
"Venture is Dead (Again)" buff.ly/VBQlTBW @ganeumann (via @joincolossus)


"Venture is Dead (Again)" buff.ly/VBQlTBW @ganeumann (via @joincolossus)

Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz raised their first fund in 2009 after Netscape got crushed by Microsoft. They wrote a $25M check into Coinbase in 2013 nobody else would touch. It was worth $11B at the direct listing. That was conviction investing. a16z does almost none of that today. a16z is now $90B AUM, 300+ employees, a Speedrun accelerator writing $750K checks, and a lead position in every obvious late-stage round. The Coinbase edge was the old edge. The new edge is distribution, media, and brand. Which is a different business entirely and one that hedge funds can replicate. I wrote today on why the richest firms in venture are the easiest to replace, and why the LPs still paying 2 and 20 for access are the ones financing the end of the model. reloadnyc.com/access-capital…

1️⃣ In October 2025, @JensenHuang told Fox Business that Nvidia was "the engine of the largest industrial revolution in human history." Nvidia's data center sales had gone from $0.6bn a quarter in 2019 to $51bn. They reached $89bn in the quarter that ended in July 2026. Then a few days ago, Jensen resigned as Nvidia's CEO. My personal theory is that behind those numbers was a clash of titans over what kind of technology AI would be. Jensen wanted a general-purpose platform, open to any developer and any startup, running on Nvidia chips. On the other side, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta wanted AI inside their own walled gardens: their clouds, where they set the rules and run AI more and more on chips designed by themselves. Those four are what Jerry Neumann (@ganeumann) calls "synergy companies": the giants that came out on top in the years of steady growth after the dot-com crash. When a techno-economic paradigm matures, such companies usually end up dominating it. The hypothesis here is that Jensen knows the pattern and saw this coming. He was fully aware that AI was arriving late in the cycle, when the giants take over and tinkerers get squeezed out. In this context, his bet was to try and keep his market wide open with resources only he could secure: deep personal ties to Asia's chip industry, Nvidia's billions, and a direct line to the President of the United States. It now appears that he failed. That failure, and its circumstances, show how hard it is to reverse a deep trend like a great surge reaching maturity. -- I lead research at Vsquared Ventures, an early-stage VC firm backing deep tech founders across Europe. Views my own.

"Venture capital did not die for good after the 1980s, and it won’t this time either. The big money will get the headlines, but the real action, for anyone who has the sense to look, will be with small investors backing new market uncertainty." ~@ganeumann
Venture capital is dead (again). More money is being raised by fewer investors. So far in 2026, funds over $1 billion have taken 72% of all venture money raised. Last year it was 34%. Ten years ago, it was 16%. Even firms famous for staying small, like Benchmark and Union Square Ventures, have caved. Benchmark’s five partners raised $425 million in 2024. This June, they raised $2 billion. When a fund has too much money per partner, they are forced to cope by either making bad deals or by taking on less uncertainty. The former is bad business, the latter is not venture capital. The last time this happened was the 1980s. A decade when money per venture investor tripled, median returns fell from above 30% to 8%, and firms moved into buyouts and rollups. Even Sequoia dabbled in LBOs. By 1994, Marc Andreessen called Silicon Valley “dead in the water.” In his latest essay, Colossus contributing editor @ganeumann explains what happened next, what’s likely to happen now, and which firms are best placed to win. colossus.com/article/venture…

“Venture capital did not die for good after the 1980s, and it won’t this time either. The big money will get the headlines, but the real action, for anyone who has the sense to look, will be with small investors backing new market uncertainty.” colossus.com/article/venture…

I've got some wonderful news to share: EMPEROR OF NOTHING just came in at #8 on the @latimes non-fiction bestsellers list! Plus: @EW has a new story drawn from the book about the actors considered for George, Kramer, and Elaine. ew.com/larry-david-reveals-a… Thank you SO SO MUCH to everyone reading and sharing the book! #EmperorOfNothing #LarryDavid #Seinfeld #CurbYourEnthusiasm

Great post by my friend @ganeumann ! And feeling great about our focus at @crv as one of the few remaining firms focused on early stage. colossus.com/article/venture…

"If history is any guide, smaller funds dedicated to embracing uncertainty are the ones to watch."
Venture capital is dead (again). More money is being raised by fewer investors. So far in 2026, funds over $1 billion have taken 72% of all venture money raised. Last year it was 34%. Ten years ago, it was 16%. Even firms famous for staying small, like Benchmark and Union Square Ventures, have caved. Benchmark’s five partners raised $425 million in 2024. This June, they raised $2 billion. When a fund has too much money per partner, they are forced to cope by either making bad deals or by taking on less uncertainty. The former is bad business, the latter is not venture capital. The last time this happened was the 1980s. A decade when money per venture investor tripled, median returns fell from above 30% to 8%, and firms moved into buyouts and rollups. Even Sequoia dabbled in LBOs. By 1994, Marc Andreessen called Silicon Valley “dead in the water.” In his latest essay, Colossus contributing editor @ganeumann explains what happened next, what’s likely to happen now, and which firms are best placed to win. colossus.com/article/venture…

This article is so amazing. I had no idea that venture funds (including Sequoia) were doing LBOs in the 1980s. colossus.com/article/venture… @ganeumann is one of my favorite venture thinkers!

