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Mona Paulsen29,056 posts
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Mona Paulsen

@loyaladvisor

Assistant Professor in International Economic Law @LSELaw. Member @TaPP_network. Editorial board @trade_review; @monapaulsen BlueSky; she/her. 🇨🇦

◷ Joined March 2011▧ 1,200 Photos and videos
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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

Until we know more, it remains to be seen whether the Reciprocity Day EO continues, like a zombie (No longer alive, but still capable of harm). But it also raises another problem: USTR needs to clarify the legal authority for its ongoing powers to negotiate.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

Actually, the new announcement suggests the potential for a new legal basis - one I am very keen to learn about. Could this be why the US had to redo its ART? I'd like to know about it, if so.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

On February 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorise the President to impose tariffs. At the time, I reviewed the messy stacking of executive orders and proclamations to try to stitch the US Government’s arguments concerning its ARTs.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

Initially, I conflated the October 2025 Framework with the newly announced Framework from November 2026. What caught my eye was that the October 2025 ART has set US tariff rates based on Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, which many may immediately recognise as IEEPA Day.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

For now, the US-Thailand Framework builds upon the existing bilateral commitments established in 1966 and and a different framework, signed in 2002, and a plan for an ART, signed in October 2025.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

In light of the ongoing negotiations, I believe USTR could clarify to Congress the statutory basis for all ARTs. Congress might deliberate on how past EOs and Proclamations resting upon IEEPA breathe life into future frameworks.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

What it suggests is that EO continues in Zombie form. No longer alive, but still capable of harm -- that its even mentioned suggests it was in play for negotiation. Which means the leverage function continues to do work.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

Overuse of a silent partner, whether junior RA or software to generate work is hard to find. But when it is found, I think perhaps editors and the academic community might want to do a better job of calling it out. Transparency as the right foot forward in dialogue on legitimacy.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

I agree with @rodrikdani conclusion that journals and professors could evaluate AI use as co-authorship. Assessments often prohibit collaboration unless specifically established.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

I think if US officials want their Canadian counterparts to align with them owing to concerns regarding coercion and supply risks then they need to do better about compromise and abiding by their FTA dispute resolution processes. And can we all stop with non-market. Be precise.

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Mona Paulsen@loyaladvisor·Nov 17

So is the big change the expansion of middle tier listings for case by case licenses? Does presumed approval still apply to the new countries, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil?

NEW: The Department of Commerce just published new AI and semiconductor export control regulations that close some major loopholes in existing export controls. The regulation includes new rules to: (1) counter Chinese smuggling of AI chips; (2) restrict Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips; and (3) block Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. These rules are a major step forward. They still contain some key gaps that need to be filled urgently in a follow-up rule, namely, they do not block Chinese companies from buying AI chips inside the United States or renting access to AI chips at US-based data centers. However, this rule will help and is the first good-faith effort to actually close loopholes in export controls in a year and a half. Hopefully more will follow. 1. Countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips. The rule expands export controls on AI chips to five new countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil. It does not block AI chip orders to these countries, but requires a US government review (unless it is a US company that meets certain requirements). This is a massively needed step. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have been the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth biggest importers of AI chips this year. The rule doesn’t cover Taiwan itself, where chip smuggling is a massive issue (exports of AI chips to China are still not illegal under Taiwanese law), and still doesn’t prevent AI chip sales to Chinese companies in the United States, which somehow remain legal. Ultimately, large orders of AI chips by untrusted companies in any country should require a license to fully combat smuggling, as Chinese companies will move to buy AI chips anywhere there isn’t a license requirement. But this is a start. 2. Restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips. The rule creates a new remote access control that restricts companies from providing Chinese companies with remote access to AI chips. It requires a US export license to provide Chinese companies with access to 12 million TPP or more (equivalent to ~200 of the most advanced Blackwell chips, or ~800 H100 chips). This applies to chips already shipped, as well as all future shipments. Some of these requirements even apply retroactively; Commerce says existing rules already barred data supplying a majority of a data center’s compute to Chinese companies, and tells companies that violated this to self-disclose. This effectively kills the business of neoclouds like Megaspeed that exist to provide remote access to large amounts of AI compute to China. The biggest gap is the remote access controls do not apply to data centers in the United States. So Chinese companies can legally train on large numbers of Blackwells at data centers in Northern Virginia. This gap should be closed immediately with a new rule that uses Commerce’s US persons authority to capture this activity. The rule also exempts recommendation algorithms, so impact will depend on enforcement. Last, new authorities included in the text of the AI Overwatch Act would strengthen Commerce's ability to enforce these controls--that bill should pass immediately. 3. Blocking Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. The rule closes loopholes in existing controls that Chinese companies are likely exploiting to illicitly make AI chips at TSMC or Samsung. Specifically, it now requires any Chinese chip designer who is seeking to make a 16/14nm or more advanced chip at TSMC/Samsung to get a U.S. export license, and restores old rules that weren’t being enforced until now that require any untrusted company anywhere in the world to get a license to make an AI chip at TSMC or Samsung. This is a significant upgrade. Overall, this is a major step forward to countering Chinese smuggling of and access to advanced AI chips. The work here is not done, as there are some critical loopholes that remain open and need to be closed in a follow-up rule (namely those related to activities inside the United States). Commerce should move extremely quickly to close these. But this is the first time in over 18 months that the administration is starting to take export controls seriously, and does represent a meaningful step forward. Last, the fact that the Commerce press release says this rule was “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council” is remarkable and unprecedented. I have never seen a BIS rule that was not written by BIS. That implies that Commerce was dragged kicking and screaming over the finish line by the White House and Treasury, and instructed to publish this rule rather than the rumored weaker one that it preferred. Remarkable.