As painful as the next months will be and as new as this deluge is to many, this is decidedly a healthy thing and good in the long run. There is light at the end of this. 🙏
Code lives much longer than anyone ever intended. Part of the reality is new tools for identifying risk become available and force revisiting that old code and making it better in the face of bad actors. The new tools are always a step function in discovery. As Stephen J Gould wrote, "change happens in long periods of stability (stasis) interrupted by short, rapid bursts of major transformation."
We are in the midst of such a major transformation.
This is not unlike other engineering where a significant (negative) event happens that forces a review of procedures and architectures that were thought to be reliable. The first time going through this is extraordinarily difficult. But in the end, "to engineer is human" as the wonderful Henry Petroski wrote in describing this cycle of learning from the discovery of failure.
The internet has been through these crises of architecture before. The volume seems to double each time and the amount of work rises at least as much. This is a direct result of the internet itself—connecting everyone and every device means everything that happens, good or not, happens at twice the scale and half the time as it did before.
🙏🙏🙏
3% of “critical” software security bugs, in all of recorded history, have been found in the last month.
This is on pace to find another ~100,000 bugs this year alone, adding ~26% more vulnerabilities to the all time total
Do you realize how fucking insane that is?
David George @DavidGeorge83 21h Article The Boring Company & the Future Underground Ask Steve Davis when he plans to retire as the CEO of the Boring Company, and he’ll tell you: “the day I can commute from D.C. to Vegas in half an hour.” D.C. and Las Vegas are about 2,100 miles
“We have no indication, no evidence, and no reason to believe at all that any of these incidents are related to each other. In essence, the Microsoft incident has nothing to do with what we saw with the FAA. The FAA has nothing to do with what we saw with the banks a few days ago. These issues that we've seen from a technical standpoint are completely unrelated one from another. That is what we have seen. That's what all the evidence indicates. That's what all our information indicates. And to this point, we have absolutely no reason to believe otherwise that these things are related in any way,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaking about the recent wave of technical glitches and incidents at major institutions across the United States.
Senator Sanders @SenSanders I am a surgeon This is the MOST IMPORTANT chart in American healthcare.
Since 2000, hospital prices are UP 281%. Number one on the chart. Above college tuition. Three times inflation.
Now ask yourself: is your care three times better than it was in 2000? Shorter waits? More time with your doctor? Easier to get an appointment?
You know the answer. You PAID 281% more for 15-minute visits, a six-week wait for a specialist, a portal instead of a phone number, and a different doctor every time. The money went somewhere. It didn't go to the room you were in.
Here's where it didn't go. Medicare's payment to the physician over the same 25 years: up 7%. Inflation: up 93%. Adjusted for the cost of running a practice, that's a 33% cut. Every other line on this chart rose. The one for the person treating you went backwards.
So what inflated? The building. Hospitals started buying doctors' practices. Same visit, same doctor, same room, now with a "facility fee." Medicare pays more, your insurer pays more, your copay goes up. The care got worse & so did the invoice.
Then they merged. One system buys the hospital across town, the next county, the next state. Insurers can't drop them, so they pay whatever's asked. RAND found consolidation raises prices with no improvement in quality & Sometimes even worse quality.
And the backwards doctor line is the fuel. An independent practice can't survive a 33% real cut. It sells to the hospital. Now that doctor sees 28 patients a day on a quota, with an administrator deciding what gets ordered. The 281% grows by eating the doctor.
Look at the bottom of the chart. TVs -98%. Software -73%. Cellphone service -44%. Everything with real competition got cheaper and better. Everything that consolidated into a few giants got more expensive and worse.
"Nonprofit" hospitals? Many are. Nonprofit means no shareholders. It doesn't mean no surplus. The surplus goes to the next acquisition, the next tower, the next executive.
This is corporate medicine on a graph. Not greedy doctors. The doctor line went backwards. It's the building that got expensive, and it's the building that decides how long you wait.
Next time someone blames your doctor & the no surprise act for the cost of healthcare, send them this chart and ask one question:
Which line is the doctor on?
