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Ian Miers9,495 posts
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Ian Miers ✓

@secparam

CS Prof. Security and applied cryptography. Some highlights: Zerocash (zcash, et al. ), Zexe (Aleo, Aztec, etc ), zk-creds/zk-promises(...)

◷ Joined April 2012▧ 263 Photos and videos
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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 16

The em-dash in the new AI chip rule says the quiet part out loud: government policy has competing interests, sometimes inside one agency. Translation: “We wrote this rule to block remote chip access — our boss didn’t want it, Treasury and the NSC did, and maybe we did too."

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 11

If Telegram was encrypted, maybe Durov would have better luck getting the honeypot attention he wants.

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 10

Arguably, threshold sigs should die for blockchains, and we can use a migration to hash sigs/lattice sigs as an option to replace them with executable policies. If you assume zk proofs, which likely need to anyway, you can program more realistic policies at low cost on-chain. At the same time, we know from many of the bridge hacks that simple k of n sigs is not a major roadblock to an attacker.

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 8

Frenchman who wrench attacks gets wrench attacked again. Glock bests wrench, gendarmes best man.

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 8

Crypto is speed running the lessons of both finance and cybersecurity. Today’s lesson from the Chainalysis breach: “there’s no such thing as a NOBUS (no one but us) surveillance capability.” Chainalysis is, in effect, the blockchain search engine for banks, police, and spies. It’s used to analyze and annotate what’s on chain. Hard to know what was exposed at this point. Hopefully not much, so this is simply a warning. arstechnica.com/security/202…

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 8

quick, someone set up a commercial freezer honeypot running go.

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 6

Breaches like this are why on-chain activity has to be actually private if it touches economic reality. A few throwaway addresses or decoys don’t cut it. Bitcoin and Ethereum are Twitter for your bank account. It needs to be fixed.

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 6

The UK really doesn't like free speech. And if you think porn doesn't matter, the next thing they are coming for is VPNs. Free speech, crushed under a boot heel they are too busy l[the rest of this sentence may also be illegal in the UK].

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 3

Independent price and inflation data from Bloomberg. Would be interesting to make this cryptographically verifiable. Minimally you can commit to data as it's collected. But for prices taken off websites, you can go slightly further and get some evidence it was actually from the site via zk tls or attestations. Thanks @austincampbell finding this.

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 3

ZK-Tea: a website were verified experts in SNARKs can anonymously spill the beans on whats wrong with the benchmarks in competing papers. (note, i'm not one of the in the weeds snark experts, I just occasionally hear comments and wish this was more public because I don't always know who to believe.)

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 3

So Anthropic has a paper on SNARKs for proving the correctness of LLM inference. The idea of snarks for LLMs is that you can check a response came from the claimed model without the operator exposing the model’s weights. It's Cool work. TL;DR: it’s about 70-95x slower than their chosen baseline, which is very impressive. I’m still reading, but my biggest question is whether that overhead is really ~100x. if I spent a few million tokens’ worth of engineering effort, would the baseline improve more than their SNARK scheme? Of course, at some point this doesn’t matter. The point is cost for the capability. If you want verifiable LLM results, on a non-local model, and can’t use a TEE, is 100x overhead acceptable? Note: they do this with a mixture-of-experts model and prove after the fact, in batches, so the prover only does work for the experts that actually ran. That doesn’t seem to translate to 100 tokens/second for other models. But like I said, I’m still reading. anthropic.com/research/prova…

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 2

Phone rings. Employee: “Hello?” Caller: “Is your freezer running?” Employee: “Yes.” Caller: “Then you’d better catch it. This is the Computer Emergency Response Team.”

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 1

Zcash cannot become a science fair project or a governance fair project. The point is privacy. This was true in 2018, when I said it at Zcon0 and it's true today. We still have science fair ideas from folks who should know better. And we are still trying to figure out governance, which is fine, but we should keep the purpose in mind and build something resilient. As I said at Zcon0, Zcash cannot become " a science fair project [to] ... do cool crypto for the sake of crypto. That is not the point. The point is to do privacy .... [Zcash] can't become, full lack of a better term, a governance fair project. [Zcash] is not an experiment on how you run a cryptocurrency. It's not a way to test this for other cryptocurrencies. It's not a way to indulge your fantasies about how we are going to govern cryptocurrencies. it's a means to an end. we have to build something that is actually worth governing and useful and has a functioning governance structure but the point is not the governance structure. "

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Ian Miers@secparam·Nov 1

Worth some thought of what would happen to Zcash governance and coin holder voting if a large exchange hack happens. No, it wouldn't be catastrophic. In particular, a single hack only gives a small amount of influence, but one might imagine a world of multiple hacks over a few years, at which point the vote looks way less credible. Even then, Zcash can adapt, add checks and balances, etc. So this is a serious thing to consider, but not necessarily a reason to just reject coin holder voting outright. But running the thought experiment will be useful, since it will tell folks a lot of what they want from a resilient and decentralized governance mechanism. For example, it looks very different if coinholder voting retroactively decides funding prioritization vs if it’s deciding core protocol decisions.

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