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Ted M. Young maker of tdd.cards27,587 posts
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Ted M. Young maker of tdd.cards

@jitterted

Helping your team Make Legacy Code More Testable™️ with Refactoring and Testable Architecture. Java, Spring, & TDD. he/him. mastodon: @jitterted@sfba.social

◷ Joined September 2008▧ 442 Photos and videos
Ted M. Young maker of tdd.cards avatar
Ted M. Young maker of tdd.cards@jitterted·5h

"All [read] models are wrong, but some are useful." In other words, while no read model is comprehensive (by definition, it's a point of view, a perspective, or a slice of the overall "truth" of the system), their simplicity and disposability make them valuable. #EventSourcing

Ed Newton-Rex avatar
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Ed Newton-Rex@ednewtonrex·12h

You’ve also heard again and again that artists & writers don’t want to pour all their valuable IP, data and tacit knowledge into someone else’s model, but that hasn’t stopped you taking it.

We’ve heard again and again that enterprises don’t want to pour all their valuable IP, data and tacit knowledge into someone else’s model. They want control of their own weights.

American Economic Liberties Project avatar
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American Economic Liberties Project@econliberties·Nov 17

NEW: As Virginia hearings kick off on NextEra’s proposed $67 billion acquisition of Dominion, a new memo from @sarahmeyerhoff lays out how consolidation is driving up your utility bills. "When big utilities gobble up other utilities, competitors, or suppliers, they can subsidize and enrich these new business lines at the expense of their captive customer base."

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Lee Hepner avatar
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Lee Hepner@LeeHepner·Nov 17

Excellent ideas on what the States should do with their Meta settlement money, by former CFPB and FTC technologists @Erie and @stephtngu. Hire technologists. Create open source shared complaint infrastructure. Share investigatory resources. techpolicy.press/ten-things-…

Hedgie avatar
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Hedgie@HedgieMarkets·Nov 17

🦔Nearly 1 in 3 products Amazon promoted as Black Friday and Cyber Monday deals in 2024 and 2025 cost the same or more than they did in the month before the sale, according to a Groundwork Collaborative review of more than 350 items. About 1 in 10 were more expensive during the “sale.” My Take For a lot of people, a crossed-out price and a red “deal” tag mean they’re saving money, and Amazon knows it. About a third of the time, according to this study, they could have paid the same or less a few weeks earlier. That stings most for families who held off on a purchase to catch the sale, and there are a lot of those families this year. Some of these look like the old department store trick of raising a price in October so the November markdown looks bigger, just done at Amazon’s scale. I’m not for the government setting prices, but showing the lowest price from the past 30 days next to the discount, the way Europe does, seems fair to me. Until then, free price-history sites like Keepa and camelcamelcamel can save you from paying more for a “deal.” Hedgie🤗

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Martin Hock avatar
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Martin Hock@mnhocktweets·Nov 17

🚀 Taikai 2.9.0 is out! ✨ New architecture rules 📊 Markdown metrics reports with SVG charts 🔧 Dependency upgrades & improvements Build better architectures! github.com/enofex/taikai/rel… #Java #SoftwareArchitecture #OpenSource

Matt Stoller avatar
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Matt Stoller@matthewstoller·Nov 17