Chart: @Mark_J_Perry@SenWarren#MedicareForAll
Real-time Visibility. Agentic Defense. 🛡️
At #TaniumConverge, Matt Quinn and Harman Kaur showed Atlas stopping a threat, collecting forensics and isolating hosts, with your approval, plus a preview of AI agent controls.
Explore Atlas today: tanium.com/platform/tanium-a…
NEWS: Wall Street execs and NSA have told Congress that outages were caused by patching vulnerabilities identified by AI models, sources say
AI did not cause outages but found so many issues that the rush to fix them before an attack overwhelmed systems
washingtonsun.com/technology…
Coincidences Magnified - Are We Under Attack?
I will preface this with the humility that I might be totally wrong and all these recent events really are some type of coordinated cyber-attack, although I would say if it is it’s all rather pointless and unfocused. But, I doubt this is really an “attack” in any way. However, just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean that they are not really out to get you.
No, the most likely explanation of what is going on is:
1. Fragility of increasingly large-scale and under-maintained, complex and brittle infrastructure.
2. Our increased digital dependence such that when these events happen we notice them more.
3. A few independent incidents coincidentally occurring together which causes the media and the rest of us to be more attuned to other outages that would normally go unreported, that we now bucket into some mythologized growing category.
4. Lack of resilience in the presence of failures so that their impact is longer-lasting and more impactful.
Let’s pick on a few of these. First, independent occurrences of events that seem to be connected. One example I remember was a day many years ago when the New York Stock Exchange was down for the day (software error), a US airline was ground stopped (hardware event), and on the same day a bunch of major bank CISOs, including me, were going into the White House Situation Room for a totally unrelated threat briefing (we had to hide from the White House Press Corp in case that was further coincidental evidence of “attack on America”.) After this I looked at what else happened that was unreported that day and there were dozens of other unrelated outages at hospitals, power plants, and so on. Perhaps even more happened that one day than has been happening this past week. It just went unreported.
Second, do we have any base rate data to understand if what of anything that has happened is actually so unusual or surprising? [Note: something being unsurprising doesn’t mean it’s acceptable, in fact we want such events to become ever more surprising of course].
- Microsoft outage: yes, this was unusually big, but a Microsoft outage isn’t a new occurrence. (Other large-scale tech providers have outages also, to be fair to Microsoft).
- FAA outage: maybe this was a minor change to one of 1000’s of cables that had previously been fine that had some weird accidental effect they’d not seen before hence this wasn’t the situation of “why do a production change on a Friday?” Organizations do changes all the time that they think are distant from impact risk. Perhaps this was like that. But it does seem their network should not have been so brittle in the face of this. I guess we will find out.
- NSA Net outage: do you know how many times NSA Net goes down per year? I don’t. But perhaps NSA Net isn’t a literally 100% available system (most things aren’t [literally], even stupendously critical things), so perhaps this was still within their four or five 9’s SLO. Perhaps it goes down several times a year but we just don’t normally hear about it. I don’t know, most of everyone else doesn’t either.
The list could go on.
The thing that should be disturbing to us though is the point on resilience.
I really worry when things like this happen together or in isolation and our response is: “This [bad thing] must never happen again.” and the organizations involved, sometimes when compelled to, make that system less likely to break. Then we build up more dependence on it, but again it will inevitably break in some new way for some other reason and the damage will be bigger because that increased confidence induced more dependence, because we all said “this must never happen again.”
The real lesson here is that we need to not just build resilience to failure in specific components but resilience in the overall “system”, like let’s always assume FAA comms may go down albeit at some increasingly low probability and have a true back-up emergency communications approach to at least sustain some operations. Maybe they’re working on this, I don’t know. And make sure that critical industrial systems don’t depend on alerts only being delivered by cloud-based email.
I’ll start where I began. It will be darkly funny if I’m wrong and this really is a set of related attacks. But when you look at how much breaks regularly everywhere all the time, I doubt it.
The actual need here is to reduce brittleness and increase resilience on the assumption that everything will always fail in some way at some time.
When you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras.
