
/ GitHub Connect Tokyo スポンサー様ご紹介📢 \ ZEN Architects様にもスポンサーとしてご協力いただいています! 本イベントでは、GitHubの年次開発者カンファレンスで発表された最新情報を、日本語で詳しくご紹介。 ぜひご参加ください! msevents.microsoft.com/event… 主催:日本マイクロソフト

佐藤直生 Principal Software Engineer (FDE), Microsoft 「エフェクティブ・ソフトウェアエンジニア」 link.amazon/B0dpaCEj0 「ベクトルデータベース」 link.amazon/B05voHB84

/ GitHub Connect Tokyo スポンサー様ご紹介📢 \ ZEN Architects様にもスポンサーとしてご協力いただいています! 本イベントでは、GitHubの年次開発者カンファレンスで発表された最新情報を、日本語で詳しくご紹介。 ぜひご参加ください! msevents.microsoft.com/event… 主催:日本マイクロソフト

GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol from @OpenAIDevs are now generally available in GitHub Copilot. Designed for agentic coding and code review, both models demonstrate stronger coding judgment than earlier GPT-6 models. 🌌 GPT-6.2 Astra: In early testing, it caught significantly more issues in code review than GPT-6 Astra and completed agentic coding tasks using noticeably fewer tokens. ☀️ GPT-6.2 Sol: In early testing, it caught nearly twice as many real issues in code review as GPT-6.1 Sol while keeping its findings accurate. Try both in the GitHub Copilot app, CLI, and @code. github.blog/changelog/2026-1…

Highlights from my opening of the Ignite keynote this morning on how we’re building a frontier ecosystem to turn advances in AI into real-world impact.

【最新情報をキャッチ アップ!Microsoft Ignite 2026 】 こちらのサイトでは、Microsoft Ignite で発表した最新ニュースを一挙にご紹介! 重要な発表内容をまとめて確認できます。 ぜひチェックしてみてください👀 👇最新情報をチェック! msft.it/6017xEqoP #MSIgnite

Amazing work from our partners at GitHub and all the security maintainers who worked with us. Read their story: github.blog/open-source/main…
Our national cyber defense will fall behind if we can’t run security agents 24/7.

GraphRAG Zero solves a fundamental challenge that has limited AI agents' ability to reach their full potential. It’s a technology for holistic discovery that reflects years of Microsoft research, transforming graph-based retrieval from an experimental technique into a deployable system. Optimized for real-world applications and agents, it enables organizations to explore connections across vast amounts of their own data, quickly and at low cost. It’s available now in Foundry IQ and @github’s Repo Mind Light, supporting applications from scientific discovery to repository understanding. msft.it/6017xE5xL

The evolution of GraphRAG: Advancing systems and evaluation together - Microsoft Research microsoft.com/en-us/research…
ブログ書きました: [速報]PostgreSQL互換のサーバレスでOLTPとOLAP両対応を実現する「Microsoft Fabric HorizonDB」パブリックプレビュー publickey1.jp/blog/26/postgr…

With Meta’s latest models coming to Foundry, we’re giving developers and enterprises even more choice and flexibility!
Muse Wonder, Muse Spark 1.3, and Muse Ember are coming soon to Microsoft Foundry on @Azure.

The best result doesn’t have to cost the most. GitHub Copilot Fusion chooses and coordinates models for each task, so developers on GitHub can focus on the work. On Terminal-Bench 4.1, Copilot Fusion Max achieved a 71.2% resolution rate, 5.4 points ahead of leading frontier models Opus 5.5 and Fable 5.2, while costing 88% less than Fable 5.2 and 57% less than Opus 5.5.

Introducing Copilotforce Salesforce customer context and sales workflows are coming to @MSFTCopilot and @MicrosoftTeams—where more than 400M people already collaborate Our expanded partnership with @Microsoft spans Copilot, Teams & Fabric: → Salesforce in Microsoft Copilot will help sellers prepare for meetings, spot deal risks & take supported Salesforce actions, informed by customer context, emails, meetings & shared documents → @SalesCloud in Teams will bring pipeline insights, deal alerts & supported opportunity updates into Teams, with Agentforce Coworker helping sellers delegate work & take action → Data 360 + Microsoft Fabric connect through bidirectional zero copy, so teams can access data across both platforms without duplicating source datasets → @Informatica expands its Microsoft integrations to help teams find trusted data in Copilot, build governed AI agents in Foundry & trace data lineage in Fabric @Accenture joins as Customer Zero and design and implementation partner to help shape and validate Copilotforce within its global sales organization, after scaling Microsoft Copilot to 740,000+ people See what’s new from #MSIgnite: sforce.co/4kgw4iZ

