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Stefan Soesanto11,267 posts
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Stefan Soesanto

@iiyonite

Lecturer @hslu, Computer Science and Information Technology // Former @CSS_ETHZurich/@ETH, @ECFR, @Pacificforum // all cyber op flavors, IW, CEMA, space 🃔

◷ Joined October 2013▧ 1,293 Photos and videos
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Stefan Soesanto@iiyonite·Oct 8

My latest for @lawfare on the "Cyber Corps: Ukraine's least understood cyber actor." "By the summer of 2024, the Ukrainian military intelligence service (GUR) was one of the closest-watched actors in the Russia-Ukraine war. News outlets reported extensively about the service’s maritime drone campaign against Russia’s Black Sea fleet and drone strikes against Moscow’s strategic early-warning radar network. At the same time, the GUR had begun to self-attribute its offensive cyber operations, an unusual departure from the traditional secrecy of other intelligence services. Yet, on July 1, 2024, another development connected to the GUR passed almost unnoticed. A small band of hacktivists calling themselves the Cyber Corps (Кіберкорпус) quietly appeared on Telegram, claiming the group “was created by officers of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense.” Whether the Cyber Corps is genuinely affiliated with the Ukrainian military intelligence service cannot be answered definitively. But a series of indicators and circumstantial evidence suggest some form of organizational relationship. To date, the GUR has neither endorsed the Cyber Corps’ claim that GUR officers created it, nor repudiated the corps’ claims taking credit for cyber operations the GUR officially conducted. Curiously, the Cyber Corps’ distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) activities also increasingly overlapped with, and ultimately led to the absorption of, parts of the IT Army of Ukraine." Link: lawfaremedia.org/article/the…

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Stefan Soesanto@iiyonite·15h

Known statistical blind spot: We barely measure how often we take down our own infrastructure.

Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton says NSA outage caused by the agency applying software patches for vulnerabilities discovered last month that affected a large swath of the internet: cnn.com/2026/11/17/politics/…

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Stefan Soesanto@iiyonite·Nov 17

And so it begins... Just remember: There is no evidentiary attribution standard Paris has to clear. I highly doubt that no matter how weak or strong France's evidence might be, none of the 26 member states will deny Paris its push for Iran sanctions. politico.eu/article/france-p…

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⟳ Stefan Soesanto retweeted
BRAVE1@BRAVE1ua·Nov 16

“I’ve never been approached by a service member asking to develop a drone with AI built in. The job is to identify and solve practical problems”, a Brave1 representative told NBC News. Brave1 supports Ukrainian developers building AI-driven solutions, including Clarity AI and Dwarf Engineering. The task is not to replace humans, but to make their work simpler and less dangerous. @NBCNews takes a closer look at how this shift is unfolding in Ukraine. Article in the first reply👇

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Stefan Soesanto@iiyonite·Nov 14