The question of the past 5 days is whether near-simultaneous system outages across infra, transportation, communications, etc. are horses or zebras.
Enough people on many sides of these issues (defense hawks, anti-AI, doomers, anti-tech, IT people, etc.) can find their own common threads across MSFT, FAA, United, Chase, NSA, AAPL and turn them into a theory. Depending on your perspective it explains things or seems like a (wild) conspiracy.
If you're looking for horses, the common thread is approaching the classic system lockdown of pre-Thanksgiving through end of January. It would be very straight forward to explain all of these as just gearing up for that travel/retail/operational load and lockdown.
The AI line through this is two-party.
First, that many vendors (and OSS projects) have been using AI to find potential vulns and patch them. It is reasonable to assume the volume of patches has increased as the find rate has and the knowledge that once found in-house they were found outside. The volume of these fixes is likely stressing systems and so compatibility or breadth testing might not be a higher priority than getting fixes out there even if they break stuff.
Second, the client/customer side of this should be (but might be) also using AI to test their infrastructure. They are likely finding many configuration holes in networking and permissioning. Changing these is always non-zero risk even in the best of times and trying to push those through before next week is a must do knowing again that adversaries are also looking and downtime during the holiday is a true disaster. In addition, the patches from vendors are being applied in essentially real time. There's no other choice as the patches coming out now lack the time and pacing to obscure what they are fixing making them information rich for bad actors.
Neither of these preclude being closer to zebra hoofbeats—meaning adversarial attacks. The zebra scale can be anything from a single coordinated actor to literally a bunch of people all with the same tools pointed at different targets. The latter is possible because these tools all make it to all the curious/bad actors at the same time. That was the Friday FBI warning (ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf). It is not much of a reach to think independent actors all started testing this out. Apple, Microsoft, Chase are obvious kinds of targets for stuff like this. But realize those are also exactly the entities moving quickly to get to a patched and locked down state.
The most common thread is that all the systems are big and complex with the fragility primarily driving not by "bugs" in layers of the code but by configurations and permissioning that are extremely difficult to test and get right, and also very rarely reproducible by any vendor in the mix. This can broadly be called a challenge with legacy or just big systems.
Overlay the new reality that AI is in fact driving which is an increased pace of identifying, fixing, and deploying code changes. We are collectively going to go through many more system downtimes than previously experienced until the technology stack (IT people and infra) get better at this new speed. This is exactly what the industry went through going through Y2K and just after with Windows XP. The past two decades, SaaS and mobile included moved at a well-rehearsed and comfortable pace. I discussed that here -> x.com/stevesi/status/2101886…
The FAA one stands out as not fitting this patten nearly as much. This one deserves more investigation because it involves new hardware. That's a known risk across all vendors but especially this type of hardware and even vendor(s).
The diversity, timing, and apparent type of complex issue point to much more classic hoofbeats. It is easy to see the timing and assume coordination but the timing can also be because of availability of tools and the holiday.
PS: CNN reporting that echo-sigma .com sales are +800%. As a prepper product of the cold-war it is fair to say that unless you've been preparing a backpack with a tube tent, multi-tool, and 3 days of life boat rations will not be of much help. Covid taught us that.
Enough debating what AI is or might become. It’s time to build on what it is today.
An AI Action Plan: 10 concrete work items for Labs, enterprises, developers, and government—security, agents, access, liability, copyright, & more.
Let’s get engineering.
So what the industry tried to warn enterprises about 6 months ago is here. The events of this week so far are not a coincidence. AI is making it easy for hackers to attack multiple customers. All incident responders are busy, unfortunately there is no silver bullet. If you haven't:
- run a multi model testing harness across your infrastructure.
- patch your code
- find virtual patching solutions for open source
When it happens, because it will. Your SOC should be ready to detect and remediate in record time. REVAMP your SOC to a real time data lake with proactive ML detectors across your data, with AI running correlation if you want a chance to come out ahead. Band-aid reactive solutions which work on multiple data lakes is not a plan.
This has been known forever—since patches. It is routine and patches are often obfuscated (by any of several methods) in attempts to reduce this risk.