One of the best thinkers about vc @ganeumann
Venture capital is dead (again). More money is being raised by fewer investors. So far in 2026, funds over $1 billion have taken 72% of all venture money raised. Last year it was 34%. Ten years ago, it was 16%. Even firms famous for staying small, like Benchmark and Union Square Ventures, have caved. Benchmark’s five partners raised $425 million in 2024. This June, they raised $2 billion. When a fund has too much money per partner, they are forced to cope by either making bad deals or by taking on less uncertainty. The former is bad business, the latter is not venture capital. The last time this happened was the 1980s. A decade when money per venture investor tripled, median returns fell from above 30% to 8%, and firms moved into buyouts and rollups. Even Sequoia dabbled in LBOs. By 1994, Marc Andreessen called Silicon Valley “dead in the water.” In his latest essay, Colossus contributing editor @ganeumann explains what happened next, what’s likely to happen now, and which firms are best placed to win. colossus.com/article/venture…

Here's what happened the last time venture capital turned into an arms race, like it is today. "In 1982, the median IRR was above 30%; it slid to about 8% by 1988."
Venture capital is dead (again). More money is being raised by fewer investors. So far in 2026, funds over $1 billion have taken 72% of all venture money raised. Last year it was 34%. Ten years ago, it was 16%. Even firms famous for staying small, like Benchmark and Union Square Ventures, have caved. Benchmark’s five partners raised $425 million in 2024. This June, they raised $2 billion. When a fund has too much money per partner, they are forced to cope by either making bad deals or by taking on less uncertainty. The former is bad business, the latter is not venture capital. The last time this happened was the 1980s. A decade when money per venture investor tripled, median returns fell from above 30% to 8%, and firms moved into buyouts and rollups. Even Sequoia dabbled in LBOs. By 1994, Marc Andreessen called Silicon Valley “dead in the water.” In his latest essay, Colossus contributing editor @ganeumann explains what happened next, what’s likely to happen now, and which firms are best placed to win. colossus.com/article/venture…

I love reading @ganeumann This time on the changing world of venture
Venture capital is dead (again). More money is being raised by fewer investors. So far in 2026, funds over $1 billion have taken 72% of all venture money raised. Last year it was 34%. Ten years ago, it was 16%. Even firms famous for staying small, like Benchmark and Union Square Ventures, have caved. Benchmark’s five partners raised $425 million in 2024. This June, they raised $2 billion. When a fund has too much money per partner, they are forced to cope by either making bad deals or by taking on less uncertainty. The former is bad business, the latter is not venture capital. The last time this happened was the 1980s. A decade when money per venture investor tripled, median returns fell from above 30% to 8%, and firms moved into buyouts and rollups. Even Sequoia dabbled in LBOs. By 1994, Marc Andreessen called Silicon Valley “dead in the water.” In his latest essay, Colossus contributing editor @ganeumann explains what happened next, what’s likely to happen now, and which firms are best placed to win. colossus.com/article/venture…

Excellent article once again from @ganeumann. "Venture is Dead (Again)" colossus.com/article/venture…

The Larry David biography is an absolute masterpiece of a book. I could not recommend it more

Great read from @ganeumann yet again. One of the few people who seems to understand what is happening to venture and the technology industry. cc @Nicolas_Colin
Venture capital is dead (again). More money is being raised by fewer investors. So far in 2026, funds over $1 billion have taken 72% of all venture money raised. Last year it was 34%. Ten years ago, it was 16%. Even firms famous for staying small, like Benchmark and Union Square Ventures, have caved. Benchmark’s five partners raised $425 million in 2024. This June, they raised $2 billion. When a fund has too much money per partner, they are forced to cope by either making bad deals or by taking on less uncertainty. The former is bad business, the latter is not venture capital. The last time this happened was the 1980s. A decade when money per venture investor tripled, median returns fell from above 30% to 8%, and firms moved into buyouts and rollups. Even Sequoia dabbled in LBOs. By 1994, Marc Andreessen called Silicon Valley “dead in the water.” In his latest essay, Colossus contributing editor @ganeumann explains what happened next, what’s likely to happen now, and which firms are best placed to win. colossus.com/article/venture…

I couldn’t agree more and loved your piece. Last week, I shared some brief thoughts on this trend and my approach to it
Adam Besvinick @Besvinick Nov 3 Pre-seed Investing in the Age of Consensus Six months ago, I ended a post with this: a disciplined, right-sized pre-seed fund isn’t playing a dead game. It’s playing a different one, and it still works. Since then, it feels like the venture