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Douglas Mun50,055 posts
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Douglas Mun

@douglasmun

National Cyber Incident Response Expert | Former CISO & DPO | Vibe Coder

◷ Joined June 2012▧ 589 Photos and videos
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Douglas Mun@douglasmun·13 Apr 2023

“It is possible to unintentionally offend others, not necessarily due to an incorrect stance, but rather due to a difference in perspective.”

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Stephen Fewer@stephenfewer·13h

Today @rapid7 is disclosing CVE-2026-123007, a critical integer underflow vulnerability affecting NGINX HTTP/2, that leads to unauthenticated RCE (under certain constraints). Read the full technical details on our blog: rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-…

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Stephen Fewer@stephenfewer·13h

PoC for CVE-2026-123007, showing RCE against NGINX in a local Docker container, available here: github.com/sfewer-r7/CVE-202…. Exploitation requires ~128GB of network traffic and a specific memcpy implementation (a fast path based on AVX512)!

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⟳ Douglas Mun retweeted
Feng Xue@s0what·13h

Today we hosted an offline meetup with the author of Artex and CyberStrikeAI. More than 200 defenders joined us to explore and discuss how we, as a community, should respond to the autonomous offensive framework.

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小龙先生@Dragonhau66·Nov 17

百度创始人李彦宏,在深圳APEC说了几句没人敢在台上说的话: AI 没给大多数公司创造利润,AI 形势最紧迫,AI泡沫可能会破灭! 他的原话是:是不是每个公司用了AI之后,收入就变多了,利润就上升了? 这个好像还没有,在大多数公司还没有。如果不解决这个问题,大家担心的AI泡沫,就有可能变成现实。 最紧迫的事,是找到AI真正适合的应用场景。 说这话的人,是中国最早All in AI的那批人。百度刚交出连续第六个季度营收下滑的财报。 你品一下这个画面。 一个押了十年AI的人,在APEC的聚光灯下,亲口承认AI还没让大多数公司赚到钱。他不是在唱空,他是在说一个连他自己都还没解决的问题。 算力投入成倍增长,Token消耗往上冲,云服务价格在涨。但应用层的渗透,低于预期。 钱烧在芯片和模型上,利润没落到报表里。 这就是英伟达今晚财报要面对的那道题的另一面:卖铲子的人赚翻了,用铲子的人还在挖坑。 李彦宏给了个解法:组织能力。他用工业革命打比方,电机装进工厂了,但流水线还没发明,电对GDP的贡献就很有限。今天大模型能力够强了,企业的组织方式跟不上,一样白搭。 你买了最贵的算力,用着最好的模型,但你的公司还是按上个时代的方式在运转。 AI泡沫会不会破,不看英伟达的财报, 看的是有多少公司,真的因为AI多赚了一块钱。 李彦宏告诉我们的是: 铲子卖得再好,挖不出金子,最后谁都得停手。 AI泡沫会不会破灭? 我认为很大概率一定会破,不破不立!

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Faruk avatar
⟳ Douglas Mun retweeted
Faruk@SansLimit3·14h

🚨 New Research | Inside an AI-Driven #php2shell Operation We identified an exposed operator server running a PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) campaign. It revealed a self-built AI-agent pipeline, a custom C2, and a full credential-harvesting operation. Key findings: - Public PoCs forked into a per-build mass-exploitation chain - 400+ hosts compromised, ~290K files (9.5 GB) exfiltrated - 39 parallel AI workers on self-hosted DeepSeek V4.1 - AI agents tasked to autonomously steal $50K+ in crypto - Cloud keys, IAM credentials, DB dumps, secrets and source code stolen - An AI worker accidentally looted the operator’s own lab Blog: socradar.io/blog/php2shell-a… #threatintelligence #cti #threathunting

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Rami McCarthy@ramimacisabird·14h

Microsoft's agent-framework hack was conducted using Cairn, Pi (harness), and GLM 5.3 The attacker compromised credentials to ESRP (MSFT release pipeline), and navigated IP allowlisting to release the malicious version

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Douglas Mun@douglasmun·22h

Over 178 of the world's biggest brands reportedly served malware to their own visitors — from a script they trusted. This is the supply-chain nightmare in its purest form: you don't attack 178 companies. You attack the one script they all embed. douglasmun.github.io/Douglas…

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⟳ Douglas Mun retweeted
pyn3rd@pyn3rd·Nov 18

#java4shell #cve-2026-114938 Achieving a full RCE exploit chain is quite challenging. Heap memory disclosure, on the other hand, is relatively easy to achieve. But the real danger comes when sensitive data, like AWS access keys or something, happens to reside in nearby memory regions. This is reminiscent of #heartbleed back in the day.

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InfiShark Tech@InfiShark·Nov 17

🚨 Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) reportedly only fires on x86 servers whose CPUs have AVX-512 VBMI. ARM boxes like Graviton and older Xeons never run the buggy code. Calif found and reported it and says it leaked before Oracle's patch. Its own write-up is due by 1 PM Pacific today, so everything below comes from early analysis by Oligo and IONIX and is still unconfirmed. Here's how it works: java.util.Base64 is ordinary Java code -- on CPUs that support it, HotSpot swaps the decoder for a hand-written AVX-512 intrinsic, and that is on by default. The intrinsic came from JDK-8268276, which is built for JDK 18 and backported into Java 17.0.6, and this is where the reported "17.0.6 and later" range starts. Per Oligo, a 65-byte input (64 Base64 characters plus one "=") makes the length math for the final padded block underflow. The decoder ends up doing a 64-byte write that runs 62 bytes past its output buffer into the Java heap. Base64 gets decoded before login all over the place: HTTP Basic headers, JWTs, SAML assertions. That is where the pre-auth label comes from. The CVE record is still reserved and no vendor advisory names the component. IONIX reproduced the out-of-bounds write, but says the bytes follow a fixed pattern and it has not shown a crash or code execution. No public exploit, no reported attacks. Early reports name Java 17 only -- IONIX also lists 21 and 25, which carry the same intrinsic. To fix -- Oracle's November builds (17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1) carry 11 Java SE fixes, but nothing yet ties this CVE to them, so check the release notes for CVE-2026-114938. Interim, not vendor-endorsed: start the JVM with -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics, which stopped the write in IONIX's test on 17.0.21. Quick check: lscpu | grep avx512_vbmi

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Microsoft Threat Intelligence@MsftSecIntel·Nov 17

Microsoft research shows how device code phishing, which persuades users to approve a legitimate sign-in rather than stealing a password, can extend to AI coding agents, using GitHub Copilot CLI as an example. msft.it/6012xEPT6 In a controlled proof-of-concept simulation, one approved device code led to four possible outcomes: remote steering of an active session, misleading entries in agent memory, exposure of synced session history, and access to private repositories. None of which were observed in the wild. Any device-flow client can be targeted this way, and a legitimate verification page does not mean the request is safe. Microsoft Defender detections and disruption help connect phishing attempts to GitHub authorization activity. Read the blog for the full findings and mitigation guidance.