This piece by @benthompson is going viral and for good reason. It's a very well-written historical narrative of why Nvidia is a creature of U.S. strategy, and how the fall of Jensen Huang represents a fundamental break from it. It's wrong, but an important statement on just how most business leaders understand our current context. The thesis is that "Nvidia was, by the powers that be, considered a defense contractor, and Huang never adjusted." The chip industry, Thompson argues, had from its inception focused on global sales, and not being subject to government control. It was organized by venture capitalists to do so, consistent with a tradition going back hundreds of years. The sharp break to a new model model of competing with China, "pursuing the route of bans and forced compliance, instead of innovation and openness," ends American exceptionalism. That's the argument. It's wrong, and obviously so. Let me point out that the U.S. didn't set up chip fabs or any infrastructure or transfer technology to the USSR or the Eastern bloc. Why not? Well there was this thing called the Cold War. To argue that bans and forced compliance are new requires overlooking the entire history of the chip industry until 1989! The chip industry was not created by venture capitalists, it was created, nurtured, and organized at virtually every stage by the U.S. government. It was AT&T that discovered the foundational technology, and military contracts and antitrust cases mandated AT&T share those technologies with U.S. small firms for a small fee. The government then bought from those firms - Motorola and Texas Instruments are the now-famous ones. And the government was the biggest customer for all of the early years, and actively sought to have the customer base widen. The commercialization was not a result of Robert Noyce, but of U.S. policy. There were also always restrictions, and obvious ones. I mentioned the Cold War. But the transfers of technology were also government choices. You can read Alfred Chandler's The Electronic Century, but there's a reason that most of the keychip supply chain went to countries like Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, West Germany and Taiwan, who were all under U.S. military protection. There's a reason that the U.S. government created Sematech in the 1980s and threatened import quotas on Japan, and had IBM source memory from Korea. Semiconductors were *always* a strategic industry and were *always* treated as such. The other point is that the U.S. government has always treated our industries as strategic, and has always used bans and forced compliance as one set of tools to organize our industrial capacity. Alexander Hamilton laid it out his Report on Manufacturers, he did not want the U.S. to be at the mercy of the industrial powerhouse of English, and explicitly sought protection for manufacturing. Thomas Jefferson literally banned U.S. exports. High tariffs were a bulwark of 19th century industrial policy, and that's not even getting into the creation of the 20th century administrative state and very deliberate control over radio technology. The reasons for all of these controls were exposed during the pandemic, when limited sourcing over everything from chips to personal protective equipment to certain kinds of plastic to baby formula subjected all of us to meaningful risk. Are "innovation and openness" also part of that toolkit? Of course. But even those words are too flabby to even parse. Take innovation. Our laws until the 1960s made it clear that innovation in immoral devices, like gambling, was not protected by patents. We sought to channel capital into "useful arts and sciences," not *any* arts and sciences. Similarly, "openness" was useful when we needed what other countries provided, but not when it fostered risks. We were open to sending information to the USSR, we were not open to letting them build our space program because they knew how to get a man into space first. If any American policymaker or business leader prior to the 1980s had looked at Nvidia circa 2026, they would have been horrified and shocked. Ben Thompson just kind of hand waves away how we have put our entire country at risk via the Taiwan strait, or how the whole goal of the company was to coordinate a supply chain outside the control of the U.S. on something that is absolutely vital to the American way of life. We *never* would have allowed anything remotely close to that in previous eras. Thompson does argue that it was not a good idea to risk the country over Taiwan or send all those factories to China.' But that was the point of Nvidia and the entire chip strategy from the 1990s onward. You can't disentangle the two. Nvidia is the manifestation of the post-Cold War view among U.S. elites suggesting that America would always be the preeminent hyper-power and we could all just focus on getting rich with capital light cream-skimming and then go on our wellness routines. The only way anyone could see Jensen Huang and Nvidia as a great American and a great American company is if they have an ideologically driven view of U.S. history that airbrushes out how we've always dealt with domestic risk, prosperity, and production. Thompson's argument is important and well-written, because it does reflect the basic lack of understanding pervasive among so many of the talented and insightful people who have learned their trade in modern business. You can see that in the tension where Thompson does wrestle with the Taiwan problem, or the mass offshoring of factories. But ultimately he doesn't have a compelling way to understand those problems. After all, how are you going to deal with them without "bans and forced compliance"? How would anyone have stopped that mass offshoring without "bans and forced compliance"? If basic tools of statecraft to protect the U.S. people are rendered un-American, the necessary consequence is the risk built up in the Taiwan strait and the offshoring Thompson decries. It is a series of short-term sales of U.S. capacity to foreign entities, something that profits CEOs, consultants and financiers but fosters immense risk. It's not that there's a pecuniary interest among that class, it's just that it's very hard to break with the ideological system that built the success they now have. I do hope this obituary for Jensen Huang's way of doing business is an actual end of that way of doing business and a return to traditional American statecraft. Or perhaps we are too far coddled by the brief era of American hyperpower to even understand our own traditions that built it. I don't know. Anyway, the piece is worth reading.

