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Stephan Berger2,622 posts
Stephan Berger avatar

Stephan Berger

@malmoeb

Head of Investigations @InfoGuardAG infosec.exchange/@malmoeb

◷ Joined October 2012▧ 1,164 Photos and videos
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Matthew Green 🌻@mgreen27·Nov 9

S5PIVOT (Qilin) reuses similar persistence to what we observed in VIPERTUNNEL. Hunt for: - a numeric scheduled task - pythonw.exe running from ProgramData with no arguments - sitecustomize .py in Lib\ loading the payload via runpy hexastrike.com/resources/blo…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Nov 2

In a recent IR case, we observed successful NTLM-authenticated Exchange Web Services (EWS) requests against an on-premises Exchange server, despite Hybrid Modern Authentication and enforced MFA. A short field note on how legacy authentication paths remained accessible and what we found during the investigation. dfir.ch/posts/field_note_mha…

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InfoGuard Labs@InfoGuard_Labs·Oct 28

#ClickFix to #Akira: a recent ransomware case began with ClickFix injected into legitimate websites. We unpack the obfuscated PowerShell, browser cache evidence and IOCs—with a #YARA rule included. github.com/ig-labs/InfoGuard…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Oct 23

New Field Note: Reconstructing an Attacker’s Workflow During a recent incident, we recovered several PowerShell scripts an attacker left behind. They revealed a surprisingly practical post-exploitation toolkit: - File-based command execution - Credential harvesting through Windows authentication prompts - Active Directory reconnaissance and remote WMI access testing - SMB share discovery and permission checks Parts of this tradecraft overlap with activity Microsoft documented in its analysis of the TerminalFix campaign, a ClickFix variant that ultimately deploys a reverse tunnel into the victim network Link: dfir.ch/posts/field_note_att…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Oct 21

My teammate @mgreen27 put together a new Velociraptor artifact to "inventory PHP installations on Windows, Linux and macOS for remediation scoping. Collect package versions, common binary/module paths and running PHP processes." docs.velociraptor.app/exchan… This might come in handy in the upcoming days 🙈

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Oct 15

Unit 42 also published their findings recently:

SEO campaign drops a trojanized MSI impersonating PuTTY that installs a Node.js loader alongside a legitimate, signed PuTTY GUI as a decoy. C2 server is resolved through #EtherHiding. Operator pushes JS for recon, exfil and live screen streaming. Details: bit.ly/4zv6omY

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Oct 15

An investigation into an EtherRAT infection revealed how a malicious MSI impersonating Advanced IP Scanner was inadvertently distributed to four endpoints through a legitimate Microsoft Intune deployment. We trace the infection from a suspicious GitHub repository to the enterprise software distribution process and show forensic artifacts that helped reconstruct the attack. dfir.ch/posts/field_notes_et…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Oct 5

Python 3.15 (the final release is currently scheduled for October 9, 2026) introduces .start files as a structured replacement for executable import lines in .pth files. A .start file in site-packages references a package.module:callable. Python imports the module and invokes the callable during interpreter startup, before the user-supplied Python code runs. From a DFIR perspective, this creates another startup artifact worth checking when investigating unexpected Python execution or persistence. A wrote a short blog post about it, with an example showcasing the technique: dfir.ch/posts/today_i_learne…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Oct 3

“Crucially, this service is configured with Before=sysinit[].target, ensuring the rootkit executes on every system boot prior to the initialization of any security tooling.” [1] This is an interesting approach, but it may be worded too generically. With DefaultDependencies=no and Before=sysinit[.]target, the malicious systemd unit is deliberately moved into very early userspace initialization. That can matter from a detection perspective: if an EDR only attaches its eBPF programs, kprobes, tracepoints, or other telemetry after its userspace service starts, the rootkit may already have loaded and established its hooks by then. But "before any security tooling" is too absolute IMO. In the analyzed unit (see blog post from TALOS), the rootkit is explicitly stating "After=systemd-modules-load.service", so kernel modules loaded through the normal early boot path may already be resident. The rootkit is using insmod to load the malicious module, and the module itself resides on disk. Plus, after loading, you face various rootkit detection techniques. Loading it before any EDR / security tooling might be the easier part of the whole "stealth" journey. [1] blog.talosintelligence.com/u…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Sep 30

