
Something has bothered me for a while, and I finally built the thing that fixes it. In security work, "we fixed it" is almost always an assertion. A bug gets found. A patch gets written. Someone reviews the diff, nods, and says it looks right. Maybe a re-audit happens. Then everyone moves on and the fix becomes a line in a report. But notice what usually does not happen: nobody takes the original exploit, runs it again against the patched code, and proves the specific thing it did no longer happens. We reason about fixes. We rarely re-run them. That gap has consequences. A patch can look correct and miss the actual path. A patch can close the hole and quietly break legitimate use at the same time. A patch can work for the wrong reason. All three happen, and a diff review catches none of them reliably, because reading code is not the same as executing it. So I built ExploitLens. You give it three things: a real exploit, the commit it worked against, and the commit meant to stop it. It replays the exploit against both commits under identical frozen inputs, using real Foundry execution, not a simulation of execution, the real thing. Then it aligns the two call trees semantically and finds the first causal divergence: the exact call where the two runs stop agreeing, which is where the prohibited effect stops being reachable. It also runs a third phase that I think matters more than people expect. It checks that legitimate use still works at the patched commit. A patch that stops the exploit by breaking the contract is not a fix, and if you only test the exploit you will never notice. The output is a Fix Receipt: a schema validated evidence bundle with a hash over its own contents. Rederive the hash offline and a single altered byte fails the check. You do not have to trust me, or the tool, or a dashboard. Here is the part I care about most. ExploitLens will not tell you a contract is secure. No replay can establish that. It cannot tell you no other vulnerability exists, because it never went looking. It will not give you a verdict without a reproduction, and when a gate fails, the failure stays in the committed bundle rather than getting smoothed into something more comfortable. What it will tell you is narrow and provable: this exploit, against this patch, under these inputs, no longer produces this effect and here is exactly where it stopped. I would rather ship a small true claim than a large vague one. The security industry has enough green badges. for now it'll carry two cases you can click through yourself. One is a controlled reentrancy fixture. The other is a real 2022 DeFi incident TempleDAO/STAX replayed and verified end to end. Code: github.com/solutiono1/exploi… Over the next couple of weeks I am taking it further: wiring it into @Telegraphprotoc so it can buy verified on chain facts about the real incident, instead of assuming its local reproduction matches what actually happened. A local proof is only as good as its connection to reality, and that connection has to be bought, not assumed. I will be posting the build as it happens including the parts that break. If you do security work, or you have opinions about what a fix should have to prove before anyone calls it fixed, I want to hear them.