Obituaries The demise of Jensen Huang was the end of a great many things, including Nvidia’s long-term prospects, the AI bubble, and the exceptional way in which the U.S. viewed itself in the world. stratechery.com/2026/obituar…

Basel Musharbash avatar
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Basel Musharbash@musharbash_b·Nov 16

Everyone should read this to understand our economic predicament

First of all, I'll agree with you that Jeff Bezos was good at monopolizing e-commerce and is not particularly focused or hungry when it comes to space. And throw all the strays you want at Lockheed and Boeing. Their leadership is skilled at corruption and financial engineering, not production. I always like it when you go after corporate monopolies. That out of the way, I didn't say *anyone* can shove capital at an engineering problem and solve it easily. That's obviously untrue, and I'm not going to stand behind something I didn't say. I said that applying capital and engineering to a problem leads to improvement. It does. I don't think it's easy, but it's a clear and replicable model Americans have followed for hundreds of years. There's nothing unique about the path SpaceX took to make certain launches more efficient. But just because it's not unique doesn't mean it's not a real accomplishment. Good for your team, the pride you guys feel is well-deserved. There's also nothing unique about Boeing or Lockheed being shitty; financial engineering leads to poor results and limited learning. It's downright shocking that for many years we relied on the Russians for launches, and that was a straight-up policy failure. NASA's funding of SpaceX to break that cartel was a good choice. What is historically unusual today in the U.S. is two things. One, we as a society have dramatically narrowed the set of people who can marshal capital, and most of that set are not capable of hiring and running large engineering projects. It used to be the case that capable and interested leadership was necessary to raise capital, now the qualification is simply being part of a narrow set of monopolists. Bezos spends his time on a mega-yacht staring at his wife's boob job. And hey, that's fine for him, but it's weird that such a character would have control over a space company on which he's not focused. It's a waste of large amounts of capital and a society that allows it is quite Soviet. Same with Zuckerberg dumping $80 billion into the Metaverse, Boeing and its Jack Welch-inspired mess from the 1990s onward, or Microsoft's endless attempts to make corporate America pay for variants of Clippy. We've always know the rich and famous mostly don't innovate to challenge the status quo - why would they? As Woodrow Wilson put it in 1913, "The treasury of America... depends upon the inventions of unknown men, upon the originations of unknown men, upon the ambitions of unknown men. Every country is renewed out of the ranks of the unknown, not out of the ranks of those already famous and powerful and in control." It's not, therefore, a surprise, to see stagnation in America, which is a problem you've actually highlighted. You're a bit different than the rest of the Silicon Valley set. You are interested the technology work for which you fundraise, and you can inspire engineers to do great work. And that matters. There are downsides to your choices, and I won't go into them here, but the innovation is real. My question is why innovation is not more widespread, as it used to be. It's not just the narrow set of people who can marshal capital, the other gating factor is that we have de facto limited the structure in which one can organize capital to shareholder driven financial institutions. Such corporations have their place, and always have. But to only allow that kind of structure is weird, and would have meant we never would have created the original NASA that built the foundations of our space capacity. We had a far more innovative era and much more productive set of industries from the 1930s to the 1970s, when we built most of the foundational digital and aerospace technologies. With our financier-driven model today, for instance, we never would have the free universal GPS system that we take for granted, or the nuclear submarine developed by Admiral Rickover. We may not even have the semiconductor or the laser, or perhaps those would be bottled up in some large firm, protected by a thousand IP attorneys. All of those deployments of innovative scientific and engineering capacity are a result not just of engineering prowess, but of government policy to limit the power of dominant firms who had captured the control of those technologies, or to simply empower good leadership within public bureaucracies. I'll be a bit more specific. I once got a list of antitrust cases in 1952, and here are some of the industries where the DOJ antitrust division forced an end to anti-competitive uses of patents: Electric lamps, glass bulbs, tubing, argon gas, machinery, electrical equipment, fluorescent lamps, soap and synthetic detergents, variable condensers (the tubing devices used on radios to select broadcasting stations), chlorinating equipment, braking systems, electrical equipment, powder, and paste for the detection of defects in metal parts, wrinkle finishes for paint, enamel, and