New at #MSIgnite: Microsoft Perception is generally available. Plus, ISOC in Microsoft Defender and new ways to secure agentic insiders. Here's the full security rundown: msft.it/6014xE9xI

🆕 @MicrosoftAI's MAI Code 2 and MAI Code 2 Flash are now generally available in GitHub Copilot. MAI Code 2: A powerful, general purpose coding model built to help developers get from request to result with focused responses, practical code changes, and less unnecessary back and forth. Ideal for complex tasks like deep debugging, multi-file implementation, refactoring, and repository-wide reasoning. MAI Code 2 Flash: A lightweight, cost-efficient coding model optimized for everyday development workflows. Well suited for code explanations, targeted edits, routine fixes, and rapid iteration. Try them in the GitHub Copilot app, CLI, and @code. github.blog/changelog/2026-1…

I’m incredibly proud of the Microsoft Autopilot Team. 7 months and 11 days ago our team had zero people and zero lines of code. In a short time we assembled some amazing AI builders in Microsoft to build something new. Today we are bringing the first enterprise-grade autonomous digital teammate to life. It has its own identity, email, OneDrive and works where you work. techcommunity.microsoft.com/…
ブログ書きました: [速報]マイクロソフト、コーディング用AIモデルとして高性能かつ低価格「MAI Code 2」「MAI Code 2 Flash」発表 publickey1.jp/blog/26/aimai_…

全国のお客様およびパートナーの皆様へ 先週発生した Microsoft 365 の障害により、お客様およびパートナーの皆様の日々の業務や事業運営に、多大なご迷惑とご心配をおかけしましたことを、改めまして心よりお詫び申し上げます。 本件は技術的な問題によるもので、サイバー攻撃または AI や AI エージェントに起因するものではありません。多くの Microsoft 365 サービスの前段に位置するネットワーク ゲートウェイにおいて、次の 3 つの要因が重なり、グローバル規模の障害に至りました。 第一に、特定の負荷条件下で、サーバーが過負荷となり応答不能に陥る潜在的な不具合がありました。これは、Microsoft 365 のネットワーク ゲートウェイ サーバー専用に用意した修正プログラムに起因するものです。この修正プログラムは本年 7 月から全世界へ順次展開され、3 か月以上にわたり、本不具合は顕在化していませんでした。 第二に、障害発生の約 15 時間前、Teams は、利用するネットワーク ゲートウェイを Exchange Online も利用しているプライマリ ゲートウェイへ切り替えました。これにより同ゲートウェイの負荷が増加し、トラフィックのパターンも変化しました。なお、この切り替えは、通常の運用手順に従ったものでした。 第三に、その時点で、前日に発生した別の問題により、ネットワーク ゲートウェイのサーバーの約 14% が停止していました。全体の処理能力には十分な余裕があったため、この停止だけではお客様への影響は確認されていませんでした。しかし、前述の切り替えによる負荷の集中と重なったことで、その余裕が大きく減少しました。 このように、負荷の増加とサーバー容量の減少が重なった結果、潜在していた不具合が顕在化しました。リクエストが滞留して最終的にサーバーが応答不能に陥り、障害は世界各地のネットワーク ゲートウェイ基盤へと連鎖的に拡大しました。また、通常より復旧に時間を要したのは、サービスを復旧したサーバーに、待機していたトラフィックが一斉に流れ込み、再び過負荷となったためです。当社は本不具合が原因であることを特定後、該当する処理を従来の正常な状態に戻すためのアップデートを開発し、サービスを段階的に復旧いたしました。 障害の発生以降、処理能力を増強するとともに、トラフィックのリダイレクトと接続処理に関する監視を強化しました。あわせて、影響の連鎖的な拡大を防ぐため、負荷を分散する制御策を導入しております。また、障害中に滞留したメールが配信不能として送信者に返送されないよう、メールの配信期限を延長いたしました。事後検証報告書(PIR)は、Microsoft 365 管理センターで公開しております。 お客様が当社サービスに寄せてくださる信頼に応える責任を、私たちは極めて重く受け止めています。今回の教訓を確実に生かし、再発防止に全力を尽くしてまいります。
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below. We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations. The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services. First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments. The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact. Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores. Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary’ gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts. Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own. Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States. When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive. Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units’ which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units’ are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally. Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway. Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change. After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region). The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.