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New post on Eth Research!
EIP-8288: the networking side of recursive aggregation
By:
- cskiraly
- Csaba Kiraly
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26263
Highlights:
- Post-quantum signatures by themselves don’t necessarily break today’s mempool networking: simulations at ~15 signature tx/s show nodes can propagate/fetch them with modest upload (about one copy per tx per node), while one builder can still include everything.
- Recursive aggregation can also handle today’s signature-only load, but naïvely “pushing” a fresh proof to every peer every interval creates a large standing bandwidth cost that depends mostly on peer count (roughly peers × proof_size ÷ interval), even at low transaction rates.
- Switching from proof-push to ‘announce coverage then fetch proofs on demand’ can significantly reduce upload (especially at low load), but requires richer metadata and clear rules for when a node should fetch proofs—open questions for EIP-8437’s wire protocol.
- Who aggregates is crucial for privacy-transaction capacity: if only a fraction of nodes aggregate, the design of raw-transaction relay/fetch timeouts and whether nodes wait for covering proofs can swing capacity from very low to very high (in the study, ~6 to ≥72 privacy tx/s under different designs).
- The 1,000 ms aggregation interval only works if the assumed prover is fast enough: merging a node’s proof with peers’ proofs can consume most/all of the interval, and slower hardware can fail badly under privacy load—so EIP-8288 should specify the target prover/assumptions and what slower nodes should do.
ELI5:
Imagine Ethereum transactions sometimes come with very big “receipts” (signatures or privacy proofs). Instead of every computer on the network checking and passing around those big receipts one-by-one, EIP-8288 lets computers bundle many receipts together into one bigger but more efficient “super-receipt” (a recursive STARK proof). Then blocks only need to carry and verify the super-receipt. This turns the mempool into a network that not only shares transactions, but also continuously builds proofs. The article uses simulations to show that whether this works well depends heavily on networking rules (who sends proofs to whom, when peers download them, and how fast computers can build/merge proofs).
New EIP!
Dependency frames for leanSPHINCS signatures
🔗 github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pul…
Highlights:
- Adds a new EIP-8141 frame mode: a dependency verification frame that executes no EVM code and only declares required signature dependencies as (scheme, data_hash, verification_key_hash) triples.
- Defines only one dependency scheme initially: leanSPHINCS (stateless, Keccak-256-based, post-quantum), where a zero data_hash can mean “the transaction’s own signature hash.”
- Signatures are explicitly not included in the transaction encoding; they travel beside transactions in the mempool and blocks, and blocks include one signature per distinct dependency used by their transactions.
- All nodes verify these signatures outside the EVM (and can do so in parallel with execution); mempool nodes can reject transactions missing required signatures before simulation.
- The block header commits to the carried signatures, enabling a future upgrade to replace per-signature witnesses with a single aggregate proof (e.g., like EIP-8288) without changing transaction hashes or smart account logic for reading dependencies.
ELI5:
This proposal lets a transaction list which big post-quantum signatures it needs without stuffing those huge signatures inside the transaction itself. Instead, the signatures are carried next to the transactions in the block/mempool, verified by nodes outside the EVM, and smart accounts can read the list of required signatures from a special “frame” field.
New post on Eth Research!
Exploring post-quantum signature aggregation for EIP-8288
By:
- manel1874
- Manuel B. Santos
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26261
Highlights:
- EIP-8141 (programmable account validation) plus EIP-8288 (recursive STARK aggregation of dependencies) could let wallets choose diverse signature schemes while the network verifies a common aggregated proof format.
- An experimental leanVM/leanSTARK implementation benchmarks five schemes under STARK proving: Falcon-512, ML-DSA-44, FORS, Raccoon-128, and Raccoon-G, measuring proving time, proof size, verifier cost, and peak memory.
- Single-proof batching hits a witness/commitment capacity ceiling (2^28 words) for some schemes: up to 32 Falcon signatures, 6 ML-DSA signatures, 1 Raccoon-128 signature, while FORS scales well (tested at least 100) due to a specialized Keccak circuit and has proof sizes smaller than the raw signature payload.
- Raccoon-G verification is too large for one leanSTARK under current limits, so the post demonstrates a multi-STARK approach: split the expensive matrix-row computation into five leaf proofs, bind them with D = H(signature, commitment), and aggregate them via binary recursion into one final proof.