In cases you are interested in parts of my longer answers (This was before the French attribution statement came out): Several threat actors have previously demonstrated an interest in sabotaging refrigeration systems. But none have mounted a cross-border campaign that systematically used defrost functions, manipulated temperature settings, suppressed alarms, and locked operators out of refrigeration controllers (ransom-isac.org/blog/the-cop…). The current campaign in Europe is considerably more elaborate and carefully planned than anything we have seen prior, and is primarily targeting Danfoss and Copeland/Dixell refrigeration controllers (cert.cyber.gouv.fr/alerte/CE…). (Note: It is still unclear whether the attacks in Europe and those against US military commissaries (signalandsilence.substack.co…) are connected, were carried out by the same threat actor, and whether the full range of techniques observed in Europe was also used in the US). (Anonymous) For example, shortly after the Russian invasion in February 2022, a threat actor suspected to be affiliated with Anonymous accessed a Danfoss controller at Russia's Selyatino Agricultural Hub. He changed the temperature settings from −24°C to +30°C which threatened to spoil around 40.000 tons of frozen meat and fish products (asorps.ru/novosti/news_post/…); Danfloss itself noted in its October 2025 Tech Insider Newsletter that “sixteen [Russian] supermarkets using AK SM 800 were targeted by cyberattacks at the start of the war. The hacker group Anonymous publicly encouraged disrupting Russian infrastructure” (assets.danfoss.com/documents…, p. 9). (Iran) The same Danfloss newsletter also notes that in 2022, “forty stores were hacked [in Israel]. All affected stores lacked proper firewall or VPN protection, and all used AK SM 800. Only the SM800 was affected” (assets.danfoss.com/documents…, p. 9). Noam Rotem and Ido Kenan published a piece back in August 2023 that looked into the hacking and shutdown of industrial refrigerator systems at a Shufersal supermarket in Tel Aviv (cybercyber.co.il/?p=2166). The investigation did not identify the manufacturer of the compromised refrigeration controls, so a connection to Danfoss or Copeland remains unconfirmed. In May 2026, Profero investigated an attack on an Israeli food-production facility and attributed it with high confidence to the IRGC-linked Cyber Isnaad Front. The attack involved wiper malware and compressor damage, with no identified Danfoss or Copeland equipment (profero.io/blog/war-between-…). NPR talked to Profero’s CEO Omri Segev Moyal last week and he of course was confident that the recent refrigerator attacks in the US and Europe were conducted by the Cyber Isnaad Front as well (kbia.org/2026-11-03/a-new-co…). (Russia) In November 2024, the pro-Russian hacktivist group CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR)/Z-Pentest, compromised a meat-processing facility in Los Angeles and shut off its refrigeration, spoiling more than 2.000 pounds of meat and triggering an ammonia leak to force an evacuation (regmedia.co.uk/2025/12/10/us…). Notably, the DoJ’s indictment does not identify the manufacturer of the refrigeration controls nor whether the attackers activated defrost mode. So, from a technical perspective, the recent self-attribution by NoName and Z-Pentest is unconvincing. The current attacks demonstrate a level of operational planning and familiarity with industrial refrigeration systems that we have not previously seen from these groups. Rather than simply shutting down equipment or changing temperature settings, the attackers systematically exploited defrost functions, suppressed alarms and locked operators out of controllers, potentially preventing intervention while refrigerated goods deteriorated. The Copeland incident also involved hundreds of parameter changes across dozens of devices within minutes, suggesting a level of automation. This requires a different set of skills, including knowledge of refrigeration processes, controller-specific commands, and automated attack tooling. //////////// Supermarket refrigeration systems are/were very attractive because they are/were relatively easy to discover and access. Many controllers had/have publicly exposed management interfaces, often protected only by weak or default passwords (ransom-isac.org/blog/the-cop…). So, there is no need to even exploit any software vulnerabilities. Refrigeration systems also offer measurable physical effects, immediate visibility, and considerable media attention. One possibility could be that we are dealing with a non-political threat actor that is simply experimenting with automated attack protocols, potentially using AI tools to discover vulnerable systems, manipulate controllers and campaign across multiple countries. In this scenario, the attacks themselves are the experiment, while the public media coverage and government reactions provide the cherry on top. Alternatively, the objective could be psychological to demonstrate how unprepared businesses are and to show how governments are unable to protect everyday services. Attacks against European supermarket chains and US military commissaries could also send a broader message about national preparedness for war. If a country cannot protect its refrigeration infrastructure, how prepared is it for armed conflict at home? Another possible motive could be retaliation, particularly by Russian or Iranian actors that might be seeking to make Western populations experience some of the economic hardship they are enduring. //////////// Industrial refrigeration systems have been vulnerable for years - if not decades - largely because their security has never been a priority. Many controllers remain accessible via the open internet, weak and default passwords, and run outdated or unsupported software. Yet, attackers have rarely bothered to exploited these weaknesses systematically in a cross-border campaigning fashion. Refrigeration controllers offer limited opportunities for conventional ransomware. Similarly, isolated supermarket outages have little national-security significance. And spoiling food sends no obvious political message either. This may explain why we have not previously seen a comparable highly coordinated cross-border sabotage campaign to begin with. //////////// Currently, we are being forced to learn from our adversaries who repeatedly exploit systems that we ourselves are reluctant to touch. They are gaining practical experience in conducting cyber operations against physical infrastructure, while we largely confine ourselves to studying the consequences and issuing defensive guidance. That is not a sustainable approach for a Europe that is sleepwalking into war. Europe needs to develop its own understanding of offensive cyber operations through systematic research, realistic experimentation and sustained cyber warfighting exercises, rather than waiting for adversaries to demonstrate what is possible.

