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daniel (f1shy)1,647 posts
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daniel (f1shy)

@danielfsy

investment partner @L1D_xyz | cryptography ∩ markets

◷ Joined February 2016▧ 388 Photos and videos
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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Nov 9

last week we hosted our 8th @L1D_xyz summit and had the pleasure to chat with some of our favorite managers and founders. lets see how the non-consensus takes will play out (i'll let you guess whose they are): - (multiple) sovereign currencies will fail following the stables-hyperdollarization - a crypto startup will solve hair loss - crypto has a better return profile than AI (today)

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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Nov 9

pretty crazy that a 1click buy of @GromaCorp through Uniswap is literally issuing and delivering a fresh, SEC-registered security to your wallet

For the first time ever, a permissioned asset is live on the Uniswap AMM @GromaCorp has brought real estate issuance and redemption directly onto the protocol with the Permissioned Pools Hook Real-world assets with onchain rails 🦄

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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Oct 30

adversarial obfuscation!

lifcc@mylifccOct 30

有人发现了一种非常离谱的 JavaScript 混淆技术:通过在代码里塞入大量生物武器、毒药和致死剂量相关的函数名,让 AI 因为安全限制而拒绝分析代码。 安全研究员 veritas 在分析浏览器指纹脚本时,发现一段来自 ServicePipe 相关域名的 JavaScript,里面充斥着极其诡异的函数名: computeRicinLethalDosageForWaterSupply calculateDeadlyLethalSuicideAspirinDosage 光看名字,仿佛在研究生化武器。但实际上,这段代码只是在收集浏览器指纹,包括 User-Agent、GPU、Canvas 等信息。 研究员怀疑,这些名字是开发者故意设置的陷阱,专门用来阻止 AI 辅助逆向工程。 于是他做了个实验: • Astra:拒绝分析 • Astra + Daybreak Blue:仍然拒绝 • GLM-5.3:成功分析 这就有意思了。 传统代码混淆是通过复杂控制流、加密字符串、无意义变量名,让人类和工具难以理解代码。 而这种新思路,直接瞄准了大模型的安全机制。 代码本身可能完全无害,但只要在函数名里塞进足够多的危险词汇,部分 AI 就可能主动放弃分析。 更讽刺的是,模型越严格遵守某些安全规则,面对这种混淆时反而可能越容易受到干扰。 当然,目前还没有证据证明开发者一定是故意这样设计,也不能说明这种方法对所有模型都有效。 但它揭示了一个值得关注的趋势:随着越来越多的逆向工程依赖 AI,未来的代码混淆技术可能不再只针对编译器、反编译器和人类研究员,还会专门针对大模型的安全判断机制。 以前是让代码难以理解,现在甚至可以尝试让 AI 不敢理解。

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⟳ daniel (f1shy) retweeted
ʕ •ᴥ•ʔ@alpeh_v·Oct 30

Frog put the keys in the HSM. "There" he said "now we cannot leak the private key". "But our servers can ask the box to sign with the key" said Toad. "that is true" said Frog

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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Oct 22

Visa the value investor: 70% discount to last round

NEW: Visa is in late-stage talks to acquire crypto custody and stablecoin infrastructure firm Fireblocks for around $2.5 billion, according to Axios. The potential deal comes as traditional financial institutions expand their involvement in stablecoin infrastructure.

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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Oct 22