- Wallet-side proving is likely impractical under typical client constraints (e.g., browser/wasm memory limits), motivating a flow where wallets sign locally but outsource proof generation to an untrusted external aggregator; EIP-8288 still needs specification work (proof formats/parameters, dependency binding, and potentially revised wrapper limits such as MAX_LEANSTARK_DEPS_PER_WRAPPER=1) to support same-verifier batching cleanly.
ELI5:
Ethereum wallets might want to use different kinds of “future-proof” (post-quantum) signatures, but checking all of them directly on-chain could be expensive and some schemes don’t support wallet features like threshold signing. This post shows a way to have an off-chain computer prove “these signatures are valid” inside one cryptographic proof (a STARK), so the blockchain only checks the proof. The author tests several post-quantum signature types, measures how big and slow the proofs are, and shows how to split a too-large verification into multiple smaller proofs and then glue them together.
Weekly Roundup
Solving PQC Bandwidth via Nybrind Wiesner Money & Lattice HSMs
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26229
3 comment(s) this week
Proprietary AMMs and Ethereum
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/25543
3 comment(s) this week
Ethereum PropAMMs: today and tomorrow
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26129
2 comment(s) this week
Elastic Ethereum
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26236
2 comment(s) this week
A privacy pool on frame transactions: what works, and the case that does not yet
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26223
2 comment(s) this week
[RFC] WARCoin: Deterministic 1:1 USD Stablecoin via Serialized 7-Day Color Ring Buffers and Burn-on-Egress Invariants
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26246
1 comment(s) this week
More Meters or More Prices? One- vs. Multi-dimensional Fee Mechanisms on Ethereum
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26244
1 comment(s) this week
Multi-dimensional decentralization metrics, and an open question on first-broadcast double-spend rules
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26242
1 comment(s) this week
Seam: verifying Zcash headers on Base with EIP-152, and proving shielded payments without linking the chains
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26239
1 comment(s) this week
Folding vs full-verifier recursion for PQ signature aggregation in leanVM: measurements and negative results
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26227
1 comment(s) this week
EIL: Trust minimized cross-L2 interop
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/23437
1 comment(s) this week
GKR with a Machine-Checked Core, and a Sparse Prover Made Faster with Byte-Identical Proofs
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26226
1 comment(s) this week
How large can EIP-8141's validation budget be? A mempool DoS benchmark
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26224
1 comment(s) this week
New EIP!
Batch Pricing for Generic Proofs
🔗 github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pul…
Highlights:
- Adds a new batched dependency scheme (provisional ID 0x12) that lets one proof leaf verify multiple independent 32-byte claims under the same verification key, extending EIP-8288’s generic proof framework.
- Each transaction commits (in its signature) to a claim and a `min_batch` value; gas is charged as a per-claim cost plus a discounted share of the leaf verification cost computed from `min_batch`, independent of the eventual batch membership or block order.
- Introduces “complete batch wrappers” (mode 2) that contain the full member transactions plus a single leaf proof; public mempool admission/propagation requires the entire batch to be valid, have exactly one batched dependency per member, use one common verification key, and be fully sponsored by the same EIP-8141 paymaster.
- Mempool handling is atomic: clients must validate the whole batch and reserve paymaster funds for all members together; if any member becomes invalid/expired/included, the batch must be dropped and members can only remain pending via another complete admissible batch (no partial batches relayed).
- Consensus/block inclusion remains per-transaction: blocks do not include the batch wrapper and do not require atomic inclusion of the whole batch; builders may include any subset of batch-covered claims, keeping original `min_batch` qualifiers, which means mempool rules don’t fully prevent underfunded partial batches in blocks.
ELI5:
This proposal lets many transactions share one big “proof check” and split the cost, like carpooling. Each transaction says up front the smallest group size it’s willing to be in (a minimum batch size). The public mempool will only accept and gossip these transactions if they arrive inside a complete, fully funded batch with one shared sponsor (paymaster), but miners/builders can still include transactions one-by-one in blocks.
New EIP!
FOCIL Omission Witnesses for Frame Txs
🔗 github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pul…
Highlights:
- Adds "inclusion list witnesses": the payload envelope carries signed inclusion lists used to justify omissions, and the bid commits to them via an SSZ root (preventing builders from showing different witnesses to different nodes).