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⟳ Stefan Soesanto retweeted
Eugene Kaspersky@e_kaspersky·Nov 10

An investigation into suspicious activity within a software developer’s network has revealed a months-long presence of the "Black Owl" (BO Team) group, involving the compromise of both development infrastructure (CI/CD) and a software digital-signature server. The attackers’ likely intention was a supply-chain attack. Details can be found in the report by our ICS CERT team: kas.pr/a2di

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Stefan Soesanto@iiyonite·Nov 9

New: U.S. spy agencies have a "low confidence" judgment Iran is responsible for the cyberattacks on France's refrigeration systems, three sources tell me. Unlike France the U.S. does not pin blame on a specific group. U.S. sees Iran as leading suspect on attacks across Europe too

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Stefan Soesanto@iiyonite·Nov 9

I don't know ... the only thing that convinces me in France's attribution assessment is the infrastructure overlap to the Shahid Kaveh recon campaign in April. The rest is weak sauce. FOFA is widely available. CyberbanNews article after the fact doesn't mean much. And Farsi language traces is suggestive, but insufficient. It's also just bad practice by the French to not even state whether this attribution assessment is high, medium, or low confidence level. The publication of the attribution assessment by the French judiciary/police, foreign ministry, and ANSSI shows a whole of government approach. But what strikes me as odd is Paris' quick unilaterism. One would assume that given how widespread this campaign likely was, that the French government would coordinate a unified response with all the other affected EU countries. Instead, Paris storms ahead with its public attribution, summons the Iranian ambassador, and then wants to push for another round of EU sanctions (???) We'll see whether other EU governments will release their own attribution assessments before the EU's Foreign Affairs Council meeting on November 16. My best guess is that France will share some of its classified intelligence insights with the affected member states beforehand. If not, then this could become a rather awkward meeting for France. p.s. Foreign policy-wise it would make a lot of sense for the US administration to push out their attribution assessment - if it was Iran. This might entice its European allies to join the next stage in the war against Iran. p.s.2 I just can't shake the feeling that Paris is getting played. Source: cert.cyber.gouv.fr/uploads/C… Also, Jenna McLaughlin's Nov. 3 article is quite informative: npr.org/2026/11/03/nx-s1-602…

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Stefan Soesanto@iiyonite·Nov 6

On November 4, ENISA published a joint statement on the refrigeration cyberattacks across Europe (digital-strategy.ec.europa.e…). I was expecting some kind of threat intelligence insights, or a dedicated EU advisory, or perhaps even an example of successful cooperation. Instead, we got a statement that goes “we monitor" ... "we are aware" ... "we exchange information.” And then reminds companies of their regulatory obligations under NIS2 and the Cyber Resilience Act. But where was that sense of urgency when it actually mattered? The warning signs were public in late-August, when US military commissaries experienced suspicious refrigeration failures. A little-known independent non-cyber threat intel investigator pieced together the incidents on her Substack by using open sources and connecting the dots to known vulnerabilities (signalandsilence.substack.co…) By late September, refrigerator failures were being reported at four US military commissaries in Europe (stripes.com/theaters/europe/…). Where were the public warnings from ENISA and national cybersecurity authorities then? Where were the proactive advisories to European operators of potentially vulnerable refrigeration systems? Where was the urgency that European authorities demonstrated around PHP2Shell? (I am still waiting for evidence of anything remotely critical as refrigerators being exploited through PHP2Shell) As far as I am aware, the first targeted public advisories in Europe appeared only after French supermarkets were hit on October 11–12. This is precisely where proactive threat intelligence and early-warning capabilities should have made a difference. And now, in November, ENISA reminds companies of their obligations? How surreal is that??? Perhaps, instead of pushing out such a statement, ENISA and the national authorities ought to explain how they fulfilled their own threat intel collection and early-warning responsibilities. What did they know, when did they know it, and who did they warn? You cannot regulate your way out of this potentially massive threat intelligence failure!

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