varnish, latex, prismatic glassware and illuminating appliances, peach pitting machinery, fluorescent materials, metal abrasives industry, machine tools, dental impression powder, telescope grocery carts, sheet chargers used to feed sheets of metal materials to rolling mills, etc. During WWII, we also basically had the government pay to replace pretty much all of the nation's machine tools. The government also financed R&D, and was the key customer for smaller firms building out the semiconductor industry, like Texas instruments and Motorola. Those companies licensed AT&T's tech because of the 1952 antitrust consent decree that forced the telecom firm to offer nondiscriminatory licenses to all comers of all Bell Lab innovations. The result of these policy choices was a ton of innovation. We are in a very different world now. Our current policy choices on who can raise capital to control technologies and within what structures they can do so represent an ideologically blinkered approach that kneecaps innovation. Many on the right see these policy choices as virtuous and inherent. They imagine that only great men can transcend what are actually just self-imposed traps that drown the talents of most Americans. You don't see that as much in China, which has plenty of innovation. That country has many policies the U.S. used to have, such as highly competitive markets, a financial system geared to production, weaker IP, and an export-oriented currency regime. They are predatory, but very capable, precisely because they control their financiers, as America did until the 1970s. Obviously I don't endorse the Chinese state's aims or totalitarian goals, but they have learned from us what works, and we should similarly learn from them. You understand my argument, you have a lot of investments in China and have commented on the capabilities of the Chinese government and people. Today, in the West, you are one of the small number of people who can access large amounts of capital in our dysfunctional and corrupt political order, and use it to actually bend metal. Why you can do so is a separate and perhaps not as charitable a discussion, but I will leave that aside. You can also hire capable engineers and empower them. Good for you. That's hard. It's also not genius. When you had a task in which you didn't control the context - DOGE - the results were different. The actual disagreement here is the nature of how leadership happens. Many find comfort in thinking they need great men to protect them and innovate, my own view is that ordinary people, when free, can do extraordinary things. So I think we should focus on undoing the shackles - whether monopolies, excessive patent thickets, corruption, poor financial regulation - confining the American people. To put it differently, I don't think we should make it extremely difficult for competent people to raise money to do innovative things just so Zuckerberg can waste money on his dork metaverse. I'll offer one other observation. You built your career starting in the 1990s, when there was a consensus that broadly technology was a force for good. That consensus existed precisely because of the old American policies I am discussing here, and the ones currently at work in China. We didn't confine the deployment of technology to a narrow extractive set of monopolists, but broadened it and ensured that it did offer public benefits through a certain legal framework. That framework collapsed, and there are now few protections for consumers, workers, or suppliers anymore. You know this directly too, you sued Apple for its misuse of its app store monopoly power. The result of this legal collapse is that there's too much innovation around harming people and extraction, too much investment in predatory gambling systems and surveillance pricing bullshit. There are too many monopolies and too much enshittification. So the consensus that technology is a force for good is fracturing. People don't think innovation is helping them anymore. Look at the anger at data centers, no one believes AI is going to benefit them. It's a very bad thing that people think this, but it's also rational. They see how it's used for pricing bullshit and surveillance and layoffs, on the vague promise from the financiers behind it that it *might* cure cancer one day. They see the narrow control of technology as all about extraction for a dominant few. It's not the Jetson's anymore. Some neat launch innovations don't change that. Maybe the collapse of that consensus doesn't bother you, or maybe you think it can be reconstituted via the same path used to destroy it. But you should think about it, because on this consensus rests your empire. And that's not even factoring in the reality that if we regulated our systems competently, AI might actually cure cancer instead of raising the price to treat it. At any rate, my view is what makes America awesome is that we set up our institutions so ordinary people can do extraordinary things. We are all, in the end, quite ordinary, but also touched with the divine. And that includes you. So good job to your team for what they accomplished. Most of them likely know they stood on the shoulders of giants, and that they contributed to the great flow of human knowledge that goes back thousands of years.