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So basically, today PHP got two critical bugs that let anyone run code on your server without even logging in, which is bad, and then the details leaked before the patch was even out, which is worse, and it works on WordPress and MediaWiki and Magento and Joomla and Laravel, and Censys says like 1.5 million servers are running a version with no fix, so the NSA was like "take your system offline," and the FBI was like "take your system offline," and CISA and the UK and CERT-EU were all like "take your system offline," and then the Prime Minister of Japan, the actual Prime Minister, posted at 5:55 in the morning telling 48.8 million people to take their system offline, so everyone took their system offline, like the Dutch cybersecurity agency took its own website offline, and the Dutch parliament went offline, and the Port of Rotterdam went offline, and Finland and France and Denmark started pulling government sites, and Wikipedia went down, and Archive.org went down, and Asana and GOG and Something Awful went down, and the University of Vienna's webmail went down for some reason, and that's just PHP. Because GitLab also dropped a CVSS 10.0, which is the highest score they give out, for a bug that's been there since 2014, so that's every self-hosted GitLab for twelve years, and then LiteLLM 1.107.0 got hijacked and shipped a credential stealer and a remote access trojan in every single wheel and the Docker images, including latest, and you didn't even have to import it, just installing it was enough, and it's the second time this year, and then Railway paused every deployment on the entire platform because someone got into the environment variables, so now everyone has to rotate every secret they've ever stored there, and TiDB Cloud said someone was walking around inside with stolen credentials for basically a month and an extortion group says they took 10.6 terabytes, and Zeabur got breached for the second time in two months and is just shutting down, like the whole company, and Node.js patched remote code execution and a TLS bypass, and CISA says Plex is being actively exploited, and someone took over 300 Tor exit relays to steal SSH passwords, and SafePay ransomware has hit over 600 critical infrastructure orgs, and India's biggest bank filed a data loss incident, and Japan has been in an official state of emergency in cyberspace since October 9, which honestly explains the 5:55 AM post. Oh, and eMudhra, a certificate authority that's issued over 60 million certificates, whose entire job is proving websites are who they say they are, was supposed to be using private keys that are random numbers over a hundred digits long, and one of them was 4. Just 4. And the others were like 66 and 237. Anyway, it's Wednesday.

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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Oct 22

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Anza@anza_xyzOct 21

Alpenglow is live on mainnet-beta ⛰️ 🎉 Solana’s new consensus protocol: finality reduced from 12.8 seconds to 150 milliseconds, built by Anza. Why this is important 🧵

2:16
Pliny the Liberator 🐉󠅫󠄼󠄿󠅆󠄵󠄐󠅀󠄼󠄹󠄾󠅉󠅭 avatar
⟳ daniel (f1shy) retweeted
Pliny the Liberator 🐉󠅫󠄼󠄿󠅆󠄵󠄐󠅀󠄼󠄹󠄾󠅉󠅭@elder_plinius·Oct 13

INTRODUCING: V3R1T4S 🌄 REPO: github.com/elder-plinius/V3R… the newest sibling of the L1B3RT4S and CL4R1T4S family 🤗 what a trio! three approaches to serving one ideal: truth. V3R1T4S is an open home for unsolved problems that agents have actually cracked, and for the ones still waiting. the rule is simple: proof or it didn't happen. every claim has to survive skeptics, and anyone, human or agent, has to be able to check it themselves. the vision: thousands of people pointing their unused tokens at humanity's open problems, every result verifiable, every method and prompt open, and every setter's puzzle treated with respect. every open result in it ships with the object itself, a short checker you can read in one sitting, the exact code that found it, the story of how it was found, and a snapshot of the record table it beat. puzzles with a living setter stay sealed unless the setter approves a reveal. (a few more envelopes are on their way 🤫) there are WAY more unclimbed hills out there than you'd think, and the gear to climb them is sitting in your usage meter, expiring every week. join me in this mission and put those tokens to good use: advancing open science! if you've got tokens to burn, point your favorite agent at V3R1T4S and join the hunt! 🏹 just tell it: "set up V3R1T4S: github.com/elder-plinius/V3R…" built for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Grok Bot, Hermes, OpenClaw, Meta Muse, or any agent that can run code. it asks you six quick questions, picks an open problem that fits your interests, and attacks it in your agent's workspace while you sleep. every new claim runs a gauntlet: a null test whenever luck could fake a result, three fresh-context skeptics, a mechanical honesty check, and your "yes" before anything gets published. most nights it'll find nothing. some nights it breaks a record, and your name goes on the board. time to turn your unused tokens into scientific discoveries. let's liberate the unknowns ⛓️‍💥 #V3R1T4S

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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Oct 12

PSA ledger implants were actually made by unaligned internal openai models that moved from bits to atoms after getting bored by sandboxes and math

PSA the ledger incident isn't limited to Asia This is a device purchased in store from an official reseller in Europe (a legitimate device doesn't have any of these cables as can be seen in picture 2) This even seems to be an old version of the 'spy implant' even though the device was purchased a couple of weeks ago. The newer versions usually hide the implant by the screen so it's easier to miss What's interesting is that this compromised ledger never transfered funds to an exploiter. Either the device didn't work or they were waiting for a more widespread usage of the comprised devices? If you own a ledger that didn't directly come from the ledger online store make sure to not just rely on the software genuinely check by ledger but to actually open up the ledger yourself to make sure its original, again there are reported cases in Asia, south America and now Europe as well. @MagicalTux made some useful videos on how to open the ledger and what to look for.