- A witness only counts for a node if that node had already accepted at least one inclusion list from the same committee member by a fixed deadline (the slot N+1 attestation deadline), reducing disagreement caused by differing IL views.
- Replaces builder-claimed evaluation indices with a node-derived per-transaction checkpoint k*(T), computed from the block access list: an omitted frame transaction is judged at the state just before the first non-witnessed transaction that writes to its relevant validation state.
- Introduces admission rules and caps for inclusion-list processing (per-IL gas cap, per-transaction gas cap, and per-IL/per-tx VERIFY-gas budgets) and defines Profile 2 eligibility for which frame transactions can be enforced under these rules.
- Does not strictly depend on inclusion_list_bits: if bits are removed in the future, the mechanism still works using witness roots + node-local counting, but enforcement may shift from gossip-time filtering to post-reveal omission checking.
ELI5:
Sometimes Ethereum has a “must-include list” (an inclusion list) of transactions that block builders are supposed to include. For newer “frame transactions,” whether they’re valid can depend on account state that other transactions in the same block might change. This EIP says: if a builder wants to skip (omit) a listed frame transaction, they must include the signed inclusion lists they relied on as proof (“witnesses”), and everyone checks the skipped transaction at a fair moment in the block derived from the block’s access list—so builders can’t sneak in some unrelated transaction to justify skipping it.
New post on Eth Research!
[RFC] WARCoin: Deterministic 1:1 USD Stablecoin via Serialized 7-Day Color Ring Buffers and Burn-on-Egress Invariants
By:
- Deamonminwar
- Daemon Minwar
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26246
Highlights:
- WARCoin replaces typical ERC-20 unlimited balance bookkeeping with finite, serialized issuance slots to reduce infinite-mint and replay/double-spend risk.
- Minting is gated by a strict USD-only ingress rule (non-USD assets are rejected) to avoid cross-collateral “toxic asset” contagion.
- Each $1 unit is tracked as a discrete serial (#1–#1,000) inside one of 7 day-of-week “color” buckets, with deterministic rules for minting, burning, and spillover.
- Egress to external assets triggers burn-on-egress: the underlying serials are invalidated on-chain and moved into a burn pool, with delayed recycling (must finish sequential minting before reusing burned indices).
- Hard supply invariants and fail-safes cap issuance: active+burned serials must stay ≤ 10^9, active supply must be ≤ verified USD reserves, and minting freezes if buckets saturate or the global cap is reached until redemptions occur.
ELI5:
WARCoin is a $1 digital token that tries to stay safe by giving every single “coin” a numbered ticket in a limited set of boxes (one box per day of the week). You can only create these coins by putting in real USD, and whenever you send coins out to buy other crypto, the system destroys (burns) the exact numbered tickets so they can’t be reused or duplicated. Because there are only so many numbered tickets available at a time and strict rules about recycling burned tickets, the design aims to prevent “infinite money” bugs and reduce damage from hacks.
New post on Eth Research!
More Meters or More Prices? One- vs. Multi-dimensional Fee Mechanisms on Ethereum
By:
- M1kuW1ll
- Fei Wu
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26244
Highlights:
- Pushing the one-dimensional benchmark (floor-adjusted + EIP-8372) to a higher target-to-limit ratio (from 1/2 to 4/5) increases execution (to ~199–215M gas/block) but reduces state growth well below the 120 GiB/year target and increases congestion (near-limit blocks rise to ~13–21%).
- With a high target ratio, the EIP-1559 base-fee update rule becomes a binding constraint because rounding prevents the base fee from dropping to the few-wei equilibrium range; the simulated base fee stays much higher than equilibrium, shrinking especially the most price-elastic resource (state).
- Replacing the EIP-1559 update with an EIP-4844-style “excess gas + fake exponential” update lets fees fall closer to equilibrium, restoring more execution (~215–244M gas/block) and state growth (~94–96 GiB/year), but causes much more congestion (~39–41% near-limit blocks).
- A single shared base fee cannot keep both execution and state near their targets simultaneously: it follows the bottleneck resource, so one branch tends to be over-priced whenever the other branch is near/over target.