Matt Stoller avatar
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Matt Stoller@matthewstoller·Nov 16

First of all, I'll agree with you that Jeff Bezos was good at monopolizing e-commerce and is not particularly focused or hungry when it comes to space. And throw all the strays you want at Lockheed and Boeing. Their leadership is skilled at corruption and financial engineering, not production. I always like it when you go after corporate monopolies. That out of the way, I didn't say *anyone* can shove capital at an engineering problem and solve it easily. That's obviously untrue, and I'm not going to stand behind something I didn't say. I said that applying capital and engineering to a problem leads to improvement. It does. I don't think it's easy, but it's a clear and replicable model Americans have followed for hundreds of years. There's nothing unique about the path SpaceX took to make certain launches more efficient. But just because it's not unique doesn't mean it's not a real accomplishment. Good for your team, the pride you guys feel is well-deserved. There's also nothing unique about Boeing or Lockheed being shitty; financial engineering leads to poor results and limited learning. It's downright shocking that for many years we relied on the Russians for launches, and that was a straight-up policy failure. NASA's funding of SpaceX to break that cartel was a good choice. What is historically unusual today in the U.S. is two things. One, we as a society have dramatically narrowed the set of people who can marshal capital, and most of that set are not capable of hiring and running large engineering projects. It used to be the case that capable and interested leadership was necessary to raise capital, now the qualification is simply being part of a narrow set of monopolists. Bezos spends his time on a mega-yacht staring at his wife's boob job. And hey, that's fine for him, but it's weird that such a character would have control over a space company on which he's not focused. It's a waste of large amounts of capital and a society that allows it is quite Soviet. Same with Zuckerberg dumping $80 billion into the Metaverse, Boeing and its Jack Welch-inspired mess from the 1990s onward, or Microsoft's endless attempts to make corporate America pay for variants of Clippy. We've always know the rich and famous mostly don't innovate to challenge the status quo - why would they? As Woodrow Wilson put it in 1913, "The treasury of America... depends upon the inventions of unknown men, upon the originations of unknown men, upon the ambitions of unknown men. Every country is renewed out of the ranks of the unknown, not out of the ranks of those already famous and powerful and in control." It's not, therefore, a surprise, to see stagnation in America, which is a problem you've actually highlighted. You're a bit different than the rest of the Silicon Valley set. You are interested the technology work for which you fundraise, and you can inspire engineers to do great work. And that matters. There are downsides to your choices, and I won't go into them here, but the innovation is real. My question is why innovation is not more widespread, as it used to be. It's not just the narrow set of people who can marshal capital, the other gating factor is that we have de facto limited the structure in which one can organize capital to shareholder driven financial institutions. Such corporations have their place, and always have. But to only allow that kind of structure is weird, and would have meant we never would have created the original NASA that built the foundations of our space capacity. We had a far more innovative era and much more productive set of industries from the 1930s to the 1970s, when we built most of the foundational digital and aerospace technologies. With our financier-driven model today, for instance, we never would have the free universal GPS system that we take for granted, or the nuclear submarine developed by Admiral Rickover. We may not even have the semiconductor or the laser, or perhaps those would be bottled up in some large firm, protected by a thousand IP attorneys. All of those deployments of innovative scientific and engineering capacity are a result not just of engineering prowess, but of government policy to limit the power of dominant firms who had captured the control of those technologies, or to simply empower good leadership within public bureaucracies. I'll be a bit more specific. I once got a list of antitrust cases in 1952, and here are some of the industries where the DOJ antitrust division forced an end to anti-competitive uses of patents: Electric lamps, glass bulbs, tubing, argon gas, machinery, electrical equipment, fluorescent lamps, soap and synthetic detergents, variable condensers (the tubing devices used on radios to select broadcasting stations), chlorinating equipment, braking systems, electrical equipment, powder, and paste for the detection of defects in metal parts, wrinkle finishes for paint, enamel, and varnish, latex, prismatic glassware and illuminating appliances, peach pitting machinery, fluorescent materials, metal abrasives industry, machine tools, dental impression powder, telescope grocery carts, sheet chargers used to feed sheets of metal materials to rolling mills, etc. During WWII, we also basically had the government pay to replace pretty much all of the nation's machine tools. The government also financed R&D, and was the key customer for smaller firms building out the semiconductor industry, like Texas instruments and Motorola. Those companies licensed AT&T's tech because of the 1952 antitrust consent decree that forced the telecom firm to offer nondiscriminatory licenses to all comers of all Bell Lab innovations. The result of these policy choices was a ton of