Our team at @DecryptAds is out today with our first report, which we’ve been working on for months. The research is focused on AI slop recipe and cooking websites, the fake chefs who supposedly run them, and the Russian and Chinese ad tech companies integrated into the sites..🧵
In the age of AI and everyone and their dog trying to execute complex supply chain attacks on websites, more folks need to be thinking about CSP's and how to deploy them in sophisticated ways.
Check out Krebs' most recent piece @ krebsonsecurity.com/2026/11/…
For publisher websites, since ad tech allows advertisers to bring an "attribution partner of their choice" to execute JS after the ad loads, & since it's almost unheard of for publisher sites to properly use Content Security Policy response headers, we get malicious ad redirects.
...to collect victim data or trigger their exploits against users. But if your website had a CSP and the attacker domain was not on the CSP list, then the domain wouldn't be able to execute JavaScript and most attacks would essentially be stopped in it's tracks.
A Content Security Policy (CSP) is essentially a list of domains which are authorized to execute JavaScript on your website. This is the list of partners you "know and trust" and if one of those partners suddenly gets compromised, most attackers will need to use a new domain...
...so that when you load the website you're given let's say the mobile version logged into your account instead of the desktop version and not logged in. Request/Response headers can have defenses in them, both for the server/website and the end-users loading that website.
Content Security Policies are response headers sent from servers, when you load a website, things like your user agent, cookies, other details get sent as request and response headers -- basically bundling up all the details...
That being said, and I'm extremely grateful to @briankrebs for not only covering one 'modern' defense for these types of JavaScript supply chain attacks: something known as a "Content Security Policy" response header, but also giving us new context from @reporturi about it..
All this to say, when an a/b testing platform has a supply chain attack, there's typically not much between that piece of code and end-users visiting your website, and so fortunately yesterday's attack was very short-lived.
a/b testing code deploys oftentimes outside of consent dialog flows because in order for an a/b test on a page to not have a weird white page flashing experience, the first paint load needs to be the variation being served.
Some folks may know that I use to deploy Optimizely (big fan) and I worked with tons of a/b testing tools when I was doing consulting work and rebuilding analytics stacks. The way these are deployed, they typically are one of the first snippets of code to render on a page...
Before I share some thoughts, here's @briankrebs newest piece with a cheeky headline "Attackers Used Optimizely to A/B Test Malware on Top Websites" krebsonsecurity.com/2026/11/…
Another week, & another JavaScript supply chain attack - this time involving an attack on Optimizely which resulted in financially motivated attackers being able to target their clients like BBC, CNN, Equifax, Ledger, Zoom & countless other folks using their a/b test software. 🧵
some really solid questions in this thread about the NVIDIA / Megaspeed debacle ⤵️🌩️⚖️
hopefully the Congressional hearings can figure out why our semiconductor national security policy the last 2 years has boiled down to, "let Nvidia to handle it"
Very, very strange statement tonight from @CommerceGov and @TheJusticeDept about Megaspeed. The facts here just don't add up, and this does nothing to explain why Commerce did not cut Megaspeed off from chips. In fact, it raises even more questions about what happened here.
BIS claims that it started an investigation into Megaspeed in 2024, and following an end-use check in June 2025 it handed off the criminal investigation to DOJ. It also said that in June 2025, Nvidia put Megaspeed on its own internal no-trade blacklist--implying this solved the issue and cut them off from Nvidia chips.
The problem with this story, is that Megaspeed kept buying chips after Nvidia put them on their no-trade list. @mackhawk reported in December 2025 that Megaspeed imported 17,544 GB300 AI chips in November 2025, worth about $787 million. There are multiple other reports that say Megaspeed continued to receive chips into 2026.
If Commerce was so concerned about Megaspeed smuggling chips to China that the DOJ opened a criminal case after an end-use check in June 2025, and Nvidia also put them on an internal blacklist, why didn't Commerce also put them on the Entity List? That is literally the entire purpose of the Entity List, to list companies in situations like this! If it had done that--and also put Megaspeed's affiliates and subsidiaries such as Speedmatrix (its Malaysian subsidiary) and PT Megaspeed International (its Indonesian subsidiary) on the Entity List--Commerce could have actually cut Megaspeed off from chips!
Instead, Commerce appears to have outsourced Entity List restrictions and export enforcement to Nvidia. That is insanely irresponsible! Does @USTreasury outsource sanctions enforcement entirely to US banks? Of course not, OFAC sanctions entities that are violating US sanctions. How is "we didn't act because Nvidia acted for us" the best defense Commerce can muster here?
And also, why was Nvidia's blacklisting action so ineffective? Did Nvidia also place Megaspeed's subsidiaries such as Speedmatrix and PT Megaspeed International on its blacklist? I would bet they did not! If they kept shipping to them after blacklisting Megaspeed, that would be very concerning. What is the point of Nvidia blacklisting Megaspeed if they continue to allow their chips to be shipped to Megaspeed's subsidiaries in Malaysia and Indonesia?
It's hard to decide who screwed up more here, @CommerceGov or Nvidia. Just a total failure all around. How could both sides have agreed that Megaspeed represented a national security risk, but completely failed to prevent Megaspeed from buying $787 million worth of chips just five months after it was blacklisted? And undoubtedly more chips in 2026.
Maybe instead of writing defensive press releases that don't add up, @CommerceGov could write a rule finally placing Megaspeed on the Entity List. But maybe they're waiting for Treasury and NSC to write that rule for them as well.
Thrilled to announce that I’ve joined @DecryptAds as COO. After years of identifying problems in ad tech, I’m proud to join a company building solutions that put the evidence in everyone’s hands. Thanks to @adexchanger/@avargasedits for the convo! adexchanger.com/programmatic… (1/4)