Obviously new defense in depth techniques are required now as well.
Another reason to delay updates anymore, providing or absorbing.
Hackers are now using LLMs to continuously scan software updates, spot newly fixed bugs, and build attacks before teams can apply the fix — all without human involvement. That’s according to the latest report from the Google Threat Intelligence Group.
We're helping defenders counter automated threats with Google AI Threat Defense, which combines Gemini and other frontier models to find and fix flaws before attackers can exploit them.
The #FBI issued a FLASH advisory warning that cybercriminals and state-aligned hackers are exploiting ARTEX, a super intelligence-powered penetration testing framework, to automate attacks against businesses and organizations worldwide. ARTEX can accelerate intrusions from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. It was used in the October ConnectWise supply-chain compromise, which exposed Microsoft 365 customer environments and involved attempted authentication against more than 2,250 downstream tenants.
The FBI is urging businesses and organizations to strengthen access controls, monitor suspicious automated activity, and report potential compromises to ic3.gov.
Read more here: ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf
The Financial Times acknowledges that the ouster of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang is a massive blow to the open-source community.
This is a victory for the aspiring monopolists at Anthropic and OpenAI, which have been lobbying the US government to restrict Chinese open-source models -- exploiting "national security" rhetoric to try to ban their main competitors.
Link: ft.com/content/418ca885-fbcf…
The reason the SRG is tasked with counter terror and protest response is because the two roles overlap, and the mayor knows it.
The SRG isn’t just a bunch of officers in riot gear who show up at protests. They do intelligence work, they know who the agitators and troublemakers are, and they actively prevent protests from turning into riots.
For this reason, the chaos agents at the DSA, Mamdani included, have wanted to eliminate the SRG from the minute it was created. These people want to be able to instigate riots and chaos at will, and the SRG stood in their way.
Keep in mind these are not just ‘protesters’. These are highly organized, heavily funded networks that exist to undermine and destabilize our world.
They keep enemies lists, including the names and addresses of police officers and their families, so-called ‘zionists’, politicians, and activists. In fact, my name and addresses of my family have been found circulating on these DSA/antifa group chats as well.
To be clear, they are terrorists.
And the SRG was our primary line of defense. Without them, absolutely nothing is preventing Paris-style revolutionary riots from breaking out in our city. In fact, that is very likely the ultimate goal here.
Replacing the SRG will be a civilian unit largely comprised of DSA activists who will police their own comrades. Which is to say, give them free rein to sow chaos and riot at will, while providing official cover for their criminal actions.
Once again Zohran is showing his true colors. He’s a radical revolutionary hiding behind TikTok videos and a fake smile.
Senator Sanders @SenSanders I'm a surgeon. Let me tell you what Medicare for All means from inside the operating room.
Medicare already pays doctors 33% less than it did in 2001, adjusted for the cost of running a practice. It cut us again for 2027.
Third year in a row.
That one payer is why private practice fell from 80% of doctors to less than 20%. Why your doctor now works for a hospital system with a quota. Why I spent six hours last Friday trying to get one patient seen.
Medicare for All takes the payer that did that and makes it the only one. Nobody to negotiate with. Nowhere else to send the patient. One rate, set in Washington, for every surgeon in America.
CBO looked at it. Their words: demand for care would rise faster than the supply of doctors and hospitals. Universal coverage is not universal access. A card in your wallet is not an appointment.
And the 68,000 deaths? That's a computer model, not a body count. Here's a number that isn't a model: Medicare Advantage denied 200 of 207 of the sickest patients at one hospital system last year. Government-contracted. Government-paid.
I'm not defending insurance companies. I've spent two weeks on this feed showing what they do. But the answer to a bad insurer isn't one insurer with no competition and a 33% pay cut baked in.
The answer is a system where the doctor can still say "send her to me." Medicare for All is the last system where that's possible, and the first where it isn't. @Doctor4Patients#MedicareForAll
At a time when 68,000 people a year die unnecessarily because they can’t afford to get to a doctor on time, we need to develop a sense of urgency.
Healthcare is a human right. We must pass Medicare for All.