A U.S. Air Force @usairforce C-17 reportedly flew from Joint Base Andrews to Riga on August 23, then continued to Moscow-Vnukovo on August 25 - potentially marking the first U.S. C-17 sighting over Russia in years.
#US#Russia#Riga#Latvia#News
Source: @casusbellii.
The Eastern Mediterranean is becoming increasingly important, not just militarily but also economically and strategically. Through major undersea data and energy projects backed by Saudi, Greek and French partnerships, Greece is gaining a central role while Turkey risks being left out.
The argument is that Turkey needs to look beyond naval standoffs and diplomatic statements. It must develop its own maritime and technological capabilities, create alternative projects and get involved in existing ones with a real say in decision-making.
Influence in the Eastern Mediterranean isn't just about controlling the waters, but also about controlling the infrastructure, technology and economic interests beneath them.
#Greece#Turkey#MaritimeNews#Influence#Shipping
Source: @ersinelikoglu.
The key point is that maritime power is about much more than having a strong navy or a large fleet. It’s about everything that makes a country powerful at sea, from shipping and shipbuilding to undersea cables, energy infrastructure and maritime technology.
The dominance of European and American companies in these industries shows how maritime capabilities can translate into real economic and geopolitical influence.
Turkey has the potential to develop similar capabilities, building on its progress in military shipbuilding. But that takes more than money, ships and shipyards. It requires knowledge, experience, investment and long-term strategic thinking.
Ultimately, maritime power isn't just about having ships. It's about having the industrial strength, expertise and vision to turn the sea into a source of economic and geopolitical influence.
#Shipping#Influence#EU#US#Turkey#ship@Seatrade@SynMaxInt@Mar_Ex@themaritimenet
Source: @ersinelikoglu.
Weekly chokepoints risk & transit monitor - November 16.
Preliminary Strait of Hormuz crossings fell to 98 in the week to 15 November, down 29.5% from the previous week's preliminary count of 139, with both entries and exits lower. However, routing conditions remained largely unchanged, with more than two-thirds of crossings still classified as Route Undetermined as Iranian Unilateral Scheme crossings fell to 25 from 42, and use of recognized corridors unchanged at five transits. Bab el-Mandeb traffic also eased to 279 crossings, although TSS adherence improved to 91.0% and dark transits fell to 25. Meanwhile, attacks on commercial shipping slowed to two confirmed incidents with no fatalities, although there is no clear evidence of a sustained improvement in regional security.
✔️ Hormuz routing remained largely unchanged. Route Undetermined accounted for 68 crossings, or 69.4% of traffic, against 66.2% last week on a preliminary basis. A further 25 used the Iranian Unilateral Scheme, two used Omani routes and three the Hormuz TSS, so conventional corridors remain little used. Sanctioned crossings were 10, level with last week's settled figure after the preliminary 14 was revised down.
✔️ Attacks continued at a slower recorded pace than in October. The Kpler dataset records 136 attacks since March, with 25 seafarer fatalities and 52 injuries. Two incidents were confirmed this week, while last week's count has been revised up from two to six. Of the 45 incidents since 1 October, 42 were in the Gulf and Hormuz theatre and 37 involved tankers.
✔️ Bab el-Mandeb crossings decreased to 279, down 7.3% from last week's preliminary 301, since revised to 310. Laden movements fell from 187 to 173, TSS adherence improved from 90.7% to 91.0% and dark transits decreased from 28 to 25.
✔️ Hormuz recorded lower preliminary traffic while Bab el-Mandeb eased, under different operating conditions. Hormuz continues to face significant routing uncertainty, while Bab el-Mandeb maintains more consistent commercial movements. The figures show continued shipping activity, not a confirmed reduction in underlying risks.
#News#Iran#Shipping#Hormuz#ShadowFleet#Sanctions#Maritime
Source: @MarineTraffic, @Kpler, Yuan Li.
marinetraffic.com/en/maritim…
⚠️Doğu Akdeniz’de suyun altına dikkat. Denizde kapasite inşası ve altyapı süreçlerinin ana aktörleri farklı olsa da figüranı Yunanistan’dır.
📌Türkiye figüranla cebelleşirken bir yanda Suudi-Yunan ortaklığında East to Med Data Corridor (EMC), diğer yanda Fransız-Yunan ortaklığında (Great Sea Interconnector) GSI üzerinden Doğu Akdeniz’de Yunanistan’ın özneleştiği ve Türkiye’nin denklem dışına itildiği bir sermaye mekansallaşması süreci inşa ediliyor.
📌GSI her ne kadar Yunan ve Türk kamuoyunu fazlaca meşgul etse de üç hafta öncesine kadar ana odak Kıbrıs adasının batısındaki sularda EMC’de idi.
📎Soldaki görselde EMC-1 ve EMC-2 veri bağlantı projeleri güzergahlarını görüyorsunuz, sağdaki görselde ise Doğu Akdeniz’de, özellikle GKRY’nin güneyinde Sondaj Gemisi (Drillship), Araştıma Gemisi (Research/Survey Vessel) ve Çok Maksatlı Açık Deniz Destek Gemisi (Multi-Purpose Offshore Vessel) yoğunluğunu görebilirsiniz. Bu su kütlesinin üstü kadar altı da oldukça hareketlidir.
