
🚨 IOC ALERT 🚨 All defenders, block this now: 1688360[.]cc

Head of Security @supermetrics | Interested in building secure software and everything outdoors. @OWASP_AISVS co-lead.

🚨 IOC ALERT 🚨 All defenders, block this now: 1688360[.]cc

The dependency that you use for A/B testing has been compromised and is now delivering malware to viewers of every page of your app.

I think there’s a fundamental misconception in how the security industry talks about ARTEX, Cairn and similar offensive AI frameworks. And even reports from major security vendors keep reinforcing it. People treat these frameworks like the C2 frameworks we’ve known for years. With Cobalt Strike and others, parts of the framework were deployed on the victim’s systems. Implants, loaders, communication protocols and other implementation details provided recognizable patterns that we could write signatures for. But ARTEX and Cairn work differently. The orchestration runs on the attacker side. The LLMs, prompts, skills, tools and infrastructure are interchangeable. Change any of these components and the resulting attack can look completely different. The framework itself doesn’t define what ends up on the victim’s systems. Yes, there are a few minor implementation fingerprints, such as certain ARTEX/Norma User-Agent strings. We’ve even written rules for them. But these cover tiny parts of a framework’s functionality, not the attacks it can orchestrate. An IP address, webshell or exploit used in a campaign doesn’t suddenly become an “ARTEX indicator” because ARTEX was involved. And that’s why I find all these “ARTEX IoC collections” and “How to detect ARTEX” guides so misleading. They encourage people to think we’re dealing with another recognizable malware or C2 framework. We’re facing a different class of offensive technology, and I think many people still haven’t understood that. The detection guidance should be what we’ve been telling defenders for decades: detect malicious behavior, attack techniques and traces of compromise. There is no special defense against ARTEX. Tomorrow the same attacker could use a different framework, a different model and completely different tools. The names are disposable. The underlying attack techniques are what we need to detect.

All debts have to be paid eventually 💸
We're heading into a world where every technical debt comes due.

Engineers: I should become a plumber, I’ll be safe from AI. AI: let me do acrobatics with a John Deere.
Researchers have used reinforcement learning to teach a 5-tonne John Deere skid-steer loader to perform complex acrobatic manoeuvres autonomously. Trained in simulation and transferred to a real machine, the system can balance on two wheels, navigate rough terrain, spin, and control its bucket before landing safely. The research demonstrates the potential of AI-driven automation for heavy construction and industrial machinery. Video Credit: @leggedrobotics / @ETH Paper: wevlv.co/4kltYys #engineering #technology

Allow me to demonstrate why using CVSS to determine severity can be misleading. Each example gets more and more ridiculous. 👇 First vulnerability: Port 22 is open with SSH running. CVSS breakdown: Attack vector: Network Attack complexity: Low (just log in) Privileges required: High (requires a user account) User interaction: None Scope: Unchanged Confidentiality: High Integrity: High Availability: High Final severity: 7.2 (High)

NY Times: U.S. intelligence indicates that Jensen Huang had an affair with a spy. U.S. intelligence: She is not a spy. We do not know what you are talking about. NY Times: Well, what is a spy really anyway?


AI labs existentially depend on us buying their cyber red models, which would create a dystopian monopoly. Our only hope is Jensen Huang who supports open models and….. ohhh…. Ohhhhhhhh

As someone more worried about concentration risks than proliferation risks, and holding the belief that open models and a strong open ecosystem are a net good, I am worried about the consequences of Jensen's ouster. It plays into the hands of of people who believe themselves...

“If she’s a 10, then you’re an asset” 😂😭😂😭
Jensen Huang in the Matrix, learning how Chinese spies work Wait till the end 👀

In 1998, we at L0pht told the Senate software makers weren’t building security into products. 28 years later, users still pay for preventable flaws. Congrats to Lauren Zabierek & @boblord on launching the Software Safety Institute. Long overdue. softwaresafety.org

An investigation into a customer reveals that a senior executive is having an affair with a suspected foreign intelligence operative.

> be AI company > scrape the entire internet > ignore licenses and copyright > download millions of pirated books > use them to train frontier models > spend tens of millions buying physical books > cut off their spines > scan every page > destroy the originals > lecture everyone else about intellectual property > we are the good guys
We added two sentences to Claude Code's prompt on Opus 5.5 to steer it away from recreating someone else's specific game because using Claude to infringe IP is against our usage policy. Original games, genre games, and games built from your own designs and assets are meant to keep working. We'll continue to iterate to ensure we're striking the right balance. In the meantime, if Claude turns down something that's yours, send it my way.

A founder of a competing product has just openly accused one of your founders of actively hacking their product.

People are catching onto AI labs narrative "sorry it was the agent don't blame me"
> Railway gets caught hacking competitor's infra > “sorry, my agents accidentally did it” This is insane