- Across tested simulations and calibrations, EIP-7999’s multidimensional pricing achieves more execution while keeping state growth at the 120 GiB/year target, at similar or lower congestion than the one-dimensional variants, supporting a shift from separate metering to separate pricing as Ethereum scales.
ELI5:
Ethereum blocks have limited “space” for different kinds of work (running computation and growing the on-chain state). A one-price system uses one knob (one base fee) to control all of it, which means whichever resource is the tightest ends up setting the price for everything. This paper compares that one-price approach with a multi-price approach (EIP-7999) that sets separate prices for different resources. In simulations, giving each resource its own price lets Ethereum get more computation done while still keeping state growth near the intended target, without making blocks hit their limits more often.
New post on Eth Research!
Multi-dimensional decentralization metrics, and an open question on first-broadcast double-spend rules
By:
- saintthor
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26242
Highlights:
- The repo provides an open-source LLM “skill” (SKILL.md, Apache-2.0) for analyzing decentralization as multiple independent dimensions rather than relying on a single metric like the Nakamoto coefficient.
- The Nakamoto coefficient is treated as a per-subsystem input (and time-sensitive snapshot) because it can go stale and isn’t directly comparable across different consensus types.
- The skill’s current dimensions include: node/validator concentration, stake/wealth concentration (e.g., Gini/HHI), client diversity, network/infrastructure concentration; plus broader factors like consensus dependency scope, privileged actors/finality authority/economic assumptions, and Sybil/eclipsing/blast-radius/cost-to-participate concerns.
- It compares several architecture families (PoW, PoS, DAG, sharded systems) against Atomic Ownership Blockchains (AOB), and explicitly separates “validation level” (mainnet history, audits, testnet, demos) from architectural properties.
- AOB’s proposed double-spend handling is “first broadcast wins” with waiting periods based on estimated broadcast time t₀ (e.g., accept after 2·t₀ without conflict; recipients may wait 4·t₀), local (non-global) blacklisting of double-signers, and longer waits under suspected partitions; the author requests critique on how robust this is under adversarial latency/eclipses and what decentralization dimensions are missing.
ELI5:
The author made a tool that grades blockchains using a bunch of separate “fairness and safety” measurements instead of one score, because one score can be misleading. They also describe their own blockchain idea where each item has its own little history that only the current owner can write to. If someone tries to pay two people with the same item, it creates two conflicting histories, proving the owner cheated. The rule is basically “the first version that gets broadcast to the network wins,” and the author asks how well that holds up if attackers can delay messages or isolate victims.
New EIP!
Code Reads in Block-Level Access Lists
🔗 github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pul…
Highlights:
- Adds a new `code_hash` field to each `AccountChanges` entry in the EIP-7928 Block Access List, containing the Keccak-256 hash of an account’s *pre-block* bytecode when that code is actually loaded during the block (otherwise empty).
- Precisely defines “code load” events that trigger recording `code_hash` (e.g., calls/frames to the address as code address, EXTCODESIZE/EXTCODECOPY, certain EIP-7702 validation/authorization checks, and EIP-8298 SETCODEFROM source access after its gas check).
- Uses hashes (not bytecode) to keep the BAL small, enable deduplication across accounts, and let witnesses/provers fetch code from hash-keyed stores while still being able to verify completeness.
- Consensus impact: changes the RLP shape of `AccountChanges` and therefore `block_access_list_hash`, requiring a hard fork; BAL correctness rules extend so mismatched `code_hash` values make the block invalid.
- Together with EIP-7709 (making BLOCKHASH a state read), aims to make the block + BAL + a state snapshot sufficient to assemble proving/stateless inputs without executing the block first.
ELI5:
Blocks need to look at some contracts’ code (their program bytes) to run. Today the block access list tells you which accounts and storage slots were touched, but not which code had to be read unless it changed. This proposal adds one extra field per touched account: the hash of that account’s code at the start of the block, but only if the block actually needed to read that code. That way, someone building a proof or a “stateless” check can know exactly which contract code to fetch without first running the block.
New EIP!
eth/73 - Proof wrapper propagation
🔗 github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pul…
Highlights:
- Defines eth/73 as an extension of eth/72 to propagate EIP-8288 proof wrappers: peers announce wrapper mode/length/hash plus coverage hints, then retrieve wrappers by hash via new request/response messages.