📌Bu iki görseli bir arada okuduğunuzda EMC ve diğer veri/enerji bağlantı altyapıları ya da projeleri üzerinden halihazırda Doğu Akdeniz’de jeopolitik derinliğin oluştuğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu derinliği oluşturan ana aktör ise uluslararası hukuktan ziyade jeoekonomik dinamiklerdir. Türkiye bu derinlikte kaybolmamalı, fiili devlet uygulamalarından feragat etmemeli ve denize çıkmalıdır.
📌Tıpkı GSI projesinde olduğu gibi NAVTEX restleşmelerinin paralelinde EMC de Türkiye’nin aleyhine işlemeye devam ediyor. Suudi stc’ye bağlı dijital altyapı şirketi center3 ile Yunan elektrik şirketi PPC projeyi yürütmekteler. Bu projenin denizaltı kablolarını üretme ve döşeme işi ise Fransız Alcatel Submarine Networks’e (ASN) ihale edilmiş durumda.
📌Türkiye bu projelerin dışında tutuldukça alternatif proje üretmeli ve/veya mevcut konsorsiyumlara söz sahibi olarak dahil olmalıdır. Elbette NAVTEX ilanı ve fiili devlet uygulamaları kıymetlidir ancak bu ilan ve uygulamalar, denizcilik kabiliyetleriyle ve teknik/teknolojik kabiliyetlerle de desteklenmelidir.
🇩🇿🇳🇪 Amid sensational coverage and misinformation about Algeria and Niger, much of the context is missing.
Our September analysis traces their history, recent rapprochement and the security, energy and geopolitical interests reshaping relations across the Sahel.
thegeopoliticaldesk.com/alge…
Iran's Revolutionary Guards said in a statement carried by state media Friday that two oil tankers hit mines and caught fire in and near the Strait of Hormuz, a day after Tehran claimed five other tankers had met similar fates.
"Two violating oil tankers — one east of the Strait of Hormuz and the other within the Strait itself — that attempted to transit via an unauthorized route struck mines," Iran's powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said in a statement carried by state TV and the semi-official Tasnim news agency. cbsnews.com/live-updates/ira…
"UANI identified one of the sanctioned tankers as the SOGL....'This tanker had loaded its Iranian LPG from Assaluyeh Port, Iran, in late August. It then breached the US blockade and made its way to a Malaysian anchorage."
—Jemima Shelley @JemimaShelley via @FoxNews Exclusive
Read👇
foxnews.com/world/iranian-gh…
The Russian vessel MAIA-1 has departed the port of Baltiysk, where other cargo ships have previously loaded military equipment and materiel.
The vessel has a documented history of transporting cargo for the Russian government. On a previous voyage, it travelled from the Pacific via the NSR.
Its current destination remains unknown. The next key development will be its passage through the Danish Straits. Particular attention should be paid to whether the vessel is accompanied by a naval escort and whether its route continues towards the Mediterranean. @SONARROW_OSINT@auonsson@key2med@UKForcesTracker@Richard_AHolmes@KaptainLOMA@te3ej@The_Lookout_N@seawaves_mag
It appears that Navvik Leader, the vessel that is towing the burning Espirito Santo Express, has reversed course over the past day.
She is still in company with Maersk Topper and Starnav Delphinus.
They do not list a destination by they have been tracking northwest toward the Brazilian coast since they started the tow back on November 1.
🚨🇫🇮 Finnish court convicts two FITBURG (IMO 9250397) crew members over the sabotage of two subsea cables in the Gulf of Finland.
🇷🇺 Russian captain received 3.5 years in prison, while boatswain was sentenced to 2 years and 10 months.
Key findings:
🔴 Anchor lowered in Russian territorial waters despite fully functional equipment.
🔴 Dragged along the seabed for approximately 130 km.
🔴 Crew kept sailing for two hours after Finnish authorities ordered the anchor raised.
The court found intentional aggravated sabotage, not an ordinary maritime accident. ⚠️
🇧🇫🇪🇺🚨| Very interesting development regarding Burkina Faso and its relations with EU.
"We want a partnership based on sincerity," Burkina Faso's Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré told EU officials in Brussels, his ministry said on Nov. 6.
He met Birgitte Nygaard Markussen, the new EU Special Representative for the Sahel, on Nov. 3, and Kaja Kallas, the EU's High Representative for foreign affairs, on Nov. 4.
According to the ministry, the EU spoke of a "renewed approach" to Burkina and the Sahel and offered to step up political dialogue.
The EU's diplomatic service called the talks "constructive, open and frank, including on our differences". Neither side announced an agreement.
Traoré used the visit to attack a European Parliament resolution on Burkina, which he blamed on "false statements" by French MEP Christophe Gomart @Chris_Gomart .
"Avoid wearing European glasses to read the Sahelian context," he said.
He also rejected the idea that Ouagadougou is isolated: "My presence here is proof that we are not closed."
The trip came six days after the Russia-Africa summit, where Burkina's message asked Moscow to deliver on their strategic partnership while defending diversified partnerships.
Europe had reopened contacts before that: Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot visited Ouagadougou in August, and he met Traoré again in Brussels on Nov. 5.
This is a noteworthy development, given that Ouagadougou did cut diplomatic ties with France in June and expelled two EU delegation officials in July.