My colleague @mgreen27 published velociraptor-skills, a set of reusable AI skills for DFIR with Velociraptor. These skills guide artifact selection, collection, hunting, analysis, and context management. They use a shared Python harness, vraptor, through a command-line interface rather than an MCP server or individual AI tools. The goal of using a separate harness is to optimize token use, control performance, and standardize the format of generated analysis notes. Read the full blog post here: labs.infoguard.ch/posts/ai_a…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Sep 27

This GPO-based “ransomware without ransomware” technique is pretty cool: abuse trusted Group Policy to deliver the impact, without ever dropping an encryptor on Windows endpoints. But there is something slightly amusing about framing “traditional ransomware detection wouldn’t catch this” as the big defensive challenge. By the time an attacker has domain-admin-equivalent privileges, can create and link GPOs at the domain root, turn off the firewall domain-wide, and exfiltrate data, there have likely been plenty of opportunities to detect them before the ransom wallpaper appears. Not detecting the ransomware binary isn't the same as not detecting the attack. 🙂 securelist.com/tr/payload-ra…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Sep 27

MacSync's iCloud Calendar trick is pretty cool. One MacSync downloader analyzed by Securelist contains a URL such as: https://caldav.icloud[.]com/published/... It retrieves a public .ics calendar, creates an anonymous pipe, launches zsh -s, sets the pipe as stdin, and feeds the calendar into it line by line. Most of the iCalendar content is obviously not valid shell syntax, so zsh simply produces errors as it works through it. Eventually, however, it reaches attacker-controlled shell commands embedded after the DESCRIPTION: field, and executes them. Those commands then download the next stage, again from iCloud. So, effectively, a public iCloud Calendar is being used as a trusted-hosted shell-script carrier. icloud[.]com is already listed by the Living Off Trusted Sites (LOTS) Project for malicious downloads and exfiltration, but not, as far as I can see, for this particular technique. Definitely something to watch for. Source: securelist.com/macsync-new-v…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Sep 26

As mentioned in yesterday’s post, several users downloaded a malicious installer that ultimately executed ChainScript. Part of the Hands-On Recon chain involved taking screenshots using PowerShell. The screenshot below shows the relevant code. This becomes particularly interesting from a detection perspective when PowerShell logging is enabled, and the resulting events are collected centrally. As is often the case, Elastic already has a detection rule covering this technique. It looks for PowerShell content containing: CopyFromScreen AND ("System.Drawing.Bitmap" OR "Drawing.Bitmap") A nice example of how relatively simple PowerShell Script Block Logging can expose attacker collection activity. Source: github.com/elastic/detection…

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Stephan Berger@malmoeb·Sep 25

Recently, we responded to a single-host infection that our SOC handed over to us. The user downloaded a malicious "Remote Desktop Connection Manager" - well, actually, a legitimate tool developed by Microsoft- but attackers were now misusing the brand. See the first screenshot, where the user followed a classical malvertising, landing on the site in the second screenshot. After downloading and running the installer (leading to an infection), the attackers had full access to the infected device (and leveraged that access to take screenshots via PowerShell (more on that on another tweet) and use SSH to pivot to the internal network). The RAT was ChainScript, as nicely depicted here. [1] As soon as we took over this case, we began hunting inside the network for traces of lateral movement and/or similar techniques (TTPs, IOCs). Additionally, we found 3 additional infected computers with the same malware, with infections occurring in a short time span.. which was like.. what happened here? It turns out the devices belonged to employees on the same team, and the employee who had the first infection pasted the malicious link in a Teams Chat, encouraging the rest of the team to install the same software from the same malicious site (d'oh). So the saying could not be truer: Trust, but verify. Always download trusted software from legitimate sites; as this example shows, an infection (infections!) can happen within minutes. [1] blackpointcyber.com/blog/cha…

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