- Introduces three new devp2p messages: NewProofWrapperHashes (announce up to 64 wrappers), GetProofWrappers (request up to 32 hashes with compact/full flag), and ProofWrappers (return validated wrappers with omissions allowed and a recommended 2 MiB soft limit).
- Adds “compact” wrapper serving (compact=1) where a peer may omit transaction bytes previously sent on that connection and replace them with keccak hashes, requiring the requester to reconstruct from cache or retry with compact=0.
- Specifies a special mode 2 “raw-witness wrapper” to relay raw signatures/witnesses for later aggregation; clients must validate witnesses with locally supported (program, format-id) validators, may decline unknown formats without penalty, and must not treat mode 2 entries as proof-backed until a valid aggregate proof arrives.
- Tightens transaction propagation rules: dependency-bearing transactions must not be sent in standard transaction messages; blob-related behavior integrates with EIP-8070/EIP-8141 so wrappers can circulate with blob data elided and cells are advertised/fetched only after a validated covering wrapper.
ELI5:
This proposal adds a new Ethereum networking “language” (eth/73) so computers can tell each other about shared proof/signature bundles (“proof wrappers”) and fetch them by hash. Instead of sending every transaction with all its proofs repeatedly, peers announce which wrappers they have (with size and hashes) and other peers can request the full wrapper only when needed, saving bandwidth and enabling proof aggregation workflows.
New post on Eth Research!
Seam: verifying Zcash headers on Base with EIP-152, and proving shielded payments without linking the chains
By:
- Himess
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26239
Highlights:
- A permissionless on-chain relay on Base verifies Zcash block headers against Zcash consensus rules (Equihash via the EIP-152 BLAKE2b precompile, difficulty adjustment including NU7’s 25-second blocks, timestamp rules, PoW target, and most-work fork choice), so contracts can read Zcash’s best chain without trusting a committee or bridge.
- Per-header cost is ~626k gas on average (with Equihash ~361k gas); following Zcash at 25-second blocks is ~3,456 headers/day (~2.2×10^9 gas/day), estimated around ~0.01 ETH/day at ~0.005 gwei on Base.
- The relay design handles reorganizations safely: it avoids gas-cost blowups by not clearing orphaned height indices, ensuring attackers can’t freeze the relay by forcing expensive state rewrites; feeders can delay updates but cannot make invalid headers be accepted.
- On top of the relay, a RISC Zero zkVM proof (Groth16-wrapped) can prove a shielded Zcash payment meets an app-defined condition (minimum value, receiver commitment, memo includes a payment reference) and is included under ZIP-221/ZIP-244 commitments anchored to a header the relay has—without revealing txid, note, block, or address on the EVM chain.
- It’s experimental: testnets only and unaudited; security depends on trusted deployment inputs (checkpoint/parameters), liveness depends on header feeders, proofs currently require GPU for practical performance, and the main security bound is economic (apps must require sufficient cumulative work, not a simple confirmation count).
ELI5:
Seam is like putting a mini “Zcash verifier” inside Base (an EVM chain). Instead of trusting a bridge operator to tell Base what happened on Zcash, a smart contract checks Zcash block headers itself (the hard math puzzle, timestamps, and difficulty rules). Then, if someone wants to prove they paid you on Zcash without revealing which transaction or address it was, they can generate a zero-knowledge proof that says “a real shielded payment of at least X went to the receiver this app expects,” and Base can verify that proof cheaply—without learning the private details or linking the two chains by publishing a txid.
New post on Eth Research!
Elastic Ethereum
By:
- cskiraly
🔗 ethresear.ch/t/26236
Highlights:
- Ethereum’s throughput and timing (12s slots, one block/slot, gas/size limits) are mostly pre-configured and adjusted slowly, while real network/node capacity fluctuates quickly; the protocol lacks a closed-loop, protocol-wide mechanism to reduce load when the system falls behind.
- Elasticity is framed primarily as robustness against congestion collapse (doing lots of work that doesn’t ‘count’), not just efficiency; the TCP analogy motivates measuring conditions and backing off quickly to prevent runaway overload and enable higher average utilization safely.
- The author highlights two ‘work in flight’ buffers: the mempool (pre-inclusion) and the ‘available but not finalized’ chain (post-inclusion, pre-finality). They argue the size/cost of this unfinalized backlog is a missing control signal that could guide capacity decisions.
