on cost of living/inflation 3) Put America First 4) Change our relationship to Israel Our voters showed up. And the above four reasons are why many of them voted for Democrats. This is according to a pollster who nailed the results. While many spent Monday attacking Rachel Campos Duffy for calling for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, it turns out her political advice was sound. (She’s also a great person.) In the next few months, there's going to be a lot of gaslighting. Expect to hear any number of establishment politicians say the solution to our woes is amnesty. I'm open to the idea that we should change enforcement—by focusing more on businesses that hire illegal labor, for instance. But anyone pushing amnesty is lying to you. The reason we lost is the war. The president himself said so last night. If you'd like to argue it was worth it, that losing the Senate for the next 6 years was worth it, then do so. Argue it was a worthwhile cost to pay. Agree or disagree, that's at least honest. But everyone knows why we lost. And any honest conversation about where we go from here must start there. I remain hopeful about our country. To the people who are pissed off and want to say, “I told you so”: you’re right, you did tell us so. Take that energy into electing Republicans who share your worldview. To the people who are just pissed at the results, you should be. Let’s take that anger and get back to the work of saving our country.

Jan Zilinsky avatar
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Jan Zilinsky@janzilinsky·Nov 4

NORC just released an amazing dataset (its Civic Health & Elections Project) so we can test, again, whether it's really true that (young) men are massively more conservative than women The ideological gender gap exists but...

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Jay Van Bavel, PhD avatar
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Jay Van Bavel, PhD@jayvanbavel·Oct 28

Explicit measures of prejudice are much stronger predictors of discrimination than implicit measures. A new adversarial collaboration found that self-report measures of racial bias exhibited greater predictive validity of discrimination than indirect measures (explaining ∼45% vs 3% of the variance). The zero-order correlations between each indirect measure and behavioral measures of discrimination were quite low ( r = .00 to .19) By comparison, correlations between direct measures and discrimination were all statistically significant (r = .099 to .381). Moreover, the behavioral discrimination measures generally produced effects favoring Black over White targets, which "complicates claims that anti-Black effects on indirect measures are a source of cumulative disadvantage." psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/202…

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Christian Pieter Hoffmann avatar
Christian Pieter Hoffmann@cphoffmann·Oct 26

“The surveys also revealed a persistent divide between experts who saw misinformation as widespread and consequential and those more skeptical, with sharpest disagreement on its behavioral impact and increase over time.” - @Sacha_Altay et al. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.…

John B. Holbein avatar
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John B. Holbein@JohnHolbein1·Oct 20

It is deeply discouraging that “evidence is the bottom line in any empirical inquiry” needs saying at all.

Recent prescriptions and policies would have us judge research by non-evidentiary standards, e.g. presumed political impact and scholar identity. In a new essay, Tom Clark and I argue empirical claims should instead be evaluated based on evidentiary strength. We outline a framework for judging evidence, and show its usefulness by revisiting high-profile scholarly disagreements spanning policing, political violence, election administration, and terrorism, before critiquing non-evidentiary approaches. We also argue social science needs a culture that is hospitable to critique—rather than one which condemns critics as “bullies”—if quality standards are to be upheld. dropbox.com/scl/fi/fsgpflron…

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Michael Gilead avatar
⟳ Christian Pieter Hoffmann retweeted
Michael Gilead@Michael_Gilead·Oct 21

🚩 When Polymarket or Kalshi says there's a 70% chance something will happen, should we believe it? Excited to share our new paper, just published in PNAS, in which we examined more than ONE MILLION forecasts from Polymarket, Kalshi, Manifold, and Metaculus, spanning 12 domains and forecasting horizons ranging from hours to years. The main finding is striking: Prediction markets and collective forecasting platforms are remarkably well calibrated. When they assign events a 70% probability, those events really do happen about 70% of the time. And this pattern holds surprisingly well across different platforms, domains, and forecasting horizons. But there's an important twist. When we looked more closely, we discovered systematic biases in some of the domains where forecasting matters most (wars, elections). For decades, psychologists have documented how poorly humans often reason about probability and uncertainty. Our findings offer an encouraging counterpoint: When judgments and information are aggregated, we can achieve a surprisingly accurate understanding of an uncertain future. That doesn't mean we can predict what will happen next with certainty. But it does mean that we can be remarkably good at estimating how uncertain the future really is. This work was a great collaboration. The data for this project was meticulously collected for years by Justin Dickerson, the project was led by Hilla Shinitzky and Maayan Peer, with @mattansb leading the analyses. 📄 Read the paper: pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.26… #Forecasting #Polymarket #Kalshi #DecisionScience #PNAS

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Laurenz Guenther avatar
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Laurenz Guenther@GuentherLaurenz·Oct 18

France currently experiences large-scale rioting, mostly by (former) immigrants. Such events are often treated as isolated incidents. They are not. As I show here, immigration-related riots are becoming increasingly frequent and intense over time: laurenzguenther.substack.com…

Christian Pieter Hoffmann avatar
Christian Pieter Hoffmann@cphoffmann·Oct 10

„Given the very weak relationships between SMU and the severity of anxiety and depression symptoms, SMU is unlikely to account for the contemporary youth mental health crisis.“ bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wil…

First meta-analysis of the most authoritative studies: Adolescents' use of social media accounts for less than 1% of their subsequent symptoms of depression and anxiety. Most of the empirical investigations into social media use and mental health symptoms have utilized cross-sectional designs or have shown small effects, leading to scepticism in the field. More conclusive evidence could be synthesized from the full range of more robust longitudinal and experimental designs. Experimental designs are required to draw conclusions regarding causal relationships. Longitudinal designs afford conclusions regarding the direction of effects over time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first review [and meta-analysis] to comprehensively synthesize longitudinal and experimental evidence on the association between time and frequency of social media use and mental health symptoms. We identified a considerably higher number of longitudinal papers than in a previous review. The key findings of this review and meta-analyses were that the relationships effects between time and frequency of social media use and depression and anxiety symptoms were statistically significant but relatively weak The time spent by young people using social media accounts for less than 1% of their subsequent symptoms of depression and anxiety. There is no evidence that this effect increases as age decreases. Reducing time spent on social media by young people is unlikely to be effective in preventing the worsening of their symptoms of depression and anxiety. Given the very weak relationships between social media use and the severity of anxiety and depression symptoms, social media use is unlikely to account for the contemporary youth mental health crisis. In relation to policy implications, a relationship between duration and frequency of social media use on subsequent anxiety and depression is not a solid basis for the rationale for age-related legal restrictions on social media.

Jay Van Bavel, PhD avatar
⟳ Christian Pieter Hoffmann retweeted
Jay Van Bavel, PhD@jayvanbavel·Oct 6

Liberals and conservatives behave differently in everyday life--conservatives seem to be out with others at lot more while liberals stay home and doomscroll. This study analyzed activity using smartphones to track college students and found that conservatives were more likely to be at parties, noisy places, fraternities and religious facilities. Liberals were at home, resting, doing chores, and browsing social media. This helps explain why conservatives are, on average, happier than liberals. The behavioral differences were small but robust, not accounted for by other plausible factors (e.g., demographics), and most pronounced in the leisure domain. psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/202…

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Steve McGuire avatar
⟳ Christian Pieter Hoffmann retweeted
Steve McGuire@sfmcguire79·Sep 24

If the trend holds, academic journals will soon be receiving twice as many submissions per year as they did before the introduction of ChatGPT. AI will write them. AI will review them. And AI will read them.

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“There’s going to be a flood of poor-quality research that the system is not equipped right now to handle.” Always has been dot jpg

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