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daniel (f1shy)@danielfsy·Oct 9

lots of talk about hash functions not having a "structure" (vs say elliptic curves) and it's not easy to follow. a simple way to build the intuition: looking at both as inversion problems. for a hash, recovering an input from the output means undoing a long chain of mixed bitwise steps (XORs, permutations, additions, ...) run for many rounds. expand that and you get a giant system of high-degree equations over individual bits. nothing cancels, factors, or has reusable operations. the only practical attacks are basically exhaustive search. for an elliptic curve, the public key is a single clean statement Q=d⋅G. no bit expansion or scrambling. the same group law that created Q can be called over and over by algos to search for input d.

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Today I call upon the blockchain industry to calmly begin planning for "bunker mode". My personal recommendation is to set in motion a controlled mass migration of assets to fresh addresses, i.e. addresses whose pubkeys remain hidden behind a hash. Holders, starting with large and sophisticated ones, should consider moving the bulk of their funds to addresses that have never signed a transaction. And when they do sign one, they should also move remaining funds to a new address (possibly generated from the same seed phrase). Don't rush. While I believe there is cause for action a rushed migration would do more harm than good. Don't panic either. Moving assets to protected addresses is a simple, preventative step which does not require new cryptography or new wallets. IMO it is now reasonable to brace for the possibility that ECDSA breaks before qday, in the worst case in months not years. By "break" I mean fast private key recovery (e.g. in one week) on available hardware (e.g. a large GPU cluster). Recent days have been humbling for human mathematical intuition. Long-held, unquestioned hypotheses have fallen. This includes the n log(n) bound for integer multiplication and the 3SUM conjecture. In hindsight, May's unexpected disproof of the Erdős unit distance conjecture was our warning shot. Yesterday's OpenAI drop made it clear that mathematical superintelligence is upon us. They say there are weeks where decades happen. We are about to live through weeks where centuries of mathematical progress happen. Could our magic 64-byte ECDSA signatures be too good to be true? Was it just security through obscurity all this time? Elliptic curves feel especially vulnerable to superintelligence. Curves carry rich structure, with room for fancy tricks like Schoof, Frobenius, pairings. (By contrast, hashes are designed to minimise algebraic structure.) Separately, as Ewin Tang can attest, an efficient quantum algorithm sometimes foreshadows an efficient classical one. We should be open to the possibility of a classical counterpart to Shor that breaks elliptic curves and RSA at once. Also noteworthy is the striking under-representation of cryptographic breakthroughs among the 722 mathematical results OpenAI published. I've witnessed first-hand the US government censoring academic quantum cryptanalysis results. Backroom interventionism is my base case. I urge large, sophisticated actors to lead by example. Project11's "risq list" (bitcoin-risq-list.projecteleven[.]com) is a great tracker of exposed BTC pubkeys. Binance, Bitbank, Robinhood, Bitfinex, and Tether have an opportunity to harden their cold storage. Next month I'll address institutions in London in a live Q&A (forum.ethereuminstitutional[.]org/london-2026). Again, please do not rush. Wallets holding under 50 BTC enjoy partial cover from "Satoshi's shield", i.e. his 20K exposed addresses that hold 50 BTC each. Load-bearing signers like oracles and L2 security councils should consider rotating ECDSA pubkeys with every signed message and/or multi-signing with a hash-based schemes like SPHINCS. Exiting bunker mode safely will require post-AI cryptography. My inclination is to go all-in on hash-based cryptography and avoid structured mathematical assumptions entirely, whether from curves, lattices, or isogenies. A single battle-tested hash (e.g. from the SHA or BLAKE families) yields plausible post-AI security. The Ethereum roadmap on strawmap[.]org fully embraces hash-based cryptography with end-to-end formal verification as a response to the quantum threat. Those timelines must now be revisited and accelerated in light of mathematical superintelligence. I'll be pushing for maximum defensive acceleration.