- Mainnet propagation data (Xatu, late 2026) shows fixed safety margins are uneven: many blocks leave slack unused, yet tail cases still push some nodes past attestation-related timing; performance differs by node/operator group and geography, implying a single fixed timeout/slot design is inherently suboptimal.
- Two broad design directions are proposed: (1) control the set point—how far and how fast Ethereum builds ahead of finality—by adapting knobs like block size, slot/round timing, pipelining depth, or parallelism; and (2) de-risk pipelined building by reducing the cost of conflicts/reorgs (e.g., selective-ack style voting windows, more independent blocks, and leveraging recursive aggregation/ZK proofs), while acknowledging open questions about agreed-upon signals, gaming resistance, stability of the control law, fairness/inclusivity, and fee/issuance interactions.
ELI5:
Ethereum is like a highway where the speed limit and number of lanes are mostly set ahead of time. When traffic gets worse or the road gets damaged, the highway doesn’t automatically add lanes or slow down in a coordinated way—so sometimes everything jams up and lots of effort is wasted. The post suggests Ethereum should work more like TCP on the Internet: constantly measure how crowded things are, speed up when it’s safe, and slow down quickly when it’s not. A key idea is to watch how much ‘unfinished work’ is piling up—transactions waiting in the mempool and blocks that are published but not yet finalized—and use that as a shared signal to adjust how much new work the chain takes on, so it stays stable and can scale better.
New EIP!
LUCID Key Publisher Priority Lists
🔗 github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pul…
Highlights:
- Validators subscribe (with BLS-signed messages) to on-chain managed lists of publisher addresses; any address supported by >50% of active validator effective balance becomes “priority.”
- Block ordering for LUCID sealed-transaction commitments changes: commitments from priority publishers must come before all others, then sort by fees/gas/commitment_root; violating this ordering makes the payload invalid.
- A new execution-layer registry system contract maintains vote lists and a FIFO queue of list/subscription updates that are pulled into each payload via an EIP-7685/EIP-7732 ExecutionRequests system call.
- Key-release messages (LucidKeyMessage) gain a signature that must authenticate the ticket’s key_publisher, preventing users from claiming a priority publisher while releasing keys independently.
- The EIP removes max_preceding_commitments from ST tickets/bundles (and related checks), relying on priority ordering to reduce key-release optionality risks; all changes are hard-fork, state, and format breaking versus EIP-8184/7732.
ELI5:
This proposal lets Ethereum validators vote on a “trusted publishers” list for LUCID encrypted transactions. If an encrypted transaction uses a publisher that most validator stake trusts, it gets to run earlier in the block than encrypted transactions using other publishers. It also requires the publisher to sign the key-release message, so someone can’t pretend to use a trusted publisher but secretly release the key themselves.
New EIP!
Forward-Compatible Gas Repricing via Versioned Opcodes
🔗 github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pul…
Highlights:
- Introduces a parallel V2 opcode set whose gas costs follow EIP-8037/8038, while legacy opcodes keep the pre-Glamsterdam gas schedule.
- After activation, newly deployed runtime bytecode must use only V2 versions of repriced opcodes and must not include gas-introspection opcodes (e.g., GAS, GASLIMIT) or the deployment reverts.
- Successful V2 deployments set an on-chain per-account marker (code_version = 2) to record that the code passed the V2 deployment gate.
- Adds DELEGATECALL_V2, which behaves like DELEGATECALL but fails immediately unless the target account has code_version >= 2, preventing delegating into legacy-code contexts under new assumptions.
- Keeps backward compatibility by grandfathering all existing contracts under old gas rules, while allowing the ecosystem to migrate over time (e.g., via upgraded implementations) and enabling future versioned opcode generations (V3, etc.).
ELI5:
Ethereum wants to change how much “gas” (fees) certain actions cost, but changing it for everyone could break old smart contracts. This proposal creates a new “version 2” set of opcodes (the building blocks of contract code) with the new gas prices, and says that only new contracts can use these V2 opcodes. Old contracts keep working forever with the old gas prices. It also adds a special DELEGATECALL_V2 that only lets you delegatecall into V2 contracts, and it bans gas-peeking opcodes like GAS and GASLIMIT in V2 so contracts won’t depend on fragile gas details.