innovation. We are in a very different world now. Our current policy choices on who can raise capital to control technologies and within what structures they can do so represent an ideologically blinkered approach that kneecaps innovation. Many on the right see these policy choices as virtuous and inherent. They imagine that only great men can transcend what are actually just self-imposed traps that drown the talents of most Americans. You don't see that as much in China, which has plenty of innovation. That country has many policies the U.S. used to have, such as highly competitive markets, a financial system geared to production, weaker IP, and an export-oriented currency regime. They are predatory, but very capable, precisely because they control their financiers, as America did until the 1970s. Obviously I don't endorse the Chinese state's aims or totalitarian goals, but they have learned from us what works, and we should similarly learn from them. You understand my argument, you have a lot of investments in China and have commented on the capabilities of the Chinese government and people. Today, in the West, you are one of the small number of people who can access large amounts of capital in our dysfunctional and corrupt political order, and use it to actually bend metal. Why you can do so is a separate and perhaps not as charitable a discussion, but I will leave that aside. You can also hire capable engineers and empower them. Good for you. That's hard. It's also not genius. When you had a task in which you didn't control the context - DOGE - the results were different. The actual disagreement here is the nature of how leadership happens. Many find comfort in thinking they need great men to protect them and innovate, my own view is that ordinary people, when free, can do extraordinary things. So I think we should focus on undoing the shackles - whether monopolies, excessive patent thickets, corruption, poor financial regulation - confining the American people. To put it differently, I don't think we should make it extremely difficult for competent people to raise money to do innovative things just so Zuckerberg can waste money on his dork metaverse. I'll offer one other observation. You built your career starting in the 1990s, when there was a consensus that broadly technology was a force for good. That consensus existed precisely because of the old American policies I am discussing here, and the ones currently at work in China. We didn't confine the deployment of technology to a narrow extractive set of monopolists, but broadened it and ensured that it did offer public benefits through a certain legal framework. That framework collapsed, and there are now few protections for consumers, workers, or suppliers anymore. You know this directly too, you sued Apple for its misuse of its app store monopoly power. The result of this legal collapse is that there's too much innovation around harming people and extraction, too much investment in predatory gambling systems and surveillance pricing bullshit. There are too many monopolies and too much enshittification. So the consensus that technology is a force for good is fracturing. People don't think innovation is helping them anymore. Look at the anger at data centers, no one believes AI is going to benefit them. It's a very bad thing that people think this, but it's also rational. They see how it's used for pricing bullshit and surveillance and layoffs, on the vague promise from the financiers behind it that it *might* cure cancer one day. They see the narrow control of technology as all about extraction for a dominant few. It's not the Jetson's anymore. Some neat launch innovations don't change that. Maybe the collapse of that consensus doesn't bother you, or maybe you think it can be reconstituted via the same path used to destroy it. But you should think about it, because on this consensus rests your empire. And that's not even factoring in the reality that if we regulated our systems competently, AI might actually cure cancer instead of raising the price to treat it. At any rate, my view is what makes America awesome is that we set up our institutions so ordinary people can do extraordinary things. We are all, in the end, quite ordinary, but also touched with the divine. And that includes you. So good job to your team for what they accomplished. Most of them likely know they stood on the shoulders of giants, and that they contributed to the great flow of human knowledge that goes back thousands of years.

Ted M. Young maker of tdd.cards avatar
Ted M. Young maker of tdd.cards@jitterted·Nov 16

Just discovered a small bug in my JitterTravel #EventSourced app. But it's not a bug in the code! It's what can happen without fully thinking through the dependencies that can be created between events. Hope to have time to mention it in my upcoming Ted Talks next week!

Fietser avatar
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Fietser@AmericanFietser·Nov 13

American urban infrastructure engineering is where uncontrolled design perfectly meets up with inconsiderate behavior.

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the government man avatar
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the government man@me_irl·Nov 13

posting the graph of github outages since msft acquisition again

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Simon Martinelli avatar
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Simon Martinelli@simas_ch·Nov 15

💯 My great-uncle was the director of a factory in my hometown and they were building signs and dials for watches. On the other hand my father was a craftsman and the owner of a painting business. So I know both sides very well. And therefore software development will never be a factory. martinelli.ch/not-a-factory-…